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Introduction:	
The	Constructed	Self	
	
	
How	close	does	man,	despite	all	his	knowledge,	usually	live	to	madness?	
What	is	truth	but	to	live	for	an	idea?	When	all	is	said	and	done,	everything	
is	based	on	a	postulate;	but	not	until	it	no	longer	stands	outside	him,	not	
until	he	lives	in	it,	does	it	cease	to	be	a	postulate	for	him.	
—	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Journals	and	Papers	
	
	
	
	 Emotions	are	such	a	ubiquitous	part	of	everyday	experience	that	they	are	often	referenced	
in	a	kind	of	shorthand	that	obscures	their	underlying	complexity.	This	can	be	illustrated	using	the	
case	of	a	person	who	encounters	a	snarling	dog	and	feels	afraid.	This	example,	or	a	similar	
variation,	is	used	frequently	by	philosophers	as	a	basic	case;	and,	indeed,	on	the	surface	it	does	
seem	like	a	very	simple	emotional	response.	But	stating	it	as	I	have	just	done	is	a	form	of	
abbreviation.	If	we	unpack	what	is	happening	in	the	situation,	the	level	of	complexity	quickly	
increases.	The	person	in	the	example	sees	the	dog:	so	far,	this	occurs	on	the	level	of	sensory	
perception,	a	complex	subject	in	and	of	itself.	The	person	further	perceives	details	about	the	dog’s	
body	language,	such	as	bared	teeth,	growling,	a	crouching	pose,	etc.	These	details	are	compared	
with	existing	knowledge	that	the	person	has	about	animal	body	language	and	are	interpreted	as	a	
threatening	posture.	Here	again,	there	is	a	complex	evaluation	of	multiple	sensory	inputs	
occurring.	In	addition,	the	person	evaluates	the	snarling	dog	as	a	possible	source	of	bodily	harm;	
this	judgment	is	based	on	stored	knowledge	of	the	physical	capabilities	of	dogs	in	general.	This	
evaluation	of	the	animal	as	a	threat	to	the	self	is	involved—in	ways	that	are	still	debated	among	
scholars—with	physiological	changes	in	the	person,	such	as	adrenaline	release,	elevated	heart	rate,	
tensing	of	muscles,	and	potentially	other	responses	that	prepare	the	body	to	fight	or	flee,	or	at	the	
very	least	keep	a	close	eye	on	the	dog.	
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	 Thus,	even	the	seemingly	simple	case	of	fearing	a	dog	involves	multiple	levels	of	
comparison,	evaluation,	and	judgment—that	is,	cognitive	work.	In	an	emotional	response,	certain	
sets	of	cognitive	operations	interact	in	ways	that	can	be	identified	as	characteristic	of	the	specific	
emotion	in	question;	this	is	particularly	true	of	more	complex	emotions,	which	may	even	involve	
other	emotions	as	subcomponents	of	the	overall	operation.	These	properties	of	emotion	are	
integral	to	the	way	human	beings	not	only	feel	but	also	think	about	a	situation.	Arrangements	of	
information	and	the	order	and	method	by	which	it	is	processed	structures	thought.		
	 The	precise	details	of	how	the	mind	functions	are	potentially	useful	for	understanding	a	
wide	variety	of	situations	that	occur	in	the	world,	but	this	project	focuses	specifically	on	a	set	of	
literary	works	operating	in	accordance	with	certain	properties	of	emotion.	For	fictional	narratives	
seeking	to	represent	human	beings	as	characters,	the	text	must	implicitly	posit	some	form	of	
mental	architecture	in	order	to	simulate	real	human	interactions.	Both	emotions	and	texts	
function	according	to	an	internal	logic.	Arrangements	of	cognitive	operations,	which	I	will	call	the	
signature	structure	of	an	emotion,	help	to	define	a	specific	emotion	and	distinguish	it	from	others	
—	what	makes	fear	fear,	or	sadness	sadness,	for	example.	A	text	likewise	has	a	structure,	which	
manifests	itself	both	through	visual	divisions	such	as	paragraphs	and	through	semantic	cues	that	
signal	how	different	parts	of	a	text	relate	to	one	another.	This	project	traces	out	structural	
similarities	between	the	thought	processes	by	which	cognitive	evaluations	are	reached	and	the	
presentational	methods	of	this	group	of	fictional	works.	The	correlation	between	narrative	
structures	in	these	texts	and	the	logical	structures	underpinning	emotions	allows	the	texts	to	
serve	as	abstract	models	for	commonly	occurring	personal	and	interpersonal	situations.	
	
	 3	
I.	Conceptualizing	Mental	Operations	
	 The	tendency	to	regard	reason	and	emotion	(formerly	often	known	as	the	‘passions’)	as	
polar	opposites	has	shaped	the	discourse	around	these	two	aspects	of	mental	reality	since	
antiquity.1	Although	there	are	excellent	arguments	for	not	considering	reason	and	emotion	to	be	a	
true	pair	of	opposites,	their	entrenchment	as	such	in	both	historical	accounts	and,	in	many	cases,	
the	popular	imagination	of	today,	lends	this	notion	considerable	persuasive	if	not	explanatory	
power.	However,	particularly	the	realization	that	not	only	reason	but	also	emotion	has	cognitive	
aspects	calls	this	polarity	into	question.	Recent	discussions	of	emotion	acknowledge	that	the	
cognitive	operations	involved	are	important,	but	opinions	differ	widely	as	to	the	relative	
importance	of	cognitive	elements,	physiological	changes,	and	the	subjective	experience	of	feeling.	
To	some	extent	this	is	a	question	of	how	an	emotion	is	defined;	for	example,	one	could	argue	that	
the	cognitive	evaluation	is	what	causes	the	emotion,	but	not	part	of	the	emotion	itself.	Or,	
conversely,	some	contend	that	the	cognitive	side	is	a	mere	rationalization	subsequent	to	a	
physiological	reaction	triggered	by	sensory	perception.	
	 The	latter	view	dates	back	to	the	philosopher	and	pioneer	psychologist	William	James,	
who	in	the	late	nineteenth	century	theorized	that	perception	caused	bodily	change,	and	that	the	
feeling	of	the	bodily	change	was	the	emotion.	James	used	the	example	of	encountering	a	bear	to	
illustrate	what	he	meant,	saying	that,	contrary	to	the	popular	belief	that	one	runs	away	because	
                                                
1	Furthermore,	at	least	since	Plato’s	decision	to	cast	reason	as	the	charioteer	and	divide	the	passions	
between	the	subordinate	horses	in	his	Chariot	Allegory,	emotions	have	had	a	tarnished	reputation.	The	
Chariot	Allegory	represents	Plato’s	view	of	the	human	soul.	One	horse	embodies	‘rational,’	moral	passions	
and	pulls	the	chariot	obediently,	while	the	other	embodies	‘irrational’	passions	such	as	appetites	and	is	
unruly.	The	charioteer	must	attempt	to	drive	straight	despite	the	divergent	behavior	of	the	two	horses.	
Emotions	fared	little	better	with	the	early	moderns.	David	Hume	is	led	to	remark	that	“Nothing	is	more	
usual	in	philosophy,	and	even	in	common	life,	than	to	talk	of	the	combat	of	passion	and	reason,	to	give	the	
preference	to	reason,	and	assert	that	men	are	only	so	far	virtuous	as	they	conform	themselves	to	its	
dictates”;	see	Hume,	A	Treatise	of	Human	Nature,	ed.	David	Fate	Norton	and	Mary	J.	Norton	(Oxford:	UP,	
2000),	265.	Yet	even	though	Hume	himself	states	that	the	passions	“ought”	to	be	supreme,	he	nevertheless	
casts	them	in	an	unappealing	light	by	describing	reason	as	their	“slave”	(ibid.,	266).	
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one	fears	the	bear,	actually	one	fears	the	bear	because	one	runs	away.2	James’s	counterintuitive	
(and,	on	my	view,	incorrect)	description	of	the	chain	of	causality	set	off	discussions	which	have	
yet	to	be	fully	resolved	today	about	the	chronological	order	of	as	well	as	the	connections	between	
the	intellectual	content,	the	bodily	changes,	and	the	subjective	experience	of	emotions.	
	 Reason	likewise	presents	some	definitional	questions.	Jon	Elster,	in	Reason	and	Rationality,	
elucidates	an	important	distinction	in	the	concepts	used	to	talk	about	mental	operations:	“reason	
is	objective,	whereas	reasons	are	subjective.”3	Despite	the	tradition	of	casting	of	emotions	as	
antithetical	to	reason,	they	have	the	potential	to	be	either	reasonable	or	unreasonable	in	the	
subjective	sense.	Reason,	in	the	objective	sense,	is	an	ideal	standard;	to	avoid	confusion	with	the	
thought	operation	commonly	referred	to	as	such,	this	project	inclines	to	the	term	‘logic’	to	refer	
to	the	ideal.	The	original	advantage	of	‘logic’	that	makes	it	appealing	—	which	ideally	also	applies	
to	‘reason’	—	is	that	it	renders	complex	and	impenetrable	mental	operations	transparent	and	
comprehensible.	The	danger,	however,	is	that	in	the	process	details	are	eliminated	that	could	turn	
out	to	be	pivotal,	thereby	oversimplifying	matters.		
	 When	we	refer	to	‘using	one’s	reason,’	we	are	actually	talking	about	a	type	of	thinking,	one	
that	is	usually	sequential	as	well	as	conscious.	When	the	brain	is	primarily	employing	sequential	
thought	operations,	the	results	are	readily	accessible	to	conscious	oversight,	and	thus	it	is	
relatively	easy	to	analyze	the	results	to	determine	whether	they	live	up	to	the	ideal	of	logic;	for	
                                                
2	I	do	not	subscribe	to	James’s	theory	because	it	seems	to	me	that	the	uncertainty	about	whether	non-
mental	bodily	components	of	emotion	precede	mental	ones	or	vice	versa	is	the	result	of	the	high	speed	at	
which	many	of	these	changes	occur,	such	that	an	order	is	not	discernible	through	self-observation.	James’s	
example	of	the	bear	brings	up	the	issue	of	reflex.	Since	reflexes	function	to	preserve	the	well-being	of	the	
experiencing	subject	in	a	critical	moment,	they	need	to	be	fast;	they	are	a	type	of	mental	shortcut	in	which	a	
sensory	input	triggers	a	bodily	response	without	first	being	consciously	evaluated.	Affective	elements	—	in	
this	case	most	likely	a	fear	response	—	would	logically	also	be	triggered	so	that	the	body	can	cope	with	the	
demands	being	placed	upon	it	by	the	brain,	but	since	physiological	responses	such	as	elevated	heart	rate	
and	adrenaline	release	take	effect	more	slowly	than	the	muscle	contractions	of	running	away,	it	makes	
sense	that	this	example	would	seem	to	show	that	affect	follows	action.	On	my	view,	both	affect	and	action	
are	subsequent	to	some	type	of	cognitive	evaluation	—	even	if	it	is	the	simplified	and	unconscious	
evaluation	that	a	certain	sensory	stimulus	is	cause	for	a	pre-programmed	reflex	response.	
3	Elster,	Reason	and	Rationality,	trans.	Steven	Rendall	(Princeton:	UP,	2009),	3.	
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simultaneous	evaluations,	this	is	considerably	more	difficult.4	While	one	can	in	some	cases	
retrospectively	dissect	the	evaluation	to	sort	out	the	individual	calculations	that	produced	it,	
there	is	a	much	greater	chance	of	introspective	insufficiency.	And	it	is	these	simultaneous	
evaluations	that	typically	give	rise	to	emotions.	However,	the	difficulties	involved	in	
understanding	emotions	do	not	make	them	inherently	‘worse’	than	sequential	thought	operations.	
Recent	scholarship	on	emotions	has	tended	to	view	them	as	being	on	an	equal	footing	with	other	
types	of	thought	operations;	for	example,	Martha	Nussbaum	stresses	that	“emotions	are	not	just	
the	fuel	that	powers	the	psychological	mechanism	of	a	reasoning	creature,	they	are	parts,	highly	
complex	and	messy	parts,	of	this	creature’s	reasoning	itself.”5	To	a	great	extent,	then,	both	‘reason’	
and	‘emotion’	are	concepts	that	are	used	to	describe	types	of	mental	operations.	Part	of	the	
difference	which	we	believe	that	we	perceive	is	a	function	of	our	introspective	experience	of	
whether	the	mental	operation	is	conscious	or	unconscious,	and	whether	it	is	accompanied	by	
physiological	changes	such	as	adrenaline	release,	increased	heart	rate,	etc.	But	it	is	important	to	
keep	in	mind	that	both	have	mental	processes	at	their	root.	
	 Thus,	sequential	thought	operations	have	traditionally	been	identified	with	reason,	while	
simultaneous	thought	operations	have	been	associated	with	emotion,	or	sometimes	intuition.	
This	division	was	solidified	considerably	during	the	eighteenth	century,	in	which	Enlightenment	
thinkers	such	as	Alexander	Gottlieb	Baumgarten	and	Christian	Wolff	turned	to	logic	as	the	
expression	of	what	they	considered	the	‘higher’	cognitive	functions.6	While	it	is	not	within	the	
capacity	of	a	biological	system	to	process	information	truly	instantaneously,	the	brain	does	have	
                                                
4	Richard	S.	Lazarus	discusses	conscious	and	unconscious	thought	operations	in	Emotion	and	Adaptation	
(New	York:	Oxford	UP,	1991),	152–159.	
5	Nussbaum,	Upheavals	of	Thought:	The	Intelligence	of	Emotions	(Cambridge:	UP,	2001),	3.	
6	See	Hans	Adler	on	Enlightenment	thinkers’	“attitude	toward	logic	as	the	master	of	the	senses.”	Adler,	
“Aesthetics	and	Aisthetics:	The	Iota	Question,”	in	Aesthetics	and	Aisthesis:	New	Perspectives	and	
(Re)Discoveries,	ed.	Adler	(Oxford:	Peter	Lang,	2002),	11.	
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the	capacity	for	speeds	that	would	be	subjectively	perceived	as	such.7	At	this	degree	of	rapidity,	
the	computations	that	constitute	thought	operations	mostly	elude	the	monitoring	of	the	
conscious	mind,	and	it	is	this	that	lends	an	air	of	impenetrability	to	the	operations	that	function	
in	a	simultaneous	manner.	Conversely,	the	subjective	feeling	of	increased	control	that	
accompanies	conscious	monitoring	has	contributed	to	the	historical	bias	in	favor	of	the	type	of	
thought	operation	known	as	reason.	As	to	how,	exactly,	consciousness	relates	to	other	mental	
operations	occurring	in	the	brain,	the	plethora	of	research	on	the	topic	of	consciousness	shows	
that	this	phenomenon	remains	an	open	field	of	inquiry	despite	significant	interest	in	
understanding	it.8	Insofar	as	simultaneous	mental	operations	are	conscious,	it	is	due	to	their	
being	analyzed	retrospectively	in	a	sequential	manner.	
	 What	would	a	simultaneous	thought	operation	look	like?	Given	the	current	level	of	
understanding	of	the	brain	at	a	cellular	and	synaptic	level,	a	biological	answer	to	this	question	is	
unsatisfyingly	indeterminate	at	this	point	in	time.	A	conceptual	approach	to	answering	this	
question,	however,	is	suggested	by	Oliver	G.	Selfridge’s	pandemonium	model.	His	seminal	essay	
“Pandemonium:	A	Paradigm	for	Learning”	from	1959	proposes	a	system	to	explain	perception	and	
a	mechanism	by	which	such	a	system	could	learn	to	perceive	more	efficiently.9	Selfridge’s	model	
                                                
7	“Based	on	experimental	observations	and	theoretical	considerations,	it	was	postulated	early	on	that	
information	processing	in	the	brain	occurs	in	chunks	in	the	time	range	of	subseconds.	Stepwise	changes	of	
brain	electric	activity	in	the	sub-second	range	were	observed	also	using	other	methods	than	the	presently	
reviewed	functional	microstate	analysis.”	Dietrich	Lehmann,	“Consciousness.	Microstates	of	the	Brain’s	
Electric	Field	as	Atoms	of	Thought	and	Emotion,”	in	The	Unity	of	Mind,	Brain	and	World.	Current	
Perspectives	on	a	Science	of	Consciousness,	ed.	Alfredo	Pereira	Jr.	and	Dietrich	Lehmann	(New	York:	
Cambridge	UP,	2013),	209.	
8	Among	the	numerous	recent	publications	dealing	with	consciousness	are:	Douglass	Godwin,	Robert	L.	
Barry,	and	René	Marois,	“Breakdown	of	the	Brain’s	Functional	Network	Modularity	with	Awareness,”	
Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	112,	no.	12	(2015):	3799–3804;	Stanislas	Dehaene,	
Consciousness	and	the	Brain:	Deciphering	How	the	Brain	Codes	Our	Thoughts	(New	York:	Penguin,	2014);	
Dimitris	Platchias,	Phenomenal	Consciousness:	Understanding	the	Relation	between	Experience	and	Neural	
Processes	in	the	Brain	(Montreal:	McGill-Queen’s	UP,	2011).	
9	Oliver	G.	Selfridge,	“Pandemonium:	A	Paradigm	for	Learning,”	in	Mechanisation	of	Thought	Processes;	
Proceedings	of	a	Symposium	Held	at	the	National	Physical	Laboratory	on	24th,	25th,	26th	and	27th	November	
1958	(London:	H.M.	Stationery	Off.,	1959),	511–529.	
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posits	an	arena	full	of	demons,	each	of	which	is	attuned	to	a	specific	variant	of	the	sense	
perception	at	hand.	In	the	case	of	vision,	for	example,	this	would	mean	different	shapes.	Sensory	
input	arrives	at	all	of	the	demons	simultaneously,	and	each	demon	lets	out	a	shriek	of	a	loudness	
proportional	to	the	degree	of	similarity	between	the	incoming	input	and	the	input	to	which	it	is	
attuned.	A	decision	demon	selects	the	loudest	of	the	subdemons,	and	thus	processing	occurs	
without	the	need	to	sequentially	test	the	input	against	each	demon	individually.	This	simplest	
version	of	the	model	can	be	expanded	to	include	multiple	tiers	of	demons	capable	of	performing	
more	detailed	interpretations	of	input.	The	model	supposes	furthermore	that	learning	occurs	
through	a	mechanism	of	self-monitoring	that	reinforces	or	undermines	individual	components	of	
the	model	based	on	the	accuracy	of	their	performance.		
	 While	the	original	article	belongs	to	the	field	of	artificial	intelligence,	it	was	printed	along	
with	a	discussion	by	several	other	researchers,	one	of	whom	(John	McCarthy,	who	had	coined	the	
term	‘artificial	intelligence’	in	1955)	comments	that	pandemonium	could	serve	as	“an	actual	model	
of	conscious	behavior”	in	the	brain.10	Selfridge’s	ideas	have	since	been	appropriated	by	
psychologists	and	cognitive	scientists	studying	human	perception,	notably	in	models	of	how	
reading	occurs.11	Pandemonium	was	put	forward	as	a	model	of	parallel	processing	in	visual	
perception,	but	scholars	have	recognized	its	explanatory	potential	for	other	parallel	mental	
operations,	as	well.	The	model’s	spheres	of	influence	are	evident	in	the	work	of	psychologists	
David	Rumelhart	and	Jay	McClelland:	they	developed	a	theory	of	reading	influenced	by	the	
demon	concept	and	later	produced	computer	models	mimicking	human	perception	that	explicitly	
draw	on	concepts	of	parallel	processing.12	Additionally,	John	V.	Jackson	suggested	in	his	1987	essay	
“Idea	for	a	Mind”	that	levels	and	sublevels	of	demons	could	be	a	useful	representation	of	mental	
                                                
10	John	McCarthy	in	response	to	Selfridge,	“Pandemonium,”	527.	
11	Stanislas	Dehaene,	Reading	in	the	Brain:	The	New	Science	of	How	We	Read	(New	York:	Viking,	2009),	44f.		
12	D.E.	Rumelhart,	J.L.	McClelland	and	the	PDP	Research	Group,	Parallel	Distributed	Processing:	
Explorations	in	the	Microstructure	of	Cognition,	2	vols.	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	1986).	
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architecture	in	general.13	Jackson’s	paper	discusses	parallel	processing	in	a	way	that	blurs	the	
boundary	between	computers	and	living	organisms,	which	is	revealing	of	the	nature	of	this	line	of	
inquiry:	namely,	that	the	more	closely	the	field	of	artificial	intelligence	approaches	its	most	basic	
objective	of	imitating	intelligence,	the	less	applicable	the	distinction	between	the	‘artificial’	and	
the	‘human’	becomes.	The	ways	in	which	intelligence	per	se	functions	are	describable	by	concepts,	
which	is	the	area	of	strength	of	the	pandemonium	model.	
	 The	type	of	modeling	carried	out	by	Selfridge	is	not	a	mere	metaphorical	overlay,	though	
it	does	derive	much	of	its	explanatory	force	from	the	vivid	figurative	terms	in	which	it	is	
presented.	The	possibilities	of	the	concept	are	manifest	in	the	word	‘pandemonium’	itself,	since	
its	literal	meaning	—	‘the	place	where	all	the	demons	reside’	—	evokes	both	the	chaos	of	a	
multitude	of	wayward	beings	and	a	sense	of	order	due	to	their	all	being	gathered	together.	
Similarly,	emotions	have	a	reputation	in	the	cultural	imagination	for	being	unruly	and	oftentimes	
destructive,	yet	there	are	distinguishable	patterns	in	their	modes	of	operation.	In	the	case	of	
mental	operations	that	manifest	this	type	of	dissonance,	Selfridge’s	model	illustrates	a	means	of	
conceiving	of	a	system	in	which	chaos	and	order	coexist	in	close	proximity.	
	 This	project	extends	the	pandemonium	concept	to	the	simultaneous	thought	operations	
involved	in	emotions.	Since	the	model	itself	is	built	on	the	idea	of	multiple,	hierarchically	
arranged	tiers	of	demons,	there	is	no	great	leap	necessary	to	suppose	that	higher-order	cognitions	
might	also	function	according	to	pandemoniac	principles	of	parallel	processing.	In	fact,	one	of	the	
most	profound	implications	of	contemporary	scientific	inquiry	for	emotion	studies	may	be	the	
inevitable	cultural	idea	of	the	brain	as	a	computer	—	that	is,	as	a	network	of	electrical	circuits	that	
                                                
13	John	V.	Jackson,	“Idea	for	a	Mind,”	SIGART	Newsletter	101	(July	1987):	23–26.	
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perform	computations.14	The	notion	of	similarity	functions	in	both	directions:	perhaps	it	is	not	
that	the	brain	is	like	a	computer	so	much	as	that	humanity	has	built	computers	in	quasi-imitation	
of	the	brain.	The	comparison	is	inevitable	because	computers	and	brains	have	a	common	basis	in	
electrical	signals.	When	one	adopts	a	definition	of	emotions	that	accords	a	central	role	to	
cognition,	as	this	project	does,	there	is	then	no	reason	to	privilege	either	‘reason’	or	the	‘passions’	
—	they	are	simply	two	different	types	of	thought	operations,	one	primarily	sequential,	the	other	
primarily	simultaneous.	Either	may	be	judged	to	function	correctly	or	incorrectly	in	terms	of	
logical	coherency,	appropriateness,	or	some	other	criterion.		
	
II.	Examining	Emotions	in	a	Literary	Context	
	 The	following	chapters	deal	with	four	narrative	fictions	by	nineteenth-century	authors,	all	
of	which	are	‘psychological	novellas’	in	the	sense	that	readers	have	commonly	noted	their	
particular	attention	to	the	internal	lives	of	the	characters.	The	authors	were	selected	because	they	
are	exceptional,	not	because	they	are	representative;	both	authors	and	texts	are	distinguished	by	
their	thoughtfulness,	nuance,	and	careful	crafting	of	situations	in	order	to	provide	a	basis	for	the	
emotions	that	are	produced.	Describing	the	emotions	of	characters	is	a	staple	of	fictional	texts,	
but	these	four	works	do	more:	the	form	of	the	text	has	a	structure	that	replicates	the	logical	
structure	of	the	emotion	being	represented.	In	the	following	chapters,	I	undertake	a	particular	
type	of	close	reading	of	these	four	narratives	in	order	to	bring	out	the	textual	features	that	
functionally	resemble	the	cognitive	operations	involved	in	emotion.		
	 This	project	is	concerned	with	other	questions	than	the	ones	that	are	usually	asked	by	
literary	scholars.	The	reader	of	this	project,	therefore,	should	not	be	surprised	at	the	scope	of	
                                                
14	This	analogy	finds	traction	not	only	in	the	cultural	imagination	but	also	in	scholarly	literature	on	artificial	
intelligence;	see,	for	example,	the	chapter	entitled	“The	Mind	Is	a	Computer	Program”	in	Eric	B.	Baum,	
What	Is	Thought?	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	2004),	33–65.	
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these	textual	analyses.	Rather	than	seek	to	produce	comprehensive	interpretations	of	the	works	it	
deals	with,	it	focuses	instead	on	those	aspects	of	the	texts	that	relate	to	the	mental	phenomena	
under	investigation.	The	questions	that	I	am	asking	of	these	texts	center	around	understanding	
psychology;	gaining	insight	into	the	logical	structures	that	undergird	emotions;	and	sorting	out	
what	cognitive	components	combine	to	produce	a	composite	evaluation,	and	how	they	combine.	
Contemplating	the	intersection	of	emotion	and	literature	brings	also	up	a	question	about	the	
direction	of	influence.	Do	we	read	in	order	to	understand	emotions?	Or	does	knowledge	of	how	
emotions	work	inform	our	reading?	This	project	operates	under	the	supposition	that	the	answer	is	
both.	Emotions	and	literature	are	mutually	illuminating:	approaching	a	text	from	the	perspective	
of	its	emotional	content	provides	a	means	of	opening	it	to	fruitful	interpretation;	and,	in	equal	
measure,	narrative	can	offer	a	better	understanding	of	how	emotions	come	into	being,	develop,	
and	have	consequences.	
	 The	approach	to	texts	taken	in	this	project	departs	from	the	modes	of	literary	criticism	
that	prevailed	during	the	late	twentieth	century	and	draws	on	older	conceptions	of	why	we	read	
that	have	often	taken	to	be	more	or	less	self-evident.	Just	as	the	pandemonium	model	uses	
computer	processes	to	simulate	human	mental	operations,	my	readings	approach	literary	
characters	as	if	they	had	a	psyche—that	is,	as	legitimate	simulations	of	human	beings.	Simulating	
the	mind	of	a	fictional	character	has	the	potential	to	serve	as	training	in	the	skill	of	empathizing.	
As	philosophers	point	out,	the	ability	to	approach	another	being	as	if	it	had	a	mind,	and	to	
simulate	and	try	to	anticipate	its	emotional	reactions,	is	a	core	feature	of	empathy.	Because	
empathy	is	important	in	motivating	individuals	to	behave	ethically,	this	type	of	simulating	is	
crucial	to	the	development	of	individuals	within	the	social	framework.15	Investment	in	characters	
and	their	fictional	fates	is	a	subject	that	is	still	discussed	in	the	creative	writing	seminar,	but	rarely	
                                                
15	Philosophers	have	long	noted	the	connection	between	empathy	and	ethical	behavior,	two	examples	being	
Rousseau	and	Schopenhauer	(who	called	it	‘compassion,’	according	to	the	terminology	of	their	time).	
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in	literary	studies.	A	postmodern	attitude	might	hold	that	such	ways	of	reading	are	naïve,	but	if	
querying	texts	in	this	way	opens	up	new	possibilities	of	knowledge,	then	the	theoretical	
paradigms	should	accommodate	these	readings,	rather	than	the	other	way	around.	The	potential	
that	this	project	seeks	to	develop	is	through	the	application	of	current	ideas	about	how	thinking	
functions	to	a	method	of	reading	texts.	This	method	is	not	so	different	from	what	readers	can	do	
intuitively,	but	it	attempts	to	be	more	explicit	about	what	goes	on	and	thereby	shed	light	on	how	
reading	interacts	with	the	reader’s	interior	operations	and	personal	makeup.	The	impulse	comes	
from	an	older	type	of	literary	criticism,	but	the	method	draws	on	insights	from	recent	work	in	
philosophy,	artificial	intelligence,	and	cognitive	science.	
	 Approaching	literary	passages	in	the	manner	of	this	project	—	that	is,	as	models	of	
emotion	—	sheds	light	on	questions	of	how	emotions	are	constructed	in	readers,	what	
justifications	are	given	for	their	appearance	in	characters,	how	they	are	modulated	over	time,	and	
what	significance	their	very	structure	and	composition	has	for	the	central	themes	of	the	work.	In	
addition,	the	study	of	literary	emotions	raises	the	question	of	their	relationship	to	narrative.	The	
focus	of	this	project	is	on	the	formation	of	emotions	—	in	other	words,	it	is	more	concerned	with	
how	emotions	are	caused	than	with	their	effects	once	they	are	in	existence.	It	is	widely	recognized	
in	the	scholarly	literature	that	narratives	are	important	because	they	let	readers	see	how	
possibilities	are	played	out	and	how	emotions	interact	with	the	world.	There	is	another	reason,	
however,	for	paying	attention	to	narrative:	its	role	in	forming	emotions	in	the	first	place.	
	 The	project	takes	a	closer	look	at	the	specific	arrangements	of	context	to	see	precisely	how	
these	contribute	to	emotions.	These	analyses	pull	in	all	sorts	of	information	that	seems	to	have	
little	to	do	with	whatever	emotion	is	under	analysis,	but	because	emotion	is	bound	up	in	narrative,	
it	is	absolutely	relevant;	contextual	data	is	essential.	This	is	part	of	what	makes	emotions	hard	to	
define	and	classify:	they	are	very	difficult	to	separate	from	other	mental	operations	—	and	the	
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more	complex	the	emotion,	the	more	this	holds	true.	Emotions	are	something	that	must	be	
understood	as	networks	of	meaning.	The	connections	and	mutual	influences	between	an	emotion	
and	judgments,	beliefs,	sensory	data,	and	other	emotions	must	all	be	counted	as	part	of	the	
composite	evaluation.	Their	composite	nature	enables	various	possible	configurations	that	
increase	overall	complexity;	for	example,	an	emotion	might	be	caused	by	a	belief	while	
simultaneously	involved	in	the	alteration	of	a	second	belief,	or	an	emotion	might	be	one	of	the	
factors	involved	in	producing	a	second	emotion.	The	mental	framework	allows	for	second-order	
encapsulations	such	as	these,	which	are	also	suggestive	of	ways	in	which	the	brain	could	function	
self-reflexively	according	to	checks	and	balances,	rather	than	strictly	hierarchically.	
	
	 In	the	1990s	and	early	twenty-first	century,	the	study	of	emotions	has	seen	much	
development	among	philosophers	and	psychologists,	as	well	as	in	the	hard	sciences.	The	insights	
of	the	former	are	more	useful	for	literary	studies,	as	the	results	that	can	currently	be	obtained	by	
brain	researchers	seem	to	have	little	to	say	about	emotions	at	the	level	of	complexity	which	is	
relevant	for	the	study	of	fiction.16	There	are	many	lenses	through	which	one	can	view	the	topic	of	
                                                
16	One	example	of	the	limitations	of	brain	research	is	provided	by	a	recent	study	that	set	out	to	determine	
whether	fictional	versus	factual	texts	produce	different	patterns	of	brain	activation.	Subjects	were	presented	
with	a	series	of	short	texts	of	approximately	48	words	that	were	arbitrarily	labeled	either	as	fictional	or	as	
factual;	the	content	of	these	texts	—	“events	as	regularly	reported	in	the	daily	news,	in	TV	documentaries	
and	newspaper	reports”	(25)	—	was	of	a	nature	that	might	plausibly	have	been	either.	The	fMRI	results	
showed	differing	levels	of	brain	activation	for	the	two	scenarios:	‘fictional’	texts	showed	activation	patterns	
that	“support	the	assumption	that	reading	fiction	invites	for	mind-wandering	and	thinking	about	what	
might	have	happened	or	could	happen”	(26),	whereas	‘factual’	texts	showed	activations	consistent	with	
“higher	personal	relevance	to	the	reader”	and	“more	autobiographical	memory	retrieval”	(25).	This	example	
proves	unsatisfying	for	literary	analysis,	for	one	thing	because	the	extreme	brevity	of	the	texts	(necessitated	
by	the	nature	of	the	fMRI	measurements	being	collected)	limits	the	experiment	to	testing	a	hypothesis	
about	fictionality,	not	literariness,	as	pointed	out	by	the	authors	themselves	in	the	introduction.	For	
another	thing,	the	activation	patterns	merely	serve	to	confirm	what	one	would	already	intuitively	suspect	
about	how	readers	engage	with	fact	vs.	fiction.	While	it	may	be	of	interest	that	our	ideas	about	how	we	
process	information	have	a	physiological	manifestation	in	the	brain,	the	mere	fact	that	fMRI	registers	
activity	level	in	certain	areas	does	not	tell	us	anything	specific	about	what	is	going	on	there	(e.g.,	“mind-
wandering”	does	not	reveal	to	where	the	mind	wanders);	this	information	is	thus	likely	to	be	of	more	use	to	
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emotion;	especially	sociological	and	historical	views	—	including	how	emotions	play	out	in	social	
settings,	how	emotions	are	grouped	together	versus	differentiated,	and	how	societies	assign	value	
to	emotion	and/or	its	expressions	—	are	major	areas	of	inquiry	in	the	current	intellectual	
landscape.17	However,	since	my	goal	is	to	engage	with	the	complexities	presented	by	narrative	
forms	on	a	level	that	is	meaningful	for	understanding	individual	psychology,	my	focus	in	this	
project	is	on	the	internal	workings	of	the	mind,	the	nuts	and	bolts	of	what	makes	an	individual	
experience	a	particular	emotion	in	a	particular	situation.	Sometimes	we	read	literature	to	
understand	the	world	around	us,	and	sometimes	we	read	it	to	understand	ourselves.	The	analyses	
in	this	project	address	primarily	the	latter	concern.	
	 Particularly	the	branch	of	philosophy	of	emotion	known	as	cognitivism	proves	to	be	
applicable	to	the	questions	being	asked	in	this	project.	The	main	alternative	to	cognitivism,	
according	to	Mette	Hjort	and	Sue	Laver,	is	social	constructivism,	which	considers	emotions	to	be	
primarily	the	result	of	large-scale	cultural	factors	more	so	than	individual	mental	realities.18	Other	
views	on	emotions	are	represented	by	Richard	Wollheim,	who	draws	heavily	from	
psychoanalytical	models;19	and	by	Peter	Goldie,	who	holds	a	semi-cognitivist	hybrid	view	that	
particularly	emphasizes	the	role	of	narratives.20	
	 While	the	philosophy	of	emotions	has	flourished	during	the	last	decades,	literary	scholars	
have	been	slow	to	incorporate	its	insights	into	their	own	discipline.	The	study	of	emotions	has	by	
no	means	been	neglected,	but	although	there	are	many	studies	that	examine	emotions	in	
literature	from	a	historical	or	sociological	perspective,	seeking	to	relate	them	to	large-scale	
                                                                                                                                                       
neurologists	than	to	literary	scholars.	See	Ulrike	Altmann	et	al.,	“Fact	vs	fiction	—	how	paratextual	
information	shapes	our	reading	processes,”	Social	Cognitive	and	Affective	Neuroscience	9,	no.	1	(2014):	22–29.	
17	A	recent	sociological	study	on	emotions	is	Eyal	Winter’s	Feeling	Smart:	Why	Our	Emotions	Are	More	
Rational	Than	We	Think	(New	York,	NY:	Public	Affairs,	2014).	A	historical	survey	is	Jan	Plamper’s	The	
History	of	Emotions:	An	Introduction,	trans.	Keith	Tribe	(Oxford:	UP,	2015).	
18	Mette	Hjort	and	Sue	Laver,	introduction	to	Emotion	and	the	Arts	(New	York:	Oxford	UP,	1997),	6.	
19	Richard	Wollheim,	On	the	Emotions	(New	Haven:	Yale	UP,	1999).	
20	Peter	Goldie,	The	Emotions:	A	Philosophical	Exploration	(Oxford:	UP,	2000).	
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cultural	and	societal	forces,	far	fewer	approach	them	from	an	individual	perspective	by	looking	at	
what	philosophy	and	psychology	can	reveal	about	their	internal	workings.	Though	there	are	many	
philosophers	who	support	their	arguments	with	excerpts	from	fictional	works	—	with	the	
qualification	that	these	explications	tend	to	be	less	developed	than	work	done	in	the	field	of	
literary	studies	—	examples	of	literary	scholars	who	apply	philosophy	of	emotion	to	interpret	
texts	are	rare.	A	notable	exception	is	Patrick	Colm	Hogan,	an	English	literature	scholar	whose	
work	is	heavily	influenced	by	the	cognitivist	philosophical	view	of	emotions,	as	well	as	drawing	on	
neuroanatomical	information.	In	What	Literature	Teaches	Us	about	Emotion,	Hogan	focuses	
primarily	on	basic	emotions	—	including	love,	grief,	mirth,	guilt,	shame,	jealousy,	and	empathy	—	
in	important	works	of	world	literature.21	Another	literary	scholar	who	draws	on	philosophical	
theories	is	Charles	Altieri,	though	his	book	The	Particulars	of	Rapture,	which	addresses	emotions	
in	works	of	art	and	literature,	is	highly	critical	of	the	cognitivist	position.22	Calling	his	view	
expressivism,	he	stresses	the	value	of	emotions	as	ends	in	themselves,	as	opposed	to	the	emphasis	
by	cognitivists	on	intentional	or	goal-directed	behavior.	Martha	Nussbaum’s	Upheavals	of	
Thought	might	well	also	be	considered	part	of	this	group,	since	even	though	the	author	is	a	
philosopher,	the	book’s	(quite	substantial)	latter	half	focuses	on	interpreting	emotions	in	
literature.	While	her	analyses	hypothesize	about	broad	cultural	shifts	from	Antiquity	to	
Modernism,	there	seems	to	be	untapped	potential	in	Nussbaum’s	work	in	that	many	of	the	
concepts	she	puts	forward	could	contribute	to	a	close-reading	type	of	literary	criticism.23		
                                                
21	Patrick	Colm	Hogan,	What	Literature	Teaches	Us	about	Emotion	(New	York:	Cambridge	UP,	2011).	
22	Charles	Altieri,	The	Particulars	of	Rapture	(Ithaca:	Cornell	UP,	2003).	
23	In	the	second	half	of	her	book,	Nussbaum	uses	selected	literary	works	to	make	a	historical	argument	
containing	notions	of	progress	which	seem	highly	problematic.	The	section	on	love,	for	example,	concludes	
by	casting	Ulysses	—	and	Modernism	more	generally	—	as	the	culmination	of	two	millennia	of	reflection	on	
romantic	attachment.	Yet	even	the	literary	analyses	themselves	seem	to	undermine	the	notion	of	progress:	
areas	of	advancement	in	one	era	exhibit	retrogression	in	another,	and	vice	versa;	the	advantages	shift	but	do	
not	accumulate.	Indeed,	the	use	which	she	makes	of	the	literary	texts	seems	disconnected	from	the	
interpretive	implications	more	directly	suggested	by	her	theoretical	framework.	Hypotheses	about	broad	
trends	in	the	history	of	thought	are	difficult	to	defend	using	insights	garnered	from	the	cognitivist	
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	 Cognitive	approaches	to	literature	seem	to	be	gaining	ground,	especially	in	the	English-
speaking	world.	The	complexity	of	mental	functioning	likely	means,	however,	that	the	‘approach’	
aspect	will	in	most	cases	be	specific	to	the	texts	under	analysis;	in	other	words,	there	are	
numerous	ways	in	which	a	literary	text	can	make	use	of	how	the	brain	functions	in	order	to	
achieve	its	aesthetic	effect,	and	scholars	will	therefore	likely	need	to	tailor	to	the	individual	texts	
their	‘approaches’	rather	than	trying	to	come	up	with	a	theory	and	apply	it	broadly.	The	specificity	
of	individual	instances	of	emotions	precludes	the	possibility	of	simply	borrowing	another	
approach	and	applying	it	to	the	texts	that	I	consider	in	this	project;	I	instead	come	up	with	an	
approach	based	on	the	specific	mental	processes	that,	as	I	will	argue,	are	at	work	in	producing	
resonances	between	brain	and	text	in	these	instances.	
	
III.	What	Is	an	Emotion?	
	 The	approach	to	emotions	taken	in	this	project	is	most	closely	related	to	cognitivism,	one	
of	the	major	schools	of	thought	in	philosophy	of	emotions.	Cognitivism	holds	that	a	belief	or	
desire	is	necessary	for	an	emotion;	its	appeal	lies	in	the	promise	that	emotions	can	be	made	fully	
intelligible.	While	simple,	early	versions	of	the	position	consider	emotions	to	be	more	or	less	
identical	with	a	belief	or	desire,	later	accounts	further	emphasize	the	intentionality	of	emotions,	
which	is	usually	expressed	with	the	help	of	a	preposition:	emotions	are	about	something,	are	
directed	towards	something,	etc.	Thus,	intentionality	clarifies	that	emotions	have	to	do	with	the	
relationship	between	the	emoter	and	his	environment,	broadly	conceived	(for	example,	
‘environment’	could	include	the	emoter’s	own	body).	Cognitivism	has	been	heavily	criticized	by	
those	who	argue	that	it	does	not	adequately	account	for	the	role	of	the	physiological	side	of	
                                                                                                                                                       
principles	in	the	first	section	of	the	book,	which	provide	ways	of	understanding	aspects	of	a	specific	
instance	of	an	emotion,	but	seldom	deal	with	patterns	across	time.	But	for	these	same	reasons,	I	have	found	
the	insightful	analyses	of	the	first	half	of	the	book	to	be	well	suited	to	providing	interpretive	impulses	on	
the	smaller,	more	individual	scale	that	applies	to	my	project.	
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emotional	response,	and	who	point	to	borderline	cases	such	as	moods,	to	which	beliefs	and	
desires	do	not	necessarily	apply;	and	cognitivism	has	again	been	defended	by	proponents	who	
seek	to	revise	and	expand	it	so	as	to	meet	the	charges	of	its	critics,	while	maintaining	the	position	
that	beliefs	and	desires	are	a	central,	defining	factor	in	emotions.24		
	 Many	of	the	arguments	in	the	following	chapters	are	informed	by	a	particular	conception	
of	mental	architecture;	this	is	thus	a	basic	assumption	in	the	text	and	must	be	explained	and	
clarified	right	at	the	outset.	Interpreting	emotions	in	literature	first	requires	a	working	definition	
of	emotion.	As	the	lively	discussions25	in	the	fields	of	not	only	literary	studies	but	also	film	and	
media	studies,	history,	sociology,	philosophy,	psychology,	cognitive	science,	and	neuroscience	
show,	there	is	no	consensus	on	what	an	emotion	is.26	In	this	situation,	it	seems	reasonable	to	take	
a	position	which	proves	itself	to	be	effective	in	yielding	better	understandings	of	texts,	provided	
that	it	can	be	supported	by	a	significant	body	of	evidence.	
	 The	lack	of	consensus	among	disciplines	and	schools	of	thought	regarding	the	definition	
of	emotion	—	even	in	terms	of	how	to	differentiate	it	from	mood,	sensation,	thought,	etc.	—	is	
the	result	of	how	the	boundaries	of	the	concept	are	delineated.	Because	mental	operations	are	
                                                
24	Proponents	of	cognitivism	include	Martha	Nussbaum	(Upheavals	of	Thought,	2001)	and	Robert	Solomon	
(“Emotions	and	Choice,”	in	Explaining	Emotions,	ed.	Amélie	Rorty	(Los	Angeles:	University	of	California	
Press,	1980));	prominent	critics	include	Aaron	Ben-Ze’ev	(The	Subtlety	of	Emotions	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	
Press,	2000));	Richard	Wollheim	(On	the	Emotions);	and,	to	some	extent,	Peter	Goldie	(The	Emotions:	A	
Philosophical	Exploration),	although	the	latter’s	work	also	has	much	in	common	with	the	cognitivist	
position. 
25	Large,	interdisciplinary,	government-funded	centers	for	emotion	studies	are	an	indication	of	the	strong	
contemporary	interest	in	the	subject.	Examples	include	“Languages	of	Emotion”	at	the	Freie	Universität	
Berlin,	funded	by	the	German	Universities	Excellence	Initiative	between	2007	and	2014	(Languages	of	
Emotion	homepage,	Freie	Universität	Berlin,	accessed	March	25,	2015,	http://www.loe.fu-berlin.de/);	“The	
Affect	Project,”	supported	since	2011	by	a	Social	Sciences	and	Humanities	Research	Council	of	Canada	
Partnership	Development	Grant	(“About,”	The	Affect	Project,	accessed	March	25,	2015,	
https://affectproject.ca/index.php/home/aboutap);	and	the	Centre	for	the	History	of	the	Emotions	at	
Queen	Mary	University	of	London,	which	has	received	funding	from	numerous	sources	including	the	Arts	
and	Humanities	Research	Council	of	the	UK	as	well	as	the	European	Union	(“Funding,”	The	Centre	for	the	
History	of	the	Emotions,	accessed	March	28,	2016,	http://.qmul.ac.uk/emotions/funding/).	
26	For	example,	Carroll	E.	Izard	alludes	to	the	lack	of	consensus	in	the	field	of	psychology	in	“More	
Meanings	and	More	Questions	for	the	Term	‘Emotion,’”	Emotion	Review	2,	no.	4	(2010):	384.	
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ultimately	inseparable	from	one	another,	there	are	no	objective	criteria	for	deciding	on	a	‘best’	
account	of	where	emotion	ends	and	something	else	begins.	In	the	absence	of	a	compelling	reason	
to	prefer	any	particular	definition	over	others,	this	project	will	define	emotion	in	a	way	that	leads	
to	a	productive	interpretation.	The	definition	will	be	broad,	encompassing	many	thought	
operations	that	are	calculative	in	nature.	However,	one	property	that	distinguishes	emotion	in	
this	context	is	that	it	consistently	manifests	itself	as	a	composite	evaluative	operation,	whereas	
logical	reasoning	tends	to	deal	with	a	limited	and	more	manageable	quantity	of	factors.	Complex	
logical	evaluations	are	built	upon	a	combination	of	numerous	calculations,	each	of	which	could	
be	viewed	as	a	distinct	step,	since	they	occur	sequentially.	Emotions,	on	the	other	hand,	are	
usually	the	result	of	multiple	calculations	occurring	simultaneously,	and	thus	may	have	a	
qualitatively	different	character	than	logical	evaluation.	The	precise	nature	of	this	difference	will	
vary	according	to	circumstances,	a	few	examples	of	which	will	be	pursued	in	the	chapters	to	
follow.	
	 A	fundamental	assumption	behind	this	project	is	that	emotions	are	intelligible	operations	
whose	causes	are	determinate,	although	practically	speaking	it	may	not	be	possible	to	determine	
them	in	all	cases.	An	emotion	may	be	considered	irrational	if	it	is	based	on	a	false	belief;	it	may	be	
considered	inappropriate	if	its	intensity	is	out	of	proportion	to	the	circumstances.	(This	could	be	
due,	for	example,	to	individual	psychological	causes	or	to	interference	from	other	emotions	which	
the	subject	is	experiencing.)	However,	the	emotions	in	both	of	these	cases	are	nevertheless	
intelligible;	in	other	words,	one	can	uncover	the	causes	that	brought	the	emotion	into	existence,	
despite	the	problematic	nature	of	some	of	these	causes.27	
                                                
27	Jon	Elster’s	lecture	Reason	and	Rationality	contains	a	lucid	discussion	of	reason,	rationality,	irrationality,	
and	intelligibility,	which	he	develops	in	the	context	of	the	long-standing	debates	about	reason	versus	
passion.	
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	 This	project	employs	a	functional	concept	of	emotion;	that	is	to	say,	an	emotion	is	
distinguishable	by	what	it	does.	Emotions	are	about	assigning	value	and	importance	to	mental	
contents	and	constructs.	They	are	an	integral	part	of	a	human	being’s	mechanisms	for	interacting	
with	its	surroundings;	in	the	most	basic	terms,	an	organism	living	under	the	conditions	of	
finitude,	in	which	it	is	impossible	to	perceive	or	to	know	everything,	must	have	a	system	for	
navigating	existence	as	effectively	as	possible	despite	limited	information	if	it	is	to	survive	and	
thrive.	On	a	mental	level,	that	means	sorting	information	—	both	external	perceptions	and	
internally	generated	thoughts	—	according	to	importance,	so	that	limited	attention	resources	can	
be	allocated	effectively.	Emotions	are	necessary	for	an	individual	to	generate	goals	and	then	
pursue	them.	
	 This	project	takes	the	position	that	the	thought-content	of	an	emotion,	as	opposed	to	
somatic	aspects,	is	necessary	for	an	emotion.	Thus	it	draws	a	distinction	between	emotions	and	
moods,	the	latter	of	which	might	conceivably	be	the	result	of	endocrine	fluctuations	and	external	
stimuli	without	any	contribution	from	higher-order	thought	operations.	Based	on	critical	views	
on	cognitivism,	one	could	easily	suppose	that	a	reading	of	a	literary	text	based	on	a	cognitivist-
type	model	would	result	in	an	interpretation	that	oversimplifies	emotions	and	thus	ignores	the	
interesting	complexity	of	literary	texts.	However,	taking	into	account	the	central	role	of	narrative,	
one	can	see	why	the	thought-content	of	emotions	is	of	primary	importance.	Especially	the	
complex	emotions	to	be	dealt	with	here	are	not	the	result	of	only	a	single	belief	or	desire;	rather,	
they	arise	from	entire	networks	that	may	include	multiple	beliefs	and	desires,	as	well	as	thoughts,	
memories,	and	sensory	perceptions,	all	of	which	are	evaluated	in	terms	of	the	individual’s	latent	
belief	system.	
	 Since	the	primary	focus	of	my	project	is	on	the	part	of	emotions	that	is	intellectually	
comprehensible,	at	times	it	may	seem	as	though	the	physiological	dimensions	of	emotion	do	not	
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receive	due	consideration.	That	is,	there	are	certain	bodily	processes	that	are	part	of	the	affective	
nature	of	emotions;	that	contribute	to	the	subjective	‘feeling’	of	an	emotion.	Of	course,	mental	
operations	are	also	bodily	functions;	nevertheless,	it	is	possible	to	draw	a	distinction	because	
mental	operations	allow	for	intellectual	discussion	in	a	way	that,	for	example,	endocrine	
fluctuations	do	not.	The	means	of	representing	affective	intensity	in	a	text	are	different	from	the	
means	of	representing	cognitive	components	of	emotion.	Physiological	(in	the	sense	I	am	
delineating)	processes	must	be	discussed	in	more	descriptive,	less	precise	terms.	They	do,	
however,	factor	in	to	the	current	project:	when	I	make	the	claim	that	emotions	establish	the	value	
attached	to	mental	contents	or	that	well-trodden	mental	pathways	can	be	rewritten,	the	
chemistry	of	emotion	is	involved	in	the	process	of	reinforcing	or	undermining	the	existing	
cognitive	infrastructure.	
	
IV.	Concepts	and	Organization	
	 Emotion	is	a	type	of	thinking.	In	order	to	work	out	the	consequences	of	this	idea,	these	
analyses	will	continually	draw	upon	the	conception	of	emotions	as	composite	evaluations.	I	
sometimes	also	refer	to	the	concept	of	judgment,	which	is	a	subtype	of	evaluation:	typically,	
judgments	are	a	comparison	of	a	given	situation	against	existing	ideas	about	how	the	world	works.	
Furthermore,	an	emotion	is	time-dependent,	establishes	a	hierarchy,	is	involved	in	the	formation	
and	modification	of	‘latent	beliefs,’	and	has	a	signature	structure.	These	are	the	core	concepts	that	
inform	this	project.	They	emerge	—	not	necessarily	in	these	exact	words	but	in	conceptually	
similar	form	—	from	cognitivist	discourses	on	emotions;	and,	as	the	following	chapters	aim	to	
demonstrate,	their	potential	applicability	to	literary	interpretation	is	high	because	of	their	
nontrivial	link	with	the	organization	and	aims	of	narrative.	In	order	to	highlight	the	recurrence	of	
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these	concepts	in	multiple	texts	and	contexts	throughout	this	project,	I	include	a	number	of	
cross-references	to	other	inter-	as	well	as	intrachapter	locations.	
	 That	emotions	have	a	relationship	to	time	is	unsurprising,	since	time	is	one	of	the	basic	
parameters	of	existence.	Time-dependence,	in	the	context	of	this	project,	is	significant	because	of	
its	influence	on	affective	intensity,	which	tends	to	increase	when	evaluations	are	temporally	
compressed.	The	simultaneity	versus	sequentiality	of	evaluations,	which	have	already	been	
mentioned,	thus	have	consequences	for	the	level	of	affective	response	to	a	situation.		
	 The	establishment	of	hierarchies	is	the	means	by	which	attention	is	allocated.	Brain	
researchers	have	developed	concepts	of	a	mental	‘foreground’	and	‘background’	in	order	to	
conceptualize	the	way	in	which	mental	data	seem	to	be	relatively	more	or	less	present	to	
consciousness	at	different	moments.28	Research	supports	the	assertion	that	a	human	being’s	
capacity	to	function	in	everyday	situations	in	the	world	is	dependent	on	emotional	responses,	
which	underlines	the	importance	of	emotion	as	a	form	of	thought	and	an	intellectual	matter.29	
	 The	term	‘latent	belief’	will	be	used	in	this	project	to	signify	a	notion	that	has	been	
practiced	or	established	sufficiently	to	become	long-term	mental	stock.	Its	facticity	or	provability	
are	irrelevant	for	the	purposes	of	this	classification;	the	belief	that	two	plus	two	equals	four	is	to	
be	considered	just	as	much	a	latent	belief	as	the	belief	that	one	political	party	is	better	than	
another.	The	reason	for	assigning	the	qualifier	‘latent’	to	this	term	is	to	underline	the	role	of	a	set	
of	propositions	against	which	more	transient	data	is	compared	in	order	to	evaluate	it.	Put	another	
way,	latent	beliefs	encompass	all	of	an	individual’s	ideas	about	how	the	world	works,	and	any	new	
data	is	processed	in	accordance	with	this	basis.	Beliefs	also	tend	to	occur	in	sets	because	of	
                                                
28	Richard	Loosemore	and	Trevor	Harley,	“Brains	and	Minds:	On	the	Usefulness	of	Localization	Data	to	
Cognitive	Psychology,”	in	Foundational	Issues	in	Human	Brain	Mapping,	ed.	Martin	Bunzl	and	Stephen	José	
Hanson	(Cambridge,	MA:	Bradford,	2010),	221f.	
29	For	example,	Antonio	Damasio	found	that	people	with	brain	injuries	that	disrupted	their	emotional	
responses	had	difficulty	prioritizing	tasks	in	a	way	that	would	allow	them	to	handle	practical	matters	
effectively;	see	Descartes’	Error:	Emotion,	Reason,	and	the	Human	Brain	(New	York:	Penguin,	1994). 
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narrative	interrelations	with	one	another;	in	chapter	two,	a	particular	kind	of	belief	collocation	
will	be	analyzed,	which	will	here	be	termed	a	‘script.’30	Scripts	are	mental	shortcuts	that	are	
established	through	repetition.	Because	of	this,	they	tend	to	reflect	the	cultural	conditioning	
through	an	individual’s	environment	to	a	high	degree.	
	 The	signature	structure	of	an	emotion,	which	has	already	been	mentioned	above,	refers	to	
recurring	arrangements	of	cognitive	data	and	the	logical	operations	that	are	performed	on	them.	
In	the	case	of	fear,	for	example,	the	signature	structure	includes	at	least	two	clusters	of	data:	
information	about	a	situation	in	which	the	individual	presently	finds	itself,	and	latent	beliefs	
about	types	of	situations	that	are	or	may	be	harmful.	The	logical	operations	that	are	performed	
are	a	comparison	of	the	situation	with	the	latent	beliefs,	and	the	judgment	to	the	effect	that	the	
situation	is	indeed	of	a	type	that	represents	a	threat.	
	
	 Chapter	one	of	this	project	deals	with	two	emotions,	trust	and	sympathy,	in	E.T.A.	
Hoffmann’s	novella	Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi	(1820).	In	the	first	portion	of	the	chapter,	I	show	how	
the	relative	prominence	of	various	narrative	elements	at	different	moments	maps	onto	
fluctuations	in	the	main	character’s	level	of	trust	in	three	other	characters,	which	in	turn	affects	
her	efforts	to	gather	information	from	them.	This	illuminates	the	interplay	between	emotions	and	
mental	hierarchies.	In	addition,	I	also	consider	the	role	of	intuition	in	these	interactions;	although	
not	an	emotion,	intuition	is	a	form	of	composite	evaluation	and	therefore	a	closely	related	
thought	operation.	The	second	portion	of	the	chapter	looks	at	a	particular	scene	in	which	the	
main	character	carries	out	a	plan	designed	to	elicit	the	emotion	of	sympathy	from	another	
character.	This	provides	an	opportunity	for	the	reader	to	observe	how	an	emotion	is	narratively	
constructed,	both	in	the	sense	of	being	recorded	in	a	fictional	text	and	in	the	sense	of	occurring	in	
                                                
30	See	page	90.	
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the	target	character	as	a	result	of	external	and	internal	narrative	strands	interacting	in	his	
cognitive	landscape.	
	 Building	on	the	latter	example	from	the	first	chapter,	the	second	chapter	is	about	a	
character	who	performs	an	even	more	elaborately	constructed	plan	to	generate	an	emotion.	In	
The	Seducer’s	Diary,	which	is	part	of	Søren	Kierkegaard’s	work	Either/Or	(1843),	the	seducer	
chronicles	his	implementation	of	a	true	emotional	manipulation	that	results	in	a	young	woman	
becoming	profoundly	infatuated	with	him.	The	emotion	of	infatuation	involves	accessing	a	wide	
spectrum	of	the	latent	beliefs	which	a	person	holds;	for	this	reason,	it	is	complicated	to	produce	
—	as	evidenced	by	the	intricacy	of	the	seducer’s	plan	—	as	well	as	rendering	those	who	experience	
it	vulnerable	to	alterations	of	core	beliefs	about	themselves.	The	seducer’s	method	includes	
replicating	certain	signature	aspects	of	infatuation	such	as	obsessive	mental	preoccupation	with	a	
person,	as	well	as	playing	to	cultural	scripts	about	romantic	love.	
	 In	the	third	chapter,	I	examine	the	surprise	ending	to	Adalbert	Stifter’s	Brigitta	(1847).	
This	chapter,	unlike	the	others,	ventures	to	speculate	about	the	emotional	response	of	the	reader;	
however,	these	speculations	are	closely	based	on	features	of	the	text,	particularly	the	order	in	
which	information	is	presented.	This	specific	instance	of	surprise	has	a	highly	articulated	
intellectual	content	because	it	involves	a	collision	of	two	well-developed	narrative	strands	which	
necessitates	re-evaluations	of	both.	The	signature	structure	of	surprise	is	thus	laid	out	for	the	
reader	in	the	structure	of	the	text.	The	fact	that	the	novella	is	constructed	in	such	a	way	that	the	
collision	can	take	place	within	a	very	brief	timespan	greatly	increases	the	emotional	intensity	for	
the	reader:	a	considerable	amount	of	cognitive	work	over	a	short	duration	results	in	a	more	
concentrated	affective	response.	
	 The	fourth	chapter	deals	with	the	emotion	of	regret	in	Die	Resel	(1883)	by	Marie	von	
Ebner-Eschenbach.	Here,	the	text	has	the	same	structure	as	the	emotion:	just	as	regret	involves	a	
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might-have-been	that	refuses	to	leave	one’s	mental	stage,	Die	Resel	confronts	a	character	with	a	
story	that	could	(almost)	have	been	her	own.	I	focus	on	persistence	because	that	is	what	pushes	
regret	into	the	territory	of	a	complex	emotion.	Regret	follows	some	choice,	and	this	choice	is	the	
result	of	an	evaluation.	The	complexity	of	the	evaluation,	however,	may	not	be	fully	clear;	for	
example,	choices	about	which	actions	to	take	in	life	involve	weighing	various	predictions	of	future	
outcomes.	Once	a	choice	is	made,	an	actual	outcome	comes	into	being;	in	the	process	of	regret,	
an	alternative	possible	outcome	persists	in	the	mind	and	is	held	up	to	the	actual	outcome,	
resulting	in	a	dissection	of	the	pros	and	cons	of	each.	Regret	thus	has	the	signature	structure	of	a	
revelatory	engine,	a	means	of	uncovering	repressed,	suppressed,	or	nonapparent	information,	
which	makes	it	an	excellent	lens	through	which	to	interpret	a	story.	
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Chapter	One:	
The	Ordering	of	the	Mind		
in	E.T.A.	Hoffmann’s	Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi	
	
	
Anxiety	comes	first;	it	discovers	the	logic	before	it	arrives,	just	as	one	can	
sense	in	one’s	bones	that	a	storm	is	approaching.	
—	Vigilius	Haufniensis,	The	Concept	of	Anxiety	
	
	
	
	 Since	attention	is	a	limited	resource,	the	way	in	which	it	is	allotted	has	a	significant	
impact	on	the	constitution	of	mental	life.	Emotions	are	the	core	mechanism	for	directing	the	
activity	of	the	mind:	their	intensity	signals	what	is	important	and	thus	worthy	of	attention;	yet	at	
the	same	time,	the	relative	prominence	or	obscurity	of	thoughts,	ideas,	memories,	and	other	
information	has	an	impact	on	which	emotions	form	at	a	given	time.	The	question	of	whether	a	
given	piece	of	information	is	prominent	or	not	is	subject	to	internal	as	well	as	external,	and	to	
intentional	as	well	as	accidental	circumstances.	One	may	try	to	remember,	or	be	reminded	by	
another;	one	may	choose	to	pursue	a	line	of	thought,	or	it	may	be	associatively	suggested	by	
events	in	one’s	environment.	Thus,	in	matters	of	hierarchization	—	that	is,	of	the	establishment	of	
priorities	in	the	mind	—	there	is	a	degree	of	mutual	influence	between	emotions	and	the	available	
information.	
	 These	dynamics	are	a	central	element	of	E.T.A.	Hoffmann’s	novella	Das	Fräulein	von	
Scuderi,	which	appeared	first	in	an	almanach	and	then	in	the	third	volume	of	his	Serapions-Brüder	
collection	in	1820.1	The	drama	of	this	story	lies	in	the	process	of	untangling	that	is	carried	out	over	
the	course	of	the	novella	by	the	main	character,	Magdaleine	von	Scuderi,	a	seventy-three-year-old	
                                                
1	The	novella	was	well	received,	earning	Hoffmann	an	addendum	of	fifty	bottles	of	wine	in	addition	to	his	
honorarium	from	the	almanach	publisher.	For	more	information	on	the	reception	history	of	Hoffmann’s	
novella	from	its	publication	to	the	present	era,	see	Detlef	Kremer,	E.T.A.	Hoffmann:	Erzählungen	und	
Romane	(Berlin:	E.	Schmidt,	1999),	144–147;	or	Rolf	Meier,	Dialog	zwischen	Jurisprudenz	und	Literatur:	
Richterliche	Unabhängigkeit	und	Rechtsabbildung	in	E.T.A.	Hoffmanns	“Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi”	(Baden-
Baden:	Nomos	Verlagsgesellschaft,	1994),	18–20.	
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writer	who	finds	herself	playing	the	role	of	detective	and	ultimately	solves	a	case	of	serial	murders	
and	jewel	thefts.2	Although	legal	proceedings	and	legal	discourse,	which	traditionally	frown	upon	
emotions	as	lacking	the	logical	precision	appropriate	to	judicial	matters,	are	continually	present	
throughout	the	text,	they	prove	again	and	again	to	have	limitations	that	are	only	overcome	
through	precisely	such	means	as	they	would	eschew.	At	the	end	of	the	novella,	for	example,	
Scuderi	manages	to	secure	the	release	from	prison	of	the	jeweller’s	apprentice,	Olivier	Brußon,	
partly	through	an	appeal	to	sympathy;	although	the	legal	system	would	consider	him	guilty	(as	an	
accomplice),	setting	him	free	is	more	satisfying	to	the	conscience	of	Scuderi	—	as	well	as,	one	may	
easily	suppose,	to	the	consciences	of	many	readers.	For	right	and	wrong	are	neither	clear-cut,	nor	
do	they	belong	exclusively	to	the	domain	of	judicial	reasoning.3	
	 In	addition	to	questions	of	hierarchization,	a	second	issue	with	regard	to	emotions	that	
greatly	affects	how	this	novella	develops	is	the	nature	of	emotion	as	a	form	of	composite	
evaluation.	Scuderi	is	effective,	both	as	a	literary	character	and	as	an	amateur	detective,	because	
                                                
2	Scuderi’s	status	as	a	detective	has	been	the	subject	of	much	debate.	Richard	Alewyn	argued	in	1963	that	
Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi	was	the	first	detective	story,	pre-dating	Edgar	Allen	Poe’s	work	(“Das	Rätsel	des	
Detektivromans,”	in	Definition.	Essays	zur	Literatur,	ed.	Adolf	Frisé	(Frankfurt	a.M.:	Vittorio	Klostermann,	
1963)),	but	revised	his	position	with	respect	to	the	claim	that	Scuderi	is	a	detective-figure	in	Probleme	und	
Gestalten.	Essays	(Frankfurt	a.M.:	Insel,	1974),	351–360.	Many	concur,	however,	with	his	assessment	of	the	
novella	as	a	whole;	see,	for	example,	Maximilian	Bergengruen,	“Das	monströse	Erbe	(der	Literatur):	
Ehebrecher,	Verbrecher	und	Liebende	in	E.T.A.	Hoffmanns	‘Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi,’”	in	Monster:	zur	
ästhetischen	Verfassung	eines	Grenzbewohners,	ed.	Roland	Borgards	(Würzburg:	Königshausen	&	Neumann,	
2009),	(219).	Friedrich	Kittler	attributes	Scuderi’s	success	as	a	detective	to	her	“psychologischen	
Einfühlungskraft”	(“Hoffmann:	Eine	Detektivgeschichte	der	ersten	Detektivgeschichte,”	in	Dichter,	Mutter,	
Kind	(Munich:	Fink,	1991),	198)	—	in	other	words,	to	her	skill	in	gaining	insight	into	the	emotional	
landscapes	of	others.	Arguments	against	viewing	her	as	a	detective	are	found,	for	example,	in	Kremer,	
Erzählungen	und	Romane,	157;	and	Hartmut	Steinecke,	Die	Kunst	der	Fantasie:	E.T.A.	Hoffmanns	Leben	und	
Werk	(Frankfurt	a.M.:	Insel,	2004),	389.	Ulrike	Landfester	acknowledges	both	sides	and	therefore	situates	
the	novella	somewhere	in	between	(“Um	die	Ecke	gebrochen:	Kunst,	Kriminalliteratur	und	
Großstadttopographie	in	E.T.A.	Hoffmanns	Erzählung	‘Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi,’”	in	Die	Stadt	in	der	
europäischen	Romantik,	ed.	Gerhart	von	Graevenitz	(Würzburg:	Königshausen	&	Neumann,	2000),	110).	For	
more	extensive	summaries	of	the	debate,	see	Achim	Küpper,	“Poesie,	die	sich	selbst	spiegelt,	und	nicht	Gott”:	
Reflexionen	der	Sinnkrise	in	Erzählungen	E.	T.	A.	Hoffmanns	(Berlin:	Schmidt,	2010),	70–73;	or	Claudia	
Liebrand,	Aporie	des	Kunstmythos:	die	Texte	E.T.A.	Hoffmanns	(Freiburg	im	Breisgau:	Rombach,	1996),	177.	
3	Whether	one	agrees	with	the	assessment	that	mercy	is	greater	than	justice,	or	not,	the	very	existence	of	
this	debate	is	proof	of	a	significant	grey	area.	
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she	employs	every	faculty	at	her	disposal.4	Logical	reasoning,	emotions,	intuitions,	and	even	the	
nocturnal	process	of	dreaming	are	all	a	part	of	Scuderi’s	mental	landscape,	and	it	is	through	
paying	heed	to	these	things	and	seeking	to	reconcile	the	seeming	conflicts	between	the	various	
parts	that	she	eventually,	bit	by	bit,	uncovers	the	entire	story	behind	the	jewel	murders.	In	
keeping	with	its	detective-story	features,	Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi	involves	questions	of	who	can	
be	trusted	and	who	cannot.	The	example	of	trust	highlights	the	way	in	which	emotions	are	a	
composite	evaluation:	one	considers	(either	instantaneously	as	intuition	or	over	time	as	
deliberation)	various	aspects	of	an	individual’s	character,	which	results	in	a	feeling	as	to	whether	
his	words	correspond	to	his	thoughts	and	actions.5	How	precisely	one	moves	from	characteristics	
to	feeling	will	be	a	subject	of	this	chapter.	The	way	in	which	the	term	feeling	(“Gefühl”)	is	used	to	
describe	the	effect	of	Scuderi’s	mental	processes	brings	it	into	close	proximity	with	the	idea	of	
intuition.	The	text	provides	numerous	opportunities	to	examine	how	intuition	blurs	the	
boundaries	between	affect,	evaluation,	and	cognition.	
                                                
4	Scuderi’s	use	of	all	her	faculties	is	discussed	by	Alewyn,	Probleme	und	Gestalten,	353;	Birgit	Röder,	A	Study	
of	the	Major	Novellas	of	E.T.A.	Hoffmann	(Rochester:	Camden	House,	2003),	52;	as	well	as,	from	a	feminist	
perspective,	by	Anita	McChesney,	“The	Female	Poetics	of	Crime	in	E.T.A.	Hoffmann’s	‘Mademoiselle	
Scuderi,’”	Women	in	German	Yearbook	24	(2008):	4.	
5	Truthfulness	—	or,	at	any	rate,	telling	things	the	way	one	sees	them	—	is	at	stake	in	this	story,	as	opposed	
to	reliability	—	i.e.,	if	an	individual	says	he	will	do	something,	how	likely	is	it	that	he	will	follow	through	
and	do	it	—	which	is	a	different	kind	of	trust.	
	 Olli	Lagerspetz	does	not	consider	trust	an	emotion	because	it	“rather	seems	to	be	characterized	by	
the	fact	that	a	number	of	beliefs	and	emotions	—	such	as	certain	suspicions	or	fears	—	fail	to	appear”	
(Trust:	The	Tacit	Demand	(Dordrecht:	Kluwer	Academic	Publishers,	1998),	15).	This	objection,	however,	is	
an	argument	precisely	for	considering	trust	to	be	an	emotion	according	to	the	parameters	of	this	project:	
firstly,	the	multiplicity	of	factors	to	which	Lagerspetz	alludes	is	an	indication	that	trust	should	be	counted	
among	the	composite	processes	that	are	the	focus	here;	and	secondly,	if	fear	or	suspicion	is	the	result	of	a	
composite	evaluation	of	a	situation	to	the	effect	that	it	is	somehow	threatening	to	one’s	well-being,	then	the	
opposite	evaluation	(or	judgment)	that	it	is	not	threatening	is	of	the	same	nature,	and	therefore	they	both	
ought	to	be	considered	emotions.	The	absence	of	suspicion	need	not	entail	the	absence	of	emotion	if	there	
is	an	opposite	affective	response	in	the	positive	spectrum,	something	akin	to	the	feeling	of	well-being	or	
satisfaction	—	in	this	case,	satisfaction	that	the	decision	to	rely	on	a	person	will	lead	to	a	good	outcome.	
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	 This	chapter	deals	with	the	generation,	course	of	development,	and	consequences	of	two	
emotions:	trust	and	sympathy.6	Scuderi’s	level	of	trust	or	mistrust	at	various	points	in	the	
narrative	has	an	influence	on	her	progress	in	unraveling	the	mystery	of	the	jewel	murders.	The	
king’s	sympathy	or	lack	thereof	affects	his	decision	regarding	the	Brußon	case.	Composite	
evaluations	are	especially	influential	for	Scuderi	in	matters	of	trust,	while	hierarchization	is	a	
decisive	factor	in	her	supplication	to	the	king;	but	there	is	also	significant	crossover	of	the	issues	
in	both	instances.	
	
I.	Whom	To	Trust?	—	Questions	of	Intuition	
	 Trust	can	be	based	on	an	empirical	observation	to	the	effect	that	since	an	individual	has	
historically	behaved	in	a	certain	way	under	given	circumstances,	one	may	reasonably	expect	him	
also	to	behave	in	this	way	under	the	present,	similar	circumstances.7	Yet	this	simple	formulation	
fails	to	capture	the	complexity	of	trust;	it	is	in	fact	a	leap	from	a	generalized	set	of	circumstances	
to	a	specific	instance.	The	mind	must,	as	a	first	step,	identify	a	pattern	of	behavior;	and	as	a	
second	step,	it	must	make	the	judgment	that	the	present	situation	meets	the	criteria	for	
belonging	to	the	behavior	pattern.8	This	process	is	a	composite	evaluation	whose	multiple	steps	
mean	that	there	are	many	points	at	which	it	could	go	wrong.	It	involves	sorting	through	a	large	
                                                
6	Whereas	the	the	judicial	elements	and	the	portrayal	of	artists	in	Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi	have	received	
widespread	scholarly	attention,	less	has	been	paid	to	the	internal	psychological	processes	that	are	at	the	
center	of	this	chapter.	Critics	often	describe	Scuderi’s	process	as	‘intuitive’	but	do	not	analyze	the	nature	of	
the	intuition	(see	notes	9	and	19	below).	
7	Empirical	observation	of	behavior	patterns	is	one	major	basis	for	trusting;	another,	which	lies	beyond	the	
scope	of	this	project,	is	mutual	self-interest,	or,	as	Russell	Hardin	calls	it,	“encapsulated	interest”	(Trust	and	
Trustworthiness	(New	York:	Russel	Sage	Foundation,	2002),	3).	
8	Hardin	discusses	the	potential	for	both	cognitive	and	noncognitive	(e.g.,	affective)	components	to	
contribute	to	trust	(Trust	and	Trustworthiness,	68),	as	well	as	the	central	role	of	judgement	and	the	
formation	of	rational	expectations	in	trust	(ibid.,	113f.).	
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amount	of	information	to	select	out	salient	details	or	reduce	it	down	to	a	manageable	conclusion.9	
Several	parts	of	Hoffmann’s	novella	show	how	composite	evaluations	help	or	hinder	the	
understanding	of	a	situation,	depending	on	the	circumstances;	but	on	the	whole,	Scuderi’s	
intuitive	feelings	of	trust	or	mistrust	do	much	to	aid	her	understanding	by	alerting	her	to	salient	
details	about	the	other	characters’	personalities,	whereas	her	reasoning	—	at	least	initially	—	is	
inconclusive	or	even	mistaken.	
	 Before	turning	to	Scuderi’s	interactions	with	the	other	characters,	it	is	appurtenant	to	
survey	how	she	becomes	entangled	in	a	murder	mystery.	The	plot	of	Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi	is	
loosely	based	on	historical	events	during	the	reign	of	Louis	XIV,	and	the	titular	character	is	
modeled	after	Madeleine	de	Scudéry,	a	popular	and	successful	author	of	novels.	In	the	novella,	
lovers	carrying	gifts	of	jewelry	after	dark	are	being	stabbed	in	the	heart	or	else	knocked	
unconscious,	their	jewels	are	stolen,	and	the	attacker	always	seems	to	vanish	despite	the	best	
efforts	of	the	authorities.	
	 The	story	opens	with	a	nocturnal	visit	to	Scuderi’s	home	by	a	mysterious	man,	whom	the	
servants	deny	an	audience	with	Scuderi	herself	but	who	insists	on	leaving	a	small	box	for	her.	The	
man’s	exit	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	there	is	a	citywide	curfew	in	effect,	and	Hoffmann	takes	
this	opportunity	to	enter	a	flashback	mode	that	recounts	a	string	of	poisonings	initiated	by	
Madame	de	Brinvilliers	and	the	subsequent	involvement	of	the	Chambre	ardente,	a	special	
tribunal	charged	with	discovering	who	is	behind	the	crimes.10	This	narrative	provides	background	
                                                
9	For	further	thoughts	on	how	large	quantities	of	information	—	particularly	of	the	visual	and	aural	variety	
—	are	handled	in	the	novella,	see	Sheila	Dickson,	“Devil’s	Advocate?	The	Artistic	Detective	in	E.T.A.	
Hoffmann’s	Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi,”	Forum	for	Modern	Language	Studies	29,	no.	3	(1993):	246–256.	
Dickson	recognizes	the	important	role	of	intuition	in	Scuderi’s	investigations	but	views	it	as	subjective,	
prejudiced,	and	inferior	to	more	‘rational’	—	or,	in	my	terms,	linear	and	conscious	—	thought	processes.	
10	An	analysis	of	how	early	nineteenth-century	discourses	on	the	topic	of	criminal	proceedings	relate	to	
Hoffmann’s	depictions	of	such	things	in	the	novella	can	be	found	in	Antonia	Eder,	“‘Welch	dunkles	
Verhältnis	der	Dinge’:	Indizienlese	zwischen	preußischer	Restauration	und	französischem	
Idealabsolutismus	in	E.T.A.	Hoffmanns	‘Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi,’”	in	Spiegelungen	—	Brechungen.	
Frankreichbilder	in	deutschsprachigen	Kulturkontexten,	ed.	Veronique	Liard	(Berlin:	Trafo,	2011),	263–285.	
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for	the	main	plot	as	well	as	illustrating	the	inquisitorial	nature	of	the	Chambre	ardente,	which	
becomes	significant	later.	The	exposition	of	the	poisoning	affair	transitions	naturally	into	an	
explanation	of	the	circumstances	surrounding	the	murders	taking	place	in	the	narrative	present,	
which	have	all	of	Paris	uneasy.	King	Louis	XIV	is	initially	hesitant	to	give	free	reign	to	the	—	in	his	
eyes	overzealous	—	Chambre	ardente	in	the	matter	of	the	murders;	however,	a	group	of	
concerned	citizens	belonging	to	the	class	usually	targeted	by	the	attacker	sends	him	a	poem	
depicting	in	dramatic	fashion	the	dangers	currently	faced	by	Parisian	lovers.	Wanting	a	second	
opinion	on	the	poem,	the	king	consults	first	the	Marquise	de	Maintenon,	his	second	wife,	and	
then	Scuderi,	who	also	happens	to	be	present	at	court	due	to	her	friendship	with	Maintenon.	
Requesting	Scuderi’s	opinion	is	a	logical	move,	since	she	is	a	writer	herself,	and	indeed	she	replies	
in	writerly	fashion	with	a	provocative	couplet:	“Un	amant	qui	craint	les	voleurs	/	n’est	point	digne	
d’amour.”11	(A	lover	who	fears	thieves	is	not	worthy	of	love.)	
	 The	novella	then	explains	that	this	event	had	occurred	on	the	day	before	Scuderi	was	
visited	by	the	insistent	stranger,	thus	bringing	the	narrative	back	to	the	present.	The	stranger’s	
box	turns	out	to	contain	a	magnificent	necklace	and	bracelets,	as	well	as	a	letter	that	begins	by	
quoting	the	very	same	couplet	which	Scuderi	had	uttered	the	day	before,	followed	by	a	message	
from	“die	Unsichtbaren”	(797)	thanking	her	for	influencing	the	king	not	to	step	up	the	efforts	to	
halt	the	nighttime	attacks.	She	is	quite	upset	by	the	interpretation	of	her	“Worte,	halb	im	Scherz	
hingeworfen”	(797)	as	an	apology	for	the	murders.	Perhaps	she	meant	them	only	as	a	literary	
device,	displaying	“ritterlichen	Geist”	(795),	but	they	had	a	real-world	effect	on	the	king.	That	the	
                                                
11	E.T.A.	Hoffmann,	Sämtliche	Werke	in	sechs	Bänden,	ed.	Hartmut	Steinecke	and	Wulf	Segebrecht	with	the	
cooperation	of	Gerhard	Allroggen,	Friedhelm	Auhuber,	Hartmut	Mangold,	and	Ursula	Segebrecht,	vol.	4,	
Die	Serapionsbrüder,	ed.	Wulf	Segebrecht	with	the	cooperation	of	Ursula	Segebrecht	(Frankfurt	a.M.:	
Deutscher	Klassiker	Verlag,	2001),	795.	Subsequent	page	numbers	given	in	parentheses	within	this	chapter	
refer	to	this	volume.	
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latter	is	subject	to	being	influenced	through	narrative	forms	plays	an	important	role	later	in	the	
novella,	when	Scuderi	attempts	to	convince	him	to	pardon	Brußon.	
	 Seeking	counsel,	Scuderi	shows	the	box	and	its	contents	to	Maintenon,	who	immediately	
recognizes	the	jewelry	as	the	work	of	René	Cardillac,	the	most	renowned	artisan	in	Paris.	They	
summon	Cardillac	in	the	hopes	that	he	can	name	the	person	for	whom	he	crafted	these	pieces	
and	thereby	provide	a	lead	in	the	murder	case.	He	tells	them	that	he	made	these	particular	pieces	
only	for	himself	and	that	they	subsequently	disappeared	from	his	workshop,	whereupon	
Maintenon	and	Scuderi	assume	that	they	were	stolen.	Cardillac	then	offers	them	as	a	gift	to	
Scuderi	and	leaves	abruptly	in	great	haste.	
	 This	is	how	Scuderi,	somewhat	accidentally,	finds	herself	involved	in	the	matter	of	the	
murders.	She	eventually	manages	to	find	out	what	is	really	going	on:	there	is	no	band	of	robbers,	
as	the	civil	authorities	believe,	but	rather	just	one,	very	well-informed	killer:	René	Cardillac	
himself,	whose	extreme	obsession	with	his	own	creations	had	driven	him	to	commit	murder	to	
get	them	back.12	Yet	although	Scuderi	unravels	the	case,	she	faces	at	the	end	of	the	novella	a	
trying	situation	in	which	the	plain	facts	are	of	little	use:	Cardillac	is	fatally	stabbed,	and	his	
apprentice,	Olivier	Brußon,	who	was	with	him	when	he	died,	is	incorrectly	blamed	for	his	death	
and	imprisoned.	Eventually,	Brußon’s	release	is	secured,	though	not	without	considerable	
difficulties	which	will	be	discussed	later	in	this	chapter.	First,	however,	it	is	worth	taking	a	look	at	
Scuderi’s	interactions	with	three	of	the	major	characters	in	particular,	since	the	ways	in	which	
they	affect	her	are	revealing	of	how	intuition	functions	as	a	means	of	evaluating	people.	The	
                                                
12	Cardillac’s	obsession	is,	among	other	things,	a	reflection	of	his	ideal	of	radical	autonomy	in	art.	Scuderi,	
whose	works	garnered	broad	popular	appeal	but	were	generally	considered	to	lack	true	genius,	embodies	
the	other	extreme	of	a	highly	sociable	artistic	ideal.	However,	Burkhard	Dohm	argues	that,	albeit	modern	
and	radical,	Cardillac	lacks	autonomy	as	a	result	of	the	aftereffects	of	his	prenatal	trauma	(“Das	
unwahrscheinliche	Wahrscheinliche:	zur	Plausibilisierung	des	Wunderbaren	in	E.T.A.	Hoffmanns	‘Das	
Fräulein	von	Scuderi,’”	Deutsche	Vierteljahrsschrift	für	Literaturwissenschaft	und	Geistesgeschichte	73,	no.	2	
(1999):	316).	
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emotion	of	trust	—	which	is	about	deciding	whether	someone	should	be	believed	—	is	crucial	to	
working	out	the	details	of	the	mystery.	Prior	to	the	resolution,	Scuderi	has	cause	to	question	her	
trust	in	each	of	these	characters,	in	some	cases	due	to	a	conscious	thought	process	and	in	others	
due	to	her	intuition.	She	uses	her	feelings	to	guide	her	towards	the	solution	to	the	mystery,	but	
not	in	a	vague	sense;	rather,	these	“feelings”	are	actually,	on	closer	analysis,	evaluations	of	
character.	However,	because	they	are	composites	based	on	narratives,	they	may	seem	to	lack	a	
basis	in	reason	though	they	actually	do	not.	
	 The	concept	of	‘intuition’	certainly	applies	whenever	Scuderi’s	“Ahnungen”	are	mentioned,	
but	in	addition,	this	faculty	is	often	referred	to	in	common	speech	as	a	‘feeling’	that	such	and	such	
was	the	case,	which	seems	to	apply	to	several	of	the	usages	of	“Gefühl”	in	the	novella.13	The	
slightly	ambiguous	terminology	actually	suggests	productive	ways	of	thinking	about	intuitions	
and	emotions.	While	the	two	can	be	differentiated	in	that	intuition	can	be	purely	cognitive	and	
need	not	necessarily	have	an	affective	component,	quite	often	it	does.	Furthermore,	a	defining	
characteristic	of	intuition	is	that	it	seems	to	‘come	out	of	nowhere.’	While	some	have	attributed	
this	to	outside	influences	or	supernatural	causes,	there	is	no	need	to	do	so:	intuitions	with	this	
quality	can	be	explained	as	products	of	evaluations	that	occur	on	a	subconscious	or	semiconscious	
level.	Because	the	subject	is	not	consciously	aware	of	the	cognitive	steps	taken	in	order	to	arrive	at	
the	conclusion,	it	seems	mysterious.	Emotions	can	and	often	do	occur	in	the	same	way.14		
                                                
13	Examples	of	“Gefühl”	being	used	to	refer	not	to	an	affective	state,	but	rather	to	a	cognitive	evaluation	that	
something	is	the	case,	include	la	Regnie’s	statement	about	Scuderi’s	trust	in	“Euerm	Gefühl,	der	innern	
Stimme”	(816),	as	well	as	the	narrative	instance’s	reference	to	Scuderi	being	betrayed	“vom	innern	Gefühl”	
(817),	which	had	indicated	to	her	that	Brußon	was	innocent;	and	Brußon’s	use	of	“Gefühl”	(824)	to	refer	to	
his	dawning	awareness	during	childhood	of	his	parents’	desperate	financial	straits.	
14	Both	intuitions	and	emotions,	as	subconscious	processes,	fall	under	the	category	of	what	Daniel	
Kahneman	discusses	as	“System	1,”	whereas	reasoning,	linear	thinking	is	a	conscious	process	that	falls	under	
the	category	of	“System	2.”	However,	Kahneman	tends	to	regard	unconscious	processes	as	less	complex	
than	conscious	ones;	for	example,	he	mentions	cases	in	which	System	1	erroneously	substitutes	the	answer	
to	a	simpler,	related	question	for	the	more	complex	answer,	which	is	not	readily	calculable,	but	leads	to	the	
correct	result.	While	this	type	of	thought	error	is	very	helpful	in	explaining	biases,	which	are	a	major	focus	
of	Kahneman’s	research,	it	constitutes	only	a	subset	of	the	possible	ways	in	which	unconscious	thought	
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	 Intuitions	represented	in	literature	can	fall	anywhere	on	the	scale	between	the	rationally	
explicable	and	the	outright	supernatural,	but	they	usually	have	at	least	some	degree	of	mystery	to	
them	—	again,	this	sense	of	‘coming	out	of	nowhere.’	While	it	is	the	case	that	the	origins	of	
Scuderi’s	“Ahnungen”	are	obscure,	Hoffmann’s	text	does	in	fact	provide	the	necessary	
components	to	construct	an	explanation	for	them,	and	thus	there	is	no	need	to	surrender	
intelligibility.15	In	part,	this	is	the	nature	of	a	good	detective	story:	the	clues	are	present	all	along,	
but	one	does	not	immediately	see	them.	On	subsequent	readings,	with	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	
details	that	before	seemed	unimportant	take	on	a	new	significance.	
	
A.	The	Guilty	One	
	 This	is	nowhere	more	applicable	than	in	the	case	of	René	Cardillac,	the	first	such	character	
about	whom	Scuderi	has	intuitions	of	a	mixed	nature.	Immediately	after	Maintenon	names	
Cardillac	as	the	only	possible	creator	of	the	jewelry	delivered	to	Scuderi,	the	novella	makes	a	
digression	(delivered	by	the	third-person	omniscient	narrative	voice)	in	order	to	give	a	general	
sketch	of	this	character,	including	a	strikingly	quotable	epithet:	“einer	der	kunstreichsten	und	
zugleich	sonderbarsten	Menschen	seiner	Zeit”	(799).	This	not	only	serves	to	fill	in	the	reader	on	
some	interesting	details	about	this	particular	character;	it	is	also	information	about	Cardillac’s	
reputation,	which	is	known	“in	ganz	Paris”	(799)	and	therefore	—	and	most	importantly	in	this	
                                                                                                                                                       
processes	can	function.	This	project	operates	according	to	the	hypothesis	that	the	reverse	is	very	often	the	
case	—	that	unconscious	processes,	being	the	result	of	evaluations	on	multiple	levels,	can	be	just	as	if	not	
more	complex	than	conscious	ones	—	and	explores	several	examples	of	this.	See	Kahneman,	Thinking,	Fast	
and	Slow	(New	York:	Farrar,	Straus	and	Giroux,	2011),	20f.	and	12.	
15	The	rational	explicability	of	events	in	the	novella	is	emphasized	by	Henriette	Herwig,	“‘Das	Fräulein	von	
Scuderi’:	zum	Verhältnis	von	Gattungspoetik,	Medizingeschichte	und	Rechtshistorie	in	Hoffmanns	
Erzählung,”	in	E.T.A.	Hoffmann.	Romane	und	Erzählungen,	ed.	Günter	Saße	(Stuttgart:	Reclam,	2004),	208.	
The	opposite	claim	of	irrationality	is	usually	directed	at	Cardillac’s	psychological	makeup,	not	at	the	
internal	causal	chain	of	the	novella.	
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context	—	by	Scuderi.16	This	information	is	in	fact	what	forms	the	background	—	the	mental	
landscape,	so	to	speak	—	for	how	Scuderi	perceives	Cardillac	in	the	following	scene,	Cardillac’s	
audience	with	Maintenon	and	Scuderi,	which	follows	directly	after	the	digression.		
				 The	description	of	Cardillac	presents	a	clash	of	perspectives:	on	the	one	hand,	one’s	
reputation	in	society,	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	issue	of	how	to	read	personality	through	
physiognomy,	as	in	this	example:	“Wäre	Cardillac	nicht	in	ganz	Paris	als	der	rechtlichste	
Ehrenmann,	uneigennützig,	offen,	ohne	Hinterhalt,	stets	zu	helfen	bereit,	bekannt	gewesen,	sein	
ganz	besonderer	Blick	aus	kleinen,	tiefliegenden,	grün	funkelnden	Augen	hätte	ihn	in	den	
Verdacht	heimlicher	Tücke	und	Bosheit	bringen	können.”	(799)	In	hindsight,	of	course,	this	
passage	has	quite	a	different	meaning,	since	the	generally	agreed-upon	perception	of	Cardillac	
turns	out	to	be	false.	However,	it	is	not	entirely	clear	to	whom	the	other	perspective	should	be	
attributed.	On	one	level,	these	are	the	words	of	the	omniscient	narrator,	though	it	is	important	to	
note	that	the	narrative	instance	performs	the	function	of	delivering	the	‘general	opinion.’	This	can	
be	deduced	from	the	fact	that	the	narrator	gives	Cardillac	all	of	these	positive	bywords	despite	
‘knowing’	that	he	turns	out	to	be	the	murderer	in	the	end.	However,	another	possibility	is	that	the	
subjunctively	suggested	“Verdacht	heimlicher	Tücke	und	Bosheit”	actually	does	exist	in	people’s	
minds	subconsciously	but	is	merely	being	ignored	due	to	Cardillac’s	impeccable	reputation.	This	
reputation	is	stronger	than	any	suspicions	and	is	at	the	forefront	of	people’s	thoughts	because	it	is	
consistent	with	certain	latent	beliefs	they	hold	about	what	constitutes	an	upstanding	citizen.	
Cardillac	creates	—	with	great	skill	—	jewelry	that	is	both	pleasing	to	the	eye	and	useful	for	
winning	over	a	lover;	because	the	Parisians	hold	the	latent	beliefs	that	beautiful	objects	are	
                                                
16	Further	discussion	of	the	way	appearances	drive	the	society	that	populates	Hoffmann’s	novella	can	be	
found	in	Landfester,	who	discusses	the	reality-distorting	aspects	of	the	“Großstadt”	as	a	setting	(“Um	die	
Ecke	gebrochen,”	112);	Röder,	who	examines	the	hypocrisy	of	multiple	societal	factions	(Study	of	the	Major	
Novellas,	39–47);	and	Hartmut	Mangold,	who	describes	the	atmosphere	as	“ein	Klima	allseitigen	
Mißtrauens”	(Gerechtigkeit	durch	Poesie:	rechtliche	Konfliktsituationen	und	ihre	literarische	Gestaltung	bei	
E.T.A.	Hoffmann	(Wiesbaden:	Deutscher	Universitäts	Verlag,	1989),	262).	
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valuable	and	that	a	man	who	brings	a	gift	of	jewelry	is	worthy	of	affection,	they	hold	the	creator	in	
high	esteem.	This	is	an	example	of	a	common	social	phenomenon	whereby	an	individual	who	
does	something	of	which	society	approves	is	therefore	automatically	assumed	to	have	good	
character.	The	cognitive	activity	behind	it	constitutes	an	irrational	thought	process,	since	it	is	
based	on	a	false	premise	that	equates	the	pleasurable	with	the	ethical,	thereby	shortsightedly	
confusing	individual	utility	with	the	general	good.	Such	an	assumption	indirectly	points	to	a	
danger	in	placing	too	much	emphasis	on	unreflected,	unquestioned	values:	by	superficially	
focusing	on	their	own	pleasure	to	the	exclusion	of	other	considerations,	the	Parisians	overlook	
important	aspects	of	Cardillac’s	character	which	have	serious	consequences.	The	epithets	applied	
to	Cardillac	are	so	similar	that	they	start	to	sound	hollow	after	a	few	repetitions,	as	if	people	were	
merely	reciting	from	a	memorized,	internalized	script.	A	stark	contrast	forms	when	Count	
Miossens	then	inverts	the	practice	near	the	end	of	the	novella	by	calling	him	“der	verruchteste,	
heuchlerisch[s]te	Bösewicht”	(845),	an	epithet	that	emphasizes	the	discrepancy	between	
expectation	and	actuality.	
	 Returning	to	the	passage	quoted	above	that	describes	Cardillac’s	eyes	and	gaze,	it	is	
interesting	to	note	the	way	that	physical	appearance	is	presumed	to	be	connected	with	certain	
personality	characteristics.17	Such	references	are	quite	problematic:	on	the	one	hand,	the	notion	
that	people	with	beady	green	eyes	are	any	sneakier	or	more	malevolent	than	others	is	obviously	
outdated	and	absurd;	on	the	other	hand,	there	is	no	clear	line	in	the	text	between	description	of	
physical	characteristics	and	interpretation.	Specifically,	the	comment	about	“sein[en]	ganz	
besondere[n]	Blick”	seems	to	be	less	about	how	Cardillac’s	eyes	are	than	about	how	he	uses	them	
—	in	other	words,	it	is	about	his	expression,	which	could	potentially	give	information	about	his	
                                                
17	On	the	role	of	physiognomic	evaluations	in	the	novella,	see	also	Kremer,	Erzählungen	und	Romane,	157;	
and	Caroline	Gommel,	Prosa	wird	Musik:	von	Hoffmanns	“Fräulein	von	Scuderi”	zu	Hindemiths	“Cardillac”	
(Freiburg	im	Breisgau:	Rombach,	2002),	114.	
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inner	state.	Although	there	is	not	enough	information	in	this	particular	passage	to	make	any	
definitive	claims,	a	usual	interpretation	of	body	language	is	that	a	person	who	has	something	to	
hide	might	tend	to	look	around	carefully	in	order	to	notice	anything	that	has	the	potential	to	
expose	him.	This	could	suggest	a	sneaky	disposition,	though	only	in	combination	with	other	
aspects	of	behavior,	since	there	might	be	other	reasons	for	an	individual	to	cast	about	his	gaze.	
Reading	appearances	can	thus	also,	like	intuitions	and	emotions,	be	an	issue	of	making	a	
composite	evaluation.		
	 By	providing	an	extended	digression	on	Cardillac’s	various	personal	characteristics,	what	
the	narrative	in	effect	accomplishes	is	to	share	with	the	reader	the	information	available	to	
Scuderi,	and	thus	allow	for	an	understanding	of	why	she	reacts	to	him	in	the	way	that	she	does.	
Basically,	she	attributes	his	strange	behavior	to	artistic	eccentricity,	since	he	has	a	reputation	for	
that,	and	neither	finds	it	suspicious	nor	feels	compelled	to	look	deeper	into	the	matter.	But	as	it	
turns	out,	Cardillac’s	particular	form	of	eccentricity	has	all	along	been	linked	to	the	aspect	of	his	
personality	that	drives	him	to	become	a	murderer	and	a	thief.18	Cardillac	is	rather	a	case	of	an	
individual	being	misinterpreted	by	society	in	general.	His	‘reputation’	is	based	more	on	how	
people	want	him	to	be	than	on	his	behaviors	and	actions.	Society	fits	him	into	its	pre-existing	idea	
of	‘the	artist.’	Cardillac	is	particularly	susceptible	to	this	sort	of	simplistic	categorization	because,	
as	artists	go,	he	is	of	a	variety	that	is	particularly	welcome	to	society:	he	makes	objects	that	are	a	
source	of	pleasure	to	all,	not	just	to	a	select	few,	and	he	is	not	the	sort	of	artist	who	provokes	
people	or	makes	them	feel	uncomfortable	and	question	themselves.	Even	eccentricity	can	become	
a	stereotype	in	the	hands	of	a	thoughtless	society.	Society	fits	what	it	sees	into	its	vision	of	‘the	
                                                
18	The	question	of	whether	Cardillac	is	accountable	for	his	actions	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	analysis,	but	
has	been	dealt	with	in	numerous	other	studies;	see,	for	example,	Herwig,	“Gattungspoetik,	
Medizingeschichte	und	Rechtshistorie,”	209;	Christian	Jürgens,	Das	Theater	der	Bilder:	ästhetische	Modelle	
und	literarische	Konzepte	in	den	Texten	E.T.A.	Hoffmanns	(Heidelberg:	Manutius,	2003),	79–81;	and	Röder,	
Study	of	the	Major	Novellas,	46f.	
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eccentric	artist,’	all	the	while	failing	to	recognize	the	specific	features	of	this	particular	eccentric	
—	namely,	the	element	of	dangerous	pathological	compulsion.	
	 After	Cardillac’s	abrupt	departure,	Maintenon	teases	Scuderi	about	having	an	admirer,	
since	Cardillac’s	behavior	towards	her	did	bear	a	certain	superficial	resemblance	to	that	of	an	
infatuated	lover.	(Or,	at	any	rate,	it	seemed	to	indicate	that	he	was	experiencing	a	strong	passion;	
however,	the	characters	are	not	able	to	differentiate	romantic	passion	from	an	artistic	passion	
that	has	become	twisted	into	a	pathological	obsession.)	By	so	doing,	Maintenon	imagines	
Cardillac’s	awkwardness	as	fitting	into	a	familiar	category,	even	though	she	knows	that	this	
cannot	be	the	real	reason	behind	it.	Scuderi	is	less	sanguine	about	aspects	of	his	behavior	that	
seem	not	to	fit	the	situation,	though	she,	too,	feels	compelled	by	her	established	favorable	opinion	
to	mistrust	her	own	misgivings:	
Und	nun	hat	selbst	Cardillacs	Betragen,	ich	muß	es	gestehen,	für	mich	etwas	
sonderbar	Ängstliches	und	Unheimliches.	Nicht	erwehren	kann	ich	mir	einer	
dunklen	Ahnung,	daß	hinter	diesem	allem	irgend	ein	grauenvolles,	entsetzliches	
Geheimnis	verborgen,	und	bringe	ich	mir	die	ganze	Sache	recht	deutlich	vor	
Augen	mit	jedem	Umstande,	so	kann	ich	doch	wieder	gar	nicht	auch	nur	ahnen,	
worin	das	Geheimnis	bestehe,	und	wie	überhaupt	der	ehrliche,	wackere	Meister	
René,	das	Vorbild	eines	guten,	frommen	Bürgers,	mit	irgend	etwas	Bösem,	
Verdammlichem	zu	tun	haben	soll.	(805)	
	
With	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	this	passage	is	revealing	of	possible	ways	in	which	an	intuitive	
thought	process	can	coexist	with	an	operation	of	conscious	reasoning.	Scuderi’s	“Ahnung”	is	her	
intuition	about	Cardillac’s	behavior.	Because	his	apparent	turmoil	while	presenting	Scuderi	with	
the	jewelry	is	out	of	proportion	to	the	immediate	surroundings,	it	is	reasonable	to	conclude	—	
assuming	intelligibility	—	that	Cardillac	has	some	other,	internal	cause	for	his	agitation.	That	this	
should	occur	in	the	present	situation	—	that	is,	in	the	context	of	the	jewelry	murders	—	is	a	
coincidence	that	Scuderi’s	intuitive	thought	processes	might	well	regard	as	suspicious.	However,	
her	intuition	coexists	with	her	regard	for	Cardillac,	which,	as	noted,	is	based	on	his	reputation.	
Scuderi	can	reach	no	conclusion	in	her	conscious	thoughts	because	her	intuition	to	mistrust	
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Cardillac	conflicts	with	her	belief	in	his	reputable	character;	and	as	yet,	she	can	see	no	cause	for	
favoring	either	interpretation	over	the	other.	
	 The	novella	does	not	simply	present	Scuderi’s	intuition	as	fact;	rather,	it	is	possible	to	
reconstruct	from	the	text	the	thought	processes	behind	it.	The	narrative	perspective	follows	
Scuderi	closely,	and	much	of	the	information	it	imparts	may	be	attributed	to	her;	so,	for	example,	
in	the	scene	with	Cardillac,	there	are	a	number	of	details	to	unsettle	her.	Cardillac	displays	“ein	
häßliches	Lächeln”	(802)	as	he	acknowledges	that	he	made	the	jewelry;	and	when	he	adds	that	he	
made	it	for	himself,	Scuderi	is	“voll	banger	Erwartung”	(803),	presumably	because	she	fears	that	
this	connects	him	with	the	string	of	murders.	However,	she	is	all	too	ready	to	believe	Cardillac’s	
lie	that	the	jewelry	disappeared	from	his	workshop.	In	some	sense,	the	jewelry	did	“disappear,”	
though	of	course	Cardillac	knows	very	well	who	is	responsible;	and	it	is	Scuderi,	not	Cardillac,	
who	labels	it	“das	Eigentum,	das	Euch	verruchte	Spitzbuben	raubten”	—	as	if	she	were	completing	
the	tale	that	the	general	populace	would	wish	to	believe	about	Cardillac.	After	all,	he	is	seen	as	
“das	Vorbild	eines	guten,	frommen	Bürgers.”	Furthermore,	after	Scuderi	explains	how	she	came	
into	possession	of	the	jewelry,	Cardillac	shows	physical	signs	which,	because	the	narrative	
perspective	revolves	around	Scuderi,	we	may	presume	are	perceived	by	her	as	well:	“Als	nun	die	
Scuderi	geendet,	war	es,	als	kämpfe	Cardillac	mit	ganz	besonderen	Gedanken,	die	während	dessen	
ihm	gekommen,	und	als	wolle	irgend	ein	Entschluß	sich	nicht	fügen	und	fördern.	Er	rieb	sich	die	
Stirne,	er	seufzte,	er	fuhr	mit	der	Hand	über	die	Augen,	wohl	gar	um	hervorbrechenden	Tränen	
zu	steuern.”	(803)	These	gestures	are	signs	of	internal	emotional	turmoil,	and	would	likewise	
factor	into	Scuderi’s	intuition	that	something	is	amiss	with	the	jeweller.	There	is	nothing	in	the	
passage	to	indicate	what	these	“thoughts”	are,	but	the	“decision”	turns	out	to	consist	in	presenting	
Scuderi	with	the	jewels	as	a	gift.	This	action,	however,	triggers	a	rapid	string	of	emotionally	laden	
reactions,	which	the	text	conveys	in	a	visually	arresting	manner	through	dashes:	“nun	stürzte	
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Cardillac	nieder	auf	die	Knie	—	küßte	der	Scuderi	den	Rock	—	die	Hände	—	stöhnte	—	seufzte	—	
weinte	—	schluchzte	—	sprang	auf	—	rannte	wie	unsinnig,	Sessel	—	Tische	umstürzend,	daß	
Porzellain,	Gläser	zusammenklirrten,	in	toller	Hast	von	dannen.	—”	(804)	Nevertheless,	Scuderi	is,	
at	this	point	in	the	novella,	not	yet	able	to	connect	her	suspicions	with	anything	concrete.	Her	
conflictedness	persists	into	the	following	evening:	although	she	makes	light	of	the	incident	in	
poetic	form	for	the	amusement	of	the	court,	the	text	describes	her	state	of	mind	while	doing	so	as:	
“alle	Schauer	unheimlicher	Ahnung	besiegend”	(806).	Otherwise,	however,	there	are	no	further	
immediate	consequences,	since	the	narrative	jumps	ahead	several	months	to	the	next	relevant	
occurrence.	
	
B.	The	Innocent	One	
	 The	second	character	about	whom	Scuderi	has	specific	intuitions	is	Madelon	Cardillac,	
daughter	of	the	jeweller.	Madelon	is	in	love	with	and	engaged	to	Olivier	Brußon,	and	is	convinced	
of	his	innocence.	The	intensity	of	her	feelings	for	him	is	what	initially	persuades	Scuderi	to	
concern	herself	with	his	fate.	Scuderi’s	intuitions	about	Madelon	are	unequivocally	positive.	She,	
the	narrative	instance,	and	Brußon	are	all	of	one	accord	in	extolling	Madelon’s	beauty,	virtue,	
piety,	youth,	and	innocence;	she	is	described	as	“den	unschuldsvollen	Engel”	(810),	an	“Engelsbild”	
(825),	“das	fromme,	engelsreine	Kind”	(830),	“das	Himmelskind”	(847),	and	an	“Engelskind”	(849).	
Trusting	that	Madelon	really	is	as	sweet	and	innocent	as	she	appears	is	important	because	it	
forms	the	origin	of	Scuderi’s	interest	in	Brußon’s	fate	and	provides	the	motivation	for	her	
engagement	on	his	behalf.	The	fact	that	Madelon	loves	Brußon	lends	credibility	to	his	claims	of	
innocence;	in	other	words,	if	Madelon	is	a	guileless	person,	then	her	attraction	to	him	suggests	
that	he	possesses	a	similar	character.	She	might	be	mistaken	and	have	fallen	for	a	scoundrel,	of	
course,	but	more	often,	like	attracts	like,	as	Scuderi	tries	to	explain	to	Chambre	ardente	president	
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la	Regnie	as	a	reason	for	her	belief	in	Brußon’s	innocence:	“Madelons	tugendhaftes	Herz,	das	
gleiche	Tugend	in	dem	unglücklichen	Brußon	erkannte!”	(848)		
	 The	hierarchization	of	ideas	also	plays	a	role	in	Scuderi’s	consideration	of	whether	to	trust	
in	Madelon	or	not.	Scuderi	not	only	listens	to	Madelon’s	account	of	the	events	on	the	night	of	
Cardillac’s	death,	but	also	makes	inquiries	of	the	servants	and	the	neighbors.	With	all	of	this	
information	at	her	disposal,	she	seeks	to	form	an	idea	of	the	relationships	between	the	three	
people	involved	in	the	incident.	As	a	result,	she	contemplates	two	ideas:	on	the	one	hand,	the	
possibility	that	Brußon	might	possess	a	violent	temper,	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	image	of	
domestic	harmony	presented	by	Madelon:	“Doch	je	begeisterter	Madelon	von	dem	ruhigen	
häuslichen	Glück	sprach,	in	dem	die	drei	Menschen	in	innigster	Liebe	verbunden	lebten,	desto	
mehr	verschwand	jeder	Schatten	des	Verdachts	wider	den	auf	den	Tod	angeklagten	Olivier.”	(812)	
This	passage	describes	how	Scuderi’s	thought	process	is	ultimately	swayed	in	the	direction	of	
believing	Madelon.	It	is	necessary	to	use	a	word	like	‘sway’	rather	than	something	more	decisive	
such	as	‘convince’	because	Scuderi’s	mental	landscape	includes	inclinations	both	trustful	and	
mistrustful.	To	‘convince’	suggests	that	one	idea	displaces	another,	thus	leaving	no	room	for	the	
coexistence	of	multiple,	conflicting	ideas.	Here,	the	first	possibility	—	that	Brußon	might	have	
struck	Cardillac	down	in	a	moment	of	anger	—	is	a	stock	idea	based	on	generalizations	about	
what	people	sometimes	do.	It	is	only	salient	insofar	as	it	might	provide	a	motive	for	a	vicious	
deed;	however,	this	depends	on	that	interpretation	being	valid,	and	there	turns	out	to	be	nothing	
to	corroborate	it	in	any	of	the	testimonies	which	Scuderi	collects.	Since	it	receives	no	sustenance	
or	confirmation	through	actual	facts,	it	fades	into	the	background.	Based	on	these	initial	
interactions	with	Madelon,	Scuderi	decides	to	try	to	intervene	on	Brußon’s	behalf,	but	her	view	of	
the	case	faces	further	challenges.		
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	 During	her	audience	with	la	Regnie,	in	which	she	pleads	Brußon’s	case	and	asks	to	speak	
with	him,	Scuderi	must	also	acknowledge	that	the	legal	—	that	is,	predominantly	reason-based	
and	linear	as	opposed	to	intuitive	and	composite	—	view	of	the	case	has	a	certain	compelling	
quality:	
In	der	Tat	konnte	sich	die	Scuderi	von	der	Schuld	des	jungen	Menschen	nicht	
überzeugen.	Alles	sprach	wider	ihn,	ja	kein	Richter	in	der	Welt	hätte	anders	
gehandelt,	wie	la	Regnie,	bei	solch	entscheidenden	Tatsachen.	Aber	das	Bild	
häuslichen	Glücks,	wie	es	Madelon	mit	den	lebendigsten	Zügen	der	Scuderi	vor	
Augen	gestellt,	überstrahlte	jeden	bösen	Verdacht,	und	so	mochte	sie	lieber	ein	
unerklärliches	Geheimnis	annehmen,	als	daran	glauben,	wogegen	ihr	ganzes	
Inneres	sich	empörte.	(817)	
	
Once	again,	Scuderi’s	inner	evaluation	of	events	conflicts	with	an	alternative	conclusion	—	here,	
one	which	lays	claim	to	a	higher	degree	of	legitimacy	on	the	grounds	that	conclusions	reached	
according	to	the	methods	of	legal	discourse	are	based	on	linear	reason,	that	it	is	therefore	clear	
what	their	terms	are,	and	that	they	are	therefore	transparent.	The	legal	viewpoint	does	not	have	
the	messiness	of	intuition.	It	purports	to	create	order	out	of	untidy	facts.	In	this	case,	however,	
the	facts	available	to	the	legal	mode	of	evaluation	are	not	exhaustive	—	as	becomes	clear	by	the	
end	of	the	novella.19	The	composite	evaluation	formed	by	Scuderi’s	interior	may	well	be	persistent	
in	her	mind	—	“outshining”	every	suspicion	—	because,	in	comparison	to	the	‘factual’	evaluation,	
it	has	room	to	accommodate	more	data:	impressions	of	Madelon,	statements	of	neighbors,	etc.	
But	her	intuitions	are	severely	shaken	upon	recognizing	Brußon	as	the	mysterious	person	who	
had	given	her	the	letter	in	her	carriage,	and	thus	also	identical	with	the	mysterious	visitor	who	
had	delivered	the	jewels.	This	connection	appears	to	her	as	a	nearly	certain	proof	that	he	must	be	
a	member	of	the	band	of	murderous	thieves.	This	causes	an	inversion	of	her	perspective:	instead	
of	relying	on	intuitions	generated	by	personal	interviews	with	Madelon	to	assure	herself	of	
                                                
19	The	contrast	between	Scuderi,	whose	investigative	method	relies	heavily	on	intuition,	and	the	Chambre	
ardente,	which	claims	to	have	‘reason’	wholly	on	its	side,	is	explored	in	Thiemo	Jeck,	Die	Anfänge	der	
Kriminalpsychologie:	zur	Verbindung	der	schönen	Literatur	und	der	Kriminologie	in	der	Romantik	und	dem	
Sturm	und	Drang	(Berlin:	Köster,	2010),	esp.	73.	
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Brußon’s	innocence,	Scuderi	now	believes	based	on	her	contact	with	Brußon	that	he	must	be	
guilty,	which	would	mean	that	she	was	mistaken	about	Madelon:	
Sie	gab	Raum	dem	entsetzlichen	Verdacht,	daß	Madelon	mit	verschworen	sein	
und	Teil	haben	könne	an	der	gräßlichen	Blutschuld.	Wie	es	denn	geschieht,	daß	
der	menschliche	Geist,	ist	ihm	ein	Bild	aufgegangen,	emsig	Farben	sucht	und	
findet,	es	greller	und	greller	auszumalen,	so	fand	auch	die	Scuderi,	jeden	Umstand	
der	Tat,	Madelons	Betragen	in	den	kleinsten	Zügen	erwägend,	gar	Vieles,	jenen	
Verdacht	zu	nähren.	(818)	
	
This	and	the	following	passage	describe	how	Scuderi	reinterprets	the	data	she	had	previously	
gathered	as	hypocrisy,	shifting	the	meaning	of	each	detail	that	had	contributed	to	her	evaluation	
of	Madelon’s	character	in	order	to	make	them	all	fit	the	opposite	evaluation	of	Brußon	as	guilty.	
Yet	the	composite	image	that	emerges	does	not	have	enough	persuasive	power	to	settle	her	mind,	
even	though	the	seeming	proof	of	Brußon’s	guilt	continues	to	present	a	significant	obstacle	to	
alternative	views:	
Ganz	zerrissen	im	Innern,	entzweit	mit	allem	Irdischen,	wünschte	die	Scuderi,	
nicht	mehr	in	einer	Welt	voll	höllischen	Truges	zu	leben.	Sie	klagte	das	
Verhängnis	an,	das	in	bitterm	Hohn	ihr	so	viele	Jahre	vergönnt,	ihren	Glauben	an	
Tugend	und	Treue	zu	stärken,	und	nun	in	ihrem	Alter	das	schöne	Bild	vernichte,	
welches	ihr	im	Leben	geleuchtet.	(818f.)	
	
The	belief	that	she	has	been	mistaken	about	Madelon	sets	off	an	internal	crisis	for	Scuderi	
because	she	believes	her	intuitions	about	people	to	be	consistently	accurate:	“So	bitter	noch	nie	
vom	innern	Gefühl	getäuscht	[…]	verzweifelte	die	Scuderi	an	aller	Wahrheit”	(817f.)	—	so	certain	
is	she	of	her	own	abilities.	Although	some	people	are	not	so	skilled	at	judging	the	character	of	
others,	Scuderi	has	empirical	experience,	gathered	over	many	decades,	that	her	intuitions	are	
reliable.	However,	her	evaluation	changes	again	as	she	hears	Madelon’s	exclamations	of	despair:	
“Die	Töne	drangen	der	Scuderi	ins	Herz,	und	aufs	neue	regte	sich	aus	dem	tiefsten	Innern	heraus	
die	Ahnung	eines	Geheimnisses,	der	Glaube	an	Oliviers	Unschuld.”	The	consequence	of	Scuderi’s	
stirrings	of	intuition	is	that	she	agrees	to	Brußon’s	(and	the	Chambre	ardent’s)	request	for	a	
private	interview.	The	audience	with	Brußon	ultimately	allows	Scuderi	to	refine	her	intuitive	
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evaluation	of	his	character,	thus	providing	her	with	more	concrete	data	than	a	second-hand	trust	
based	on	Madelon’s	assurances.	
	 In	the	case	of	Madelon	as	opposed	to	that	of	Cardillac,	both	Scuderi	and	the	‘eye	of	society’	
or	‘general	opinion’	come	up	with	what,	in	the	end,	proves	to	be	an	accurate	evaluation:	Madelon	
is	an	innocent.	Only	the	authorities	are	suspicious	of	her;	however,	this	view	is	not	shared	by	the	
populace,	and	merely	reflects	poorly	on	the	Chambre	ardente.	Comments	by	the	police	officer	
Desgrais	show	a	tendency,	not	lost	on	Scuderi,	to	care	more	about	producing	results	in	his	police	
work	than	about	serving	justice:	“‘Nun	weint	und	heult	sie,	und	schreit	einmal	übers	andere,	daß	
Olivier	unschuldig	sei,	ganz	unschuldig.	Am	Ende	weiß	sie	von	der	Tat	und	ich	muß	sie	auch	
nach	der	Conciergerie	bringen	lassen.’	Desgrais	warf,	als	er	dies	sprach,	einen	tückischen,	
schadenfrohen	Blick	auf	das	Mädchen,	vor	dem	die	Scuderi	erbebte.”	(809)	La	Regnie,	while	not	
as	overtly	bloodthirsty	as	Desgrais,	remains,	in	his	own	restrained	way,	just	as	unmoved	by	
Scuderi’s	methods	of	inquiry:	“Gewiß,	sprach	er,	gewiß	wollt	Ihr	nun,	mein	würdiges	Fräulein,	
Euerm	Gefühl,	der	innern	Stimme	mehr	vertrauend	als	dem,	was	vor	unsern	Augen	geschehen,	
selbst	Oliviers	Schuld	oder	Unschuld	prüfen.”	(816f.)	La	Regnie	implies	here	that	he	would	sooner	
trust	what	he	sees,	and	there	is	just	a	hint	of	condescension	in	his	statement,	because	even	
though	he	uses	the	formula	“mein	würdiges	Fräulein”	to	indicate	that	his	respect	for	Scuderi’s	
reputation	predisposes	him	to	acquiesce	to	her	request,	the	fact	that	he	points	out	her	gender	
suggests	that	it	is	partly	to	humor	her,	and	that	he	buys	into	the	dichotomy	according	to	which	
men	reason	and	women	feel.	But	the	eyes	can	be	deceptive.	The	eyes	merely	see,	but	the	inner	
‘feeling’	evaluates	information	from	all	sources.	What	is	relevant	is	not	merely	what	is	happening	
before	one’s	face	—	for	this	is	a	kind	of	superficiality	—	but	the	way	in	which	present	events	fit	
into	larger	contexts	and	patterns	of	behavior.	La	Regnie’s	attempt	to	discount	Scuderi’s	efforts	is	a	
bit	absurd:	she	is	using	all	of	her	faculties	to	analyze	the	case,	and	the	text	immediately	preceding	
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this	scene	contains	a	page-long	description	of	the	detective-like	steps	she	took	to	interview	people	
and	gather	evidence.	
	 Madelon	is	somewhat	troubling	as	a	character	because	she	appears	to	be	little	more	than	a	
concentration	of	nineteenth-century	(and	older)	stereotypes	about	young	women.20	However,	
there	is	reason	to	think	that	her	character	is	not	—	or	at	least	has	the	potential	not	to	be	—	quite	
as	flat	and	straightforward	as	it	at	first	appears.	Although	Desgrais’s	suspicion	of	Madelon	seems	
to	be	motivated	by	his	own	schadenfreude,	the	somewhat	less	hasty	la	Regnie	does	have	a	point:	
“Was	ist	ihr	an	dem	Vater	gelegen,	nur	dem	Mordbuben	gelten	ihre	Tränen.”	(816)	Indeed,	she	
does	seem	more	upset	about	Brußon’s	imprisonment	than	about	her	father’s	death.	Her	single-
minded	focus	on	her	lover	was	noted	by	her	father	as	well,	who	explained	it	to	Brußon	thus:	
Gleich	als	du	fort	warst,	fiel	sie	mir	zu	Füßen,	umschlang	meine	Knie	und	und	
gestand	unter	tausend	Tränen,	daß	sie	ohne	dich	nicht	leben	könne.	Ich	dachte,	
sie	bilde	sich	das	nur	ein,	wie	es	denn	bei	jungen	verliebten	Dingern	zu	geschehen	
pflegt,	daß	sie	gleich	sterben	wollen,	wenn	das	erste	Milchgesicht	sie	freundlich	
angeblickt.	Aber	in	der	Tat,	meine	Madelon	wurde	siech	und	krank,	und	wie	ich	
ihr	denn	das	tolle	Zeug	ausreden	wollte,	rief	sie	hundertmal	deinen	Namen.	Was	
konnt’	ich	endlich	tun,	wollt’	ich	sie	nicht	verzweifeln	lassen.	Gestern	Abend	sagt’	
ich	ihr,	ich	willige	in	Alles	und	werde	dich	heute	holen.	Da	ist	sie	über	Nacht	
aufgeblüht	wie	eine	Rose,	und	harrt	nun	auf	dich	ganz	außer	sich	vor	
Liebessehnsucht.	(829)	
	
Interestingly,	Cardillac’s	comment	about	infatuated	young	people	demonstrates	that	this	novella	
does	not	take	place	in	a	completely	unskeptical	universe,	totally	taken	in	by	the	notion	of	‘the	first	
love.’	The	fact	that	Madelon	actually	does	pine	for	Brußon	—	against	her	father’s	expectation	—	
suggests	that	there	is	something	out	of	the	ordinary	about	her	attachment.	Since	the	Cardillac	arc	
of	the	plot	is	concerned	with	issues	of	hereditary	transmission,	it	is	therefore	incumbent	to	
                                                
20	Helmut	Müller	notes	the	“klischeehafte	Idealität”	of	the	character	Madelon	in	Untersuchungen	zum	
Problem	der	Formelhaftigkeit	bei	E.T.A.	Hoffmann	(Bern:	P.	Haupt,	1964),	88.	
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wonder	whether	Madelon	may	not	have	inherited	something	of	her	father’s	obsessiveness,	just	as	
he	inherited	it	from	his	mother.21	
	 The	family	trait	—	or	curse,	or	“böser	Stern”	(832)	—	is	essentially	a	tendency	to	form	a	
fixation.	On	the	surface,	the	fixation	seems	to	apply	only	to	objects,	specifically	jewels.	However,	
on	closer	inspection,	there	is	a	narrative	element	involved.	It	cannot	be	a	coincidence	that	the	
jewel	to	which	Cardillac’s	mother	finds	herself	drawn	is	hanging	around	the	neck	of	a	man	with	
whom	she	has	a	history:	“Derselbe	Cavalier	hatte	vor	mehreren	Jahren,	als	meine	Mutter	noch	
nicht	verheiratet,	ihrer	Tugend	nachgestellt,	war	aber	mit	Abscheu	zurückgewiesen	worden.”	
(832)	Now,	Cardillac’s	mother	suddenly	sees	the	cavalier	as	“ein	Wesen	höherer	Art,	den	Inbegriff	
aller	Schönheit”	(832),	supposedly	due	to	the	visual	effects	of	the	jewel.	The	implausibility	of	such	
a	dramatic	transformation,	however,	is	an	invitation	to	read	the	scene	as	desire	displaced	onto	the	
jewel.22	Her	“Abscheu”	was	perhaps	as	much	an	abhorrence	of	her	own	desire	for	someone	willing	
to	take	advantage	of	her	without	regard	for	the	societal	consequences	as	it	was	a	disgust	for	the	
man	himself.	
	 In	Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi,	the	repressed	desires	of	one	generation	are	transferred	to	the	
next,	becoming	even	more	twisted	and	warped	in	the	process.23	Cardillac	narrates	his	history	as	if	
his	obsession	were	simply	inborn,	citing	a	piece	of	wisdom	about	transference	from	pregnant	
women	to	their	progeny;	while	that	seems	to	have	been	a	contributing	factor	(according	to	the	
                                                
21	Jürgens	(Das	Theater	der	Bilder,	36f.)	offers	one	perspective	on	the	transferral	from	mother	to	son.	Dennis	
Lemmler	points	out	the	similar	process	of	“inheritance”	that	had	occurred	among	the	poisoners	who	
occasioned	the	creation	of	the	Chambre	ardente	(Verdrängte	Künstler,	Blut-Brüder,	Serapiontische	Erzieher:	
die	Familie	im	Werk	E.T.A.	Hoffmanns	(Bielefeld:	Aisthesis,	2001),	334).	
22	Jewels	in	this	text	function	as	highly	effective	symbolic	repositories;	see,	for	example,	the	way	in	which	
Scuderi	comes	to	view	Cardillac’s	gift	as	stained	with	the	blood	of	the	murder	victims	(805).	See	James	M.	
McGlathery	for	a	discussion	of	the	transferral	of	desire	to	the	jewels	in	the	story	about	Cardillac’s	mother	
(Mysticism	and	sexuality,	E.T.A.	Hoffmann	(Las	Vegas:	Lang,	1981),	121).	Stefan	Bergström	points	out	that	
“stone	and	metal”	likewise	serve	symbolic	functions	in	Hoffmann’s	tale	Die	Bergwerke	zu	Falun,	which	he	
wrote	around	the	same	time	as	Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi	(Between	real	and	unreal:	a	thematic	study	of	E.T.A.	
Hoffmann’s	“Die	Serapionsbrüder”	(New	York:	P.	Lang,	1999),	83).	
23	A	discussion	of	historical	understandings	of	prenatal	influence	that	may	have	informed	Hoffmann’s	
novella	can	be	found	in	Dohm,	“Das	unwahrscheinliche	Wahrscheinliche,”	300–311.	
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logic	of	this	novella,	anyway),	he	has	also	left	something	out:	his	mother,	or	someone	else,	
evidently	told	him	the	story	of	the	encounter	with	the	cavalier	during	her	pregnancy.	In	other	
words,	there	is	an	environmental	influence	at	work	on	Cardillac	as	well,	since	he	has	knowledge	of	
this	narrative.24	The	power	of	suggestion	may	thus	also	have	contributed	to	the	direction	which	
his	obsessive	tendency	ultimately	took.25	It	is	therefore	not	unreasonable	to	fear	that	if	Madelon	
were	to	learn	the	narrative	of	her	father’s	obsession,	it	might	awaken	in	her	a	similar	twisting	and	
warping	of	her	own	passionate	nature.26	But	if,	on	the	other	hand,	she	can	be	kept	from	this	
knowledge,	then	her	obsession	can	be	lived	out	in	a	more	or	less	innocuous	way	by	possessing	its	
object:	Brußon	—	that	is,	if	his	life	can	be	saved.	Brußon’s	rigid	determination	that	Madelon	
should	never	learn	her	of	her	father’s	misdeeds,	even	at	the	cost	of	his	own	life,	might	seem	
excessive.	One	might	think:	surely	she	would	get	over	it	eventually;	or,	surely	the	loss	of	her	lover	
would	be	a	comparable	emotional	blow.	However,	the	logic	of	the	narrative	suggests	that	Brußon	
might	be	justified.	This	represents	an	exploratory	moment	in	which	the	narrative	puts	forth	a	
hypothesis	about	how	the	mind	functions,	thus	making	the	hypothesis	available	for	consideration	
of	its	plausibility.	The	concerns	of	those	closest	to	Madelon	crisscross:	Cardillac	was	convinced	
that	she	would	die	without	Brußon,	while	Brußon	is	convinced	that	she	would	die	if	she	learned	
the	truth	about	Cardillac.	And	perhaps	they	are	both	correct.	If	this	is	the	case,	then	there	is	an	
urgency	to	Brußon’s	concern	that	she	be	kept	ignorant.27	Supposing	that	she	does	carry	in	her	the	
                                                
24	Lothar	Pikulik	(“Das	Verbrechen	aus	Obsession:	E.T.A.	Hoffmann,	‘Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi’	(1819),”	in	
Deutsche	Novellen.	Von	der	Klassik	bis	zur	Gegenwart,	ed.	Winfried	Freund	(Munich:	Fink,	1993),	49)	and	
Kremer	(Erzählungen	und	Romane,	149f.)	also	note	the	narrative	basis	for	Cardillac’s	obsession.	Bergengruen	
argues	that	hereditary	transferrence	in	the	novella	functions	according	to	a	narrative	rather	than	a	
biological	logic	(“Das	monströse	Erbe,”	235–237).	
25	See	page	88	for	further	discussion	of	the	mechanics	of	suggestion.			
26	As	Röder	argues,	Cardillac	also	seems	concerned	that	Madelon	could	inherit	the	family	curse,	and	for	this	
reason	instructs	Brußon	to	destroy	the	jewels	upon	his	death	(Study	of	the	Major	Novellas,	46).	
27	Compare	Lemmler,	who	sees	more	potential	danger	for	Madelon	in	being	kept	ignorant	(Verdrängte	
Künstler,	339).	
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potential	for	obsession	that	ruined	her	father	and	grandmother,	then	Brußon’s	worries	would	not	
be	out	of	proportion.	
	
C.	The	Suspicious	One	
	 Olivier	Brußon,	as	the	third	primary	player	in	this	family	drama,	is	likewise	an	object	of	
Scuderi’s	evaluation,	and	his	case	is	fraught	with	the	most	difficulty.	Although	Scuderi’s	intuitions	
also	generate	conflicting	evaluations	about	Cardillac,	by	the	time	she	realizes	the	need	to	
contemplate	these	in	earnest,	he	is	already	dead.	Her	intuitions	about	Madelon	tend	in	one	
direction	only,	and	she	can	scarcely	entertain	the	idea	of	them	being	mistaken.	Brußon,	on	the	
other	hand,	is	entangled	in	several	narratives	that	swing	Scuderi’s	level	of	trust	back	and	forth	
between	extremes.	Her	reactions	to	him	are	shaped	by	two	recognitions:	recognizing	Brußon	as	
the	mysterious	stranger	who	had	delivered	two	messages,	and	recognizing	him	as	the	son	of	her	
foster	daughter	with	whom	she	had	lost	contact	years	earlier.	
	 The	recognition	of	her	personal	connection	to	Brußon	does	not	occur	to	Scuderi	
consciously	until	the	scene	in	which	he	is	brought	to	her	residence	to	“confess.”	Unconscious	
stirrings	of	recognition,	however,	begin	as	soon	as	she	sees	his	face	—	when	he	delivers	a	message	
urging	her	to	return	the	jewels	to	Cardillac,	which	she	is	unable	to	accomplish	on	the	following	
day.	As	the	mind	continues	to	work	even	in	sleep,	an	intuition	that	the	situation	is	extremely	
urgent	asserts	itself	in	her	dreams,	demanding	her	attention:	“Den	leisesten	Schlummer	störten	
ängstliche	Träume,	es	war	ihr,	als	habe	sie	leichtsinnig,	ja	strafwürdig	versäumt,	die	Hand	
hülfreich	zu	erfassen,	die	der	Unglückliche,	in	den	Abgrund	versinkend,	nach	ihr	emporgestreckt,	
ja	als	sei	es	an	ihr	gewesen,	irgend	einem	verderblichen	Ereignis,	einem	heillosen	Verbrechen	zu	
steuern!”	(808)	The	terminology	used	in	this	passage	is	suggestive	of	Scuderi’s	thoughts	revising	
themselves	from	a	general	to	a	judicial	context:	“leichtsinnig”	is	intensified	to	“strafwürdig”	and	
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the	“verderbliches	Ereignis”	becomes	a	“Verbrechen.”	The	discovery	on	the	following	day	that	
Cardillac	has	been	killed	during	the	night	and	Brußon	arrested	is	confirmation	that	her	intuition	
was	right	to	fear	an	impending	crime,	though	not	of	the	sort	the	authorities	suspect.	
	 The	mysteriousness	attendant	upon	Scuderi’s	interactions	with	Brußon	has	salience	
because	mystery	entails	the	promise	or	threat	of	a	narrative	behind	it,	which	assures	that	it	is	apt	
to	receive	attention.	The	ways	in	which	the	situation	presents	itself	to	Scuderi	—	as	a	“dunkles	
Verhältnis	der	Dinge,”	“die	leiseste	Ahnung”	(807),	or	“eine	dunkle	Erinnerung”	(808)	—	are	all	
signs	of	her	mind	attempting	to	reach	a	conclusion	about	what	is	going	on	around	her;	however,	
some	key	information	is	not	yet	available.	In	the	case	of	the	latter	—	the	“dunkle	Erinnerung	[…]	
als	habe	sie	dies	Antlitz,	diese	Züge	schon	gesehen”	—	the	circumstances	have	not	quite	aligned	
so	as	to	pull	the	memory	of	Brußon	the	child	from	the	unconscious,	temporally	distant	
background	into	the	conscious,	present	foreground	of	her	mind.	And	before	this	recognition	can	
take	place,	the	other	one	intervenes.	When	she	sees	Brußon	in	the	setting	of	the	prison,	which	is	
more	suggestive	of	sinister	goings-on,	it	triggers	her	recognition	of	him	as	the	same	person	who	
delivered	the	message	and	the	jewels.	Prior	to	this	moment,	her	mental	narrative	about	the	
mysterious	but	vaguely	familiar	nighttime	visitor	was	entirely	separate	from	the	mental	narrative	
she	had	been	forming	about	Madelon’s	fiancé.	The	moment	in	which	these	two	ideas	collide	gives	
Scuderi	a	shock	because	if	the	messenger	and	Olivier	Brußon	are	the	same	person,	then	the	
messages	prove	that	he	knew	something	about	the	jewel	murders,	which	causes	the	Chambre	
ardente’s	tale	to	make	a	leap	in	plausibility.28		
                                                
28	The	collision	of	two	narratives	that	occurs	here	bears	some	resemblance	to	the	superimposition	of	two	
narratives	at	the	conclusion	of	Brigitta;	see	page	120.	Scuderi’s	shock	is	akin	to	a	feeling	of	surprise	(i.e.,	the	
topic	of	chapter	three),	but	mixed	with	strong	feelings	of	revulsion	under	these	circumstances.	Another	
significant	difference,	of	course,	is	that	one	of	Scuderi’s	narratives	proves	to	be	inaccurate	and	the	shock	
therefore	unfounded.	
	 48	
	 The	authorities	had	come	up	with	an	explanation	of	how	the	slaying	of	Cardillac	
transpired	that	is	possible,	but	they	do	little	to	test	whether	it	is	likely.	As	long	as	it	fits	the	most	
prominent	facts,	they	are	satisfied	and	demand	no	more;	Scuderi,	on	the	other	hand,	approached	
them	on	the	suspicion	that	there	might	be	obscure	facts	which	would	turn	out	to	have	more	
bearing	on	the	matter:	“Sie	gedachte,	sich	von	Olivier	noch	einmal	Alles,	wie	es	sich	in	jener	
verhängnisvollen	Nacht	begeben,	erzählen	zu	lassen,	und	so	viel	möglich	in	ein	Geheimnis	zu	
dringen,	das	vielleicht	den	Richtern	verschlossen	geblieben,	weil	es	wertlos	schien,	sich	weiter	
darum	zu	bekümmern.”	(817)	During	the	interrogations,	Brußon	breaks	down	because	there	
seems	to	be	a	hole	in	his	story,	since	he	cannot	reveal	why	exactly	he	was	following	Cardillac	
without	giving	everything	away,	which	he	is	determined	not	to	do	for	Madelon’s	sake.	La	Regnie	is	
correct	in	suspecting	that	Brußon	is	hiding	something,	but	he	guesses	wrong	as	to	what	it	is.	
Without	asking	the	question	of	whether	a	person’s	character	is	trustworthy,	the	distinction	
between	a	malicious	and	a	benign	secret	is	elided	entirely.	From	an	idealized	legal	standpoint,	
trust	does	not	count,	only	facts.	However,	trust	is	what	motivates	and	guides	Scuderi	along	paths	
of	inquiry	that	eventually	allow	her	to	uncover	all	of	the	pertinent	facts.	
	 Of	course,	this	also	depends	on	other	characters	trusting	her,	too.	Brußon	confides	in	her	
his	story,	trusting	that	she	will	honor	his	request	to	keep	Cardillac’s	true	nature	from	becoming	
publicly	known.	His	confidence	in	her	is	based	on	their	personal	connection,	which	he	
remembers,	though	Scuderi	cannot	consciously	bring	it	to	mind	until	he	is	brought	to	her	house	
to	tell	his	story.	Scuderi’s	second	moment	of	recognition	in	regard	to	Brußon	is	thus	in	the	setting	
of	her	home,	rather	than	a	prison,	which	is	much	more	conducive	to	memories	of	and	
associations	with	familial	relationships	such	as	that	of	her	long-lost	foster	daughter.	Even	though	
the	actual	recognition	only	occurs	when	Brußon	says	the	name	of	his	mother	(though	one	
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probably	ought	to	make	some	allowance	for	Scuderi’s	age),	just	seeing	Brußon	in	these	
surroundings	brings	her	to	the	verge	of	remembering,	before	he	opens	his	mouth:	
Selbst	bei	den	entstellten,	ja	durch	Gram,	durch	grimmen	Schmerz	verzerrten	
Zügen	strahlte	der	reine	Ausdruck	des	treusten	Gemüts	aus	dem	Jünglingsantlitz.	
Je	länger	die	Scuderi	ihre	Augen	auf	Brußons	Gesicht	ruhen	ließ,	desto	lebhafter	
trat	die	Erinnerung	an	irgend	eine	geliebte	Person	hervor,	auf	die	sie	sich	nur	nicht	
deutlich	zu	besinnen	vermochte.	Alle	Schauer	wichen	von	ihr,	sie	vergaß,	daß	
Cardillacs	Mörder	vor	ihr	knie,	sie	sprach	mit	dem	anmutigen	Tone	des	ruhigen	
Wohlwollens,	der	ihr	eigen	(821).	
	
This	scene	is	the	first	time	Scuderi	has	a	chance	to	examine	Brußon’s	features	for	any	duration;	at	
their	first	meeting,	he	merely	threw	a	note	into	her	carriage	and	vanished	into	the	crowd,	and	at	
the	second,	she	fainted.	Since	the	relevant	information	is	buried	in	the	background	of	her	mind,	
recalling	it	is	a	gradual	process.	The	use	of	“hervortreten”	to	describe	how	the	memory	returns	
emphasizes	the	metaphorical	‘distance’	between	cognitive	components	that	are	present	to	
consciousness	and	those	that	are	not,	such	as	this	half-remembered	connection	with	the	three-
year-old	Olivier	Brußon.	
	 After	listening	to	the	adult	version	tell	what	transpired	between	himself	and	Cardillac,	
Scuderi	forms	a	fervent	desire	to	see	Brußon	exonerated	in	spite	of	her	shock	and	mistrust	upon	
recognizing	him	in	prison,	and	in	spite	of	the	case	being	unclear	from	an	ethical	standpoint.	
Although	Brußon	is	not	guilty	of	murdering	Cardillac,	the	crime	of	which	he	is	accused,	he	could	
be	held	responsible	for	the	jewel	murders,	since	he	had	learned	that	Cardillac	was	the	killer	and	
did	not	go	to	the	authorities	—	indeed,	he	would	likely	be	deemed	an	accomplice	according	to	the	
law.	There	are	two	main	issues	to	consider	regarding	Brußon’s	decision	not	to	report	Cardillac.	
Firstly,	Brußon	himself	attributes	it	to	the	fact	that	he	is	in	love	with	Madelon	and	believes	that	if	
she	found	out	the	truth	about	her	father,	it	would	wreck	her	emotionally	and	lead	to	her	death.	
Of	course,	this	is	ethically	problematic	to	place	the	well-being	of	one	beloved	person	over	the	
lives	of	numerous	strangers.	The	second	consideration,	though,	is	that	reporting	Cardillac	to	the	
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authorities	might	not	have	halted	the	murders	at	all,	since	Brußon’s	accusation	might	well	be	
disbelieved.	Several	factors	support	this	thesis:	the	reputation	of	the	Chambre	ardente	as	an	
inquisitorial	body,	Count	Miossens’	unwillingness	to	let	his	actions	become	known,	and	the	threat	
Cardillac	makes	that	any	accusation	would	fall	back	on	Brußon’s	own	head.	In	doing	so,	Cardillac	
can	rely	on	the	strength	of	his	reputation	with	the	citizens	of	Paris:	“Eigentlich,	spricht	Cardillac	
weiter,	eigentlich,	Olivier,	macht	es	dir	Ehre,	wenn	du	bei	mir	arbeitest,	bei	mir,	dem	
berühmtesten	Meister	seiner	Zeit,	überall	hochgeachtet	wegen	seiner	Treue	und	
Rechtschaffenheit,	so	daß	jede	böse	Verleumdung	schwer	zurückfallen	würde	auf	das	Haupt	des	
Verleumders”	(829).	Reputation	is	not	granted	on	the	basis	of	virtue,	yet	it	grants	the	recipient	
immunity	to	claims	of	lacking	it.29	Even	belonging	to	the	nobility	and	being	an	officer	of	the	king’s	
guard	does	not	give	Miossens	—	Cardillac’s	actual	killer,	though	it	was	in	self-defense	—	the	
confidence	that	his	reputation	could	stand	up	to	that	of	the	master	artisan;	plus,	he	shares	with	
many	Parisians	a	fear	of	overzealous	authorities:	“Hätte	la	Regnie,	überall	Verbrechen	witternd,	
mir’s	denn	geradehin	geglaubt,	wenn	ich	den	rechtschaffenen	Cardillac,	das	Muster	aller	
Frömmigkeit	und	Tugend,	des	versuchten	Mordes	angeklagt?”	(844)	Thus	there	are	sufficient	
grounds	to	take	seriously	Cardillac’s	blackmailing	of	Brußon.	However,	one	could	argue	that	the	
latter	ought	to	have	made	other	attempts	to	halt	the	murders	prior	to	his	visit	to	Scuderi.	Despite	
the	fact	that	Scuderi	does	not	hesitate	to	refer	to	Brußon’s	execution	as	“das	himmelsschreiende	
Unrecht”	(840),	his	actions	are	ethically	ambiguous	enough	that	they	could	reasonably	be	
expected	to	appear	blameworthy	to	a	third	party.	Furthermore,	the	belief	that	Brußon	does	not	
deserve	execution	depends	on	a	trust	in	his	intentions,	because	even	though	the	available	
                                                
29	In	this	context,	it	is	interesting	to	consider	Liebrand’s	discussion	of	the	ambiguities	of	Cardillac’s	
relationship	to	society	(Aporie	des	Kunstmythos,	183f.);	the	parallels	between	his	activities	as	a	murderous	
artist	and	the	activities	of	the	aristocratic	poisoners	described	at	the	beginning	of	the	novella	show	that	he	
is	a	reflection	of	this	society,	thus	providing	yet	another	factor	in	explaining	society’s	profound	resistance	to	
and	denial	of	the	truth	about	the	goldsmith’s	nature.	
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evidence	—	specifically	Miossens’	testimony	and	the	presence	of	the	secret	passage	and	jewel	
cabinet	in	Cardillac’s	house	—	is	compatible	with	Brußon’s	story,	a	version	of	events	in	which	
Brußon	was	an	accomplice	is	equally	possible,	if	he	were	lying.	By	this	point	in	the	novella,	
however,	Scuderi	can	cite	numerous	bits	of	evidence	that	speak	to	Brußon’s	character:	her	own	
memories	of	him	as	a	toddler,	the	fact	that	he	was	the	son	of	caring	parents,	Madelon’s	
recommendation,	the	openness	he	displays	during	the	interview	in	her	home,	and	the	“selige	
Vergessenheit”	(840)	of	the	two	lovers.	These	things,	taken	together,	form	a	basis	for	trusting	that	
Brußon	is	a	well-meaning	person.	The	question	then	becomes	whether	she	can	bring	a	third	party	
—	King	Louis	XIV,	as	it	turns	out	—	to	look	favorably	on	him	despite	lacking	access	to	these	
pieces	of	knowledge.	On	the	disadvantageous	side,	there	is	his	handling	of	the	Cardillac	situation	
to	consider,	which	was	not	irreproachable.	Scuderi’s	belief	that	he	should	not	be	punished	is	a	
composite	evaluation	of	these	factors,	some	of	which	are	positive,	some	negative,	and	some	
ambiguous.	In	addition,	several	of	these	factors	are	themselves	based	on	narratives	and	thus	have	
an	inherent	complexity	to	them.	Traditionally	understood	reason,	as	a	form	of	thinking,	would	
attempt	to	express	these	in	a	logically	precise	statement,	and	in	so	doing,	would	have	to	somehow	
quantify	the	influence	of	each	the	factors	on	Scuderi’s	evaluation	of	Brußon.30	This	would	quickly	
run	into	absurdities	because	the	evaluative	weighting	involved	here	is	a	matter	of	relative,	not	
absolute,	intensities.	There	are	no	clear-cut	relationships	between	the	various	terms,	so	they	
cannot	be	expressed	as	an	equation,	but	instead	only	as	a	narrative	which	describes	the	relative	
intensities	of	the	factors	and	their	relation	to	one	another.	For	example,	Scuderi’s	familial	tie	to	
Brußon	carries	a	lot	of	weight	with	her,	but	not	with	the	king,	because	this	factor	draws	its	
salience	from	its	numerous	interconnections	with	the	history	of	how	she	raised	her	foster	
daughter	from	a	child	and	the	investment	of	time	and	care	that	went	into	this	relationship,	all	of	
                                                
30	The	insufficiencies	of	logic	and	their	consequences	for	the	narrative	strategy	of	the	novella	are	discussed	
in	Gommel,	Prosa	wird	Musik,	53.	
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which	the	king	does	not	share.	Mental	connections	such	as	these	form	the	basis	for	
meaningfulness,	which	is	essentially	the	condition	of	being	interwoven	with	one’s	individual	
narratives.31	They	also	form	the	substratum	for	emotional	intensity,	since	a	large	part	of	emotion’s	
function	is	to	hierarchize	mental	components	and	direct	attention	to	what	is	important.32	
	
II.	Whether	To	Pardon?	—	A	Question	of	Sympathy	
	 The	interchange	between	Scuderi	and	King	Louis	XIV	in	which	she	attempts	to	secure	a	
pardon	for	Olivier	Brußon	reveals	much	about	how	the	mental	‘foreground’	and	‘background’	can	
have	effects	on	the	formation	of	emotions.33	Scuderi	knows	that	despite	her	firm	conviction	that	
Brußon	deserves	to	be	pardoned,	his	situation	presents	a	different	face	to	others,	at	least	initially.	
And	even	apart	from	the	king’s	disgust	at	the	whole	situation,	there	are	reasons	for	him	not	to	
want	to	pardon	Brußon.	It	has	already	been	mentioned	that	Cardillac’s	reputation	has	a	great	
power	to	resist	any	accusations;	in	fact,	even	the	king	would	hesitate	to	challenge	this	reputation,	
since	it	would	be	unpleasant	if	public	opinion	turned	against	him	on	the	belief	that	he	had	let	
Cardillac’s	murderer	go	free.	The	lawyer	d’Andilly	sums	up	Scuderi’s	task,	which	is	not	to	make	an	
argument,	but	rather	to	engage	the	king’s	sympathy:	“Keinen	Rechtsspruch,	aber	des	Königs	
Entscheidung,	auf	inneres	Gefühl,	das	da,	wo	der	Richter	strafen	muß,	Gnade	ausspricht,	gestützt,	
kann	das	alles	begründen.”	(846)	Thus	this	is	a	case	of	making	an	emotional	appeal,	which	is	an	
operation	that	has	historically	been	the	target	of	much	criticism;	and	in	fact,	Scuderi’s	story	is	
explicitly	called	a	“Falle”	(848)	at	one	point.	Before	dismissing	it	as	manipulative,	however,	it	
ought	at	least	to	be	subjected	to	a	thorough	analysis	of	what	is	happening	in	terms	of	cognitive	
                                                
31	See	page	123.	
32	“The	emotions	in	life	and	in	art	have	the	function	of	focusing	attention.”	Noël	Carroll,	“Art,	Narrative,	and	
Emotion,”	in	Emotion	and	the	Arts,	ed.	Mette	Hjort	and	Sue	Laver	(New	York:	Oxford	UP,	1997),	192.	
33	See	page	20.	
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work.34	Two	opportunities	to	better	understand	mental	hierarchies	present	themselves:	not	only	
does	Scuderi	proceed	in	accordance	with	the	way	hierarchies	are	established,	thereby	calling	
attention	to	their	mechanisms,	but	also	the	momentary	shifts	in	the	king’s	attitudes	enable	
inferences	into	how	information	is	hierarchized	within	the	brain	according	to	properties	of	
association,	temporal	immediacy,	and	emotional	intensity.	
	 What	is	at	stake	in	a	mental	hierarchy	is	the	distribution	of	attention.	In	a	pandemonium	
model,	the	most	emotionally	charged	cognitive	component	receives	the	most	attention,	thus	
allowing	for	a	non-binary	decision	between	multiple	cognitive	elements	competing	for	attention	
simultaneously.	The	scene	between	Scuderi	and	the	king	is	an	exemplary	demonstration	of	how,	
in	Noël	Carroll’s	words,	emotions	“cognitively	organize	our	perceptions	of	situations	in	light	of	
our	desires	and	values,	and	thereby	prepare	the	organism	to	act	in	its	perceived	interests.”35	
Because	interests	are	a	matter	of	perception,	they	are	both	subjective	and	contigent	upon	
circumstances.	Thus,	in	undertaking	to	influence	the	king,	what	Scuderi	is	attempting	is	to	
present	him	with	circumstances	in	a	form	and	order	such	that	he	decides	that	it	is	in	his	own	
interests	to	pardon	Brusson	—	that	is,	he	evaluates	the	act	in	this	way,	based	on	the	interaction	of	
circumstances	with	his	own	desires	and	values.	Bringing	him	to	evaluate	Madelon	as	worthy	of	
sympathy	would	form	an	intermediate	step	on	the	way	to	a	favorable	evaluation	of	Brusson’s	case,	
thus	illustrating	how	emotional	evaluations	can	become	compounded	when	one	feeds	into	
another.	
	 Eliciting	sympathy	from	the	king	entails	leading	him	to	an	understanding	of	Madelon’s	
situation,	since	this	emotion	“requires	people	to	make	imaginative	leaps	into	what	others	are	
                                                
34	Sheila	Dickson,	for	example,	goes	so	far	as	to	call	it	an	“abuse.”	I	find	this	a	rather	harsh	word	for	the	act	
of,	in	Dickson’s	own	words,	“seeking	to	change	the	king’s	mind,”	even	if	it	is	“from	one	prejudiced	view	to	
another”;	in	the	end,	all	views	are	prejudiced,	but	not	all	are	merciful	(“Black,	White	and	Shades	of	Grey:	A	
Reassessment	of	Narrative	Ambiguity	in	E.T.A.	Hoffmann’s	‘Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi,’”	New	German	Studies	
17,	no.	2	(1992/93):	140,	140n16).	
35	Carroll,	“Art,	Narrative,	and	Emotion,”	201.	
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thinking	and	feeling.”36	A	second	requirement,	that	the	sympathizer	“care	about	their	pain	and	
problems,”	can	take	a	number	of	forms;	for	example,	anger	at	what	has	happened	to	the	affected	
person(s),	anxiety	for	their	well-being,	regret	at	how	things	turned	out	for	them,	and	sadness	at	
their	plight	are	all	possible	specific	affective	responses	that	can	be	attached	to	a	feeling	of	
sympathy.	The	fact	that	these	are	emotions	in	themselves	is	an	indication	that	sympathy	is	a	
complex,	or	‘higher-order,’	emotion.	The	terms	‘sympathy’	and	‘pity’	are	usually	used	to	denote	
the	same	thing;	‘empathy’	is	sometimes	also	used	as	a	synonym,	or	else	may	be	used	to	distinguish	
a	related	phenomenon	in	which	the	empathizer	simulates	the	pain,	sorrow,	etc.	of	the	individual	
being	empathized	with.	In	that	sense,	empathy	involves	identification	with	the	target’s	actual	
feelings,	whereas	sympathy	has	more	to	do	with	a	feeling	directed	at	the	situation	of	the	target.	
Another	related	term,	‘empathic	accuracy,’	is	used	to	describe	successful	comprehension	of	
another’s	mental	state;	thus,	it	designates	a	cognitive	suboperation	that	is	also	involved	in	
sympathy,	minus	any	accompanying	affective	responses.	Sympathy’s	narrative	intertwinement	
reveals	itself	not	only	in	the	cognitive	portion,	in	which	the	sympathizer	reconstructs	the	mental	
state	of	another,	but	also	in	the	social	dimension	of	the	emotion.	Social	conditioning	plays	a	
major	role	in	determining	what	situations	elicit	sympathy;	the	emotion	is	learned,	not	inborn,	
though	children	exhibit	a	marked	aptitude	to	develop	the	capacity	for	it.37	Differences	across	
cultures	as	well	as	genders	are	particularly	pronounced	for	this	emotion.	Because	of	this,	the	
specific	cultural	narratives	and	latent	beliefs	held	by	an	individual	are	crucial	factors	in	its	
apprearance	and	progression.	These	are	precisely	what	Scuderi,	through	her	acquaintance	with	
the	king	and	knowledge	of	court	dynamics,	understands	thoroughly;	she	is	in	an	excellent	
position	to	apply	this	knowledge	in	crafting	her	plea	for	sympathy.	
                                                
36	David	Levinson,	James	J.	Ponzetti	Jr.,	and	Peter	F.	Jorgensen,	eds.,	Encyclopedia	of	Human	Emotions	(New	
York:	Macmillan,	1999),	652.	
37	See	Levinson,	Ponzetti,	and	Jorgensen,	Encyclopedia	of	Human	Emotions,	652.	
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	 Scuderi	sets	out	to	structure	an	encounter	that	presents	the	Brußon	case	from	an	unusual	
and	unfamiliar	angle	so	that	the	king,	instead	of	re-treading	the	pattern	of	thought	already	in	his	
mind,	produces	a	second,	parallel,	competing	evaluation	of	it.	Basically	she	is	showing	him	a	
second	side	—	and	maybe	the	different	sides	are	equally	valid.	To	say	otherwise	would	be	to	
assume	either	that	the	king’s	first	evaluation	ought	to	be	privileged	for	some	reason,	or	that	his	
first	evaluation	was	arrived	at	by	a	more	valid	mental	operation,	which	would	again	involve	
privileging	this	over	other	types	of	mental	operations,	for	which	the	justification	is	not	
immediately	obvious.	
	 In	contrast	to	the	way	the	novella	describes	many	emotions	in	terms	of	extremes,	often	
employing	the	polarity	of	the	divine	versus	the	hellish	in	order	to	enhance	their	impact,	this	scene	
works	by	means	of	relatively	subtle	modulations	of	emotion	—	which	is	not	to	say,	however,	that	
their	consequences	are	insignificant.	Scuderi	finds	herself	in	a	situation	that	almost	resembles	a	
game,	due	to	the	veneer	of	elaborate,	upper-class	social	conventions	that	surrounds	it;	however,	
the	levity	of	the	courtly	setting	in	which	it	plays	out	is	undercut	by	the	fact	that	Brußon’s	liberty	
and	probably	life	are	at	stake.	Aristocratic	social	interactions	can	seem	like	chess	under	any	
circumstances,	but	here	the	effect	is	intensified	because	the	ethical	complexity	of	the	situation	
necessitates	that	Scuderi	make	her	plea	to	the	king	“auf	die	geschickteste	Weise”	(846).	But	she,	
of	all	people,	is	up	to	the	task:	being	successful	as	an	author	requires	a	keenly	developed	sense	for	
what	will	move	people.38	Thus	it	is	reasonable	to	infer	that	Scuderi	is,	both	by	natural	inclination	
and	by	long	years	of	practice,	highly	skilled	at	eliciting	a	certain	emotional	response	from	others.	
Her	formation	of	a	plan	is	described	as	a	kind	of	inspiration:	“Nach	langem	Sinnen	faßte	sie	einen	
Entschluß	eben	so	schnell,	wie	sie	ihn	ausführte.”	(846)	On	the	one	hand,	the	trickiness	of	the	
                                                
38	“In	fact,	our	our	responses	to	works	of	fiction	are,	not	uncommonly,	more	highly	charged	emotionally	
than	our	reactions	to	actual	situations	and	people	of	the	kinds	the	work	portrays.”	Kendall	Walton,	
“Spelunking,	Simulation,	and	Slime:	On	Being	Moved	by	Fiction,”	in	Emotion	and	the	Arts,	ed.	Mette	Hjort	
and	Sue	Laver	(New	York:	Oxford	UP,	1997),	38.	
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situation	does	necessitate	some	reflection;	on	the	other	hand,	her	mind	is	practiced	at	creating	
scenarios	and	does	not	find	itself	at	a	loss	to	flesh	out	the	details	of	how	it	will	work,	once	the	
framework	has	occurred	to	her.	
	 Scuderi’s	staging	of	a	dramatic	scene	unfolds	in	two	phases.	First,	she	arrives	at	court	
attired	in	a	way	that	will	start	the	conversation	off	in	the	way	she	wants.	She	needs	to	approach	
the	issue	from	the	right	side	so	as	to	bring	up	the	associations	that	are	acceptable	to	the	king	and	
not	those	that	annoy	him.	Picking	up	once	again	on	the	narrative	of	herself	as	the	bride	of	the	
master	jeweller,	which	she	had	jestingly	spun	into	verse	earlier	in	the	novella	for	the	amusement	
of	the	court,	Scuderi	costumes	herself	in	imposing	black	robes,	complete	with	a	black	veil.	She	
even	wears	Cardillac’s	jewelry,	despite	having	sworn	never	even	to	consider	such	a	thing,	as	it	
seemed	to	her	to	be	symbolically	stained	with	the	blood	of	the	murder	victims.39	This	novella	
highlights	how	jewels	may	function	as	objects	of	power;	they	are	supposed	to	have	an	influence	
over	people.	This	is	the	case	when	a	lover	tries	to	use	jewels	to	help	him	win	over	his	beloved,	and	
it	is	true	in	a	distorted	sense	in	the	case	of	Cardillac’s	and	his	mother’s	obsessions.	Scuderi	
attempts	to	use	this	effect	in	her	audience	with	the	king,	with	partial	success:	the	jewels	do	catch	
his	attention	and	steer	the	conversation	in	the	desired	direction,	though	they	do	not	exercise	any	
extraordinary	powers	of	influence,	as	evidenced	by	the	outcome	of	the	scene.	Power	of	a	symbolic	
variety	such	as	this	is	only	as	strong	as	the	narrative	which	supports	it.	The	tale	of	the	“drei	und	
siebzigjährigen	Goldschmidts-Braut”	(806)	has	a	lightheartedness	matched	by	the	moderate	
                                                
39	Scuderi’s	wearing	of	the	jewels	symbolically	links	her	to	Cardillac.	These	two	characters	are	strong	
dramatic	foils	for	one	another	as	well	as	having	quite	a	few	similar	attributes.	Some	of	the	numerous	
discussions	of	the	dynamic	between	them	can	be	found	in	Gerhard	Neumann,	“‘Ach	die	Angst!	die	Angst!’:	
Diskursordnung	und	Erzählakt	in	E.T.A.	Hoffmanns	‘Fräulein	von	Scuderi,’”	in	Diskrete	Gebote.	Geschichte	
der	Macht	um	1800;	Festschrift	für	Heinrich	Bosse,	ed.	Roland	Borgards	and	Johannes	Friedrich	Lehmann	
(Würzburg:	Königshausen	&	Neumann,	2002),	198;	and	Irmgard	Roebling,	“Mütterlichkeit	und	Aufklärung	
in	E.T.A.	Hoffmanns	‘Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi’	oder:	Geistergespräch	zwischen	Berlin,	Paris	und	Genf,”	in	
Mutter	und	Mütterlichkeit.	Wandel	und	Wirksamkeit	einer	Phantasie	in	der	deutschen	Literatur;	Festschrift	
für	Verena	Ehrich-Haefeli,	ed.	Irmgard	Roebling	(Würzburg:	Königshausen	&	Neumann,	1996),	217.	
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response	it	awakens	in	the	king,	whereas	the	Cardillac	family	tendency	towards	obsession	comes	
from	the	depths	of	their	psychological	makeup	and	has	a	correspondingly	intense	effect.	
	 By	using	the	jewels	as	a	conversation	starter,	Scuderi	begins	a	suspenseful	narration	of	
how	she	herself	became	entangled	in	the	murder	case,	then	introduces	the	topic	of	Madelon,	and	
then	gradually	moves	on	to	others.	This	phase	of	the	plan	proceeds	as	Scuderi	had	hoped:	“Mit	
immer	steigendem	und	steigendem	Interesse	begannen	nun	die	Szenen	mit	la	Regnie	—	mit	
Desgrais	—	mit	Olivier	Brußon	selbst.”	(847)	As	the	succession	in	this	sentence	indicates,	by	
availing	herself	of	the	power	of	narrative	to	awaken	interest,	Scuderi	is	able	to	proceed	along	an	
indirect	path	—	though	of	course	these	events	are	all	interconnected	—	to	the	topic	of	Brußon,	all	
the	while	avoiding	the	king’s	negative	associations.	In	spite	of	the	fact	that	it	is	Brußon	for	whom	
Scuderi	is	pleading	and	although	he	does	receive	mention,	her	indirect	approach	means	that	the	
person	she	wants	the	king	to	pity	is	actually	Madelon;	the	latter’s	fiancé	stands	to	benefit	by	an	
act	of	displacement.	The	suspense	of	the	story	is	an	important	emotional	element	which	depends	
on	timing	the	mention	of	details	in	such	a	way	that	there	is	continually	some	new	question	about	
the	fate	of	those	involved.40	It	further	depends	to	a	large	extent	on	presenting	details	that	make	
the	people	in	the	story	vivid	—	such	as	“Madelons	wilden	Schmerz”	(847)	—	so	that	the	listener	
cares	about	their	fate.41	In	describing	the	king	as	“hingerissen	von	der	Gewalt	des	lebendigsten	
Lebens,	das	in	der	Scuderi	Rede	glühte”	(847),	the	novella	uses	a	repetitive	phrase	to	emphasize	
how	Scuderi	uses	her	storytelling	skills	effectively.	Life	is	full	of	change,	conflict,	and	
precariousness,	which	engages	the	mind	on	multiple	levels,	and	this	is	why	one	can	get	carried	
away	—	because	many	channels	of	thought	are	simultaneously	being	directed	at	what	is	being	
narrated.	In	fact,	Scuderi	intentionally	overwhelms	the	king	with	information	in	order	to	take	
                                                
40	Timing	as	a	narrative	strategy	for	producing	emotional	effects	is	further	discussed	in	chapter	three;	see	
page	137.	
41	An	especially	effective	example	of	this	is	analyzed	in	chapter	three	on	page	125.	
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advantage	of	that	very	phenomenon:	“Ehe	er	sichs	versah,	ganz	außer	sich	über	das	Unerhörte,	
was	er	erfahren	und	noch	nicht	vermögend,	alles	zu	ordnen,	lag	die	Scuderi	schon	zu	seinen	
Füßen	und	flehte	um	Gnade	für	Olivier	Brußon.”	(848)	With	all	of	his	faculties	in	use,	there	is	
hardly	room	for	the	king’s	earlier	aversion	to	Brußon	to	resurface,	creating	an	excellent	
opportunity	for	Scuderi	—	just	as	she	had	planned.	
	 As	the	king	is	considering	this	turn	of	events,	however,	one	of	his	ministers	interrupts.	
Since	suspense	is	dependent	on	the	pacing	of	the	narration,	this	gives	Scuderi	cause	for	concern.	
Emotions	have	a	temporal	trajectory,	and	the	king	would	feel	sympathy	most	strongly	shortly	
following	the	point	at	which	the	various	cognitive	elements	that	contribute	to	it	are	brought	to	
the	foreground	of	his	conscious	mind.	The	more	he	thinks	about	unrelated	business,	the	less	he	
can	contemplate	Madelon’s	plight.	After	the	initial	surge	of	feeling	has	passed,	the	vividness	—	
that	is,	the	foregrounding42	—	of	the	relevant	details	begins	to	wane.	However,	the	king	soon	
returns,	requests	to	meet	Madelon,	and	can	be	obliged	without	any	delay	because	Scuderi	has	
thought	through	the	possibilities	of	the	encounter	carefully	and	has	brought	along	Madelon:	
phase	two	of	her	plan.	Thus,	she	is	able	to	avoid	any	further	pauses	that	could	interrupt	the	
atmospheric	effect	of	the	encounter	on	the	king	and	can	let	Madelon’s	appearance	work	its	
effects:	
In	wenig	Augenblicken	lag	sie	sprachlos	dem	Könige	zu	Füßen.	Angst	—	
Bestürzung	—	scheue	Ehrfurcht	—	Liebe	und	Schmerz	—	trieben	der	Armen	
rascher	und	rascher	das	siedende	Blut	durch	alle	Adern.	Ihre	Wangen	glühten	in	
hohem	Purpur	—	die	Augen	glänzten	von	hellen	Tränenperlen,	die	dann	und	
wann	hinabfielen	durch	die	seidenen	Wimpern	auf	den	schönen	Lilienbusen.	Der	
König	schien	betroffen	über	die	wunderbare	Schönheit	des	Engelskinds.	Er	hob	
das	Mädchen	sanft	auf,	dann	machte	er	eine	Bewegung,	als	wolle	er	ihre	Hand,	die	
er	gefaßt,	küssen.	Er	ließ	sie	wieder	und	schaute	das	holde	Kind	an	mit	
tränenfeuchtem	Blick,	der	von	der	tiefsten	innern	Rührung	zeugte.	(848f.)	
	
                                                
42	See	also	page	20.	
	 59	
The	series	of	emotional	states	separated	by	dashes	is	reminiscent	of	the	earlier	passage	describing	
René	Cardillac’s	rapid	succession	of	states	at	one	point	during	his	meeting	with	Scuderi	and	
Maintenon.	Here	is	yet	another	suggestion	that	the	daughter	possesses	the	same	kinds	of	
potential	as	the	father,	though	of	course	manifesting	in	a	different	form.	Madelon	is	compared	to	
a	lily,	an	angel,	and	a	child	—	images	which,	in	this	cultural	context,	characterize	her	as	delicate,	
innocent,	and	youthful.43	The	recurrence	of	these	characterizations	of	Madelon	throughout	the	
novella	suggests	that	she	is	reliably	certain	to	be	perceived	in	this	way	under	a	variety	of	
circumstances.	The	text	likewise	makes	clear	that	Scuderi	has	noticed	the	effect	that	Madelon	has.	
Therefore,	for	the	second	phase	of	her	plan,	Scuderi	counts	on	Madelon	also	having	this	effect	on	
the	king	and	thus	eliciting	sympathy	in	the	form	of	feeling	protective	of	weakness	and	
vulnerability;	and	of	course,	the	logical	next	step	in	protecting	her	would	be	to	spare	her	feelings	
—	which	are	clearly	disturbed,	as	is	apparent	from	her	face	and	body	language	—	by	pardoning	
her	lover.	But	the	king’s	“tiefste	innere	Rührung”	is	a	stronger	reaction	than	mere	sympathy;	as	
soon	becomes	evident,	there	is	something	else	at	work	here.	For	a	moment,	the	king	seems	very	
favorably	disposed	to	grant	Scuderi’s	request;	however,	the	next	moment	brings	about	a	
significant	change	in	his	emotional	state:	
Leise	lispelte	die	Maintenon	der	Scuderi	zu:	Sieht	sie	nicht	der	la	Valliere	ähnlich	
auf	ein	Haar,	das	kleine	Ding?	—	Der	König	schwelgt	in	den	süßesten	
Erinnerungen.	Euer	Spiel	ist	gewonnen.	—	So	leise	dies	auch	die	Maintenon	sprach,	
doch	schien	es	der	König	vernommen	zu	haben.	Eine	Röte	überflog	sein	Gesicht,	
sein	Blick	streifte	bei	der	Maintenon	vorüber,	er	las	die	Supplik,	die	Madelon	ihm	
überreicht,	und	sprach	dann	mild	und	gütig:	Ich	will’s	wohl	glauben,	daß	du,	mein	
liebes	Kind,	von	deines	Geliebten	Unschuld	überzeugt	bist;	aber	hören	wir,	was	die	
Chambre	ardente	dazu	sagt!	(849)	
	
                                                
43	The	use	of	emotionally	laden	language	that	conjures	up	extremes	of	good	and	evil,	angels	and	devils,	
black	and	white	is	by	no	means	limited	to	Madelon,	but	is	applied	to	most	of	the	characters;	in	fact,	often	
both	extremes	are	applied	to	the	same	character	at	different	times.	For	a	thorough	and	convincing	
discussion	of	how	these	extremes	ironically	underline	the	inability	of	characters	to	grasp	the	ambiguities	
and	nuances	of	their	situations,	see	Dickson,	“Black,	White	and	Shades	of	Grey,”	133–157.	
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The	king’s	association	of	Madelon	with	la	Valliere,	a	former	mistress,	is	a	significant	factor	in	his	
emotional	state	and	complicates	Scuderi’s	plan	that	he	feel	sympathy	for	Madelon.	The	issue	of	
reading	appearances	arises	again	in	this	scene,	as	Scuderi’s	plan	is	to	draw	on	commonly	
recognizable	ideas	of	youthful	innocence	in	presenting	Madelon	to	the	king;	the	unanticipated	
association	with	la	Valliere	is	much	more	ambiguous,	and	it	transforms	her	appearance	into	an	
unpredictable	factor	that	can	be	turned	either	way.	At	first,	the	king	appears	to	have	a	more	or	
less	subconscious	sense	of	the	resemblance,	but	Maintenon’s	comment	brings	it	to	his	conscious	
awareness.	Madelon’s	appearance	has	been	calculated	to	arouse	sympathy	in	the	king,	but	
Maintenon	disrupts	this	process.	Lacking	Scuderi’s	skill	with	narrative,	she	proves	to	be	likewise	
less	adept	at	directing	emotion.	In	addition,	her	own	bias	may	have	moved	her	to	commit	a	
subconscious	sabotage:	a	few	days	later,	when	Scuderi	goes	to	make	discreet	inquiries	about	the	
status	of	the	Brußon	case,	Maintenon	shows	signs	of	a	jealousy	that	could	contribute	nothing	
good	to	Scuderi’s	aims:	“Fragte	sie	nun	noch	mit	sonderbarem	Lächeln,	was	denn	die	kleine	
Valliere	mache?	so	überzeugte	sich	die	Scuderi,	daß	tief	im	Innern	der	stolzen	Frau	sich	ein	
Verdruß	über	eine	Angelegenheit	regte,	die	den	reizbaren	König	in	ein	Gebiet	locken	konnte,	auf	
dessen	Zauber	sie	sich	nicht	verstand.	Von	der	Maintenon	konnte	sie	daher	gar	nichts	hoffen.”	
(850)	Scuderi	demonstrates	here	once	again	that	she	is	skilled	in	reading	people,	and	wisely	
decides	to	avoid	any	further	actions	that	could	bring	the	precariously	ambiguous	associations	
with	la	Valliere	into	the	mental	foreground	of	those	involved.	
	 The	sorts	of	images	which	one	comes	to	associate	with	a	person	have	an	impact	on	
judgments	as	to	whether	they	are	worthy	of	sympathy.	Association	involves	a	belief;	in	this	case,	
the	king	believes	that	Madelon	looks	like	la	Valliere.	However,	to	capture	what	is	significant	
about	association	requires	further	description;	one	could	believe	that	two	people	resemble	each	
other	without	experiencing	any	emotion	as	a	result,	but	in	the	case	of	an	association,	one’s	
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emotional	disposition	towards	the	first	object	is	transferred	to	some	extent	to	the	second	object.	
In	order	for	this	situation	to	arouse	the	king’s	sympathy,	he	must	believe	on	some	level	that	
Madelon	and	la	Valliere	are	similar	in	some	way,	such	that	tender	feelings	towards	the	latter	are	
transferred	to	the	former.	It	could	presumably	function	by	the	king	believing	that	Madelon	has	a	
similar	character	to	la	Valliere,	if	his	latent	beliefs	about	how	to	read	a	person	incline	him	to	
equate	exterior	with	interior	resemblance.	Earlier	passages	on	René	Cardillac’s	appearance	suggest	
that	in	the	universe	of	this	novella,	people	do	tend	to	hold	these	sorts	of	beliefs.	
	 Such	would	be	the	conditions	for	sympathy	to	occur	in	conjunction	with	the	la	Valliere	
association,	and	the	evidence	suggests	that	this	does	occur	initially,	as	the	king	appears	deeply	
moved.	It	appears,	furthermore,	that	the	association	only	retains	its	influence	so	long	as	it	
remains	unreflected,	because	as	soon	as	Maintenon	calls	attention	to	it	and	thus	propels	the	king	
into	self-awareness,	his	sympathy	towards	Madelon	receives	a	check:	“Die	Scuderi	gewahrte	zu	
ihrem	Schreck,	daß	die	Erinnerung	an	die	Valliere,	so	ersprießlich	sie	anfangs	geschienen,	des	
Königs	Sinn	geändert	hatte,	so	wie	die	Maintenon	den	Namen	genannt.”	(849)	By	putting	a	name	
on	the	king’s	association,	Maintenon	seems	to	have	prompted	him	to	remember	other	details	
about	his	history	with	la	Valliere	which	are	unfavorable	to	Madelon’s	case:	“Vielleicht	sah	er	nun	
nicht	mehr	seine	Valliere	vor	sich,	sondern	dachte	nur	an	die	Soeur	Louise	de	la	miséricorde	(der	
Valliere	Klostername	bei	den	Carmeliternonnen),	die	ihn	peinigte	mit	ihrer	Frömmigkeit	und	
Buße.”	(849)	The	crucial	detail	turns	out	to	be	how	exactly	the	king	is	affected	by	the	extremely	
ambivalent	memory	of	an	ex-lover;	that	is,	someone	for	whom	he	has	felt,	at	different	points	in	
time,	both	great	affection	and	great	disaffection.	That	the	recollection	of	la	Valliere’s	name	could	
sway	the	king’s	attitude	towards	Madelon	shows	how	one’s	mental	landscape	can	be	influenced	by	
the	specific	cognitive	factors	that	are	present	at	a	given	time,	which	is,	as	this	episode	shows,	
subject	to	outside	influences	and	chance.	The	text	also	suggests	two	other	explanations	for	how	
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Maintenon’s	comment	could	have	contributed	to	the	unfavorable	turn	in	the	king’s	evaluation	of	
Madelon:	“Mocht’	es	sein,	daß	der	König	sich	auf	unzarte	Weise	daran	erinnert	fühlte,	daß	er	im	
Begriff	stehe,	das	strenge	Recht	der	Schönheit	aufzuopfern,	oder	vielleicht	ging	es	dem	Könige	
wie	dem	Träumer,	dem,	hart	angerufen,	die	schönen	Zauberbilder,	die	er	zu	umfassen	gedachte,	
schnell	verschwinden.”	(849)	There	are	two	equally	good	possibilities	here,	and	perhaps	both	of	
them	coexist	with	the	king’s	recollections	of	la	Valliere.	The	latter,	in	particular,	describes	a	
situation	in	which	the	mechanics	of	the	mind	have	an	appreciable	influence	on	the	thoughts	and	
feelings	that	are	being	produced;	that	is,	the	element	of	surprise	causes	the	mild,	dream-like	
thoughts	to	retreat	from	consciousness	more	rapidly	than	they	otherwise	would	so	that	attention	
can	instead	be	directed	to	what	seems	more	urgent.	Yet	while	one	idea	may	be	at	the	forefront	of	
the	mind,	that	does	not	exclude	the	possibility	of	other	thoughts	having	an	influence	on	the	total	
evaluation.	An	array	of	narrative	strategies	is	necessary	in	order	to	accommodate	the	multiplicity	
of	evaluative	operations	that	are	involved.	For	this	episode	as	a	whole,	that	includes	the	lengthy,	
detailed	descriptions	of	the	characters’	gestures	and	expressions	as	well	as	the	subjunctive	
conjectures	that	discourage	the	pursual	of	only	one	line	of	interpretation.	
	 The	resultant	ambivalence	of	the	king’s	emotion	towards	Madelon	is	reflected	in	the	
action	he	takes:	although	he	does	not	grant	the	pardon,	he	makes	discreet	inquiries	and	
eventually	has	Brußon	released.44	So,	in	the	end,	the	plan	sort	of	worked,	which	is	evidence	that	
this	is	not	merely	a	case	of	a	negative	association	eclipsing	a	positive	one.	Instead,	it	seems	that	
both	continued	to	coexist	in	an	uneasy	tension,	especially	when	one	considers	the	way	the	king	
both	made	a	wedding	gift	to	Madelon	and	requested	that	she	and	Brußon	leave	the	city.	The	
intellectually	sticky	part	of	this	story	is	ultimately	neither	how	emotion	influenced	the	king’s	
                                                
44	Although	some	critics,	such	as	Gerhard	Neumann	(“Diskursordnung	und	Erzählakt,”	203),	have	
considered	Scuderi’s	attempt	a	failure	because	the	king	did	not	pardon	Brußon	on	the	spot,	this	view	does	
not	account	for	the	possibility	of	the	scene	having	an	influence	over	time	that	contributed	to	the	ultimate	
outcome.	
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decision	nor	the	answer	to	the	question	of	what	the	king	will	do,	but	rather	the	shifting	of	mental	
images	that	results	in	his	ambivalent	feelings.	The	fact	that	the	encounter	does	not	go	as	planned	
actually	makes	it	more	interesting	because	the	interference	of	the	la	Valliere	association	creates	a	
situation	in	which	two	narrative	strands	compete	for	dominance	in	the	king’s	mind,	all	the	while	
influencing	his	evaluation	of	Madelon,	an	unrelated	person	—	or	only	associatively	connected,	to	
be	precise.	The	scene	encompasses	two	levels	of	tension:	the	king’s	attitude	towards	Madelon	
competes	with	his	attitude	towards	la	Valliere,	and,	at	the	same	time,	his	image	of	la	Valliere	as	
she	was	during	the	pleasant	phase	of	their	relationship	competes	with	his	image	of	her	as	“Soeur	
Louise	de	la	miséricorde,”	a	representation	of	the	unpleasant	phase	of	the	relationship.	
	
III.	Conclusion	
	 Although	there	is	a	marriage	near	the	end	of	Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi,	it	is	surrounded	by	
such	ambiguities	that	its	inclusion	in	the	novella	seems	rather	to	underscore	the	fact	that	this	is	
no	neat	resolution	in	the	style	of	the	comedic	genre.45	The	lovers	have	been	ordered	to	depart	the	
city	quietly,	Olivier	Brußon	is	keeping	a	huge	secret	from	his	new	wife,	and	evidential	truth	has	
been	compelled	to	ally	itself	with	the	tide	of	public	opinion;	against	this	backdrop,	the	conclusion	
appears	thoroughly	at	odds	with	the	traditional	‘happy	ending.’	If	one	can	speak	of	a	resolution	to	
the	story,	then	it	consists	not	in	resolving	tensions	but	rather	in	bringing	them	fully	to	light.	Das	
Fräulein	von	Scuderi	is	a	detective	story	in	two	senses:	it	concerns	itself	with	both	the	external	
mystery	of	an	unusual	crime	and	the	internal	mysteries	of	human	emotions.	
	 Scuderi’s	doubts,	false	steps,	curiousity,	and	ultimate	unraveling	of	the	mystery	are	all	a	
function	of	how	the	simultaneous	thought	operations	of	emotion	and	intuition	steer	cognitive	
activity;	even	when	she	is	mistaken,	Scuderi	is	working	to	arrive	at	a	solution.	The	uncertainty	of	
                                                
45	For	an	overview	of	ambivalences	of	the	ending,	see	Achim	Küpper,	“Poesie,	die	sich	selbst	spiegelt”,	73–75.	
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reality	makes	it	inevitable	that	an	individual	will	not	always	respond	to	circumstances	in	the	most	
ideal	manner;	but	Scuderi,	in	possession	of	highly	developed	emotional	and	intuitive	faculties,	re-
evaluates	the	situations	with	which	she	is	confronted	in	an	ongoing	attempt	to	construct	a	
coherent	narrative	out	of	seemingly	contradictory	indicators.	Scuderi’s	success	in	forming	an	
accurate	intuition	varies	from	character	to	character:	in	the	case	of	Cardillac,	the	discrepancy	
between	society’s	reputation-narrative	and	Scuderi’s	intuitive	evaluation	of	him	results	in	her	
incorrectly	dismissing	her	suspicions;	regarding	Madelon,	she	makes	a	correct	intuition	that	
receives	and	rebuffs	a	challenge	(when	it	seems	Madelon	is	involved	in	a	complot	with	Brußon),	
ultimately	becoming	a	central	motivation	in	her	continued	pursuit	of	the	solution	to	the	case;	and	
concerning	Brußon,	the	collision	of	two	incompatible,	independently	formed	narratives	sets	off	a	
cognitive	crisis	in	which	she	is	unable	for	a	time	to	produce	a	coherent	intuitive	evaluation	of	him.	
The	end	result	of	Scuderi’s	intuition-driven	quest	to	find	out	the	truth	about	the	jewel	murders	is	
a	sequential	narrative	that	is	easier	to	comprehend	than	intuitions,	which	are	formed	on	the	basis	
of	simultaneous	impressions	from	multiple	sources	being	evaluated	against	one’s	own	beliefs	
about	the	larger	significance	of	behaviors	and	appearances.	These	factors	are	present	in	the	text,	
though	it	requires	significant	interpretive	effort	to	reconstruct	their	interrelationships,	since	they	
have	a	tendency	to	be	evaluated	as	the	characters	evaluate	them:	more	or	less	unconsciously	as	
part	of	a	larger	composite	operation.	
	 Similarly,	the	scene	between	Scuderi	and	Louis	XIV	involves	numerous	mental	
computations	occurring	simultaneously.	The	way	Scuderi’s	narrative	construct	interacts	with	
other	narratives	that	belong	to	the	king’s	store	of	memories	and	beliefs	determines	the	outcome	
of	the	encounter.	The	name	of	his	former	mistress	acts	as	a	connection	point	to	narratives	in	the	
king’s	memory	banks	that	have	both	positive	and	negative	—	but	in	any	case	unanticipated	due	to	
their	personal	nature	—	consequences	for	Scuderi’s	undertaking.	Since	the	combination	and	
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relative	prominence	of	cognitive	factors	at	the	surface	of	the	king’s	consciousness	affects	how	he	
evaluates	them,	the	mechanisms	of	hierarchization	play	a	decisive	role	in	this	encounter.	
Hierarchies	are	not	about	power	structures	used	to	manipulate	people	(although	this	type	of	
abuse	does	occur);	instead,	they	are	an	essential	tool	for	understanding	anything.	This	was	as	
much	true	in	E.T.A.	Hoffmann’s	time	as	it	is	in	the	digital	age,	in	which	hierarchies	help	us	to	
locate	information,	and	competence	is	not	so	much	about	what	one	knows	as	about	knowing	how	
to	find	the	information	needed	for	a	particular	situation.	
	 Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi	is	an	example	of	a	text	that	operates	according	to	rationally	
comprehensible	principles	with	respect	to	how	it	portrays	mental	states.	Hoffmann	includes	in	his	
text	the	indicators	that	are	evaluated	to	produce	the	intuitions	and	emotions	experienced	by	the	
characters.	It	is	therefore	possible	to	reconstruct	the	cause-and-effect	relationships	behind	these	
states.	Emotions	and	intuitions	form	on	the	basis	of	narrative	structures,	several	examples	of	
which	have	been	analyzed	in	this	chapter;	as	such,	the	author,	as	creator	of	narrative,	is	ultimately	
the	master	of	emotional	dynamics.	In	portraying	an	emotion	complexly,	the	author	executes	a	
two-directional	process:	in	order	to	lay	the	groundwork	that	will	be	evaluated	in	a	certain	way	by	
characters	or	readers,	it	is	first	necessary	to	work	through	the	material	in	reverse	by	
deconstructing	it	so	as	to	uncover	the	relevant	cognitive	factors.	
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Chapter	Two:	
The	Origins	of	Infatuation	
in	Søren	Kierkegaard’s	The	Seducer’s	Diary	
	
	
You	have	often	said	that	it	would	be	“absolutely	superb”	to	go	around	and	
ask	every	one	individually	why	he	got	married,	and	one	would	discover	
that	usually	the	deciding	factor	was	a	very	insignificant	circumstance,	and	
you	then	explore	how	ludicrous	it	is	that	such	an	enormous	effect	as	a	
marriage	with	all	its	consequences	can	emerge	from	such	a	little	cause.	I	
shall	not	dwell	on	the	mistake	implicit	in	your	looking	at	a	little	
circumstance	altogether	abstractly,	and	on	the	fact	that	most	often	it	is	
only	because	the	little	circumstance	joins	a	multiplicity	of	factors	that	
something	results	from	it.	
—	Judge	William,	Either/Or	II	
	
	
	
	 Probably	no	other	emotion	in	the	history	of	literature	has	been	at	once	so	frequently	
portrayed	and	yet	so	ill	reflected	as	infatuation.1	The	astonishing	quantity	of	works	that	seem	to	
have	taken	the	cliché	of	“love	at	first	sight”	as	dogma	suggests	that	most	authors	are	at	a	loss	to	
provide	an	explanation	that	goes	deeper	than	abstract	indicators	of	beauty	and	goodness	applied	
to	the	object	of	admiration,	the	latter	being	an	associative	procedure	lacking	psychological	
nuance.	The	absence	of	understanding	of	the	mechanisms	behind	infatuation	is	an	endless	source	
of	adverse	outcomes	for	literary	characters,	who,	in	the	absence	of	a	self-critical	perspective,	are	
wont	to	blame	fate,	the	social	order,	or	other	distant	powers	for	their	misfortunes,	instead	of	
looking	closer	to	home.	What	renders	the	ordinary	lovers	helpless,	however,	the	seducer	finds	
rather	less	inscrutable.	The	ability	to	influence	the	feelings	of	one’s	object	in	the	direction	of	one’s	
                                                
1	Sebastian	Susteck	identifies	two	common	patterns	employed	in	nineteenth-century	Realist	literature	that	
serve	as	the	reason	for	the	development	of	an	infatuation:	childhood	love	and	similarities.	Interestingly,	
although	these	two	phenomena	would	on	the	surface	seem	to	suggest	potential	for	deeper	psychological	
significance,	as	Susteck’s	study	shows,	that	is	not	the	way	they	play	out	in	literature.	The	similarities	
Susteck	discusses	refer	not	to	personality	but	merely	to	physical	appearance.	Even	shared	childhoods	
generally	remain	psychologically	undeveloped,	since	their	primary	mode	of	action	is	to	evoke	ideas	of	
fatedness	or	a	continuity	that	appeals	to	a	sense	of	order	—	that	is,	in	either	case,	a	kind	of	metaphysical	
structure	of	inevitability	that	guides	characters,	providing	reassurance	as	it	purports	to	reduce	the	
uncertainties	of	existence.	See	Susteck,	“Liebesgründe:	zum	Beginn	von	Liebe	in	Erzähltexten	des	
deutschsprachigen	Realismus,”	Jahrbuch	der	Raabe-Gesellschaft	(2006):	esp.	143–146.				
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choosing	presupposes	a	thorough	understanding	of	the	mechanisms	of	infatuation,	such	as	is	on	
display	in	Søren	Kierkegaard’s	The	Seducer’s	Diary,	a	novella-like	narrative	that	forms	a	part	of	his	
larger	work	Either/Or.2	Johannes	the	Seducer	targets	a	young	woman	named	Cordelia	who,	at	the	
beginning	of	the	diary,	does	not	even	know	him.	By	engineering	the	scripts	of	romantic	love	
through	a	variety	of	schemes,	letters,	feigned	attitudes,	and	seeming	coincidences,	he	manages	to	
convince	her	that	she	is	madly	in	love	with	him.	Since	his	aim	is	not	merely	to	inspire	a	“naïve	
passion,”	but	to	move	beyond	it	to	a	“reflected	passion,”3	Johannes	pursues	a	thoroughly	
intellectual	method,	stating	that	“the	interesting”	is	the	law	for	“all	my	moves	with	regard	to	
Cordelia.”	(365)4	This	“higher	form	of	the	erotic”	(411)	results	in	a	“poetic	afterglow”	(366)	—	that	
is,	a	pleasurable	recollection	(such	as	the	diary	affords	him),	which	is	the	nature	of	the	prize	that	
Johannes	desires.	Although	his	character	belongs	to	the	tradition	of	the	Don	Juan	story,	which	has	
a	long	history	in	print	and	on	the	stage,	Johannes’s	higher	demands	make	him	above	all	a	contrast	
to	the	traditional	seducer.5	
	 In	the	following,	I	will	first	contextualize	The	Seducer’s	Diary	in	order	to	show	how	
infatuation	is	appropriated	for	the	larger	aesthetic	project	being	undertaken	in	Either/Or.	I	then	
discuss	several	aspects	of	the	seducer’s	method	which	illuminate	the	ways	in	which	an	individual’s	
                                                
2	The	seducer’s	ability	to	deconstruct	a	complex	composite	mental	process	is	like	the	authorial	ability	
discussed	in	the	last	chapter	(see	page	65),	except	that	in	the	case	of	the	seducer,	who	is	himself	a	character,	
his	deconstruction	process	is	also	part	of	the	text	and	thus	readily	available	for	analysis.	
3	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Either/Or,	Part	I,	trans.	Howard	V.	Hong	and	Edna	H.	Hong	(Princeton:	UP,	1987),	411.	
Subsequent	page	numbers	given	in	parentheses	within	this	chapter	refer	to	this	volume.	
4	See	also	345f.	
5	The	first	major	Don	Juan	piece	was	the	play	El	burlador	de	Sevilla	y	convidado	de	piedra	(The	Trickster	of	
Seville	and	the	Stone	Guest)	from	around	1630	by	Tirso	de	Molina.	Molière	and	Lord	Byron	also	found	
inspiration	in	the	subject	matter.	One	of	the	most	prominent	reworkings,	and	the	one	that	inspired	
Kierkegaard,	is	Mozart’s	opera	Don	Giovanni	(1787);	an	aesthetic	essay	included	in	Part	I	of	Either/Or	also	
deals	with	this	work.	Whereas	the	earlier	work	Les	Liaisons	dangereuses	(Pierre	Choderlos	de	Laclos,	1782)	
resembles	The	Seducer’s	Diary	in	that	it	delves	into	the	psychological	dimensions	of	seduction	on	a	more	
profound	level	than,	for	example,	the	dramatic	renditions	of	the	seduction	tale,	Ronald	Grimsley	notes	that	
“the	Diary	[…]	differs	from	Les	Liaisons	dangereuses	in	so	far	as	its	portrayal	of	‘reflective’	seduction	
dispenses	with	those	social,	ethical,	and	even	sexual	factors	which	help	to	give	shape	and	coherence	to	
Laclos’s	novel”;	see	“Kierkegaard	and	the	Don	Juan	Theme:	Kierkegaard	and	Laclos”	in	Søren	Kierkegaard	
and	French	Literature:	Eight	Comparative	Studies	(Cardiff:	University	of	Wales	Press,	1966),	43.	
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becoming	infatuated	depends	on	the	formation	of	connections	to	latent	narratives	relating	to	the	
future	and	to	expectations	in	a	relationship,	originating	both	from	personal	preference	and	from	
social	conditioning.	At	the	end	of	the	diary,	Johannes	engineers	multiple	aesthetic	elements	that	
draw	on	all	of	his	foregoing	interactions	with	Cordelia	to	produce	one	moment	of	concentrated	
intensity.	Finally,	I	take	a	look	at	how	the	steps	in	the	process	of	becoming	infatuated	involve	
accessing	core	elements	of	personality,	and	how	infatuation	therefore	results	in	changes	or	the	
potential	for	change	in	Cordelia	and	Johannes,	respectively.	The	Seducer’s	Diary	portrays	
infatuation	in	a	way	that	removes	its	inexplicability	by	affording	the	reader	an	opportunity	to	
witness	the	mental	connections	being	made	which,	in	combination,	produce	the	emotion.6	
	
I.	The	Context	of	the	Seduction	
	 This	chapter	treats	The	Seducer’s	Diary	as	an	independent	work	—	with	reference,	
however,	to	other	parts	of	Either/Or.	Purely	in	terms	of	narrative	coherence,	it	is	able	to	function	
by	itself	as	a	novella,	and	indeed	it	has	been	stripped	of	its	context	and	published	more	than	thirty	
times.7	This	practice,	though	undeniably	problematic,	is	at	least	more	obviously	so	than	the	
insidious	distortions	and	oversimplifications	that	creep	in	when	Kierkegaard’s	pseudonymous	
works	are	cited	without	proper	consideration	of	their	literary	character;	this,	too,	is	a	pervasive	
                                                
6	Previous	scholarship	on	emotions	in	Kierkegaard’s	work	has	focused	largely	on	the	relationship	of	his	
thought	to	notions	of	passion	from	Antiquity.	By	contrast,	this	chapter	approaches	the	topic	in	order	to	
explore	individual	psychological	dynamics.	Rick	Anthony	Furtak	in	Wisdom	in	Love:	Kierkegaard	and	the	
Ancient	Quest	for	Emotional	Integrity	(Notre	Dame:	UP,	2005)	casts	the	emotion	of	love	as	central	to	
Kierkegaard’s	oeuvre,	emphasizing	the	contrast	with	Stoicist	views,	though	Daniel	Greenspan	rightly	points	
out	that	Kierkegaard’s	work	displays	a	strong	affinity	for	passions	from	ancient	thought	that	are	
diametrically	opposed	to	love;	see	The	Passion	of	Infinity:	Kierkegaard,	Aristotle	and	the	Rebirth	of	Tragedy	
(Berlin:	de	Gruyter,	2008).	
7	In	“Søren	Kierkegaard’s	Diary	of	the	Seducer:	A	History	of	Its	Use	and	Abuse	in	International	Print,”	
Bradley	R.	Dewey	recounts	the	publication	history	of	this	text	as	a	stand-alone	work,	separate	from	
Either/Or;	he	also	analyzes	the	cover	art	that	has	accompanied	it,	which	has	tended	to	suggest	misleadingly	
that	the	work	belonged	to	the	genre	of	trivial	popular	romances,	or	sometimes	to	imply	indefensible	
correspondences	between	Kierkegaard	and	his	text	(Fund	og	Forskning	i	Det	kongelige	Biblioteks	Samlinger	
20	(1973):	137–157).	
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practice,	particularly	in	the	field	of	literary	studies	(ironically	enough).	Many	of	Kierkegaard’s	
writings	are	simultaneously	philosophy,	theology,	and	literature.	The	literary	dimension,	however,	
has	been	least	explored	in	scholarship.	Literary	scholars	have	appropriated	his	ideas	as	theoretical	
frameworks	for	literary	criticism;8	have	explored	his	intersection	with	later	authors;9	and	have	
traced	the	influence	of	earlier	authors	on	his	work.10	Notably,	however,	there	is	a	dearth	of	
scholarship	dealing	with	Kierkegaard’s	texts	themselves	as	literature,	despite	the	strong	fictional	
character	of	many	of	them.11	Although	numerous	scholars	point	out	the	literary	character	of	
Kierkegaard’s	writings,12	far	fewer	actually	engage	with	the	task	of	interpreting	them	as	such;13	for	
the	most	part,	philosophers	merely	mention	his	literary	character	while	literary	scholars	apply	
                                                
8	For	instance,	George	Pattison,	“Kierkegaard	and	Genre,”	Poetics	Today	28,	no.	3	(2007):	475–497;	and	Eva	
Kit	Wah	Man,	“What	Is	An	Author?	A	Comparative	Study	of	Søren	Kierkegaard	and	Liu	Xie	on	the	
Meanings	of	Writing,”	Journal	of	Chinese	Philosophy	40,	no.	1	(2013):	123–142.	
9	A	few	recent	examples	include	Allard	den	Dulk,	“Beyond	Endless	‘Aesthetic’	Irony:	A	Comparison	of	the	
Irony	Critique	of	Søren	Kierkegaard	and	David	Foster	Wallace’s	Infinite	Jest,”	Studies	in	the	Novel	44,	no.	3	
(2012):	325–345;	J.	A.	G.	Ardila,	“The	Origin	of	Unamuno’s	Mist:	Unamuno’s	Copy	of	Kierkegaard’s	Diary	of	
the	Seducer,”	Modern	Philology:	Critical	and	Historical	Studies	in	Literature,	Medieval	Through	
Contemporary	109,	no.	1	(2011):	135–143;	William	D.	Buhrman,	“The	Narrative	Testimony	of	Kierkegaard	and	
Rowling:	Fidelity	as	the	Basic	Criterion	in	Substitutionary	Atonement,”	Renascence:	Essays	on	Values	in	
Literature	63,	no.	4	(2011):	273–286;	Géza	Kállay,	“‘What	Wilt	Thou	Do,	Old	Man?’	—	Being	Sick	unto	Death:	
Scrooge,	King	Lear,	and	Kierkegaard,”	Partial	Answers:	Journal	of	Literature	and	the	History	of	Ideas	9,	no.	2	
(2011):	267–283;	and	Siegfried	Weing,	“Kierkegaardian	Reflections	in	Martin	Walser’s	Ein	fliehendes	Pferd,”	
Colloquia	Germanica:	Internationale	Zeitschrift	für	Germanistik	25,	no.	3/4	(1992):	275–288.	
10	Notable	scholarship	in	this	regard	are	the	series	edited	by	Jon	Stewart:	Kierkegaard	and	His	German	
Contemporaries,	3	vols.	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2007);	Kierkegaard	and	His	Danish	Contemporaries,	3	vols.	
(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2009);	Kierkegaard	and	the	Roman	World	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2009);	and	Jon	Stewart	
and	Katalin	Nun,	eds.,	Kierkegaard	and	the	Greek	World	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2010).	
11	Even	so	promising	a	title	as	“Kierkegaard	and	the	Novel”	turns	out	not	to	be	about	“Kierkegaard	as	
novelist,”	though	the	essay	is	interesting	in	its	own	right	as	a	discussion	of	what	it	means	to	write	novels	as	
opposed	to	other	literary	forms,	as	well	as	how	Kierkegaard	regarded	this	type	of	writing	activity.	See	
Gabriel	Josipovici,	“Kierkegaard	and	the	Novel,”	in	Kierkegaard:	A	Critical	Reader,	ed.	Jonathan	Rée	and	Jane	
Chamberlain	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	1998),	114.	Similarly,	Henning	Fenger	focuses	primarily	on	the	literary	
culture	that	influenced	Kierkegaard,	giving	less	attention	to	individual	works	—	though	his	brief	discussion	
of	Either/Or	does	include	the	salient	observations	that	“no	one	able	to	read	a	text	can	persuade	himself	that	
Kierkegaard’s	own	heart	was	occupied	with	the	ethical	stage”	and	that	“if	ever	there	were	a	Kierkegaardian	
aesthete	in	Copenhagen,	it	was	Kierkegaard	himself.”	See	“Kierkegaard:	A	Literary	Approach,”	in	
Kierkegaard	and	His	Contemporaries:	The	Culture	of	Golden	Age	Denmark,	ed.	Jon	Stewart	(Berlin:	de	
Gruyter,	2003),	314.	
12	Fenger,	for	example,	refers	to	The	Seducer’s	Diary,	Repetition,	and	Guilty/Not	Guilty	as	“novels	on	love”	in	
“Kierkegaard:	A	Literary	Approach,”	315.	
13	One	exception	is	the	volume	Kierkegaard	and	Literature,	though	its	publication	date	as	well	as	its	fealty	to	
poststructuralist	literary	criticism	begin	to	make	it	outmoded.	See	Ronald	Schleifer	and	Robert	Markley,	
eds.,	Kierkegaard	and	Literature:	Irony,	Repetition,	and	Criticism	(Norman:	U	of	Oklahoma	Press,	1984).	
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him	as	a	philosopher.14	Scholars	have	analyzed	certain	aspects	of	his	writing,	such	as	irony	or	
indirect	communication,	that	have	literary	implications	—	but	then	again,	are	also	philosophical	
issues.	Prominent	traditional	aspects	of	fictional	writing	such	as	character	development	and	plot,	
on	the	other	hand,	have	gone	largely	uncommented;	it	is	thus	unusual	in	the	context	of	
Kierkegaard	scholarship	that	these	things	play	a	major	role	in	this	chapter	and	doubly	unusual	
precisely	because	it	is	so	commonplace	to	deal	with	them	in	regard	to	the	majority	of	literary	
works.	
	 Søren	Kierkegaard’s	authorship	has	two	parts:	one	pseudonymous	and	the	other	under	his	
own	name.15	At	the	beginning	of	his	writing	career,	the	pseudonymous	works	formed	the	majority;	
gradually,	the	signed	authorship	increased	in	proportion,	until	at	the	end	of	his	career	it	
predominated.	The	pseudonyms	are	a	signalling	mechanism	used	to	indicate	that	a	piece	of	
writing	represented	a	position,	and	not	the	opinion	of	the	author	—	that	is,	Kierkegaard.	In	this	
way,	Kierkegaard	was	able	to	present	and	to	explore	perspectives,	such	as	the	aesthetic	outlook	
and	the	ethical	outlook	represented	in	the	two	halves	of	Either/Or.	This	enabled	a	form	of	indirect	
communication	whose	goal	was	to	convey,	performatively,	ideas	that	could	not	be	stated	
directly.16	
                                                
14	One	finds,	for	example,	a	volume	of	philosophical	essays	being	introduced	with	the	affirmation	that	
Kierkegaard	has	an	originality	that	is	“of	a	mode	more	literary	than	philosophical.”	See	Harold	Bloom,	ed.,	
editor’s	note	to	Søren	Kierkegaard	(New	York:	Chelsea	House,	1989),	viii.	
15	In	Kierkegaard	scholarship,	‘dual	authorship’	refers	to	whether	works	are	signed	or	unsigned,	and	should	
not	be	confused	with	‘first’	and	‘second’	authorship,	which	refer	to	two	chronologically	sequential	periods	of	
productivity.	
16	As	one	might	well	expect	from	such	an	intricate,	convoluted	form	of	communication,	there	is	more	to	be	
said	on	the	matter.	A	particularly	illuminating	essay	that	looks	at	this	issue	with	reference	to	many	of	
Kierkegaard’s	works	is	Joakim	Garff’s	“The	Eyes	of	Argus:	The	Point	of	View	and	Points	of	View	on	
Kierkegaard’s	Work	as	an	Author,”	trans.	Jane	Chamberlain	and	Belinda	Ioni	Rasmussen,	in	Kierkegaard:	A	
Critical	Reader,	ed.	Jonathan	Rée	and	Jane	Chamberlain	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	1998),	75–102.	
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	 Either/Or,	published	in	1843,	is	the	first	major	work	in	Kierkegaard’s	authorship	(other	
than	his	dissertation17).	It	was	written	by	the	pseudonym	Victor	Eremita,	who	serves	as	the	‘editor.’	
In	the	preface,	Eremita	explains	that	the	text	which	constitutes	Either/Or	comes	from	a	collection	
of	papers	that	he	discovered	inside	of	a	desk	he	bought	from	a	second-hand	dealer.	As	he	was	
trying	to	open	a	stuck	drawer,	a	secret	compartment	sprang	open	instead.	The	story	about	the	
desk,	besides	allowing	Victor	Eremita	to	distance	himself	from	the	papers,	introduces	the	motif	of	
chance	that	runs	throughout	the	work,	as	well	as	serving	as	a	metaphorical	explanation	for	the	
structure	of	the	text	that	follows.	The	papers,	according	to	Eremita’s	fictional	account,	were	
written	by	two	authors	whom	he	designates	A	and	B.	Eremita’s	preface	plus	A’s	writings	form	Part	
I	of	Either/Or,	while	B’s	writings	form	Part	II.	A	remains	nameless,	and	his	portion	consists	of	a	
bunch	of	loose	scraps	of	paper,	several	aesthetic	treatises,	and	The	Seducer’s	Diary.	The	latter,	
which	is	placed	at	the	end	of	Part	I,	will	be	dealt	with	shortly;	as	for	the	scraps	of	paper,	Eremita	
places	them	at	the	beginning	under	the	heading	of	“Diapsalmata”	(that	is,	“aphoristic,	lyrical	
reflections	in	a	range	of	substantive	refrains”18),	which	was	written	on	one	of	the	scraps.	Eremita	
emphasizes	that	he	leaves	the	order	to	chance,	though	it	could	be	debated	whether	it	was	actually	
chance,	since	he	says	in	another	place	that	he	leaves	them	in	the	order	in	which	he	found	them	in	
the	drawer.	Eremita	justifies	his	editorial	decision	to	put	them	first	thus:	“it	seemed	to	me	that	
they	could	best	be	regarded	as	preliminary	glimpses	into	what	the	longer	pieces	develop	more	
coherently”	(8).	Coherence	is	a	relative	term	here;	it	is	very	much	in	keeping	with	the	aesthetic	
viewpoint	contained	therein	that	these	papers	do	not	lay	out	a	systematic	argument,	but	instead	
manifest	it	indirectly.	B’s	papers,	on	the	other	hand,	are	quite	coherent	in	arguing	for	an	ethical	
                                                
17	Kierkegaard’s	dissertation,	On	the	Concept	of	Irony	with	Continual	Reference	to	Socrates	(1841),	is	usually	
considered	as	falling	outside	the	scope	of	his	main	authorships	(Kierkegaard	himself	also	regarded	it	this	
way),	though	it	retains	a	relevance	to	them,	since	irony	would	become	a	pervasive	component	of	his	later	
works	(Socrates,	too,	to	a	lesser	extent).	
18	Editorial	note	to	Kierkegaard,	Either/Or	I	(604).	
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viewpoint.	They	take	the	form	of	two	long,	persuasive	letters	addressed	to	A,	plus	a	sermon	whose	
authorship	B	attributes	to	a	pastor	friend	of	his.	Towards	the	end	of	the	preface,	Victor	Eremita	
explains	how	the	structure	of	the	work	relates	to	its	interpretation:	“We	sometimes	come	upon	
novels	in	which	specific	characters	represent	contrasting	views	of	life.	They	usually	end	with	one	
persuading	the	other.	The	point	of	view	ought	to	speak	for	itself,	but	instead	the	reader	is	
furnished	with	the	historical	result	that	the	other	was	persuaded.	I	consider	it	fortunate	that	these	
papers	provide	no	enlightenment	in	that	respect”	(14).	Thus	the	‘either/or’	of	the	work	is	meant	
sincerely;	that	is,	the	two	parts	are	given	with	as	much	equality	of	presentation	as	possible,	and	
neither	one	is	intended	to	‘win’	—	neither	by	Eremita	nor,	one	may	presume	in	this	instance,	by	
Kierkegaard.	In	view	of	Kierkegaard’s	authorship	as	a	whole,	neither	the	aesthetic	nor	the	ethical	
sphere	is	alone	sufficient	to	the	task	of	living.19	The	religious,	a	third	category	in	his	thinking,	is	
not	even	represented	in	Either/Or,	except	inasmuch	as	it	is	indirectly	present	as	an	absence.	The	
aesthetic,	the	ethical,	and	the	religious	have	been	variously	referred	to	as	spheres	or	stages.	
Although	certain	aspects	of	these	categories	are	hierarchical	in	nature,	they	are	largely	
coextensive	with	one	another,	such	that	it	would	not	make	sense	to	say	that	one	leaves	behind	the	
aesthetic	stage	and	enters	the	ethical	or	leaves	behind	the	ethical	to	reach	the	religious.	
Furthermore,	regarding	them	as	spheres	enveloping	one	another	is	likewise	too	reductive.20	None	
                                                
19	The	titles	of	the	B’s	two	letters	—	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	they	were	given	by	Victor	Eremita,	not	B	
—	both	include	mention	of	aesthetics:	“The	Esthetic	Validity	of	Marriage”	and	“The	Balance	between	the	
Esthetic	and	the	Ethical	in	the	Development	of	the	Personality.”	This	suggests	that	the	ethicist	was	not	able	
to	make	his	point	without	reference	to	the	aesthetic	sphere,	thus	revealing	some	limitations	to	his	
viewpoint.	In	places	where	the	ethicist	remains	more	or	less	exclusively	within	ethical	categories,	his	
narrative	becomes	rather	dull,	conventional,	and	bourgeois.	The	more	interesting	moments	of	the	narrative	
bring	in	elements	of	the	aesthetic;	this	demonstrates	performatively	that	a	life	lived	‘purely’	in	the	ethical	
sphere	is	somehow	lacking.	The	aesthete’s	text	likewise	contains	elements	that	undermine	his	own	
viewpoint.	Even	if	Johannes	and	A	are	not	identical,	The	Seducer’s	Diary	represents	the	aesthetic	viewpoint	
carried	out	to	its	extremity.	The	relationship	depicted	therein	is	highly	disturbing	because	Johannes,	in	
abstracting	himself	from	the	situation,	goes	so	far	as	to	abstract	himself	from	the	pain	he	causes	Cordelia;	
the	social	nature	of	human	beings	recoils	at	this,	thus	exposing	a	flaw	in	the	‘purely’	aesthetic	viewpoint.	
20	Kierkegaard’s	Fear	and	Trembling,	which	depicts	a	conflict	between	the	ethical	and	the	religious,	provides	
an	example	of	why	a	system	of	enveloping	stages	likewise	fails	as	a	conceptual	model.	
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of	Kierkegaard’s	works	sets	out	to	dictate	a	specific	relationship	of	the	individual	to	any	of	the	
categories.	
	 The	Seducer’s	Diary	is	at	an	even	further	level	of	remove	from	the	‘author’	of	Either/Or	
than	the	rest	of	the	text;	Victor	Eremita	—	with	a	great	deal	of	irony	in	light	of	Søren	
Kierkegaard’s	relation	to	the	text	—	calls	attention	to	this	in	his	preface:	“Here	we	meet	new	
difficulties,	inasmuch	as	A	does	not	declare	himself	the	author	but	only	the	editor.	This	is	an	old	
literary	device	to	which	I	would	not	have	much	to	object	if	it	did	not	further	complicate	my	own	
position,	since	one	author	becomes	enclosed	within	the	other	like	the	boxes	in	a	Chinese	
puzzle.”21	(9)	By	so	doing,	Eremita	presses	the	reader	to	reflection	on	the	indirect	nature	of	the	
communication	which	makes	it	very	clear	that	this	piece	of	writing	is	meant	to	be	considered	as	a	
viewpoint,	from	a	critical	distance.	The	unnamed	author	A,	in	turn,	provides	another	preface	
specifically	to	The	Seducer’s	Diary;	like	Eremita’s,	it	evinces	a	strong	skepticism	towards	Johannes,	
the	author	of	the	diary.22	Victor	Eremita	discusses	the	possibility	that	A	and	Johannes	are	the	
same	person	(it	would	not	be	dissonant	with	A’s	personality	for	him	to	have	distanced	himself	
from	his	own	text),	but	that	question	is	left	deliberately	unanswered	—	this	being	the	option	
which	is	most	conducive	to	critical	reflection.	
	 The	first	three	entries	in	the	diary	do	not	pertain	to	Cordelia,	the	one	being	seduced,	but	
rather	to	some	of	Johannes’s	“actiones	in	distans.”	These	provide	a	foretaste	of	Johannes’s	
methods	as	well	as	an	illustration	of	what	he	wants;	as	A	has	told	us	in	the	introduction:	“One	
sees	from	the	diary	that	what	he	at	times	desired	was	something	totally	arbitrary,	a	greeting,	for	
example,	and	would	accept	no	more	at	any	price,	because	that	was	the	most	beautiful	thing	about	
                                                
21	Opening	a	puzzle	box	requires	that	one	press	on	the	correct	parts,	turn	the	box	a	certain	way,	etc.;	usually	
an	entire	sequence	of	such	moves	is	required	to	solve	it.	
22	A’s	editorial	treatment	of	the	diary	mirrors	to	some	extent	Victor	Eremita’s	handling	of	A’s	papers.	A	
includes	the	three	letters	from	Cordelia	—	written	after	the	end	of	the	incident	and	the	only	ones	in	his	
possession	—	at	the	end	of	his	preface;	otherwise,	he	has	attempted	to	interleave	the	letters	from	Johannes	
to	Cordelia	between	the	appropriate	diary	entries.	
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the	other	person.”	(306)	In	the	first	diary	entry,	the	plain	summary	of	events	is	that	Johannes	sees	
a	girl	exiting	a	carriage;	passes	her	on	the	street	while	casting	a	piercing	glance	at	her,	which	
makes	her	blush;	follows	her	into	a	shop;	indulges	in	an	extended	philosophical	musing	inspired	
by	the	sight	of	the	girl’s	reflection	in	a	mirror;	and	decides	to	take	no	action	at	the	moment,	with	
the	remark:	“No	impatience,	no	greediness	—	everything	will	be	relished	in	slow	draughts;	she	is	
selected,	she	will	be	overtaken.”	(317)	The	sinister	sound	of	these	words	puts	an	utterly	misleading	
spin	on	what	he	intends	to	do:	in	fact,	all	his	plan	involves	is	that	he	pass	her	on	the	street	
sometime	and	glance	sideways	at	her	in	such	a	way	that	it	triggers	her	memory	of	his	face	on	this	
evening	and	causes	her	a	little	surprise.	So	far,	he	seems	like	a	stalker,	but	not	yet	a	seducer.	
	 What	does	he	like	about	these	encounters?	—	The	same	thing	that	makes	them	
interesting	to	read:	he	enjoys	imagining	what	passes	through	the	girls’	heads	as	they	interact	with	
him.	His	method	is	to	occasion	a	slightly	out-of-the-ordinary	social	encounter,	which	produces	a	
heightened	emotion	in	them,	even	if	subtle;	this	is	what	excites	him.	A	meticulous,	almost	
detective-like	observer,	he	uses	his	exceptional	powers	of	observation	to	construct	a	narrative	
about	these	girls’	lives.	Could	he	be	wrong?	Perhaps,	but	that	is	of	little	import.	Whether	the	
servant’s	name	is	really	Jens	or	whether	the	girl	is	in	fact	going	to	visit	Aunt	Jette	does	not	matter;	
the	stories	contain	in	themselves	their	own	interest	for	him.	Actuality	merely	provides	the	
occasion	for	imagination.	Indeed,	Johannes	revels	in	the	large	measure	of	independence	which	
this	gives	him,	for	the	flip	side	of	his	imaginings’	distance	from	actuality	is	that	they	are	safe	from	
most	types	of	intrusion	by	unpleasant	realities.	The	editor	of	The	Seducer’s	Diary	—	that	is,	A	—	
remarks	of	Johannes:	“His	life	has	been	an	attempt	to	accomplish	the	task	of	living	poetically.”	
(304)	To	live	poetically	involves	existing	in	the	realms	of	possibility	and	imagination;	Johannes	
does	this	so	thoroughly	as	to	exclude	necessity	and	actuality	almost	entirely.	This	becomes	
apparent	to	the	reader	through	a	comparison	of	what	is	written	in	the	diary	and	what	one	can	
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reconstruct	of	the	actuality	of	his	relationship	with	Cordelia.	Johannes	himself	is	the	pre-eminent	
illustration	of	the	theme	first	introduced	by	Victor	Eremita’s	thought	“that	the	outer	is	certainly	
not	the	inner”	(6).	
	 Only	in	the	fourth	diary	entry	does	Johannes	catch	sight	of	Cordelia	for	the	first	time,	and	
there	his	infatuation	begins.	It	looks	as	though	he	chooses	her	at	random,	since	his	interest	is	set	
off	by	a	very	brief	sighting	in	a	public	space.	The	fact	that	she	turns	out	to	have	superior	personal	
qualities	(which	make	her	especially	suitable	to	Johannes’s	purpose)	appears,	on	the	surface,	to	be	
a	matter	of	chance.	While	the	initial	encounter	did	indeed	happen	by	chance,	Johannes’s	
recognition	of	something	special	in	Cordelia	is	not	chance	at	all,	but	rather	the	result	of	long	
practice	in	the	evaluation	of	strangers.	After	all,	wandering	about	in	public	places	observing	
people	is	Johannes’s	specialty.	
	
II.	The	Concept	of	Infatuation	
	 For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	‘infatuation’	will	be	used	to	refer	to	the	condition	of	
being	in	love.	It	is	simpler	to	use	a	single	term	than	an	entire	phrase;	plus,	it	avoids	confusion	
with	regard	to	a	distinction	that	will	be	drawn	in	the	chapter	between,	on	the	one	hand,	‘love,’	
and	on	the	other	hand,	being	‘in	love’	or	‘falling	in	love.’	Since	all	of	these	terms	have	‘love’	as	the	
primary	element,	it	would	be	easy	to	lose	sight	of	the	difference.	(Further	distinctions	can	be	
drawn	between	different	types	of	love	—	agape	and	eros,	for	example.)	Infatuation	is	sometimes	
considered	a	separate	process	from	falling	in	love,	particularly	if	it	is	regarded	as	belonging	to	the	
more	pathological	end	of	the	spectrum.	However,	such	cases	might	be	more	properly	classified	as	
‘obsession’	or	‘fixation.’	
	 A	disadvantage	of	this	choice	of	terminology	is	that	‘infatuation’	has	negative	
connotations,	as	is	immediately	clear	from	its	etymological	root,	fatuus,	which	means	‘foolish.’	
	 76	
Infatuation	has	an	ambiguous	history,	having	often	been	known	to	overwhelm	a	person	and	drive	
him	or	her	to	perform	uncharacteristic	actions;	on	balance,	it	is	doubtful	whether	it	has	resulted	
in	more	benefit	or	harm.	Foolishness	implies,	at	the	very	least,	a	mistake	or	error.	It	would	be	too	
severe	to	claim	that	infatuation	always	leads	to	error.	However,	the	other	terminological	option	—	
“falling	in	love”	—	employs	the	metaphor	of	falling,	which	itself	suggests,	among	other	things,	the	
possibility	of	personal	injury.	Given	the	choice	between	harsh	terms,	‘infatuation’	seems	to	be	the	
less	ambiguous	and	more	versatile.		
	 By	contrast,	‘love’	will	be	defined	here	as	a	long-term	attitude	towards	a	person;	love	has	
more	of	a	history.	Infatuation	can	—	though	not	necessarily	must	—	lead	to	love	through	a	
process	of	transition.	It	will	suffice	merely	to	mention	this	distinction,	since	love	is	not	the	main	
focus	here,	but	rather	serves	as	a	contrasting	term,	bracketing	out	some	things	that	are	not	part	of	
the	present	discussion.	Of	course,	love	is	a	very	complicated	emotion	in	itself,	and	has	been	the	
exclusive	topic	of	numerous	studies.23	The	concept	of	love	as	distinct	from	infatuation	does	also	
exist	in	the	universe	of	Either/Or,	as	evidenced	by	the	fact	that	Judge	William	from	Part	II	
declares	himself	a	strong	advocate	of	marital	love,	which	would	fall	into	this	category	of	a	long-
term	emotion.24		
	 To	some	extent,	these	romantic	processes	are	not	merely	a	matter	of	definition,	since	they	
have	roots	in	biology.	Experimental	results	have	shown	that	infatuation	correlates	to	increases	in	
hormone	levels,	and	that	these	increases	have	a	limited	duration.25	However,	because	the	current	
                                                
23	Philosophical	works	dealing	with	love	include,	among	others,	Martha	Nussbaum,	Upheavals	of	Thought:	
The	Intelligence	of	Emotions	(Cambridge:	UP,	2001);	Robert	Solomon,	About	Love:	Reinventing	Romance	for	
Our	Times	(New	York:	Simon	&	Schuster,	1988);	and	Aaron	Ben-Ze’ev	and	Ruhama	Goussinsky,	In	the	Name	
of	Love:	Romantic	Ideology	and	Its	Victims	(Oxford:	UP,	2008).	
24	Judge	William	emphasizes	several	times	that	love	has	a	history;	for	example:	“Marital	love	manifests	itself	
as	historical	by	being	a	process	of	assimilation;	it	tries	its	hand	at	what	is	experienced	and	refers	what	it	has	
experienced	to	itself.”	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Either/Or,	Part	II,	trans.	Howard	V.	Hong	and	Edna	H.	Hong	
(Princeton:	UP,	1987),	97.	
25	Donatella	Marazziti	and	Domenico	Canale,	“Hormonal	Changes	When	Falling	in	Love,”	
Psychoneuroendocrinology	29,	no.	7	(2004):	933f.	
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state	of	scientific	understanding	cannot	provide	lines	of	demarcation	for	these	terms,	a	more	
speculative,	conceptual	definition	will	serve	the	present	purpose.	Attempts	to	explain	the	
phenomenon	of	infatuation	solely	in	terms	of	biological	sexual	drives	fail	to	do	justice	to	the	
cognitive	intricacies	involved	and	can	come	to	seem	like	a	means	of	blaming	the	body	and	
vindicating	the	mind	in	a	dubious	dualism,	or	of	shifting	responsibility	entirely	onto	genetics	
while	ignoring	the	individual’s	powers	of	self-creation.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	justifiable	to	
consider	infatuation	as	an	intellectual–emotional	matter	without	reference	to	the	physicality	of	
love:	hormones,	pheromones,	beauty,	attractiveness.	Contemporary	society	has	ample	empirical	
evidence	from	the	phenomenon	of	online	dating	that	an	infatuation	can	form	in	the	absence	of	
physical	interaction	with	its	object.	Even	before	the	present	era,	fictional	texts	had	the	power	to	
inspire	states	of	infatuation	in	their	readers.	Thus,	while	physical	characteristics	can	and	often	do	
contribute	to	the	formation	of	an	infatuation,	they	are	not	a	prerequisite.	
	 The	Seducer’s	Diary	is	heavily	skewed	towards	the	cognitive	aspects	of	infatuation,	which	
is	not	surprising	considering	the	non-physicality	of	the	literary	medium.	Yet	the	reasons	for	the	
seduction	being	constructed	in	this	way	go	deeper:	in	an	essay	in	Part	I	of	Either/Or	entitled	“The	
Immediate	Erotic	Stages	or	The	Musical	Erotic,”	the	author	A	mentions	the	possibility	of	an	
“intellectual–spiritual”26	seduction,	as	opposed	to	the	“sensuous”	seductions	being	discussed	in	his	
piece	on	Mozart’s	Don	Giovanni.	(97)	This	is	just	such	a	possibility	to	pique	the	interest	of	the	
aesthete,	since	it	would	be	much	more	complex	and	interesting	than	a	merely	sensuous	seduction,	
so	it	is	no	wonder	that	A	becomes	entangled	(to	whatever	degree	one	wishes	to	believe)	in	the	
narrative	of	Johannes	the	Seducer.	When	Johannes	describes	his	budding	infatuation	as	being	“in	
                                                
26	In	the	original	Danish,	this	is	one	word,	aandelig,	which	has	both	of	these	meanings.	(For	readers	familiar	
with	German	but	not	Danish,	it	may	be	helpful	to	mention	that	this	word	corresponds	to	geistig.)	Søren	
Kierkegaard,	Søren	Kierkegaards	Skrifter,	vol.	2,	Enten	–	Eller.	Første	Del,	ed.	Niels	Jørgen	Cappelørn,	Joakim	
Garff,	Johnny	Kondrup,	Alastair	McKinnon,	and	Finn	Hauberg	Mortensen	(Copenhagen:	Søren	Kierkegaard	
Forskningscenteret	and	Gads	Vorlag,	1997),	101.	
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motion	within	oneself”	(326),	he	is	describing	the	activity	of	creating	narratives;	the	content	of	
these	narratives	centers	around	interactions	with	the	object	of	one’s	infatuation.27	Infatuation	
involves	an	evaluation	of	another	person	in	relation	to	one’s	own	latent	beliefs	about	what	one	
wants	out	of	life.	The	Encyclopedia	of	Human	Emotions	identifies	passion	and	physiological	
arousal	as	key	features	of	infatuation,	but	also	acknowledges	that	cognitive	factors	play	a	role,	
particularly	“intrusive	thinking	and	preoccupation	with	the	other,”	“intense	longing	for	union	
with	the	other,”	and	“idealization	of	the	other.”28	These	are	some	of	the	patterns	of	thought	that	
Johannes	simulates	in	himself	and	encourages	in	Cordelia	in	order	to	further	her	infatuation	with	
him.	The	emotion	develops	from	a	critical	mass	—	varying	widely	according	to	individual	
psychological	makeup	—	of	evaluations	to	the	effect	that	associating	with	the	person	under	
consideration	will	produce	desirable	outcomes.	This	could	mean	anything	across	a	broad	range	of	
possibilities,	both	actual	and	anticipated,	including	but	not	limited	to:	the	fun	of	engaging	in	
activities	of	mutual	interest;	enjoyment	derived	from	the	partner’s	sense	of	humor,	wit,	charisma,	
sociability,	kindness,	inventiveness,	or	other	personal	qualities;	stimulating	conversation;	sexual	
gratification;	financial	security;	pride	in	the	physical	appearance,	success,	accomplishments,	social	
standing,	etc.	of	one’s	partner;	the	possibility	of	raising	children	together;	a	reduction	in	
loneliness;	ego	gratification	due	to	compliments,	attention,	or	affection	given	by	the	partner.	
Whether	these	things	have	the	potential	to	contribute	to	an	infatuation	and	to	what	extent	
depends	on	how	highly	a	particular	individual	values	them.	The	diversity	of	this	list	attests	to	the	
complexity	of	the	set	of	evaluations	that	indicate	whether	or	not	a	person	is	viewed	as	a	good	fit	
with	one’s	romantic	aspirations;	when	it	is	furthermore	considered	that	many	of	these	evaluations	
                                                
27	According	to	Joseph	Kupfer,	infatuation	involves	daydreams,	which	would	be	a	form	of	imagined	life	
(narrative).	See	Kupfer,	“Romantic	Love,”	Journal	of	Social	Philosophy	24,	no.	3	(1993):	112.		
28	David	Levinson,	James	J.	Ponzetti	Jr.,	and	Peter	F.	Jorgensen,	ed.,	Encyclopedia	of	Human	Emotions	(New	
York:	Macmillan,	1999),	402.	
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may	take	place	at	a	subconscious	level,	it	becomes	easier	to	understand	why	infatuations	often	
seem	to	arise	suddenly	and	out	of	nowhere.	
	 For	Johannes,	Cordelia	provides	the	occasion	for	aesthetic	enjoyments	of	various	kinds,	
and	he	recognizes	immediately	that	she	can	be	that	occasion.	For	Cordelia,	on	the	other	hand,	the	
infatuation	which	she	gradually	develops	for	Johannes	is	based	on	concrete	beliefs	about	her	life.	
Therefore,	seducing	her	requires	that	Johannes	become	very	well	acquainted	with	her	psychology.	
	
III.	The	Methods	of	the	Seducer	
	A.	“The	Highest	Enjoyment”	
	 In	the	introduction	to	the	diary,	A	claims	to	be	acquainted	with	Cordelia	in	real	life	and	to	
have	observed	what	she	was	like	after	the	incident	with	Johannes.	His	description,	however,	refers	
to	a	“they,”	suggesting	either	that	he	is	generalizing	from	Cordelia’s	specific	case,	or	that	he	knows	
more	about	the	seductions	than	he	wants	to	admit	—	the	latter	being	consistent	with	the	
possibility	than	he	himself	is	the	seducer:	“No	visible	change	took	place	in	them;	they	lived	in	the	
accustomed	context,	were	respected	as	always,	and	yet	they	were	changed,	almost	unaccountably	
to	themselves	and	incomprehensibly	to	others.	Their	lives	were	not	cracked	or	broken,	as	others’	
were,	but	were	bent	into	themselves;	lost	to	others,	they	futilely	sought	to	find	themselves.”	(307)	
Two	factors	help	to	explain	what	A	means	by	describing	their	lives	this	way.	The	first	is	that	
Johannes	manipulates	the	situation	such	that	at	the	point	when	the	seduction	finally	occurs,	the	
engagement	with	Cordelia	has	already	been	broken	—	by	her,	not	him.	Thus	she	cannot	make	an	
accusation	on	the	grounds	of	the	universal	because	there	is	no	social	contract	to	which	she	can	
appeal;	an	outside	observer	would	not	recognize	that	he	had	any	obligation	towards	her.	The	
second	has	to	do	with	the	nature	of	Johannes’s	goal;	he	holds	that	“the	highest	enjoyment	
imaginable	is	to	be	loved,	loved	more	than	anything	else	in	the	world”	(368).	The	seduction	is	
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actually	not	so	much	an	event	as	the	entire	process	narrated	in	the	diary:	for	one	thing	because	of	
the	enormous	effort	involved	in	bringing	an	individual	to	the	point	of	“absolute	abandon”	(335),	
and	for	another	thing	because	Johannes	enjoys	the	interactions	all	throughout,	“in	slow	drafts”	
(334).	
	 As	mentioned	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	this	goal	is	best	reached	through	“the	
interesting.”	The	interesting	is	not	only	what	Johannes	seeks,	but	also	what	is	best	suited	to	
captivate	Cordelia.	In	that	sense,	the	two	of	them	have,	as	is	commonly	looked	for	in	romantic	
relationships,	‘something	in	common.’	However,	Johannes	uses	the	interesting	for	his	own	
aesthetic	satisfaction,	to	“rejuvenate”	himself,29	whereas	Cordelia	expects	the	interesting	to	be	a	
force	to	strengthen	the	bond	between	them.	This	dissonance	of	expectations	would	be	present	
even	with	an	ordinary	seducer,	but	the	aesthetic	seducer	produces,	when	successful,	an	even	
greater	disproportionality.	Since	he	is	of	the	opinion	that	“mere	possession	is	very	little”	(335),	the	
additional	psychological	disappointment	of	the	one	seduced	compounds	the	problem.	Johannes	
says	of	his	engagement	to	Cordelia:	“I	do	not	care	at	all	to	possess	the	girl	in	the	external	sense	
but	wish	to	enjoy	her	artistically.	Therefore	the	beginning	must	be	as	artistic	as	possible.	The	
beginning	must	be	as	nebulous	as	possible;	it	must	be	an	omnipossibility.”	(372)	Later	in	the	entry,	
he	adds:	“It	is	precisely	this	infinite	possibility	that	is	the	interesting.”	(372)	Possibility	is	thus	
closely	linked	to	his	central	guiding	principle,	and	is	something	that	he	values	in	his	own	life	as	
well	as	finding	it	a	useful	means	of	manipulating	Cordelia.		
	 What	Johannes	wants	for	himself	and	what	he	wants	for	Cordelia	are,	to	a	great	extent,	in	
alignment.30	Just	as	he	wants	to	live	in	infinity,	Cordelia	“must	discover	the	infinite,	must	
experience	that	this	is	what	lies	closest	to	a	person.	This	she	must	discover	not	along	the	path	of	
                                                
29	Johannes	uses	the	word	in	reference	to	himself	(435),	and	A	likewise	uses	it	in	describing	him	(308).	
30	For	a	discussion	of	the	precise	extent	to	which	they	align	and	where	the	alignment	breaks	down,	see	page	
108.	
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thought,	which	for	her	is	a	wrong	way,	but	in	the	imagination	[…]”	(391).	Johannes’s	positive	view	
of	the	infinite,	which	he	associates	with	imagination,	corresponds	to	his	dismissive	view	of	their	
opposites,	the	finite	and	actuality;	he	plans	to	“escape	all	this	finite	nonsense”	(427)	in	regard	to	
the	social	baggage	surrounding	broken	engagements	and	cause	Cordelia	to	“lose	sight	of	marriage	
and	the	continent	of	actuality”	(428).	To	term	actuality	a	“continent”	places	it	in	contrast	with	the	
many	water	metaphors	which	Johannes	uses	to	describe	the	conditions	he	aims	to	foster.	Near	the	
beginning,	soon	after	sighting	Cordelia,	he	muses	at	length	on	the	way	in	which	his	inner	state,	
under	the	influence	of	his	budding	infatuation,	resembles	a	boat,	concluding	with	the	line:	“How	
enjoyable	to	ripple	along	on	moving	water	this	way	—	how	enjoyable	to	be	in	motion	within	
oneself.”	(326)	A	boat	is	typically	used	as	a	means	of	conveyance,	for	transporting	a	person	from	
one	point	to	another;	but	in	this	case,	the	emphasis	on	the	rocking	obscures	any	linear	movement.	
An	increase	in	mental	activity	—	in	Johannes’s	words,	a	mood	—	is	also	what	pleases	him	about	a	
chance	observation	of	a	fisherman’s	daughter	in	the	woods	while	he	is	sitting	on	a	fence	smoking	
a	pipe;	he	describes	the	situation	and	the	glance	as	“abundant	in	inner	motion”	(403),	but	once	
again,	this	motion	is	not	going	anywhere,	but	merely	having	a	stimulant	effect	—	volatizing	his	
personality,	as	A	says	in	the	introduction	(305).	
	 Not	just	any	girl	will	do	for	the	type	of	seduction	Johannes	has	in	mind:	“[…]	it	is	
dismaying	that	it	is	no	art	to	seduce	a	girl	but	it	is	a	stroke	of	good	fortune	to	find	one	who	is	
worth	seducing.”	(334f.)	Johannes	names	“imagination,	spirit,	passion”	as	“the	essentials”	(343)	
with	which	Cordelia	is	endowed.	Although	A	says,	after	presenting	her	letters,	that	she	“did	not	
possess	the	admired	range	of	her	Johannes”	(313),	she	nevertheless	has	“a	need	for	the	unusual”	
(360)	that	sets	her	apart	from	most	people.	Johannes	is	very	complimentary	of	her,	calling	her	
“sound”	and	“remarkable”	(359)	and	noting	that	she	readily	perceives	irony	—	“exactly	what	I	
want.”	(353)	These	traits	are	signs	of	the	latent	potential	in	her	personality;	they	enable	him	to	
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work	her	up	to	a	higher	pitch	of	passion	than	would	be	possible	with	a	simpler	mind:	“The	
majority	enjoy	a	young	girl	as	they	enjoy	a	glass	of	champagne,	at	one	effervescent	moment	—	oh,	
yes,	that	is	really	beautiful,	and	with	many	a	young	girl	that	is	undoubtedly	the	most	one	can	
attain,	but	here	there	is	more.	If	an	individual	is	too	fragile	to	stand	clarity	and	transparency,	well,	
then	one	enjoys	what	is	unclear,	but	apparently	she	can	stand	it.”	(341f.)	It	is	significant	to	the	
development	of	the	relationship	that	Cordelia	possesses	these	qualities,	as	well	as	that	Johannes	
notices	them.	His	claim	that	he	has	managed	“to	plot	so	entirely	accurately	the	history	of	the	
development	of	a	psyche”	(359)	is	not	only	evidence	of	his	own	infatuation	with	her;	it	is	a	hint	as	
to	how	he	brings	about	her	infatuation	so	effectively.	Knowledge	of	her	internal	narratives	will	
later	allow	him	to	say	and	do	things	that	correspond	to	specific	elements	of	her	interiority,	giving	
the	impression	that	there	is	a	secret	connection	between	them.	His	realization	that	“the	ideal	
hovering	before	her	is	certainly	not	a	shepherdess	or	a	heroine	in	a	novel,	a	mistress,	but	a	Joan	of	
Arc	or	something	like	that”	(344f.)	lets	him	know	what	sort	of	images,	myths,	and	metaphors	will	
appeal	to	her	—	information	which	he	later	puts	to	use	in	his	letters.	
	
B.	Operations	in	the	“Campaign”	
	 Although	Johannes	often	relies	on	“chance”	(330)	or	on	actuality	providing	“the	occasion”	
(334)	for	aesthetic	enjoyments,	once	he	has	formed	an	intention	with	respect	to	Cordelia,	he	
proceeds	according	to	a	well-thought-out	plan	—	“method	I	do	have”	(387).	The	overall	course	of	
the	seduction	unfolds	in	several	phases;	it	involves	some	seemingly	counter-productive	motions,	
but	these	ultimately	help	to	manoeuvre	Cordelia’s	mental	state	into	the	condition	in	which	
Johannes	wants	it.31	A	prime	example	is	the	beginning	of	the	seduction:	Johannes	acts	in	a	way	
                                                
31	My	claim	that	infatuation	is	caused	by	reasons	also	extends	to	love	and	therefore	diverges	from	Furtak’s	
characterization	of	love	as	“prior	to	all	other	emotions”	and	the	basis	for	significance	(Wisdom	in	Love,	10).	
On	my	view,	significance	precedes	attachment;	in	other	words,	the	construal	of	an	individual	as	connected	
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that	is	calculated	to	bore	her.	He	seemingly	ignores	her,	leaving	her	to	converse	with	the	
infatuated	but	hopelessly	outmatched	‘rival	suitor,’	Edward.	It	would	never	occur	to	a	simplistic	
seducer	to	repel	the	seduced,	but	in	Johannes’s	case,	this	is	all	part	of	a	larger	plan,	for	he	can	use	
these	negative	feelings	to	create	a	sense	of	surprise	and	confusion	when	he	takes	an	action	that	
seems	completely	contradictory	to	his	previous	behavior.	Cordelia	becomes	curious	about	the	
old–young	man	who	converses	eagerly	and	animatedly	about	agronomy	with	her	middle-aged	
aunt.	Curiosity	results	in	her	taking	notice	of	him	and	finding	out	more	about	him,	but	at	this	
stage,	it	mostly	produces	a	kind	of	alienation:	
Our	relationship	is	not	the	tender	and	trusting	embrace	of	understanding,	not	one	
of	attraction;	it	is	the	repulsion	of	misunderstanding.	There	is	actually	nothing	at	
all	in	my	relationship	with	her;	it	is	purely	intellectual,	which	for	a	young	girl	is	
naturally	nothing	at	all.	The	method	I	employ	has	nevertheless	its	extraordinary	
conveniences.	A	person	who	plays	the	gallant	arouses	suspicions	and	stirs	up	
resistance	to	himself;	I	am	exempt	from	all	that.	I	am	not	being	watched;	on	the	
contrary,	I	am	marked	rather	as	a	dependable	man	fit	to	watch	over	the	young	girl.	
(351)	
	
At	first	glance,	it	would	seem	that	Johannes	and	the	hypothetical	gallant	would	equally	drive	away	
their	object;	yet	the	aesthetic	seducer	is	full	of	nuances.	Misunderstanding	is	a	conflict	of	the	
intellect	—	that	is,	a	gap	in	knowledge	causes	the	repulsion.	The	words	in	the	original	text,	
Attractioner	and	Repulsioner,32	have	Latin	roots	and	strong	associations	with	the	field	of	physics,	
which	makes	them	suggestive	of	abstract	forces.	On	the	other	hand,	Modstand,33	the	word	
translated	as	‘resistance,’	has	a	Danish	root	that	literally	means	‘to	stand	against’	and	thus	evokes	
a	more	concrete,	palpable	variety	of	opposition.	The	misunderstanding	is	an	absence	of	accurate	
knowledge,	and	without	comprehending	what	it	is	against	which	one	reacts,	one	cannot	actually	
be	reacting	against	that	thing.	In	the	first	case,	Cordelia	believes	herself	to	be	reacting	against	
                                                                                                                                                       
with	one’s	latent	networks	of	meaning	is	a	causative	factor	in	any	affective	reaction	directed	at	this	
individual.	
32	Kierkegaard,	Skrifter	2,	340f.	
33	The	German	equivalent	is	Widerstand.	
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Johannes,	yet	it	is	not	Johannes,	but	merely	a	persona	he	projects.	The	gallant,	on	the	other	hand,	
is	described	as	inspiring	a	resistance	“to	himself,”	and	since	he	presumably	does	not	operate	
behind	a	persona	in	quite	the	same	way	as	the	aesthetic	seducer,	this	resistance	disadvantages	
him,	plain	and	simple.	
	 These	dynamics	show	up	in	the	other	phases	of	Johannes’s	plan,	which	also	involve	an	
element	of	contradiction:	“The	contradiction	in	these	movements	will	evoke	and	develop,	
strengthen	and	consolidate,	the	erotic	love	in	her	—	in	one	word:	tempt	it.”	(386)	The	quote	refers	
specifically	to	the	point	at	which	Johannes	shifts	to	the	overtly	erotic	phase,	but	the	entire	plan	is	
executed	with	the	end	goal	of	the	erotic	in	mind,	and	therefore	a	similar	principle	is	at	work	in	
modified	form	throughout.	The	contradiction	of	the	erotic	is:	two	strive	to	be	one.	Tension	is	the	
friend	of	the	erotic	because	it	also	contains	a	contradiction:	forces	both	of	attraction	and	
repulsion	between	two	entities.	Tension	and	the	erotic	thus	have	a	structural	affinity	for	one	
another.	
	 The	next	part	of	the	plan	is	the	engagement,	which	is	further	broken	down	into	two	
phases:	the	motions	of	infinity,	then	the	erotic.	Johannes	tends	to	use	military	metaphors	
throughout	the	diary,	most	especially	when	he	is	describing	the	two	phases:	“The	greater	the	
abundance	of	strength	she	has,	the	more	interesting	for	me.	The	first	war	is	a	war	of	liberation;	it	
is	a	game.	The	second	is	a	war	of	conquest;	it	is	a	life-and-death	struggle.”	(385)	Johannes	
describes	the	steps	in	his	plan	as	though	Cordelia	only	became	infatuated	with	him	towards	the	
end	of	the	engagement,	but	in	fact	a	force	of	counterintuitive	attraction	is	at	work	already	by	the	
time	he	proposes.	The	proposal	itself	is	a	thorough	surprise	to	Cordelia,	since	Johannes	had	
shown	her	none	of	the	typical	signs	of	romantic	interest	up	to	that	point;	rather,	it	had	always	
been:	“I	romance	with	the	aunt”	(350),	such	that	the	occasion	of	the	engagement	inspires	
Johannes	to	comment:	“The	one	I	almost	feel	most	sorry	for	is	the	aunt,	for	she	loves	me	with	
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such	a	pure	and	upright	agronomical	love;	she	almost	worships	me	as	her	ideal.”	(371)	This	is	
meant	to	be	funny,	of	course;	however,	actually	he	does	seduce	her	to	a	certain	extent,	and	in	so	
doing	reveals	how	values	are	involved	in	forming	an	infatuation.	The	aunt’s	head	is	filled	with	
thoughts	of	agronomy;	it	clearly	occupies	a	central	position	in	her	mental	landscape.	By	involving	
himself	in	discussions	of	this	topic,	Johannes	makes	it	appear	as	if	he	shares	her	values,	which	is	
what	allows	them	to	get	along	so	well.	In	an	infatuation,	one	compares	one’s	own	values	to	those	
of	the	object,	seeking	similarity	or	compatibility.	This	process	can	be	susceptible	to	error	if	there	
is	too	much	projection	of	one’s	own	reality	onto	the	other	person,	but	this	scarcely	even	has	a	
chance	to	arise	in	the	case	of	the	seducer,	since	he	forestalls	any	friction	by	simulating	in	himself	
the	other	person’s	values.	
	 Immediately	following	the	engagement,	Johannes	presumes	to	know	that	something	
Cordelia	“would	very	likely	say”	about	him	to	a	confidante	is	that	“he	has	a	strange	power	over	me”	
(375).	Although	the	erotic	only	fully	manifests	itself	in	the	second	phase	of	the	engagement,	the	
first	phase	prepares	her	for	it:	“When	the	turn	is	made	and	I	begin	to	pull	back	in	earnest,	then	
she	will	summon	up	everything	in	order	to	really	take	me	captive.	She	has	no	other	means	for	that	
than	the	erotic	itself,	except	that	this	will	now	manifest	itself	on	an	entirely	different	scale.	Then	it	
will	be	a	weapon	in	her	hand	that	she	swings	against	me.	Then	I	will	have	reflected	passion.”	(411)	
Johannes	makes	this	“turn”	very	subtly,	so	that	Cordelia	does	not	become	so	alarmed	as	to	disrupt	
the	plan.	Instead,	in	response	to	her	vague	sense	of	an	increased	emotional	distance	from	
Johannes,	she	begins	actively	trying	to	draw	him	closer	to	her.	The	turn	occurs	when	Johannes	
starts	talking	animatedly	about	an	unspecified	subject	which	interests	them	both	—	harmless	
enough.	But	talking	about	an	interesting	subject	has	a	different	directionality	than	the	erotic;	the	
one	is	a	parallel	movement,	whereas	the	other	is	the	drawing	together	of	the	two	parties.	
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	 In	the	final	phase	of	the	plan,	Cordelia	breaks	off	the	engagement	based	on	hints	from	
Johannes	that	he	will	only	love	her	more	for	having	done	it.	He	maintains	contact	through	letters,	
but	they	are	full	of	double	meanings,	such	as	in	the	statement:	“Now	I	truly	call	you	my;	no	
external	sign	reminds	me	of	my	possession.	—	Soon	I	shall	truly	call	you	my.”	(440)	To	Cordelia,	
this	letter	implies	that	they	will	remain	committed	to	one	another	—	whether	through	the	
emotion	of	love,	or	through	marriage.	Johannes	is	very	careful	to	suggest	this	without	ever	
mentioning	marriage	or	anything	concrete.	What	the	words	mean	to	him	is	something	entirely	
different,	and	he	is	aware	of	the	deception:	to	him,	the	lines	mean	that	once	the	seduction	is	
complete,	Cordelia	will	be	‘forever	his’	as	a	poetic	recollection,	as	an	aesthetic	experience	which	
he	can	relive	at	will	in	memory	or	through	the	diary.	Johannes	owns	a	house	in	the	country;	he	
has	the	furnishings	there	arranged	to	resemble	locations	where	their	relationship	developed.	
Cordelia	has	made	plans	to	visit	a	family	in	the	country.	Johannes	arranges	for	the	carriage	to	
bring	her,	instead,	first	to	his	country	house.	What	happens	next	is	not	entirely	clear	and	will	
require	lengthier	analysis	below,34	but	what	is	certain	is	that	the	next	day	Johannes	breaks	off	all	
contact	without	explanation	and	never	has	anything	to	do	with	her	again.	Thus	concludes	the	
seduction.	
	 In	addition	to	these	larger	phases,	Johannes	uses	numerous	sub-strategies.	Sometimes	the	
aim	is	to	create	erotic	tension	through	a	combined	attraction	and	repulsion;	sometimes	it	is	to	
produce	the	appearance	of	a	separate,	parallel	world	inhabited	by	only	Johannes	and	Cordelia;	
and	sometimes	it	is	to	draw	on	the	forces	that	repose	in	common	romantic	scripts.	
	 There	is	a	particular	phenomenon	that	occurs	when	one	is	infatuated:	one	is	acutely	aware	
of	the	presence	of	the	object	of	infatuation;	in	a	room	full	of	people	and	busy	with	activity,	
nevertheless	no	movement	of	that	particular	person	goes	unnoticed.	Johannes	simulates	a	version	
                                                
34	See	page	98.	
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of	this:	“I	place	myself	before	Cordelia	everywhere;	her	eyes	see	me	continually.	To	her	it	seems	
like	sheer	attentiveness	from	my	part,	but	on	my	side	I	know	that	her	soul	thereby	loses	interest	
for	everything	else,	that	there	is	being	developed	within	her	a	mental	concupiscence	that	sees	me	
everywhere.”	(403)	The	feature	that	marks	this	practice	as	seduction	and	differentiates	it	from	
ordinary	infatuation	is	that	it	reverses	the	direction	of	causation:	instead	of	relying	on	Cordelia’s	
mind	to	take	notice	of	him	continually,	Johannes	places	himself	in	the	position	to	catch	her	notice.	
The	idea	is	to	produce	the	corresponding	emotion	of	fascination	by	reproducing	—	from	the	other	
side,	as	it	were	—	the	structure	which	is	typical	of	it.	This	is	part	of	Johannes’s	method	right	from	
the	beginning	of	his	interactions	with	Cordelia.	After	his	first	meeting	with	her	at	the	home	of	
Mrs.	Jansen,	Cordelia	and	the	Jansen	girls	depart	for	a	cooking	lesson.	Johannes	avoids	the	
obvious	action	and	instead	opts	for	the	unexpected:	“I	could	have	offered	to	accompany	them,	but	
that	already	would	have	sufficed	to	indicate	the	gallant	suitor,	and	I	have	convinced	myself	that	
she	is	not	to	be	won	that	way.	—	On	the	contrary,	I	chose	to	leave	right	after	they	had	gone	and	to	
walk	faster	than	they,	but	along	other	streets,	yet	likewise	heading	toward	the	royal	kitchen	so	
that	when	they	turned	onto	Store	Kongensgade	I	passed	them	in	the	greatest	haste	without	
greeting	them	or	anything	—	to	their	great	astonishment.”	(338)		The	surprise	has	the	effect	of	
making	Cordelia	take	particular	notice	of	him,	though	in	an	entirely	unromantic	context.	He	does	
not	wish	to	be	viewed	as	a	suitor	because	it	would	activate	Cordelia’s	latent	scripts	about	how	love	
is	‘supposed’	to	work;	this	would	be	counter-productive	because	Johannes,	after	sizing	Cordelia	up	
as	a	person,	has	decided	that,	with	her	personality,	“a	good	match	in	the	bourgeois	sense	[…]	does	
not	mean	anything	to	her”	(362).	In	fact,	Johannes	later	puts	the	infatuated	suitor	Edward	in	her	
path	just	so	that	“through	him	she	will	acquire	a	distaste	for	plain	and	simple	love”	(361).	One	
sighting	of	Johannes	would	not	be	sufficient	to	produce	“the	first	web	into	which	she	must	be	
spun”	(341),	so	he	coordinates	his	movements	to	hers:	“today	I	met	her	three	times.”	(341)	
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However,	these	meetings	are	tangential	and	extremely	brief;	he	passes	by	her,	for	example,	as	he	
is	leaving	and	she	arriving	at	Mrs.	Jansen’s.	This	is	important	to	prevent	her	from	developing	any	
specific	ideas	about	what	it	means:	“On	the	street,	I	do	not	stop	her,	or	I	exchange	a	greeting	with	
her	but	never	come	close,	but	always	strive	for	distance.	Presumably	our	repeated	encounters	are	
clearly	noticeable	to	her;	presumably	she	does	perceive	that	on	her	horizon	a	new	planet	has	
loomed,	which	in	its	course	has	encroached	disturbingly	upon	hers	in	a	curiously	undisturbing	
way,	but	she	has	no	inkling	of	the	law	underlying	this	movement.”	(341)	Merely	maintaining	a	
tension	between	the	disturbing	and	the	undisturbing,	as	precursors	to	other	tensions,	is	enough.	
The	“law”	and	the	aforementioned	“web”	give	an	indication	of	the	theory	behind	Johannes’s	
continual	appearances.	By	causing	his	interactions	with	Cordelia	to	seem	like	they	occur	
according	to	a	“law,”	he	removes	his	own	agency,	or	at	least	appears	to	do	so.	Cordelia	gets	the	
idea	that	an	outside	force	draws	the	two	of	them	together	—	as	if	it	were	fate.	The	temptation	to	
invoke	fate	where	infatuation	is	concerned	is	very	strong	because,	for	one	thing,	the	emotion	may	
appear	inexplicable	to	the	person	it	affects;	and	for	another	thing,	fate	provides	the	comforting	
illusion	that	it	is	‘meant	to	be.’	One	does	not	like	to	consider	the	possibility	that	a	relationship	
could	be	a	mistake	because	the	stakes	are	so	high	when	one	is	dealing	with	a	process	that	changes	
an	individual	at	basic	levels	of	personality.	As	Kierkegaard	writes	in	a	note	to	the	draft	of	The	
Concept	of	Anxiety,	“the	Seducer’s	secret	is	simply	that	he	knows	that	woman	is	anxiety.”35	Just	as	
Judge	William	accuses	A	of	wanting	to	“play	the	role	of	fate,”36	playing	fate	appeals	to	the	latter’s	
fellow-aesthete	and/or	alter	ego,	Johannes.	
	 One	of	Johannes’s	most	effective	tactics	is	to	suggest	thoughts	to	Cordelia.	People	
generally	find	it	invasive	if	someone	tells	them	what	to	think	directly,	but	if	an	idea	is	simply	
                                                
35	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Journals	and	Papers:	Volume	5,	Autobiographical	Part	One	1829–1848,	ed.	and	trans.	
Howard	V.	Hong	and	Edna	H.	Hong	assisted	by	Gregor	Malantschuk	(Charlottesville:	InteLex	Corporation,	
1995),	256.	[5730]	
36	Kierkegaard,	Either/Or	II,	13.	
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presented,	they	are	inclined	to	consider	it	more	neutrally.	Johannes	plants	resistance	to	the	
engagement	in	Cordelia’s	mind	very	early,	in	his	second	letter	to	her.	As	yet,	he	does	not	say	
anything	about	breaking	it,	but	he	suggests	that	this	external	sign	is	at	odds	with	internal	feeling.	
At	this	early	stage,	Cordelia	is	above	all	curious	about	Johannes,	which	inclines	her	to	be	receptive	
to	information	about	him.	Later,	when	the	engagement	is	about	to	break,	Johannes	writes	a	letter	
asserting	that	she	—	not	he!	—	thinks	“our	love	does	not	need	an	external	bond,	which	is	only	a	
hindrance”	(424).	This	more	direct	suggestion	would	likely	be	well	received	by	Cordelia	because	
she	already	has	an	earlier	precedent	for	this	line	of	thinking;	it	would	occur	to	her	as	something	
familiar,	and	immediately	she	would	be	favorably	disposed	towards	it.	
	 The	first	letter	is	also	an	example	of	suggestion,	and	it	further	illustrates	how	Johannes	
uses	the	technique,	which	he	is	not	reticent	to	describe:	“A	little	epistle	today	describing	the	state	
of	my	soul	will	give	her	a	clue	to	her	own	inner	state.”	(387)	This	letter	especially	confuses	the	
boundaries	between	the	two	individuals.	If	Cordelia	does	not	know	where	she	stops	and	Johannes	
begins,	then	it	is	easier	for	him	to	mold	her	into	an	aesthete	like	himself,	as	well	as	to	suggest	to	
her	the	ideas	he	wants	her	to	have.	The	beginning	runs	thus:	“You	say	that	you	had	not	imagined	
me	like	this,	but	neither	did	I	imagine	that	I	could	become	like	this.	Is	not	the	change	in	you?	For	
it	is	conceivable	that	I	have	not	actually	changed	but	that	the	eyes	with	which	you	look	at	me	
have	changed.	Or	is	the	change	in	me?	It	is	in	me,	for	I	love	you;	it	is	in	you,	for	it	is	you	I	love.”	
(387)	By	considering	both	options	—	that	Johannes	or	that	Cordelia	is	the	one	changed	—	
Johannes	posits	a	relationship	of	mutual	influence	at	a	time	so	early	that	no	such	relationship	
could	exist.	But	there	is	a	self-fulfilling	aspect	to	the	suggestion,	for	Cordelia’s	very	contemplation	
of	it	changes	her	in	the	way	that	any	new	idea	changes	a	person.	So	she	is	indeed	changed	by	
Johannes	—	though	perhaps	not	quite	in	the	way	the	letter	claims.	In	an	entry	after	the	first	set	of	
letters,	Johannes	uses	parallel	grammatical	constructions	to	mimic	the	process	of	thought	
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transfer:	“She	listens;	she	understands.	She	listens	to	the	familiar	saying;	she	understands	it.	She	
listens	to	another	person’s	talking;	she	understands	it	as	her	own.	She	listens	to	another	person’s	
voice	as	it	resonates	within	her;	she	understands	this	resonance	as	if	it	were	her	own	voice	that	
discloses	to	her	and	to	another.”	(388)	The	repetitions	of	“listen”	paired	with	“understand”	are	a	
representation	of	the	mental	process	that	occurs	when	one	is	receptive:	one	adopts	that	which	is	
heard,	incorporates	it	into	oneself.	The	boundary	between	the	recipient’s	own	mental	framework	
and	the	outside	idea	becomes	permeable;	the	incoming	thought	reproduces	itself,	as	a	“resonance,”	
in	the	recipient	and	is	stored	in	memory.	
	
C.	Aesthetic	Principles	in	Romantic	Scripts	
	 The	last	chapter	discussed	mental	hierarchies	as	a	means	of	dealing	with	the	nature	of	
existing;	another	way	in	which	individuals	cope	with	the	problems	of	needing	to	make	decisions	
within	limits	of	time	and	knowledge	is	through	mental	shortcuts.	In	this	section,	I	will	refer	to	a	
particular	type	of	shortcut	as	a	‘script.’37	My	use	of	the	word	‘script’	is	meant	to	evoke	both	the	
theatrical	sense	of	a	series	of	predetermined	procedures	and	the	digital-age	metaphorical	sense	of	
an	executable	section	of	code.	Scripts	are	collocations	of	latent	beliefs	that	have	become	
established	in	the	mind	through	repetition.	They	function	as	mental	shortcuts:	when	a	situation	is	
identified	which	the	brain	evaluates	as	belonging	to	a	particular	category,	the	cognitive	response	
is	channeled	along	a	pre-established	pathway	that	has	proven	to	be	effective	in	the	past.	The	
establishment	of	scripts	is	often	due	to	repetitions	of	cultural	inputs,	however,	and	thus	they	may	
be	socially	efficacious	while	not	necessarily	situationally	or	individually	efficacious.	
                                                
37	James	Russell	uses	the	term	‘mental	scripts’	in	a	similar	way	(“Core	Affect	and	Psychological	Construction	
of	Emotions,”	Psychological	Review	110	(2003):	145–172,	151);	and	Ronald	de	Sousa’s	‘paradigm	scenarios’	are	
likewise	related	(The	Rationality	of	Emotions	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT,	1987),	181–184).	
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	 Since,	as	mentioned	earlier	in	this	chapter,	infatuation	is	based	on	an	evaluation	of	its	
object	in	terms	of	compatibility	with	one’s	own	expectations,38	scripts	are	a	feature	of	mental	
architecture	that	has	significant	potential	to	contribute	to	a	feeling	of	infatuation.	Johannes	
employs	a	multitude	of	common	scripts	related	to	romantic	love.	Nearly	all	of	the	letters	he	writes	
to	Cordelia	are	based	on	one	of	these	scripts,	and	they	surface	in	other	places	in	the	diary	as	well.	
Although	many	of	these	are	(or	have	in	the	interim	become)	clichés,	it	is	to	the	credit	of	the	
aesthete	that	he	merely	uses	them	as	a	starting	point	for	some	quite	thoroughly	literary–artistic	
reflections.	The	typical	form	of	the	letters	is	to	place	the	script	in	the	first	or	second	sentence	and	
then	develop	it	further,	often	by	bringing	in	a	metaphorically	charged	image.	Johannes’s	
particular	application	of	scripts	casts	them	as	part	of	the	aesthetic	lifestyle;	his	treatment	of	them	
brings	out	dimensions	of:	imagination,	ideality,	the	infinite,	the	eternal,	and	possibility.	A	
Kierkegaardian	aesthete	strives	to	take	a	specific	slant	on	life.	In	The	Sickness	Unto	Death	(1849),	
edited	by	“S.	Kierkegaard,”	the	pseudonym	Anti-Climacus	defines	a	human	being	in	terms	of	three	
syntheses:	the	finite	and	the	infinite,	the	necessary	and	the	possible,	the	temporal	and	the	eternal.	
The	titular	sickness	is	despair,	which	can	result	from	an	individual	being	in	improper	relation	to	
any	of	these	six	dimensions	of	self.	These	ideas	about	the	self	form	a	deliberate	part	of	Johannes’s	
thinking	in	The	Seducer’s	Diary,	though	they	only	receive	systematic	development	in	the	later	
work.	Notably,	one	dimension	of	each	synthesis	is	about	being	unrestrained,	unrestricted	—	these	
dimensions	are	what	appeal	to	the	aesthete.	In	keeping	with	one	of	the	broad	motives	of	
Either/Or,	which	is	to	expose	deficiencies	in	the	aesthetic	viewpoint,	Johannes	the	Seducer	would	
qualify,	according	to	the	criteria	in	Sickness	Unto	Death,	as	being	in	despair,	since	his	philosophy	
too	exclusively	favors	one	particular	side	of	the	self.	
                                                
38	See	page	78.	
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	 For	him	to	use	scripts	in	seducing	Cordelia	is	in	some	sense	counterintuitive:	on	the	one	
hand,	these	scripts	propagate	themselves	through	the	medium	of	culture,	being	learned	through	
socialization;	on	the	other	hand,	Johannes	states	that	he	has	“never	known	any	family	that	lived	
so	much	apart”	(338)	as	Cordelia’s,	and	that	she	is	“an	isolated	person”	(339).	Additionally,	she	is	
only	seventeen,	has	never	been	in	love	before,	is	“proud,”	and	finds	the	“chatter”	of	other	girls	
boring	(342).	Cordelia	is	therefore	far	from	being	susceptible	to	a	device	with	merely	conventional	
validity.	Most	likely	there	are	certain	narratives	about	love	and	engagement	which	Cordelia	
knows	just	by	having	been	raised	in	this	society,	regardless	of	her	sheltered	upbringing.	But	the	
fact	that	Johannes’s	tactics	are	highly	effective	with	her	suggests	that	these	scripts	contain	
something	compelling	that	is	independent	of	any	veneer	of	legitimacy	conferred	by	their	being	
repeated	over	and	over	again	in	society.	
	 Scripts	of	this	nature	are	a	type	of	cultural	abbreviation:	a	quick	way	to	transmit	a	
particular	idea.	Problematically,	the	idea	—	or	at	least	the	majority	of	its	implications	—	is	often	
forgotten	in	the	process.	Johannes’s	letters	bring	the	ideas	behind	the	scripts	to	light	again.	In	
order	to	avoid	becoming	too	laudatory	of	the	letters,	it	is	incumbent	to	point	out	that	for	all	their	
compositional	merits	they	are	nevertheless	oddly	impersonal.	This	has	to	do	with	the	tenets	of	the	
aesthete.	His	affinity	for	the	realms	of	imagination	and	possibility	crowds	out	actuality	to	such	a	
degree	that	the	letters	become	very	abstract.	They	have	to	do	with	Cordelia	inasmuch	as	the	
flights	of	imagination	which	they	contain	are	specifically	tailored	to	promote	her	‘progress’	and	
she	is	carried	along	by	these.	Yet	they	remain	distant	from	her	in	many	ways	because	they	are	
usually	lacking	in	details	from	everyday	life	and/or	details	about	Cordelia	as	a	specific	existing	
individual.	
	 Upon	examining	the	scripts,	and	most	especially	upon	seeing	them	expanded	out	in	
Johannes’s	reflections,	it	becomes	apparent	that	each	of	them	has	some	variety	of	underlying	
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narrative.	These	narrative	elements	are	constitutive	of	the	emotion	of	infatuation,	as	will	emerge	
from	the	analyses	of	the	letters.	
	 Before	turning	to	the	letters,	there	are	a	few	scripts	relating	to	the	engagement	that	
demonstrate	Johannes’s	awareness	that	some	formulas	have	little	potential	in	the	poetic	realm.	
His	dismissive	attitude	in	several	instances	shows	that	he	is	vehemently	opposed	to	bourgeois	
conventionality;	it	is	thus	inconceivable	that	he	would	settle	for	an	unreflected	adoption	of	flat,	
ordinary	formulas	in	his	later	correspondence	with	Cordelia.	First,	there	is	Johannes’s	entry	
contemplating	how	best	to	shift	the	dynamic	of	the	relationship:	
Various	means	of	surprising	Cordelia	are	conceivable.	I	could	try	to	raise	an	erotic	
storm	capable	of	tearing	up	trees	by	the	roots.	By	means	of	it,	I	could	see	if	it	is	
possible	to	lift	her	off	the	ground,	to	lift	her	out	of	the	historical	context,	and	
through	secret	meetings	to	generate	her	passion	in	this	unsettled	state.	It	is	not	
inconceivable	that	it	could	be	done.	A	girl	with	her	passion	can	be	made	to	do	
anything	one	pleases.	But	it	would	be	esthetically	incorrect.	I	do	not	relish	
romantic	giddiness,	and	this	state	is	to	be	commended	only	when	one	is	dealing	
with	girls	who	are	able	to	acquire	a	poetic	afterglow	in	no	other	way.	(366)	
	
Johannes’s	reluctance	to	settle	for	“romantic	giddiness”	shows	that	he	differentiates	between	
various	degrees	of	intellectual–emotional	depth	in	romantic	dealings.	Merely	overwhelming	
Cordelia	with	passion	is	not	enough,	as	it	would	not	be	the	kind	of	“absolute	abandon”	he	desires;	
the	former	would	not	reach	as	deep	and	significant	a	level	of	her	personality	as	the	latter.	He	
eventually	concludes	that	an	engagement	would	best	suit	his	purposes:	“yes,	a	good	match,	the	
aunt	will	say”	(371).	Here,	he	pokes	fun	at	a	stereotypical	way	of	describing	a	romantic	
partnership:	the	“good	match”	is	such	a	conventional	evaluation	that	he	can	already	foresee	that	
the	aunt	will	say	just	something	of	this	sort	—	and	it	will	be	based	on	the	completely	erroneous	
assumption	that	Johannes	is	the	agronomy-loving,	comfort-seeking	persona	that	he	has	presented	
thus	far.	Of	the	proposal	itself,	he	says:	“I	kept	very	strictly	to	the	usual	formulas”	(374),	but	in	this	
case	that	is	a	form	of	calculated	restraint;	the	proposal	is	not	supposed	to	be	romantically	charged,	
since	he	plans	to	use	the	engagement	to	repel	Cordelia	in	order	to	attract	her	by	other	means:	“As	
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for	my	engagement,	I	shall	not	boast	that	it	is	poetic,	for	in	every	way	it	is	utterly	philistine	and	
bourgeois.	The	girl	does	not	know	whether	she	should	say	‘Yes’	or	‘No’;	the	aunt	says	‘Yes,’	the	girl	
also	says	‘Yes,’	I	take	the	girl,	she	takes	me	—	and	now	the	story	begins.”39	(375)	Those	romantic	
scripts	which	are	particularly	conventional	prove	to	be	an	effective	means	of	suppressing	that	
which	they	are	supposed	to	encourage	—	namely,	the	romantic.	Johannes’s	method	here	is	
counterintuitive:	“A	double-movement	is	necessary	in	relation	to	Cordelia.”	(386)	That	is,	in	
person,	“irony	and	hoarfrost	make	her	doubtful,”	whereas	“in	a	letter	I	can	throw	myself	at	her	
feet	in	superb	fashion	etc.	—	something	that	would	easily	seem	like	nonsense	if	I	did	it	in	person,	
and	the	illusion	would	be	lost”	(386).	
	 An	excellent	illustration	of	Johannes’s	point	that	one	can	pull	off	effusions	in	letters	that	
would	seem	comical	in	person	is	a	letter	containing	a	long	string	of	lines	of	this	sort:	“This	girl	I	
love	more	than	my	life,	for	she	is	my	life;	more	than	all	my	desires,	for	she	is	my	only	desire;	more	
than	all	my	thoughts,	for	she	is	my	only	thought	[…]”	(398).	Making	the	beloved	the	most	(or	even	
only)	important	thing	in	the	world	is	not	a	realistic	move	for	an	individual	who	must	continue	to	
exist	in	the	world;	it	removes	the	beloved	to	the	realm	of	imagination,	away	from	the	‘intrusion’	of	
actuality.	This	works	for	Johannes	because	his	seduction	has	a	pre-established	life	expectancy,	but	
for	Cordelia,	who	expected	a	continued	relationship,	this	idea	is	impractical.	In	addition	to	this	
expression,	which	might	be	described	as	the	‘one	and	only’-script,	the	same	letter	contains	the	‘no	
                                                
39	This	contrasts	with	the	usual	idea,	according	to	which	the	‘story’	would	end	with	the	engagement	—	or	at	
the	latest	with	marriage.	Both	the	aesthete	Johannes	and	the	ethicist	Judge	William	feel	that	culture	has	
failed	to	recognize	which	part	is	most	interesting	in	a	romantic	relationship,	though	the	latter’s	opinion	
differs	as	to	when	this	is:	“Over	the	centuries	have	not	knights	and	adventurers	experienced	incredible	toil	
and	trouble	in	order	finally	to	find	quiet	peace	in	a	happy	marriage;	over	the	centuries	have	not	writers	and	
readers	of	novels	labored	through	one	volume	after	the	other	in	order	to	end	with	a	happy	marriage,	and	
has	not	one	generation	after	the	other	again	and	again	faithfully	endured	four	acts	of	troubles	and	
entanglements	if	only	there	was	any	probability	of	a	happy	marriage	in	the	fifth	act?	But	through	these	
enormous	efforts	very	little	is	accomplished	for	the	glorification	of	marriage,	and	I	doubt	very	much	that	
any	person	by	reading	such	books	has	felt	himself	made	competent	to	fulfill	the	task	he	has	set	for	himself	
or	has	felt	himself	oriented	in	life,	for	precisely	this	is	the	corruption,	the	unhealthiness	in	these	books,	that	
they	end	where	they	should	begin.”	Kierkegaard,	Either/Or	II,	17.	
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one	understands	me	but	you’-script:	“You	have	understood	me,	you	have	understood	me	correctly,	
literally;	not	one	jot	or	tittle	has	escaped	you!”	(398)	And	another	letter	repeats	the	phrase	“you	
and	you	alone	know”	(417)	three	times.	This	points	to	a	basic,	common	desire	in	love	relationships.	
Understanding	in	human	relationships	in	general	is	difficult	to	achieve,	but	it	is	especially	
important	in	a	romantic	context	because	of	the	expectations	that	necessarily	arise	from	the	
prospect	of	a	shared	life.	Of	course,	this	is	much	less	applicable	for	a	seducer;	the	Johannes–
Cordelia	relationship	only	lasted	about	six	months,	from	April	to	September.	(The	seasonal	
symbolism	fits	the	poetic	quality	of	the	incident	perfectly:	in	spring	it	blossoms,	in	fall	it	withers,	
by	winter	it	is	over.)	However,	since	only	Johannes	knew	that	this	would	be	the	case,	Cordelia	
quite	naturally	did	form	such	expectations.	Although	this	script	is	thus	based	on	a	central,	valid	
issue	in	a	relationship,	the	particular	form	it	takes	here	and	elsewhere	is	an	example	of	operating	
in	extremes.	While	understanding	is	needed	in	a	romantic	relationship,	perfect	understanding	is	
not	humanly	achievable.	Judge	William	from	Part	II	would	view	understanding	as	a	process:	“it	is	
every	human	being’s	duty	to	become	open.”40	Johannes’s	appropriation	of	the	script	both	suggests	
its	deeper	narrative	significance	and	makes	an	ironic	commentary	on	the	seducer’s	actions.	The	
line	is	a	denotatively	empty	utterance,	coming	from	a	seducer,	because	of	course	Johannes	has	not	
opened	himself	—	that	is,	his	self,	not	his	persona	—	to	be	understood	by	Cordelia	at	all.	The	
ethicist	would	again	have	something	to	say	about	this:	“My	young	friend,	suppose	there	was	no	
one	who	cared	to	guess	your	riddle	—	what	joy	would	you	have	in	it	then?”41	
	 Access	to	knowledge	is	one	parameter	that	helps	to	define	an	infatuation.	Johannes’s	
second	letter	begins	with:	“Erotic	love	loves	secrecy	—	an	engagement	is	a	disclosure”	(388).	
Secrecy	creates	an	informational	boundary	around	the	two	participants	that	helps	to	foster	their	
exclusive	interest	in	one	another:	when	only	two	people	share	in	a	secret,	then	each	one	is	the	sole	
                                                
40	Kierkegaard,	Either/Or	II,	322.	
41	Kierkegaard,	Either/Or	II,	160.	
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possible	conversation	partner	for	the	other	within	the	territory	of	that	subject.	Johannes	claims	
that	an	engagement	is	a	way	to	“deceive	the	enemies”	(388);	this	evokes	the	‘us	versus	the	world’-
script,	which	is	a	way	of	establishing,	in	a	more	antagonistic	fashion,	a	separation	of	the	two	
lovers	from	the	rest	of	society.	This	idea	occurs	again	in	a	later	letter’s	rhetorical	suggestion	that	
they	use	Johannes’s	carriage	to	fly	away	“out	of	the	world”	(395).	A	corollary	of	‘us	versus	the	
world’	is	the	‘all	I	need	is	you’-script,	which	is	also	suggested	by	the	ending	of	this	letter:	“if	the	
world	passed	away,	if	our	light	carriage	disappeared	beneath	us,	we	would	still	cling	to	each	other,	
floating	in	the	harmony	of	the	spheres.”	(396)	Johannes	uses	imagination	to	create	parallel	
realities:	here,	one	that	defies	the	laws	of	physics;	and	elsewhere,	one	that	elevates	their	
relationship	to	mythological	status.	He	‘rewrites’	a	painting	of	Theseus	and	Ariadne,	changing	the	
configuration	of	Cupid	and	Nemesis	to	tell	his	own	tale	of	love’s	absolute	priority	and	repeating	
the	line:	“As	if	I	could	forget	you!”	(403)	in	order	to	evoke	the	‘eternal	love’-script.	Eternity	is	
likewise	a	key	element	in	Johannes’s	letter	developing	the	theme	of	longing:	“My	longing	is	an	
eternal	impatience.	If	only	I	had	lived	through	all	eternities	and	assured	myself	that	you	belonged	
to	me	every	moment,	only	then	would	I	[…]	have	enough	assurance	to	sit	calmly	at	your	side.”	
(395)	The	idea	of	love’s	transcendence	of	time	shows	up	in	the	‘loved	you	all	my	life’-script	and	
the	‘never	truly	loved	until	now’-script,	which	show	up	in	a	letter	comparing	Johannes’s	
experience	with	a	palimpsest:	“I	allow	forgetfulness	to	consume	everything	that	does	not	touch	on	
you,	and	then	I	discover	a	pristine,	a	divinely	young,	primitive	text”	(401).	Love,	as	it	is	portrayed	
in	Johannes’s	letters,	is	bound	by	neither	time	nor	space;	the	rhetorical	question,	“To	love	you,	is	
it	not	to	love	a	world?”	(399),	which	concludes	a	letter	full	of	examples	of	the	pathetic	fallacy,	
expresses	a	longing	for	the	infinite.	
	 As	Johannes	transitions	from	the	phase	in	the	engagement	in	which	he	teaches	Cordelia	
about	infinity	to	the	phase	in	which	he	teaches	her	about	the	erotic,	he	sends	a	quick	succession	
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of	six	letters	(406–407).	These	also	contain	romantic	scripts,	but	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	
power	dynamics	within	the	relationship:	“Sometimes	one	must	place	oneself	very	high,	yet	in	such	
a	way	that	there	remains	a	place	still	higher;	sometimes	one	must	place	oneself	very	low.	The	
former	is	more	proper	when	one	is	moving	in	the	direction	of	the	intellectual;	the	latter	is	more	
proper	when	one	is	moving	in	the	direction	of	the	erotic.”	(400)	These	letters	contain	many	
variations	on	the	‘you	are	my	everything’-script.	The	first	letter	contains	the	line,	“I	have	ceased	to	
be,	in	order	to	be	yours”;	Johannes’s	self-abasement	is	continued	in	the	third	letter,	where	he	
describes	himself	as	“body,	substance,	earth,	dust,	and	ashes”	and	Cordelia	as	“soul	and	spirit.”	In	
the	second	letter,	Johannes	inverts	the	meaning	of	“my	Cordelia”	in	order	to	claim	that	it	
designates	Cordelia’s	ownership	of	him,	rather	than	the	other	way	around.	An	earlier	diary	entry	
contains	Johannes’s	opinion	that	a	potential	love	interest	should	“make	such	a	deep	impression	
on	a	person	that	she	awakens	the	ideal”	(335).	Indeed,	ideality	is	usually	projected	onto	the	object	
of	infatuation.	By	rhetorically	elevating	Cordelia	and	lowering	himself,	Johannes	simulates	the	
gesture	of	idealizing	her,	thus	giving	her	reason	to	suppose	that	he	is	infatuated	with	her.	
(Perhaps	he	is,	in	a	sense,	but	in	any	case	not	in	the	way	Cordelia	would	expect.)	This	makes	her	
more	likely	to	reciprocate	because	she	does	not	need	to	fear	rejection;	she	would	perceive	it	as	
safe	to	allow	the	feelings	she	already	has	to	grow.	
	 The	latter	three	letters	in	this	group	of	six	have	especially	strong	mythical	elements.	In	the	
fourth,	Johannes	claims	that	his	interactions	with	the	world	are	mere	representations	of	his	love	
for	Cordelia:	“life	acquires	another	meaning	for	me	—	it	becomes	a	myth	about	you.”	(407)	In	the	
fifth,	he	transforms	himself	and	Cordelia	into	mystical	forces:	“I	wrap	my	thoroughly	reflective	
soul,	like	a	manifold	mobile	frame,	around	your	pure,	deep	being.”	(407).	And	in	the	sixth	letter,	
he	compares	himself	to	a	river	that	fell	in	love	with	a	maiden,	just	as	“we	read	in	old	stories”	(407).	
Implicit	in	these	letters	is	the	promise	that	love	has	the	power	to	transcend	actuality	and	access	a	
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metaphysical	realm;	based	on	the	contents	of	the	previous	letters,	this	is	the	realm	of	aesthetic	
values.	
	
D.	Worlds	Apart	
	 Although	Johannes’s	aesthetic	method	of	seduction	produces	moments	of	enjoyment	for	
him	throughout	its	entire	course,	it	does	also	have	a	climactic	moment	of	sorts	at	the	end	when	
Cordelia	visits	Johannes’s	country	house.	After	Johannes	has	talked	Cordelia	into	breaking	their	
engagement,	he	undertakes	an	elaborate	redecoration	of	this	house,	which	he	describes	in	a	diary	
entry.	Soon	after	the	break,	Cordelia	is	to	visit	a	family	in	the	country;	however,	Johannes	has	his	
servant	intercept	her	coach	and	bring	her	to	his	country	house	instead,	where	he	has	carefully	
prepared	the	appearances	that	will	meet	her	gaze.	This	encounter	refers	back	to	an	earlier	diary	
entry	in	which	Johannes	observes	that	“surroundings	and	setting	do	have	a	great	influence	upon	a	
person	and	are	part	of	that	which	makes	a	firm	and	deep	impression	on	the	memory	or,	more	
correctly,	on	the	whole	soul”	(389).	In	the	same	entry,	he	describes	the	room	at	the	home	of	
Cordelia’s	aunt	where	they	frequently	spent	time	together.	He	asserts	that	the	surroundings	are	
“entirely	appropriate”	for	Cordelia	and	then	compares	this	with	the	setting	of	another	of	his	
seductions,	which	was	“earthbound”	but	also	appropriate	because	“Emily	was	lovely	but	of	less	
significance	than	Cordelia.”	(390)	Johannes’s	evaluation	of	the	different	settings	imbues	them	
with	metaphorical	significance:	“Cordelia’s	surroundings	must	have	no	foreground	but	rather	the	
infinite	boldness	of	the	horizon.	She	must	not	be	earthbound	but	must	float,	not	walk	but	fly,	not	
back	and	forth	but	eternally	forward.”	Johannes	is	able	to	realize	this	ideal	at	his	country	house,	
where	the	view,	as	he	describes	it	in	a	later	entry,	harmonizes	with	his	vision	of	what	is	suitable:	
The	location	is	just	as	she	would	like	it.	Sitting	in	the	center	of	the	room,	one	can	
look	out	on	two	sides	beyond	everything	in	the	foreground;	there	is	limitless	
horizon	on	both	sides;	one	is	alone	in	the	vast	ocean	of	the	atmosphere.	If	one	
moves	nearer	to	a	row	of	windows,	a	forest	[Skov]	looms	far	off	on	the	horizon	like	
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a	garland,	bounding	and	inclosing.	So	it	should	be.	What	does	erotic	love	[Elskov]	
love?	—	An	enclosure.	Was	not	paradise	itself	an	enclosed	place,	a	garden	facing	
east?	—	But	it	hedges	one	in	too	closely,	this	ring.	One	moves	closer	to	the	window	
—	a	calm	lake	hides	humbly	within	the	higher	surroundings.	At	the	edge	there	is	a	
boat.	A	sigh	out	of	the	heart’s	fullness,	a	breath	from	the	mind’s	unrest.	It	works	
loose	from	its	mooring,	glides	over	the	surface	of	the	lake,	gently	moved	by	the	soft	
breeze	of	ineffable	longing.	Rocked	on	the	surface	of	the	lake,	which	is	dreaming	
about	the	deep	darkness	of	the	forest,	one	vanishes	in	the	mysterious	solitude	of	
the	forest.	—	One	turns	to	the	other	side,	where	the	sea	spreads	out	before	one’s	
eyes,	which	are	stopped	by	nothing	and	are	pursued	by	thoughts	that	nothing	
detains.	What	does	erotic	love	love?	Infinity.	—	What	does	erotic	love	fear?	
Boundaries.	(442)	
	
Johannes	acknowledges	the	appeal	of	enclosure	in	a	relationship,	yet	his	aesthetic	ideals	cannot	
entertain	it	as	more	than	an	adornment;	thus,	his	ideal	landscape	evokes	the	mood	of	enclosure	
while	actually	opening	out	into	infinite	space.	This	landscape,	as	viewed	from	the	large	room	in	
the	house,	forms	Cordelia’s	first	impression	upon	entering	the	country	house.	Next,	there	is	a	
smaller	room,	which	Johannes	has	carefully	outfitted	with	the	same	furniture	that	is	at	her	aunt’s	
house	—	willow	matting,	sofa,	tea	table,	lamp	—	plus	a	piano	like	the	one	in	the	home	of	her	
friends	the	Jansens.	In	the	music	holder,	Johannes	places	a	copy	of	the	“little	Swedish	melody”	
that	he	once	observed	her	playing	(442).	The	final	touch	is	a	book	of	poetry	—	nothing	too	
profound,	just	something	to	set	the	mood	—	lying	on	the	table	with	a	sprig	of	myrtle	between	its	
pages,	“more	than”	a	“bookmark”:	a	symbol	of	love	(442).		
	 Partly	because	the	house	is	a	physical	location,	and	partly	because	this	encounter	is	the	
most	thoroughly	planned	of	all,	this	episode	in	the	seduction	is	the	best	example	of	how	an	
infatuation	feeds	on	the	creation	of	a	separate	world,	inhabited	only	by	two,	distinct	from	the	rest	
of	society.	Infatuation	involves	the	creation	of	a	private	sphere	under	any	circumstances;	but	
Johannes,	in	keeping	with	the	ethos	of	the	aesthete,	carries	this	to	an	extreme	by	creating	a	space	
containing	all	sorts	of	visual	references	to	the	narrative	of	their	love.	When	Cordelia	sees	the	
significant	objects,	she	associates	them	with	events	in	her	relationship	with	Johannes,	which	calls	
up	the	relevant	thoughts	and	memories	to	her	conscious	mind.	Johannes	evinces	an	
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understanding	of	the	temporal	dimension	of	emotions,	whose	intensity	is	enhanced	when	
evaluations	and	connections	are	made	within	a	brief	period	of	time:	“nothing	has	been	forgotten	
that	could	have	any	significance	for	her;	on	the	other	hand,	nothing	has	been	introduced	that	
could	directly	remind	her	of	me,	although	I	am	nevertheless	invisibly	present	everywhere.	But	in	
large	part	the	effect	will	depend	upon	how	she	happens	to	see	it	the	first	time.	In	that	regard,	my	
servant	has	received	the	most	precise	instructions,	and	in	his	way	he	is	a	perfect	virtuoso.”	(442)	
Thinking	about	all	of	these	things	within	a	very	brief	space	of	time	produces	a	moment	of	
concentrated	intensity	which	forms	the	high	point	of	her	infatuation;	here,	everything	that	has	
pulled	her	towards	Johannes	combines	to	produce	an	overwhelming	emotion	to	which	she	is	
ready	to	submit	her	entire	being.	Infatuation	can	do	this	because	it	is	an	emotion	having	to	do	
with	relationships,	and	a	relationship	always	contains	the	possibility	of	change:	whenever	two	
people	interact,	their	distinct	individualities	are	brought	into	proximity,	creating	tensions	that	
either	have	to	be	resolved	through	one	or	both	of	the	people	changing,	or	else	the	tensions	will	
dissolve	the	relationship.	The	extent	of	the	tensions	is	ultimately	dependent	on	how	close	the	
relationship	is;	in	the	case	of	a	romantic	relationship	like	this	one,	that	potential	is	very	great.	The	
stronger	Cordelia’s	infatuation,	the	more	vulnerable	her	personality	is.	
	 The	separate	world	is	demarcated	not	only	by	its	visual	qualities	but	also	by	its	secrecy.	
What	is	at	stake	in	the	secrecy	of	love	is	the	private	space	of	the	two	participants	in	the	
relationship.	Johannes	states	at	the	outset	of	the	diary	that	“all	love	is	secretive”	and	then	
emphasizes	that	he	means	this	unconditionally	by	adding:	“even	the	faithless	kind,	if	it	has	the	
appropriate	esthetic	element	within	it”	(336).	The	ethicist	from	Part	II	agrees:	“I	have	no	
hesitation	at	all	in	declaring	secretiveness	to	be	the	absolute	condition	for	preserving	the	esthetic	
in	marriage,	not	in	the	sense	that	one	should	aim	at	it,	pursue	it,	take	it	in	vain,	let	the	only	real	
enjoyment	be	in	the	enjoyment	of	secretiveness.	One	of	the	favorite	fancies	of	first	love	is	that	it	
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will	take	flight	to	an	uninhabited	island.”42	By	staging	the	final	scene	of	the	seduction	at	his	house	
out	in	the	country,	away	from	Copenhagen,	Johannes	creates	a	version	of	the	uninhabited	island	
that	the	ethicist	describes.	A	private	sphere	is	important	because	it	marks	infatuation	as	
something	distinct	even	from	other	kinds	of	love,	such	as	the	familial	variety,	which	Johannes	
finds	an	unsuitable	subject	for	his	purposes:	“What	do	engaged	people	ordinarily	talk	about?	As	
far	as	I	know,	they	are	very	busy	mutually	weaving	each	other	into	the	boring	context	of	the	
respective	families.	No	wonder	the	erotic	vanishes.”	(380f.)	This	is	the	case	because	of	what	
distinguishes	a	romantic	attachment	from	all	others:	its	exclusivity.	Erotic	love	can	be	focused	on	
one	person	in	a	way	that	other	kinds	of	love,	including	familial,	cannot.	Johannes’s	dismissal	of	
familial	context	can	be	read	as	a	consequence	of	his	desire	to	separate	out	only	those	aspects	of	
romance	that	he	can	enjoy	aesthetically,	since	these	contexts	would	likely	constitute	two	of	the	
narrative	strands	that	the	participants	must	interweave	in	order	to	fortify	a	love	relationship	of	
the	more	enduring	variety.	On	the	other	hand,	his	claim	functions	as	a	critique	of	“boring”	
bourgeois	customs,	which	can	crowd	out	precisely	that	which	is	most	conducive	to	strengthening	
an	infatuation.	Being	by	nature	more	or	less	an	obsessive	process,	an	infatuation	bends	every	story	
back	onto	its	participants,	so	that	it	becomes	a	story	about	the	relationship;	any	story	that	points	
outward,	away	from	the	relationship,	is	a	distraction:	“public	information	is	irrelevant	to	the	
mysteries	of	love”	(381).	And	by	“mysteries,”	Johannes	likely	means	the	kind	of	webs	he	himself	
spins,	rather	than	the	unknown.	
	 Of	all	the	elements	which	Johannes	uses	to	produce	the	utmost	upwelling	of	Cordelia’s	
feeling	of	infatuation,	the	most	important	is	memory.	The	intense,	climactic	moment	requires	
that	multiple	preparatory	moments	be	stored	in	memory	so	that	they	can	be	recalled	at	once:	
“The	suroundings	are	always	of	great	importance,	especially	for	the	sake	of	recollection	
                                                
42	Kierkegaard,	Either/Or	II,	104.	
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[Erindring].	Every	erotic	relationship	must	always	be	lived	through	in	such	a	way	that	it	is	easy	for	
one	to	produce	an	image	that	conveys	all	the	beauty	of	it.”	(390)	Since	an	image	conveys	
information	in	a	simultaneous	manner,	it	is	well	suited	to	evoke	all	of	the	factors	which,	evaluated	
together,	produce	an	overwhelming	infatuation.	Johannes	makes	a	visual	citation	of	locations	and	
objects	that	Cordelia	associates	with	emotionally	charged	events	in	the	course	of	their	
relationship;	in	so	doing,	he	calls	to	mind	its	entire	‘history’	for	Cordelia	to	relive	in	her	
imagination	as	she	explores	the	rooms.	Whereas	a	love	relationship	has	a	history	that	gives	it	
strength	through	the	accumulation	of	reasons	for	affection	between	the	partners,	Johannes	
exploits	the	course	of	events	that	have	constituted	the	seduction	up	to	that	point	in	order	to	
simulate	a	‘history.’	These	events	cannot	qualify	as	a	history	for	two	reasons.	Firstly,	they	involve	
not	two	individuals	in	a	relationship,	but	rather	Cordelia	and	a	persona.	Secondly,	many	of	them	
—	the	letters	in	particular	—	operate	at	a	level	of	abstraction	that	precludes	meaningful	
participation	by	concrete,	existing	individuals.	
	 There	is	more	than	one	way	to	read	Johannes’s	two	final	diary	entries	from	the	24th	and	
25th	of	September,	which	bookend	the	night	when	Cordelia	is	conveyed	to	the	country	house.	On	
a	denotative	level,	the	entry	from	the	24th	focuses	on	the	Johannes’s	reflections	as	he	strolls	
through	Copenhagen	around	midnight.	If	one	supposes	that	he	is	taking	on	the	more	traditional	
role	of	the	seducer	for	this	final	stratagem,	then	these	entries	can	be	read	as	nineteenth-century	
avoidance	of	sexuality,	with	the	implication	that	Johannes	travels	to	the	country	house	and	
spends	the	night	with	Cordelia	in	the	intervening	gap.	However,	the	possibility	that	the	passage	is	
not	playing	coy	after	all	points	to	two	other	potential	readings.	It	is	conceivable	that	Johannes	
makes	no	omission	at	all,	and	that	the	final	act	in	the	seduction	does	in	fact	consist	merely	of	him	
taking	a	stroll	while	Cordelia	explores	the	country	house:	of	her	experiencing	the	height	of	her	
infatuation	while	he	imagines	her	experiencing	the	height	of	her	infatuation.	In	a	previous	entry,	
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Johannes	explains	that	his	presence	would	ruin	the	effect	of	the	surroundings:	“I	myself	do	not	
wish	to	participate	in	her	surprise	and	in	her	joy	over	it;	such	erotic	episodes	would	only	weaken	
her	soul.”	(440)	Given	the	way	Johannes	speaks	of	demanding	more	than	an	ordinary	seducer,	the	
“everything”	that	Cordelia	has	“given	away”	(445),	according	to	the	entry	on	the	25th,	might	very	
well	refer	to	her	emotions,	her	intellect,	her	personality	—	after	all,	the	main	feature	that	sets	this	
seduction	apart	is	that	Cordelia’s	virginity	is	the	least	that	is	at	stake.	So	certain	is	Johannes	of	the	
effects	the	house’s	furnishings	will	have	on	her	that	he	does	not	actually	need	to	be	there	in	order	
to	know	how	she	will	react.	A	reliance	on	imagination	to	this	degree	would	be	a	manifestation	of	
the	aesthetic	lifestyle	carried	to	its	utmost	extreme.		
	 The	third	reading	suggested	is	that	the	passage	is	deliberately	ambiguous43	—	that	both	of	
the	aforementioned	readings	are	meant	to	occur	to	the	attentive	reader,	who	is	then	even	more	
poignantly	confronted	with	the	question	of	Johannes’s	priorities;	in	other	words,	does	the	
aesthetic	seducer	even	have	any	use	for	physical	consummation,	or	is	it	made	superfluous	by	the	
pleasure	in	having	obtained	complete	intellectual–emotional	surrender	from	the	victim?	In	the	
latter	case,	having	sex	with	Cordelia	might	even	be	a	distraction,	an	unwanted	intrusion	of	
actuality	into	his	realm	of	purely	aesthetic	imagination.	The	text	of	the	entries	is	unclear	at	
several	points;	when	he	asks	on	the	25th	“why	cannot	such	a	night	last	longer?”	(445),	does	he	
mean	spending	the	night	with	Cordelia,	or	spending	the	night	with	his	own	thoughts?	The	
introduction	to	the	diary,	in	which	the	editor	A	relates	that	the	seducer’s	victims	could	not	decide	
whether	they	had	grounds	to	reproach	Johannes	and	therefore	never	made	their	grievances	public,	
favors	the	interpretation	that	the	seduction	was	mental	and	not	physical,	since	that	society	would	
have	difficulty	recognizing	a	psychological	event	as	a	seduction	according	to	its	norms.	Another	
comment	makes	one	wonder	whether	Johannes	is	speaking	literally	when	he	alludes	to	the	coach	
                                                
43	A	similar	move	is	employed	with	regard	to	the	authorship	of	parts	of	Either/Or,	as	I	have	pointed	out	on	
page	73.	
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that	is	to	drive	him	to	Cordelia:	“Everything	is	a	metaphor;	I	myself	am	a	myth	about	myself,	for	is	
it	not	as	a	myth	that	I	hasten	to	this	tryst?”	(444)	On	the	one	hand,	this	statement	may	be	read	as	
lending	support	for	the	second	reading	if	it	is	taken	to	mean	that	Johannes	does	not	actually	go	to	
meet	Cordelia;	on	the	other	hand,	it	could	indicate	that	Johannes	does	travel	there	in	body	but	
not	in	spirit	—	in	other	words,	that	he	remains	personally	detached	from	the	event	in	order	to	
experience	it	according	to	his	aesthetic	ideal	of	enjoyment.	Notwithstanding	Kierkegaard’s	dislike	
of	prudery,	indirectness	in	this	case	fits	his	vision	of	Johannes’s	modus	operandi:	“the	esthetic	is	
always	hidden:	if	it	expresses	itself	at	all,	it	is	coquettish.”44	On	the	whole,	considering	that	
Johannes	truly	wants	everything	from	Cordelia,	it	seems	more	likely	that	he	does	actually	show	up	
at	the	country	house.	However,	the	language	of	Johannes’s	final	two	diary	entries,	by	suggesting	
other	possibilities,	is	an	invitation	to	the	reader	to	consider	the	implications	of	a	psychological	
seduction.	
	
IV.	Pedagogical	Considerations	
	 Throughout	Kierkegaard’s	works,	emotions	are	taken	very	seriously	as	a	core	aspect	of	self.	
Robert	C.	Roberts	identifies	an	Aristotelian	vein	in	Kierkegaard’s	thinking	with	respect	to	
emotions,	pointing	out	the	central	importance	of	“educating	the	emotions.”45	In	The	Seducer’s	
Diary,	an	‘emotional	education’	of	sorts	also	takes	place;	however,	in	keeping	with	the	twisted	
nature	of	the	seducer’s	activities,	that	which	is	thereby	learned	cannot	be	said	to	benefit	the	
learner.	The	educational	process	does,	on	the	other	hand,	provide	a	textual	basis	for	exploring	the	
                                                
44	Kierkegaard,	Journals	and	Papers	5,	224.	[5634]	
45	Robert	C.	Roberts,	“Existence,	Emotion,	and	Virtue:	Classical	Themes	in	Kierkegaard,”	in	The	Cambridge	
Companion	to	Kierkegaard,	ed.	Alastair	Hannay	and	Gordon	D.	Marino	(Cambridge,	England:	UP,	1998),	179.	
Roberts	states	that	Kierkegaard’s	writings	are	“all	about	proper	and	improper	emotions	and	action,	and	he	
stresses,	as	strongly	as	Aristotle	does,	the	role	of	choice	in	acquiring	and	exemplifying	these.	If	we	may	
paraphrase	Aristotle	as	saying	that	genuine	existence,	or	subjectivity	(when	it	is	truth,	and	not	just	
‘subjectivity	of	a	sort’)	is	proper	pathos.”	
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nature	of	the	‘instructional	methods,’	so	to	speak,	that	can	effectively	change	emotions,	as	well	as	
how	changing	the	emotions	changes	the	self.		
	 Johannes	adopts	the	language	of	education	when	describing	the	scenes	between	the	two	
‘couples’:	Cordelia	and	Edward	plus	Johannes	and	Cordelia’s	aunt.	This	configuration	also	forms	a	
‘love	square,’	as	opposed	to	the	paradigmatic	‘love	triangle.’	In	common	with	Goethe’s	
Wahlverwandtschaften,	which	also	contains	a	foursome,	the	initial	pairings	are	soon	exchanged	
for	others;	however,	the	innovation	of	The	Seducer’s	Diary	is	that	the	reconfiguration	happens	not	
because	of	elemental	forces	of	nature	but	rather	by	the	design	of	Johannes	the	Seducer,	who	
possesses	knowledge	of	human	nature	that	removes	the	mysteriousness	of	attractions,	both	
romantic	and	other.	He	merely	wishes	to	arrange	matters	to	seem	as	though	impersonal	forces	
were	the	cause:	
She	must	owe	me	nothing,	for	she	must	be	free.	Only	in	freedom	is	there	love;	only	
in	freedom	are	there	diversion	and	everlasting	amusement.	Although	I	am	making	
arrangements	so	that	she	will	sink	into	my	arms	as	if	by	a	necessity	of	nature	and	
am	striving	to	make	her	gravitate	toward	me,	the	point	nevertheless	is	that	she	
should	not	fall	like	a	heavy	body	but	as	mind	should	gravitate	toward	mind.	
Although	she	will	belong	to	me,	yet	it	must	not	be	in	the	unbeautiful	way	of	
resting	upon	me	as	a	burden.	She	must	be	neither	an	appendage	in	the	physical	
sense	nor	an	obligation	in	the	moral	sense.	(360f.)	
	
The	seducer’s	practice	is	a	powerful	yet	restrained	display	of	agency	which	forms	a	stark	contrast	
to	the	relationships	portrayed	in	Die	Wahlverwandtschaften,	in	which	characters	are	propelled	
hither	and	thither	by	forces	which	they	are	inadequate	to	oppose.	(Cordelia’s	ineffectual	suitor	is	
accordingly	named	“Edward,”	like	the	character	in	Goethe.)	One	reads	Goethe	to	witness	the	
aesthetic	tour	de	force	on	display	in	the	novel,	not	in	order	to	learn	about	the	human	psyche.	His	
charaters	are	not	equipped	with	a	plausible	psychology,	whereas	Kierkegaard	goes	to	great	lengths	
to	provide	a	reconstructible	set	of	reasons	for	characters’	thoughts	and	actions,	grounded	in	their	
histories,	so	that	his	characters	can	function	as	adequate	simulations	of	interpersonal	dynamics.	
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	 Johannes’s	description	in	the	above	passage	of	gravitating	minds	is	dissonant	with	several	
other	places	in	the	diary	where	he	is	dismissive	of	female	intellect,	but	such	inconsistencies	are	
typical	of	the	aesthete.46	If	one	interpretation	fits	his	purpose	at	one	moment	and	another	at	the	
next,	he	is	not	inclined	to	be	overly	punctilious.	It	suits	his	pursuit	of	the	infinite	to	keep	all	
possibilities	open.	Many	of	the	dismissive	passages	are	part	of	a	rationalization	of	his	ethically	
questionable	behavior,	whereas	numerous	places	in	the	diary	demonstrate	that	what	makes	
Cordelia	so	able	to	be	seduced	in	this	way	is	precisely	her	intellect;	moreover,	that	that	is	what	
Johannes	develops	in	her:	“She	must	be	strengthened	within	herself	before	I	let	her	find	support	
from	me.	[…]	She	herself	must	be	developed	within	herself;	she	must	feel	the	resilience	of	her	
soul;	she	must	come	to	grips	with	the	world	and	lift	it.”	(360)	Notably,	however,	this	passage	uses	
passive	grammatical	constructions	that	allow	Johannes	to	go	unmentioned.	He	calls	Cordelia’s	
responses	to	the	curious	social	situations	which	he	engineers	“exercises	that	must	be	done”	(351),	
yet	he	disavows	his	own	role	in	bringing	them	about.	The	use	of	the	first-person	plural	pronoun	
“we”	in	the	following	passage	is	interpretable	as	Johannes’s	attempt	to	obscure	his	personal	
involvement	behind	a	vaguely	defined	company	which	might	perhaps	include	the	entire	foursome,	
or	perhaps	his	agronomical	persona	as	a	separate	entity	from	himself:	
This	is	the	first	false	teaching:	we	must	teach	her	to	smile	ironically,	but	this	smile	
applies	to	me	just	as	much	as	to	the	aunt;	for	she	does	not	know	at	all	what	to	
think	of	me.	But	it	could	just	be	that	I	was	the	kind	of	young	man	who	became	old	
prematurely;	it	is	possible;	there	could	be	a	second	possibility,	a	third,	etc.	Having	
smiled	at	her	aunt,	she	is	indignant	with	herself;	I	turn	around	and,	while	I	
continue	to	speak	with	the	aunt,	I	look	very	gravely	at	her,	whereupon	she	smiles	
at	me,	at	the	situation.	(351)	
	
It	might	seem	like	an	odd	variety	of	confession	for	Johannes	to	call	his	own	teaching	“false,”	since	
that	immediately	suggests	he	is	leading	her	astray.	The	text,	of	course,	contains	precisely	that	
suggestion.	However,	there	is	also	an	explanation	for	why	Johannes	would	describe	it	that	way.	
                                                
46	Johannes	states	that	“the	woman	is	the	weaker	sex”	(339);	the	ethicist	is	the	one	who	asserts	that	“woman	
is	just	as	strong	as	man”	(Kierkegaard,	Either/Or	II,	113).	
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The	teaching	is	not	false	in	the	sense	that	it	is	ineffective	in	reaching	its	aim.	From	Johannes’s	
perspective,	it	is	not	only	the	teaching	that	is	false:	he	is	teaching	Cordelia	to	be	false	herself.	To	
smile	ironically	is	to	have	two	opinions	of	a	situation,	one	on	display,	the	other	hidden.	Once	
Cordelia	learns	to	do	this,	she	is	no	longer	transparent,	and	in	that	sense	there	is	a	falseness	in	her	
smile.	
	 This	is	more	evidence	that	this	is	no	ordinary	seduction,	for	here	the	seduced,	not	just	the	
seducer,	is	false.	Another	of	Johannes’s	pedagogical	reflections	gives	a	hint	as	to	the	dynamic	
between	the	two	of	them:	“But	now	she	is	going	to	learn	what	a	powerful	force	erotic	love	[Elskov]	
is.	[…]	And	this	will	take	place	through	me;	and	in	learning	to	love,	she	will	learn	to	love	me;	as	
she	develops	the	rule,	the	paradigm	will	sequentially	unfold,	and	this	I	am.”	(377)	Learning	not	
only	to	love	in	general	but	also	to	love	Johannes	specifically	involves	becoming	similar	to	him:	
Cordelia	develops	the	reflective	capacity	of	the	aesthete.	Additionally,	the	educational	aspect	
operates	in	both	directions,	at	least	according	to	Johannes:	“My	love	affairs,	therefore,	always	have	
a	reality	[Realitet]	for	me	personally;	they	amount	to	a	life	factor,	an	educational	period	that	I	
definitely	know	all	about,	and	I	often	even	link	with	it	some	skill	or	other.”	(346)	The	idea	that	the	
relationship	with	Cordelia	produces	no	more	than	the	nebulous	“some	skill	or	other”	is	likely	to	
produce	ethical	repugnance	in	the	reader:	a	skill,	a	mere	tool	for	the	seducer’s	repertoire	is	an	
impact	entirely	out	of	proportion	to	the	impact	on	Cordelia;	this	goes	against	the	widespread	
belief	that	there	ought	to	be	mutuality	in	a	relationship	of	this	nature.	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	
reason	to	suspect	that	the	impact	on	Johannes	is	greater	than	he	himself	claims.	One	of	
Johannes’s	entries	tells	of	a	conversation	in	which	a	licentiate	friend	of	his	tells	about	the	girl	to	
whom	he	has	become	engaged:	
He	confided	to	me	that	she	was	lovely,	which	I	knew	before,	that	she	was	very	
young,	which	I	also	knew;	he	finally	confided	to	me	that	he	had	chosen	her	
precisely	so	that	he	himself	could	form	her	into	the	ideal	that	had	always	vaguely	
hovered	before	him.	Good	lord,	what	a	silly	licentiate	—	and	a	healthy,	blooming,	
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cheerful	girl.	Now,	I	am	a	fairly	old	hand	at	the	game,	and	yet	I	never	approach	a	
young	girl	other	than	as	nature’s	Venerabile	[something	worthy	of	veneration]	and	
first	learn	from	her.	Then	insofar	as	I	may	have	any	formative	influence	upon	her,	
it	is	by	teaching	her	again	and	again	what	I	have	learned	from	her.	(390f.)	
	
The	contrast	between	the	conception	of	men	and	women	on	display	in	this	passage	versus	the	one	
above	gives	a	good	idea	of	the	capriciousness	of	Johannes’s	mind.	These	vacillations	between	
idolization	of	and	condescension	towards	women	blur	the	distinction	between	teacher	and	
student	—	even,	one	suspects,	inside	his	own	head.	The	dual	directionality	of	the	educational	
aspect	of	the	diary	parallels	the	likewise	mutual	attentions	inherent	to	the	erotic.	To	have	
personal	involvement	to	this	extent	also	has	implications	for	evaluating	Johannes’s	degree	of	
detachment	—	from	Cordelia,	from	the	situation,	from	his	own	emotions	—	at	the	end	of	the	
seduction.	This	is	significant	because	Cordelia’s	personality	changes	over	the	course	of	the	
relationship,	showing	that	infatuation	makes	one	susceptible	to	alterations	at	a	basic	level	of	self	
and	raising	the	question	of	the	incident’s	effect	on	Johannes.	
	
V.	The	Asymmetries	of	Seduction	
	 Whereas	there	is	an	expectation	of	reciprocity	in	a	romantic	relationship,	a	seduction	
posits	asymmetry;	for	that	reason	it	may	be	considered	a	betrayal	of	the	romantic	relationship.	
Infatuation	is	ordinarily	about	two	people	inhabiting	the	same	narrative,	yet	in	this	seduction,	it	is	
only	one.	This	one,	Cordelia,	inhabits	a	space	along	with	a	simulation;	it	is	the	false	persona	
Johannes	projects,	which	he	describes	as	if	it	were	an	invisible	copy	of	himself:	“I	myself	am	
almost	invisibly	present	when	I	am	sitting	visible	at	her	side.	My	relationship	to	her	is	like	a	dance	
that	is	supposed	to	be	danced	by	two	people	but	is	danced	by	only	one.	That	is,	I	am	the	other	
dancer,	but	invisible.”	(380)	The	use	of	a	simulation	makes	it	easier	to	see	what	causes	Cordelia	to	
become	infatuated	because	the	simulation	becomes	whatever	is	most	likely	to	be	effective	with	
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her.	While	this	is	going	on,	Johannes	sits	back	at	a	remove	and	delivers	commentary	on	the	
development	of	the	relationship	between	Cordelia	and	the	simulation;	it	is	not	only	his	brief	
encounters	with	random	women	in	the	streets	of	Copenhagen	that	can	be	termed	“actiones	in	
distans.”	Inasmuch	as	Johannes’s	presence	in	the	relationship	is	only	as	a	simulation,	he	maintains	
a	distance	between	himself	and	his	persona	that	would	theoretically	enable	him	to	cast	off	the	
persona	after	the	relationship	ends	and	thus	avoid	any	unpleasant	thoughts	or	emotions.	For	a	
Kierkegaardian	aesthete,	who	values	the	dimensions	of	self	that	are	freeing	and	unrestricting,	an	
escape	from	consequences	is	highly	appealing.	
	 It	should	be	remembered,	however,	that	the	aesthete	is	an	unreliable	narrator.	His	
resolution	at	the	end	of	the	diary	that	“from	now	on	she	can	no	longer	occupy	my	soul”	(445)	is	
little	deterrence	to	questions	about	the	effects	of	the	incident	on	him,	which	even	A,	the	editor,	
recognizes:	“But	how	may	things	look	in	his	own	head?	Just	as	he	has	led	others	astray,	so	he,	I	
think,	will	end	by	going	astray	himself.”	(308)	Johannes	intends	to	use	infatuation	for	his	own	
aesthetic	ends,	but	one	may	wonder	whether	the	emotion	does	not	turn	the	tables	on	him.47	Does	
he	really	succeed	in	keeping	himself	outside	of	the	relationship	he	has	created?	A	sign	of	
Johannes’s	entanglement	in	the	situation	is	that	what	he	wants	for	Cordelia	is	basically	the	same	
as	what	he	wants	for	himself.	That	is,	he	wants	to	instill	in	her	the	same	aesthetic	principles	that	
he	values,	and	he	invests	as	much	time	in	her	as	she	in	him.	At	one	point,	Johannes	hides	a	note	
in	Cordelia’s	knitting,	with	the	explanation:	“It	always	seems	as	if	I	were	the	one	who	paid	
attention	to	her;	the	advantage	I	have	is	that	I	am	placed	in	her	thoughts	everywhere,	that	I	
surprise	her	everywhere.”	(410)	On	one	level,	the	implied	deception	is	real,	since	the	note	does	not	
signify	what	Cordelia	believes	it	to	signify:	while	she	takes	it	as	a	sign	of	Johannes’s	affection,	he	
intends	it	as	means	of	appearing	to	have	affection	for	her	and	thereby	encouraging	her	affection	
                                                
47	See	also	Bradley	R.	Dewey,	who	makes	the	case	that	Johannes	is	“demonically	entrap[ped]”	by	his	own	
practices.	“The	Erotic-Demonic	in	Kierkegaard’s	‘Diary	of	the	Seducer,’”	Scandinavica	10	(1971):	2.	
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for	him.	On	another	level,	however,	Johannes	is	only	deceiving	himself	here:	he	in	fact	does	pay	
attention	to	Cordelia,	since	a	great	deal	of	thought	and	planning	is	required	both	to	compose	the	
note	and	to	arrange	for	its	‘delivery.’	Another	sign	that	Johannes	is	not	as	much	in	control	of	his	
own	practice	as	he	imagines	is	this	double-edged	statement:	“She	will	believe	me,	partly	because	I	
rely	on	my	artistry,	and	partly	because	at	the	bottom	of	what	I	am	doing	there	is	truth.”	(384)	The	
“truth”	is	to	be	found	not	only	in	the	(very	compelling)	appeal	of	aesthetic	values,	but	also	in	the	
nature	of	Johannes’s	seduction.	Whereas	in	an	‘ordinary’	seduction,	infatuation	is	absent	on	one	
or	both	sides,	in	this	intellectual–spiritual	seduction,	it	is	present	on	both	sides	—	that	is	its	
“truth.”	And	it	is	an	actual	infatuation,	not	a	simulation,	despite	the	amount	of	manipulation	used	
to	generate	it.48	
	 When	Johannes	knows	that	the	end	of	the	relationship	is	approaching,	he	engages	in	some	
lengthy	reflections	on	the	nature	of	women,	which	are	actually	a	blatantly	obvious	rationalization	
of	his	behavior	in	seducing	them.	Johannes,	ever	the	master	of	reflection,	demonstrates	what	
philosophical	acrobatics	are	possible	through	the	power	of	‘deliberation’:	“The	more	I	deliberate	
on	the	matter,	the	more	I	see	that	my	practice	is	in	complete	harmony	with	my	theory.	My	
practice,	namely,	has	always	been	imbued	with	the	conviction	that	woman	is	essentially	being-
for-other.”	(432)	Although	he	is	not	quite	so	obvious	as	to	say	it	explicitly,	the	clear	implication	is	
that	woman	exists	so	that	man	can	do	what	he	wishes	with	her	—	seducing	her,	for	example.	
These	prime	examples	of	self-deception	show	why	Kierkegaard	is	considered	a	forerunner	of	
existentialism,	with	its	close	scrutiny	of	‘bad	faith.’	Despite	having	just	finished	teaching	Cordelia	
to	think	like	an	aesthete,	despite	having	“awakened	multiple-tongued	reflection”	(309),	Johannes	
claims	that	women	are	basically	vegetables:	“Woman’s	being	(the	word	‘existence’	already	says	too	
much,	for	she	does	not	subsist	out	of	herself)	is	correctly	designated	as	gracefulness,	an	
                                                
48	Even	Johannes	himself	realizes	and	acknowledges	that	his	infatuation	is	real:	“That	I	actually	am	in	love	I	
can	tell	partly	by	the	secrecy	with	which	I	treat	this	matter,	almost	even	with	myself”	(336).	
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expression	that	is	reminiscent	of	vegetative	life;	she	is	like	a	flower,	as	the	poets	are	fond	of	saying,	
and	even	the	intellectual	[aandelige]	is	present	in	her	in	a	vegetative	way.”	(431)	By	dehumanizing	
women,	Johannes	can	pretend	that	the	seduction	will	not	have	emotional,	mental,	or	other	
significant	consequences	for	Cordelia.	As	offensive	as	it	is	to	seduce	a	person,	and	as	doubly	
offensive	as	it	is	to	claim	that	it	was	all	right	to	do	it,	nevertheless	this	rationalization	also	seems	
to	indicate	some	stirring	of	the	ethical	in	him	—	otherwise,	why	would	he	demonstrate	such	
strong	signs	of	a	subconscious	effort	to	avoid	imagining	Cordelia	as	a	person?	Neither	Johannes’s	
disavowal	of	his	own	responsibility	nor	his	devaluation	of	Cordelia	remains	coherent	in	the	face	of	
his	earlier	statements	—	for	example:	“Do	I	love	Cordelia?	Yes!	[…]	I	am	one	of	the	few	who	can	do	
this,	and	she	is	one	of	the	few	qualified	for	it;	so	are	we	not	suited	to	each	other?”	(385)	Although	
contradictions	like	these	can	be	explained	away	by	again	returning	to	the	argument	that	aesthetes	
do	not	insist	on	consistency,	it	is	this	very	type	of	circular	reasoning	that	leads	A	to	suspect	in	his	
preface	that	all	is	not	well	with	Johannes.	In	this	way,	The	Seducer’s	Diary	is	a	demonstration	—	as	
opposed	to	an	explanation	—	of	a	flaw	in	the	aesthetic	viewpoint.	
	 The	outcome	for	Johannes	suggests,	further,	that	infatuation	is	so	close	to	a	person’s	
fundamental	beliefs,	desires,	and	conception	of	self	that	when	one	becomes	as	deeply	involved	in	
it	as	both	Johannes	and	Cordelia	do	during	this	relationship,	it	is	impossible	not	to	be	affected	by	
the	specific	processes	that	characterize	the	emotion.	In	so	doing,	The	Seducer’s	Diary	proclaims	its	
own	impossibility	as	a	narrative;	it	postulates	a	situation	which	must	on	some	level	appear	absurd	
to	the	reader.	How	could	Johannes’s	degree	of	empathetic	involvement	in	another	person’s	
interiority	coexist	with	such	a	lack	of	ethical	scruples?	The	text	only	makes	sense	as	a	thought	
experiment.	The	seducer	makes	a	comment	about	himself	that	applies	equally	well	to	the	diary	as	
a	whole,	as	well	as	to	Kierkegaard’s	texts	in	general:	“I	am	a	friend	of	freedom	of	thought,	and	no	
thought	is	so	absurd	that	I	do	not	have	the	courage	to	stick	to	it.”	(369)	Since	emotion	is	an	
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evaluation	capable	of	accommodating	many	factors	at	once,	sometimes	it	can	provide	insight	into	
complex	interconnections	which	one’s	linear	thought	operation	cannot	comprehend;	as	Cordelia	
writes	in	one	of	her	letters	to	Johannes	after	the	end	of	the	relationship:	“That	you	did	love	me,	I	
know,	even	though	I	do	not	know	what	it	is	that	makes	me	sure	of	it.”	(313)	
	
VI.	Conclusion	
	 The	exercise	of	rational	agency	in	one’s	own	romantic	affairs	is	an	ideal	that	is	often	
aspired	to	but	seldom	achieved.	The	Seducer’s	Diary	offers	a	rare	opportunity	to	examine	in	detail	
what	goes	into	creating	an	infatuation,	thereby	making	transparent	its	groundedness	in	numerous	
simultaneous	evaluations	that	can	otherwise	appear	as	an	incomprehensible	jumble.	Infatuation,	
like	many	complex	emotions,	arises	from	a	multitude	of	little	circumstances	which,	though	
insignificant	in	themselves,	in	combination	produce	far-reaching	effects.	Contriving	an	
infatuation	depends	on	accessing	and	working	in	accordance	with	a	person’s	internal	scripts.	
	 In	the	early	stages,	even	what	seem	like	distancing	motions	move	Cordelia	closer	to	
Johannes’s	goal:	his	play	with	alternations	of	attraction	and	repulsion,	through	appearing	warm	
and	cold	in	unexpected	succession,	catches	her	attention	and	makes	her	curious	and	therefore	
receptive	to	learning	more	of	the	details	he	feeds	her.	The	more	she	notices	him,	the	more	she	is	
going	through	the	mental	motions	of	infatuation,	since	a	heightened	awareness	of	the	love	object	
is	one	of	its	typical	features.	Johannes	awakens	Cordelia’s	latent	potential	to	appreciate	aesthetic	
values,	and	the	promise	that	being	with	him	will	result	in	the	pleasure	of	living	in	infinity,	
possibility,	and	eternity	—	the	aesthete’s	preferred	halves	of	the	syntheses49	that	constitute	a	
person	—	contributes	to	her	infatuation.	With	his	use	of	romantic	scripts,	Johannes	at	once	taps	
into	these	new	desires	and	connects	to	latent	ideas	which	Cordelia	holds	about	relationships,	thus	
                                                
49	See	page	91.	
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providing	an	anchor	in	familiar	ideas.	At	the	country	house,	Johannes	ties	together	all	of	his	
previous	efforts	through	the	use	of	visual	references	that	serve	as	shortcuts	to	access	the	different	
parts	of	her	mental	framework	that	he	has	carefully	built	up.	This	is	the	composite	basis	for	the	
emotion	that	she	feels	on	this	occasion.	
	 Infatuation	is	an	evaluation	of	another	person	in	relation	to	our	own	existent	beliefs	about	
what	we	want	out	of	life,	to	the	effect	that	this	person	will	contribute	positively.	Johannes	both	
plays	to	Cordelia’s	wants	and	instills	in	her	new	ones	to	which	he	can	then	appeal.	Because	of	the	
way	the	structure	of	infatuation	is,	it	permeates	virtually	all	aspects	of	a	person’s	interiority,	and	
that	is	why	this	emotion,	even	more	so	than	others,	is	such	a	powerful	force.	Becoming	infatuated	
is	ordinarily	an	involuntary	process	that	happens	according	to	one’s	individual	scripts	about	what	
is	desirable	in	a	partner,	whereas	the	seducer	turns	infatuation	into	something	voluntary	—	but	
according	to	his	volition,	not	that	of	the	seduced.	The	reader	of	his	diary	may	learn	the	causes	of	
Cordelia’s	infatuation	because	Johannes	is	consciously	aware	of	his	own	method.	
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Chapter	Three:	
The	Meaning	of	Surprise	
in	Adalbert	Stifter’s	Brigitta	
	
	
If	one	just	knows	how	to	surprise,	one	always	wins	the	game.	The	energy	
of	the	person	involved	is	temporarily	suspended;	one	makes	it	impossible	
for	her	to	act,	and	this	happens	whether	extraordinary	or	ordinary	means	
are	used.	
—	Johannes,	The	Seducer’s	Diary	
	
	
	
	 An	individual	who	wants	to	exercise	agency	in	life	might	well	ask	the	question:	How	can	I	
change	the	nature	of	my	emotions?	This	is	not	a	matter	of	altering	the	external	circumstances	
that	give	rise	to	an	emotional	response;	indeed,	these	often	cannot	be	influenced.	Rather,	it	is	a	
matter	of	changing	the	internal	structures	involved	in	producing	the	particular	manifestation	of	
the	emotion.	The	previous	chapters	have	repeatedly	encountered	the	dependence	of	emotion	on	
an	individual’s	latent	beliefs.	In	Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi,	for	example,	the	titular	character’s	belief	
—	based	on	society’s	general	opinion	—	that	Cardillac	is	a	respectable	citizen	causes	her	to	have	a	
misplaced	trust	in	him;	and	in	The	Seducer’s	Diary,	Johannes	acts	in	accordance	with	Cordelia’s	
latent	beliefs	—	obtained	from	common	scripts	—	about	what	love	is	in	order	to	make	her	
become	infatuated	with	him.	Since	latent	beliefs	such	as	these	have	so	much	influence	on	the	
human	emotional	landscape,	they	are	centrally	involved	in	the	issue	of	how	an	individual	can	
change	the	nature	of	his	emotions:	altering	one’s	latent	beliefs	can	result	in	a	different	emotional	
reaction	to	the	same	stimulus.		
	 Surprise	is	a	highly	effective	way	of	accessing	the	latent	scripts	by	which	one	lives	one’s	
life.	In	the	wake	of	a	surprising	event,	scripts	are	vulnerable	to	alteration.	The	emotion	of	surprise	
is	characterized	by	a	discrepancy	between	what	has	been	expected	and	what	actually	turns	out	to	
be	the	case.	In	the	context	of	emotion	research,	surprise	often	figures	in	lists	of	the	‘basic	
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emotions,’1	though	some	have	even	suggested	that	surprise	is	too	simple	to	be	considered	an	
emotion.	One	imagines	in	that	context	a	feeling	such	as	results	from	suddenly	hearing	a	loud	
noise,	or	seeing	a	person	when	one	believed	oneself	to	be	alone.	However,	such	a	phenomenon	
might	better	be	classified	as	‘startlement’	in	order	to	emphasize	its	brevity	and	simplicity,	as	well	
as	to	differentiate	it	from	more	complex	forms	of	surprise.2	Another	challenge	to	the	notion	of	
surprise	as	an	emotion	results	from	a	property	it	has	that	is	somewhat	unusual	among	emotions:	
surprise	may	be	positive,	negative,	or	neutral,	depending	on	the	circumstances	surrounding	it.	
Researchers	who	consider	either	a	positive	or	a	negative	valence	to	be	a	prerequisite	for	an	
emotion	resist	classifying	surprise	as	such,	considering	it	a	cognitive	state	instead;3	however,	since	
this	chapter	is	very	much	concerned	with	including	surrounding	circumstances,	this	objection	is	
inconsequential	for	the	present	purpose.	Here,	complexity	and	the	role	of	surprise	in	altering	
beliefs	constitute	the	starting	point	for	a	literary	interpretation.	On	closer	inspection,	‘what	has	
been	expected’	is	actually	a	narrative	which	an	individual	forms	around	future	expectations	based	
on	available	information;	likewise,	‘what	actually	turns	out	to	be	the	case’	is	also	explicable	only	as	
a	narrative.	When	a	discrepancy	between	the	two	arises,	the	mind	is	prompted	to	compare	them	
and	to	correct	misconceptions,	especially	if	the	content	of	these	narratives	has	a	significant	
bearing	on	how	the	individual	perceives	his	environment.4	The	Encyclopedia	of	Human	Emotions	
                                                
1	The	argument	for	counting	surprise	as	a	basic	emotion	gains	impetus	from	the	fact	that	it	has	a	typical	
facial	expression	that	is	easily	identifiable	and	cross-cultural	—	a	characteristic	that	makes	it	easy	to	
classify;	this	expression	was	used	to	define	surprise	as	early	as	Charles	Darwin’s	The	Expression	of	the	
Emotions	in	Man	and	Animals,	first	published	in	1872	(3rd	ed.,	ed.	Paul	Ekman,	Oxford:	UP,	1998,	278).	
2	This	is	consistent	with	the	cognitive	vs.	sensory	distinction	which	the	psychologist	William	R.	
Charlesworth	uses	to	differentiate	surprise	from	startle	(“The	Role	of	Surprise	in	Cognitive	Development,”	
in	Studies	in	Cognitive	Development:	Essays	in	Honor	of	Jean	Piaget,	ed.	David	Elkind	and	John	H.	Flavell	
(New	York:	Oxford	UP,	1969),	269–273).	
3	For	example,	Andrew	Ortony,	Gerald	L.	Clore,	and	Allan	Collins,	The	Cognitive	Structure	of	Emotions	(New	
York:	Cambridge	UP,	1988),	127.	
4	See	Michael	Niepel,	Udo	Rudolph,	Achim	Schützwohl,	and	Wulf-Uwe	Meyer,	“Temporal	Characteristics	of	
the	Surprise	Reaction	Induced	by	Schema-Discrepant	Visual	and	Auditory	Events,”	Cognition	and	Emotion	8,	
no.	5	(1994):	434;	and	Joachim	Stiensmeier-Pelster,	Alice	Martini,	and	Rainer	Reisenzein,	“The	Role	of	
Surprise	in	the	Attribution	Process,”	Cognition	and	Emotion	9,	no.	5	(1995):	8f.	
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describes	surprise	in	terms	of	expectations,	attention,	and	evaluation,	all	of	which	are	important	
in	the	analysis	of	literary	emotions:	
The	defining	feature	of	surprise	is	that	it	involves	the	violation	of	an	individual’s	
expectations.	This	violation	serves	a	clear	function.	It	interrupts	ongoing	thought	
processes,	and	this	interruption	results	in	an	involuntary	focus	of	attention	toward	
the	surprising	event.	This	process	of	selective	attention	leads	to	an	evaluation	of	
the	event	in	terms	of	its	implications	for	an	individual’s	goals	or	well-being.5		
	
The	element	of	interruption,	which	has	already	been	referenced	in	the	epigraph	to	this	chapter,	is	
part	of	the	strategy	of	Johannes	the	Seducer,	who	can	claim	that	surprise	is	an	obstacle	to	action	
precisely	because	it	has	the	opposite	effect	on	thought:	namely,	surprise	prompts	re-evaluations	
of	information,	and	it	is	this	flurry	of	mental	activity	that	distracts	a	person	from	acting	in	the	
exterior	world.6	The	person	becomes	focused	on	the	surprising	event,	which	is	something	else	
entirely	than	the	objective	of	the	“game”	Johannes	is	playing;	thus,	surprise	serves	him	as	a	tool	of	
misdirection.	He	exploits	a	structural	property	of	the	emotion	in	order	to	create	an	opportunity	to	
further	his	own	aims.	In	effect,	by	rendering	the	surprised	person’s	re-evaluations	unimportant	—	
a	mere	distraction	—,	he	undermines	what	is	normally	the	most	salient	feature	of	surprise.	
	 This	chapter	discusses	the	emotional	dynamics	of	the	surprise	ending	to	Brigitta,	by	the	
Austrian	writer	Adalbert	Stifter.	Any	reader	unfamiliar	with	the	novella	who	wishes	to	experience	
the	phenomenon	that	will	be	systematically	analyzed	in	this	chapter	is	advised	to	stop	and	read	
Brigitta	before	continuing	with	this	text	(spoiler	alert!),	especially	since	the	way	in	which	the	
experience	of	reading	differs	qualitatively	from	its	analysis	is	also	part	of	the	subject	of	this	
chapter.	
                                                
5	David	Levinson,	James	J.	Ponzetti	Jr.,	and	Peter	F.	Jorgensen,	eds.,	Encyclopedia	of	Human	Emotions	(New	
York:	Macmillan,	1999),	645.	
6	Psychologists	likewise	recognize	the	nature	of	surprise	as	interruption;	see,	for	example,	Silvan	S.	Tomkins,	
who	characterizes	surprise	as	“a	general	interrupter	to	ongoing	activity”	in	Affect	Imagery	Consciousness:	
The	Complete	Edition,	ed.	Bertram	P.	Karon	(New	York:	Springer	Publishing	Company,	2008),	273.	
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	 When	an	event	is	as	“herzerschütternd”7	as	the	scene	witnessed	by	the	narrator	at	the	end	
of	Brigitta,	it	shakes	loose	one’s	latent	beliefs	such	that	they	become	subject	to	rewriting.	The	
adjective	chosen	by	the	narrator	is	particularly	trenchant	because	the	“Herz”	is	the	metaphorical	
seat	of	emotion;	when	the	emotions	are	stirred	up,	beliefs	are	destabilized	as	well.	Whereas	an	
affective	scene	such	as	this	is	more	intense	when	it	is	witnessed	firsthand,	a	reader	does	not	have	
the	advantage	of	personal	presence;	however,	the	narrator	of	Brigitta,	as	compensation,	employs	
his	craft	in	order	to	make	the	effect	of	reading	the	narrative	intense	for	the	reader.	Literary	
technique	and	narrative	structure	are	thus	intrinsically	involved	in	the	manner	and	degree	to	
which	the	reader	responds	emotionally	to	the	story.	
	 Although	the	ending	depicts	favorably	the	negation	of	passion,8	this	“trübe	Lohe	der	
Leidenschaft”	(474)	is	not	meant	in	the	sense	of	emotions	more	generally,	but	of	a	particular	form	
of	emotion	that	predominates	in	the	younger	versions	of	the	characters.	As	just	noted,	the	final	
scene	produces	strong	emotions	in	the	narrator	as	well	as	providing	the	prerequisites	for	them	to	
be	likewise	produced	in	the	reader;	the	work	as	a	whole,	therefore,	does	not	valorize	
unemotionality.	As	I	will	argue,	although	the	actualization	of	emotions	for	the	reader	ultimately	
depends	on	factors	inherent	to	that	individual	reader	and	therefore	external	to	the	text,	the	
novella	contains	the	components	that,	upon	being	evaluated,	are	necessary	and	sufficient	to	
produce	surprise,	potentially	accompanied	by	other	emotions	such	as	the	narrator	experiences.	
My	analysis	in	the	following	will	focus	on	textual	features	that	set	up	the	conditions	for	a	reader	
                                                
7	Adalbert	Stifter,	Werke	und	Briefe:	Historisch-kritische	Gesamtausgabe,	ed.	Alfred	Doppler	and	Wolfgang	
Frühwald,	vol.	1.5,	Studien;	Buchfassungen;	Zweiter	Band,	ed.	Helmut	Bergner	and	Ulrich	Dittmann,	
Stuttgart:	Kohlhammer,	1982,	471.	Subsequent	page	numbers	given	in	parentheses	within	this	chapter	refer	
to	this	volume.	
8	As	noted	by	Jens	Stüben	in	“Naturlandschaft	und	Landschaftskultur:	zur	Symbolik	des	Schauplatzes	in	
Adalbert	Stifters	‘rumänischer’	Erzählung	‘Brigitta’”	Transcarpathica	2	(2003),	150f.;	as	well	as	Robert	
C.	Holub	in	“Adalbert	Stifter's	‘Brigitta,’	or	the	Lesson	of	Realism,”	in	A	Companion	to	German	Realism,	ed.	
Todd	Kontje	(Woodbridge:	Camden	House,	2002),	48–49.	
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to	follow	along	with	—	in	other	words,	re-create	in	their	own	minds	—	the	cognitive	pattern	that	
results	in	being	moved	by	the	ending	of	the	novella.	
	 What	sets	Stifter’s	text	apart	from	many	works	of	fiction	is	that	the	surprise	at	the	end	has	
great	intellectual	depth.	Surprise	twists	do	not	have	much	of	a	reputation	as	a	high-culture	art	
form,	being	associated	more	with	trivial	literature	than	with	literary	fiction.9	They	often	serve	as	a	
plot	device	to	hold	the	reader’s	attention	through	little	more	than	novelty.	In	Brigitta,	however,	
the	surprise	prompts	the	reader	to	re-evaluate	the	characters	and	their	psychology,	not	simply	the	
plot;	the	result	of	these	contemplations	is	an	increase	in	knowledge,	which	makes	the	surprise	
nontrivial.	The	reader	of	the	novella	also	undergoes	a	process	that	parallels	in	certain	key	ways	
the	emotional	development	of	the	characters,	and	the	surprise	ending	is	an	important	element	of	
this	emotional	arc.	These	effects	will	be	further	explored	in	the	following	sections.	
	 This	chapter	thus	operates	under	the	assumption	that	the	reader	experiences	an	
emotional	reaction	—	most	likely	involving	surprise	—	to	the	climactic	scene	at	the	end	of	the	
novella.	Although	there	are	limitations	to	what	can	be	imputed	about	readers	and	no	universal	
claims	may	be	made,	there	is	nevertheless	significant	documentation	in	the	reviews	and	
secondary	literature	on	Brigitta	to	support	the	assertion	that	reacting	with	surprise,	finding	the	
novella	moving,	and	feeling	sympathy	for	the	characters	is	a	common	response.	The	first	reviewer	
of	the	journal	version	praised	it	as	an	“Erfindung,	die	sich	besser	auf	innere	Zustände	als	äußere	
Begebenheit	versteht,”10	thus	setting	an	early	precedent	for	recognition	of	the	novella’s	
psychological	depth.	Hieronymus	Lorm	wrote	in	a	letter	that	although	the	landscape	depictions	
were	well	done,	nevertheless	“die	ganze	psychologische	Welt,	die	Sie	in	Ihrer	Brigitta	umsegeln	
                                                
9	While	surprise,	per	se,	has	certainly	found	a	place	in	aesthetically	sophisticated	texts,	the	suprise	twist	
does	not	enjoy	the	same	status.	
10	“Almanach-Schau	für	1844”	in	supplement	to	Sonntagsblätter,	Literaturblatt,	November	26,	1843.	
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und	erforschen,	wirkt	tiefer	und	nachhaltender”	by	comparison.11	Stifter’s	own	self-assessment	of	
his	novella	likewise	favored	the	latter	two	sections,	in	which	the	human	drama	is	more	in	focus;	
and	in	a	letter	to	the	editor	during	preparation	of	the	third	and	fourth	volumes	of	the	Studien,	he	
writes,	“Ich	glaube	sogar,	daß	Brigitta	weit	aus	das	Beste	in	den	2	Bänden	sein	muß.”12	Reviews	of	
the	book	version	tend	to	focus	more	on	the	picture	of	Hungarian	life	which	the	story	supposedly	
offers	(Stifter	himself	had	travelled	through	western	Hungary,	but	not	the	eastern	part,	where	the	
novella	takes	place).13	Yet	this	is	not	dissonant	with	the	emotional	concerns	of	the	novella,	since,	
as	will	be	further	discussed	in	section	II,	the	landscape	becomes	intertwined	with	the	
psychological	elements	of	the	story.	
	 The	more	recent	work	on	Brigitta	has	continued	this	trend,	with	a	number	of	scholars	
emphasizing	the	ways	in	which	the	landscape	underscores	the	thematic	elements.14	The	
psychological	dimension	of	the	novella	has	remained	a	focal	point	for	researchers;	in	fact,	the	first	
scholarly	publication	focusing	specifically	on	Brigitta,	which	was	published	in	1929,	appeared	not	
in	a	literary	journal	but	in	the	Internationale	Zeitschrift	für	Individualpsychologie.15	The	emotional	
dimensions	of	the	text	have	also	received	consideration,	such	as	the	influence	of	Herder’s	concept	
                                                
11	Hieronymus	Lorm	[Heinrich	Landesmann]	to	Stifter,	March	14,	1845,	in	Adalbert	Stifter,	Sämmtliche	
Werke,	vol.	23,	Briefwechsel	7,	ed.	Gustav	Wilhelm,	(Reichenberg:	Franz	Kraus,	1939),	22.	
12	Stifter	to	Gustav	Heckenast,	October	18,	1846,	in	Adalbert	Stifter,	Sämmtliche	Werke,	vol.	17,	Briefwechsel	1,	
ed.	Gustav	Wilhelm	with	the	use	of	preliminary	work	by	Adalbert	Horcicka	(Reichenberg:	Franz	Kraus,	
1939),	176.	
13	See	Ulrich	Dittmann,	“Brigitta.	Rezeption”	in	Stifter,	Werke	und	Briefe,	vol.	1.9,	317f.	
14	Rosemarie	Hunter-Lougheed,	for	example,	characterizes	this	in	terms	of	a	connection	between	the	inner	
and	the	outer	(“Adalbert	Stifter:	Brigitta	(1844/47)”	in	Romane	und	Erzählungen	zwischen	Romantik	und	
Realismus:	Neue	Interpretationen,	ed.	Paul	Michael	Lützeler	(Stuttgart:	Reclam,	1983),	358).	Albert	Meier	
discusses	the	effects	of	the	surroundings	on	the	characters	and	their	development	(“Diskretes	Erzählen:	
Über	den	Zusammenhang	von	Dichtung,	Wissenschaft	und	Didaktik	in	Adalbert	Stifters	Erzählung	
‘Brigitta,’”	Aurora:	Jahrbuch	der	Eichendorff	Gesellschaft	44	(1984):	215).	An	exception	is	Richard	Block,	who	
argues	that	the	Studienfassung	was	supposed	to	make	Brigitta	less	of	a	“tale	about	the	flowering	of	two	souls	
late	in	life”	and	more	of	a	tale	about	Hungary	and	Europe.	However,	Block’s	analysis	neglects	to	consider	
that	the	agrarian	components	of	the	novella,	which	metaphorically	represent	processes	occurring	within	the	
characters,	could	allow	both	possibilities	to	coexist	without	one	predominating	over	the	other.	(“Stone	
Deaf:	The	Gentleness	of	Law	in	Stifter’s	‘Brigitta,’”	Monatshefte	90,	no.	1	(1998):	18.)	
15	Hans	Bauermeister,	“Zum	Problem	der	häßlichen	Frau:	Adalbert	Stifters	Novelle	‘Brigitta’	als	
charakterologische	Studie,”	Internationale	Zeitschrift	für	Individualpsychologie	7	(1929):	436–442.	
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of	empathy	(“Einfühlung”)	on	Stifter’s	text,	which	sheds	light	on	the	way	characters	relate	to	their	
surroundings,	suggesting	that	it	is	an	organic,	complicated	interplay,	and	more	than	a	merely	
intellectual	level	of	engagement.16	Whether	explicitly	or	implicitly	through	character	analyses,	a	
large	proportion	of	scholars	acknowledge	the	emotional	depth	of	the	novella,	though	there	are	
exceptions.17	
	
I.	An	Instantaneous	Superimposition	of	Narratives	
	 In	the	years	leading	up	to	Brigitta,	Stifter	had	been	publishing	regularly	in	the	journal	Iris,	
but	this	novella	appeared	instead	in	the	1844	issue	of	Gedenke	Mein!	(published	in	November	
1843).	The	change	of	venue	likely	had	to	do	with	political	considerations:	the	novella	takes	place	
in	Hungary	and	presents	the	region	in	a	favorable	light,	which	might	not	have	found	favor	with	
Austrian	censors,	since	the	tensions	that	would	soon	lead	to	the	Hungarian	Revolution	of	1848	
were	already	quite	high;	fortunately,	however,	the	editor	of	Gedenke	Mein!,	Johann	Gabriel	Seidl,	
was	himself	a	censor.	Brigitta	subsequently	appeared	in	the	fourth	of	six	volumes	of	the	Studien,	a	
collection	of	Stifter’s	novellas	that	was	published	between	1844	and	1850;	this	version,	from	1847,	
will	be	the	primary	source	for	this	chapter,	excepting	a	few	comparative	forays	into	the	earlier	text.	
Although	the	plot	elements	and	structure	remain	essentially	the	same,	Stifter	made	extensive	
revisions	to	the	book	version.	He	recast	the	wording	of	passages	thoroughly,	making	numerous	
changes	at	sentence-level	which	improve	the	sense	of	place	in	the	novella	by	increasing	the	
precision	of	the	language:	whereas	the	journal	version	often	contains	meandering	sentences	
joined	indiscriminately	by	dashes,	in	the	book	version	the	clauses	are	carefully	punctuated	and	
                                                
16	See	Meier,	“Diskretes	Erzählen,”	216.	
17	Block’s	claims	that	the	characters	act	irrationally,	are	unemotional,	and	do	not	react	to	affective	scenes	is	
a	gross	misreading	of	the	gestural	language	of	the	novella	(“Stone	Deaf,”	19–22).	Brigitta’s	supposed	
unemotionality	—	for	example,	when	she	asks	for	a	divorce	—	is	clearly	feigned,	as	it	is	explained	
unequivocally	as	a	defense	mechanism	developed	in	childhood	to	protect	herself,	since	an	uncontrolled	
expression	of	pain	would	leave	her	vulnerable	to	ridicule	and	thus	further	emotional	harm.	
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conjoined	so	that	there	is	a	sense	of	relationship	between	the	parts.	Piquant	details	are	not	buried	
in	the	middle	of	a	string	of	clauses,	but	rather	placed	at	prominent	positions	in	the	sentence.	As	a	
countermotion	to	this	increase	in	linguistic	concreteness,	however,	the	book	version	tends	to	
present	in	a	more	subtle	fashion	details	pertaining	to	characters’	psychological	dispositions;	one	
example	is	the	passage	on	the	child	Brigitta’s	affinity	for	stones	and	sticks,	which	will	be	analyzed	
later	in	this	chapter.18	
	 Setting	the	tone	for	the	psychological	elements	of	the	story,	the	novella	begins	with	a	brief	
reflection	on	“Dinge	und	Beziehungen	im	menschlichen	Leben,	die	uns	nicht	sogleich	klar	sind”	
(411),	at	the	end	of	which	the	first-person	narrator	informs	us	that	these	thoughts	were	inspired	by	
the	events	which	he	is	about	to	relate.	His	narrative	begins	in	the	modus	of	a	“Reisebericht,”	
telling	of	a	friend,	the	Major,	whom	he	met	during	travels	in	Italy	and	who	subsequently	invited	
the	narrator	to	visit	him	at	his	estate	in	Hungary.	Throughout	the	novella,	the	male	protagonist	is	
only	ever	referred	to	as	“der	Major,”	never	by	name.	This	is	an	important	point.	The	text	is	divided	
into	four	sections	of	nearly	equal	length:	“Steppenwanderung,”	“Steppenhaus,”	
“Steppenvergangenheit,”	and	“Steppengegenwart.”	The	narrator’s	journey	to	Uwar,	the	Major’s	
estate,	as	well	as	his	reflections	on	how	they	got	to	know	each	other,	form	the	first	section.	The	
second	section	deals	with	how	the	Major	lives	in	Hungary,	details	of	how	he	manages	his	estate,	
and	how	the	narrator	occupies	his	time	during	his	stay	there.	Along	the	way,	the	narrator	engages	
in	some	speculation	about	why	the	Major	never	married;	learns	that	the	latter	harbors	a	passion	
for	the	titular	protagonist,	Brigitta	Marosheli;	and	is	told	by	the	neighbor	Gömör	that	Brigitta	
cannot	marry	the	Major	because	she	had	a	husband	who	abandoned	her	long	ago	without	
divorcing	her.	The	third	section,	which	contains	a	lengthy	flashback,	tells	the	story	of	Brigitta’s	
childhood	and	early	life:	how	she	was	neglected	for	being	ugly	in	appearance;	how	all	her	faculties	
                                                
18	See	page	134.	
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turned	inward;	how	the	attractive	and	sought-after	Stephan	Murai	courted	her;	how	they	married	
and	had	a	child;	how	Stephan	became	attracted	to	the	outwardly	beautiful	Gabriele;	and	how	
Brigitta	divorced	him	and	moved	to	Marosheli	with	the	child	Gustav.	(The	latter	detail	contradicts	
what	the	narrator	had	been	told	earlier,	downgrading	that	story	to	the	status	of	hearsay	and	
speculation.)	
	 The	narrative	thus	establishes	the	history	of	three	characters,	besides	the	narrator:	the	
Major,	Brigitta,	and	Stephan	Murai.	In	the	climactic	sequence	at	the	end	of	the	novella,	Brigitta’s	
son,	Gustav,	is	wounded,	though	not	life-threateningly,	by	a	pack	of	hungry	wolves.	The	Major	
and	the	narrator	come	to	his	rescue	and	the	three	of	them	escape	back	to	Uwar.	Word	is	sent	to	
Brigitta,	who	arrives	the	same	night.	The	next	morning,	as	she	tends	to	Gustav,	the	narrator	
comes	to	check	in	with	them,	sees	the	Major	standing	at	the	window	in	the	next	room,	and	
realizes	that	he	is	crying.	When	the	narrator	asks	him	what	is	the	matter,	he	replies:	“Ich	habe	
kein	Kind.”	Brigitta	apparently	overhears	this,	enters	the	room,	and	says	a	single	word:	“Stephan.”	
(472)	She	and	the	Major	embrace,	and	the	reader	realizes	that	Stephan	is	his	name.	Thus,	with	
only	one	word,	the	novella	reveals	that	the	two	narratives	of	Stephan	and	the	Major	are	actually	
part	of	one	history,	because	they	are	the	same	person.		
	 This	turn	of	events	is	both	emotionally	and	intellectually	laden.	The	reason	the	twist	
works	is	that	the	information	needed	to	unravel	the	plot	strands	is	compact	enough	that	its	effect	
happens	in	a	near-instantaneous	moment.	The	temporal	compression	is	indispensible	for	
producing	the	reader’s	emotional	reaction	because	the	effect	depends	on	a	multitude	of	
realizations	crowding	in	all	at	once.	The	first	three	sections	of	the	novella	set	the	reader	up	to	
make	a	positive	evaluation	of	the	Major	and	a	negative	one	of	Stephan	Murai;	when	it	is	revealed	
that	they	are	the	same	person,	one	of	the	immediate	results	is	that	the	reader	has	to	re-evaluate	
the	Major/Stephan	character	and	try	to	reconcile	opposing	attitudes	towards	him.	Brigitta,	too,	is	
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due	for	a	re-evaluation,	since	her	character	appears	in	a	different	light	once	one	realizes	that,	by	
her	choice,	during	the	entire	time	in	which	the	Major	has	lived	at	Uwar,	the	actual	nature	of	their	
relationship	has	been	acknowledged	neither	to	their	neighbors	nor	to	Gustav,	who	had	a	rightful	
claim	to	know.	
	 The	textual	medium	has	a	certain	type	of	linearity	in	that	words	are	arranged	sequentially.	
There	are	a	number	of	ways	in	which	this	linearity	can	be	disrupted	—	for	example,	visually,	in	
works	of	poetry	as	well	as	experimental	literary	forms.	Brigitta’s	surprise	twist	is	a	different	type	of	
disruption,	not	visual,	but	simulated.	The	novella	establishes	two	layers,	one	belonging	to	the	
present	and	the	other	to	the	past;	the	present-layer	encompasses	the	first,	second,	and	fourth	
sections	of	the	novella,	and	the	past-layer	is	developed	in	the	third	section.	Both	possess	the	
linearity	of	a	written	text;	each	is	read	and	experienced	in	imagination	as	a	sequential	narrative.	
The	revelation	that	“der	Major”	and	“Stephan	Murai”	are	the	same	person	superimposes	the	past-
layer	onto	the	present-layer;	as	a	consequence,	the	reader	must	re-evaluate	numerous	aspects	of	
the	present-layer	according	to	information	about	the	psychology	of	the	characters	that	can	only	
be	logically	deduced	after	the	relationship	between	the	two	protagonists	has	been	clarified.		
	
II.	Paradigms	of	Rational	Order	
	 The	surprise	ending	would	not	have	the	effect	that	it	does	without	the	preparatory	
narratives	that	precede	it.	Two	such	narratives,	naturally,	are	the	Major’s	and	Brigitta’s	personal	
histories.	However,	it	is	not	just	the	information	directly	pertaining	to	the	characters	that	
contributes	to	this	effect;	in	this	novella,	the	images	of	enlightened	agricultural	practices	form	an	
additional	layer	that	makes	an	indirect	comment	on	the	human	drama.	The	narrative	strands	
pertaining	to	the	estates	at	Uwar	and	Marosheli,	as	well	as	to	the	alliance	of	the	four	neighbors	in	
the	area,	function	as	an	external	manifestation	of	internal	developments	within	the	characters.	
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The	various	narrative	strands	provide	the	prerequisites	for	the	reader	to	perceive	the	ending	as	
highly	meaningful.	Connectedness	with	an	individual’s	internal	narratives	is	the	essence	of	
meaningfulness.	The	preliminary	sections	of	Brigitta,	by	presenting	the	reader	with	narratives	to	
which	the	final	climactic	scene	refers	back,	lays	a	necessary	groundwork	so	that	the	reader	will	
care.	
	 The	narrative	lingers	in	particular	over	the	description	of	Uwar.	From	the	narrator’s	
observation	“daß	alle	Zweige	seiner	Thätigkeit	ihre	eigene	Geldverwaltung	haben”	(436),	it	can	be	
deduced	that	the	Major’s	estate	is	carefully	ordered.	The	narrator’s	tour	through	numerous	
specialized	divisions	supports	this	claim.	These	“branches”	are	the	smaller	subdivisions	of	a	larger	
organizational	structure	resembling	a	tree:	they	are	all	a	part	of	Uwar,	which	is	one	of	the	four	
“Musterhöfe”	that	makes	up	the	agricultural	“Bund”	(441);	and	these,	in	turn,	are	involved	not	
only	in	an	outreach	to	other,	smaller	operations	in	the	area,	but	also	in	an	overarching	concept	of	
economic	development	that	includes	all	of	Hungary,	as	expressed	by	the	Major:	“Dieses	weite	
Land	ist	ein	größeres	Kleinod,	als	man	denken	mag,	aber	es	muß	noch	immer	mehr	gefaßt	
werden.	Die	ganze	Welt	kömmt	in	ein	Ringen	sich	nutzbar	zu	machen,	und	wir	müssen	mit.	
Welcher	Blüthe	und	Schönheit	ist	vorerst	noch	der	Körper	dieses	Landes	fähig,	und	beide	müssen	
hervorgezogen	werden.”	(436)	This	developmental	concept	is	like	a	hardy	plant:	it	begins	at	the	
bottom,	with	the	workers	—	even	encompassing	some	“Bettler,	Herumstreicher,	selbst	Gesindel”	
(428)	enticed	by	a	reliable	wage	—	and	ends	with	a	“Blüthe.”	In	this	botanical	schema,	Brigitta	is	
like	a	root,19	which	is	a	fitting	role	for	the	one	who	originally	came	up	with	this	method	of	
cultivation.	
                                                
19	The	text	brings	Brigitta	into	a	metaphorical	association	with	roots	in	the	passage	describing	how	she	
became	suspicious	of	affectionate	displays	during	childhood:	“Die	Mutter	aber	wurde	dadurch	noch	mehr	
zugleich	liebend	und	erbittert,	weil	sie	nicht	wußte,	daß	die	kleinen	Würzlein,	als	sie	einst	den	warmen	
Boden	der	Mutterliebe	suchten	und	nicht	fanden,	in	den	Fels	des	eigenen	Herzen	schlagen	mußten,	und	da	
trotzen.”	(447)	
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	 The	narrator’s	comparisons	of	cultivation	activities	at	Uwar	with	the	“alten	starken	Römer”	
and	the	“Sage	von	dem	Paradiese”	(437)	create	an	atmosphere	of	mythological	significance	that	
seeks	to	elevate	agriculture	and	animal	husbandry	—	which	are	indeed	useful	and	necessary	to	
humanity	—	to	a	higher	status.	These	vocations	might	otherwise	be	considered	‘below	the	station’	
of	someone	from	an	aristocratic	background	such	as	the	Major.	Nevertheless,	the	estates	maintain	
a	hierarchy	with	their	owners	at	the	apex,	though	the	workers	are	depicted	as	being	fully	satisfied	
with	their	place	in	the	arrangement.20	Everyone	seems	to	have	their	proper	place,	including	those	
persons	neither	at	the	bottom	nor	the	top	of	the	social	hierarchy,	such	as	the	managers	of	the	
Schäferei:	“Er	hat	einige	Leute	dort,	die	bedeutende	Bildung	verrathen,	und	mit	ihm	in	das	Wesen	
der	Sache,	die	sie	lieben,	einzugehen	scheinen.”	(436)	The	overall	picture	is	idealized	to	the	point	
of	being	rather	unrealistic;21	nevertheless,	it	presents	an	image	of	a	useful	vocation	that	fits	into	
the	total	aesthetic	vision	of	an	integrated	life	that	the	novella	seeks	to	promote,	and	which	is	not	
complete	until	it	also	includes	familial	harmony.	
	 Without	the	support	of	the	preparatory	narratives,	there	would	likely	still	be	some	
affective	component	to	the	reconciliation	between	the	two	main	characters,	but	it	would	not	be	as	
strong.	A	reader	might	perhaps	be	moved	by	an	extremely	simple	version	of	events	—	presented,	
for	example,	thus:	‘Two	people	were	estranged	for	many	years	and	then	became	reconciled.’	In	
this	pared-down	rendition,	any	affective	response	would	be	subject	to	associations	with	an	
individual’s	existing	stock	of	narratives	pertaining	to	reconciliation;	it	would	therefore	be	largely	
based	on	generalizations	pertaining	to	similar	situations,	rather	than	on	details	specific	to	the	
novella	Brigitta.	Specific	details	have	greater	potential	to	result	in	an	intense	emotional	response	
because	the	author	of	the	text	provides	the	components	that	are	evaluated	to	produce	the	
                                                
20		See	page	135.	
21	Wilfried	Thürmer,	for	instance,	calls	the	estates	“utopian”	in	“‘Die	ganze	Welt	kömmt	in	ein	Ringen	sich	
nutzbar	zu	machen,	und	wir	müssen	mit’:	Zur	Ambivalenz	der	Liebes-Geschichte	in	Stifters	Erzählung	
Brigitta,”	Wirkendes	Wort	57	(2007):	231.	
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emotion,	rather	than	these	components	being	drawn	from	whatever	an	individual’s	personal	
experience	happens	to	be.	Thus,	the	more	detail	and	development	present	in	the	preliminary	
narratives	of	a	text,	the	more	opportunity	the	author	has	to	influence	the	emotional	response	
generated	by	the	narrative	as	a	whole.	
	 The	extent	to	which	something	is	perceived	as	meaningful	increases	in	proportion	to	its	
degree	of	interconnectedness	with	other	mental	data,	which	is	precisely	what	the	network	of	
specific	details	in	Brigitta	provides.	Something	that	is	well-connected,	by	relating	either	to	a	large	
number	of	other	data,	or	to	a	datum	that	is	rated	as	highly	important	within	the	overall	hierarchy	
of	the	mind,	becomes	meaningful	by	extension.	Emotions	play	an	important	role	in	these	
meaning	networks,	since	they	are	the	mechanism	for	hierarchizing	cognitive	information:	the	
greater	the	emotional	intensity	attached	to	a	cognition,	the	higher	its	perceived	importance	is.22	
An	intense	emotion	experienced	at	the	end	of	the	novella	is	thus	part	of	a	two-part	reinforcement	
of	meaningfulness:	the	preparatory	narratives	provide	the	conditions	for	the	ending	to	be	
meaningful	and	therefore	emotionally	intense,	and	the	emotional	intensity,	in	turn,	underlines	
the	significance	of	the	themes	of	forgiveness	and	reconciliation,	thereby	priming	them	to	be	re-
evaluated	and	perhaps	upgraded	in	the	overall	order	of	the	mind’s	belief	system.	In	this	way,	an	
effectively	affective	literarary	text	can	gain	access	to	the	mind’s	internal	mechanisms	for	making	
sense	of	the	world.	
	
III.	Narrative	Reflections	
	 At	the	beginning	of	Brigitta,	the	narrator	reflects	explicitly	on	the	overall	narrative	
strategy	of	the	text.	The	first	sentences	state	a	problem	that	occurs	repeatedly	throughout	the	
story:	“Es	gibt	oft	Dinge	und	Beziehungen	in	dem	menschlichen	Leben,	die	uns	nicht	sogleich	klar	
                                                
22	See	the	section	in	chapter	one	on	Scuderi’s	audience	with	the	king,	beginning	on	page	52.	
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sind,	und	deren	Grund	wir	nicht	in	Schnelligkeit	hervor	zu	ziehen	vermögen.	Sie	wirken	dann	
meistens	mit	einem	gewissen	schönen	und	sanften	Reize	des	Geheimnißvollen	auf	unsere	Seele.”	
(411)	The	narrator	indicates	his	awareness	of	these	half-understood	operations,	then	goes	on	to	re-
create	for	the	reader	just	such	a	one	in	his	text.23	The	issue	is	presented	here	as	a	mystery	of	sorts,	
but	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	phrase	“nicht	sogleich	klar”	implies	that	the	ignorance	does	
not	persist:	these	“things	and	relationships”	eventually	do	become	clear	—	namely,	over	the	
course	of	the	story.24	The	phrase	has	multiple	applicabilities:	the	character	of	Brigitta	is	not	
immediately	clear	to	the	Major,	and	vice	versa;	the	relationship	between	the	two	main	
protagonists	is	not	immediately	clear	to	the	narrator;	and	the	connection	between	the	different	
storylines	presented	by	the	narrator	is	not	immediately	clear	to	the	reader.	The	presence	of	these	
parallels	on	multiple	levels	—	between	protagonists,	narrator,	and	readers	—	is	a	part	of	the	
overall	narrative	strategy	whereby	Stifter	provides	the	structural	prerequisites	for	readers	to	share	
in	experiences	that	are	conveyed	through	the	text.	The	mirroring	of	the	characters’	situation	in	
the	reader	creates	the	potential	for	empathy	and	thus	gives	an	experiential	insight	into	the	
phenomenon	laid	out	by	the	narrator	at	the	beginning	of	the	novella.	A	further	parallel	between	
the	characters’	situation	and	that	of	the	reader	involves	the	tempo	of	the	story,	which	is	also	
alluded	to	in	this	passage:	“Schnelligkeit”	as	well	as	Langsamkeit	play	a	major	role	in	how	
                                                
23	For	a	thorough	analysis	of	the	narrator’s	strategies	of	divulging	and	withholding	information	and	how	
these	affect	the	reading	experience,	see	Stefanie	Kreuzer,	“Zur	‘unerhörten’	Erzähldramaturgie	einer	
realistischen	Novelle:	Adalbert	Stifters	‘Brigitta’	(1847),”	Der	Deutschunterricht	59,	no.	6	(2007).	Gunter	H.	
Hertling	discusses	names	and	the	significance	of	them	being	withheld	(“Adalbert	Stifters	‘Brigitta’	(1843)	als	
Vor-‘Studie’	zur	‘Erzählung’	seiner	Reife:	‘Der	Nachsommer’	(1857),”	Jahrbuch	des	Adalbert-Stifter-Instituts	
des	Landes	Oberösterreich	9/10	(2002/2003):	27).	
24	Ulrich	Dittmann	notes	that	Stifter	constructs	his	story	less	naively	than	the	narrator’s	opening	remarks	
about	the	“kindliche	Unbewußtheit”	(412)	of	literature	might	lead	the	reader	to	believe	(“Brigitta	und	kein	
Ende.	Kommentierte	Randbemerkungen,”	Jahrbuch	des	Adalbert-Stifter-Instituts	des	Landes	Oberösterreich	
3	(1996):	27f.).	
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characters	perceive	each	other	and	also	in	how	the	reader	experiences	the	narrative,	which	will	be	
discussed	further	in	the	next	section.25	
	 The	narrator,	on	the	one	hand,	acknowledges	the	mysteriousness	of	human	emotional	
dynamics,	and	on	the	other	hand,	makes	a	modest	and	tentative	assertion	that	literature	has	a	
relevance	in	the	exploration	of	these	dynamics.	As	part	of	his	introductory	reflections,	the	
narrator	considers	the	claims	of	psychology	—	in	nineteenth-century	terminology,	“Seelenkunde”	
—	versus	the	claims	of	literature:	
Die	Seelenkunde	hat	manches	beleuchtet	und	erklärt,	aber	vieles	ist	ihr	dunkel	
und	in	großer	Entfernung	geblieben.	Wir	glauben	daher,	daß	es	nicht	zu	viel	ist,	
wenn	wir	sagen,	es	sei	für	uns	noch	ein	heiterer	unermeßlicher	Abgrund,	in	dem	
Gott	und	die	Geister	wandeln.	Die	Seele	in	Augenblicken	der	Entzückung	
überfliegt	ihn	oft,	die	Dichtkunst	in	kindlicher	Unbewußtheit	lüftet	ihn	zuweilen;	
aber	die	Wissenschaft	mit	ihrem	Hammer	und	Richtscheite	steht	häufig	erst	an	
dem	Rande,	und	mag	in	vielen	Fällen	noch	gar	nicht	einmal	Hand	angelegt	haben.	
(411–412)	
	
In	the	original	journal	version,	the	introductory	reflections	were	influenced	by	Jean	Paul’s	essay	
Muthmaßungen	über	einige	Wunder	des	organischen	Magnetismus	(1814);	in	the	book	version,	
these	references	have	been	cut,	with	the	one	slight	exception	of	the	neighbors’	speculation	that	
the	Major	used	“magnetism”	to	heal	Brigitta	of	her	severe	illness	(444).	The	later	version	was	
instead	inspired	by	the	Lehrbuch	der	ärztlichen	Seelenkunde,	which	Ernst	von	Feuchtersleben	had	
published	in	1845.26	In	keeping	with	the	latter’s	greater	concern	with	scientific	verifiability,	the	
book	version	omits	mention	of	unexplained	operations	such	as	“Geisterfurcht,”	
“Somnambulismus,”	“Elektrizität,”	and	premonitions	of	death.27	Nevertheless,	in	a	more	
convincing	if	less	concrete	manner,	since	these	phenomena	no	longer	have	quite	the	same	aura	of	
                                                
25	See	page	137.	
26	The	influence	of	Jean	Paul	and	Feuchtersleben	on	Brigitta	is	discussed	in	Ulrich	Dittmann,	“Brigitta.	
Erläuterungen”	in	Stifter,	Werke	und	Briefe,	vol.	1.9,	321f.;	as	well	as	Christian	von	Zimmermann,	“‘Brigitta’	
—	seelenkundlich	gelesen.	Zur	Verwendung	‘kalobiotischer’	Lebensmaximen	Feuchterslebens	in	Stifters	
Erzählung,”	in	Adalbert	Stifter:	Dichter	und	Maler,	Denkmalpfleger	und	Schulmann;	neue	Zugänge	zu	seinem	
Werk,	ed.	Hartmut	Laufhütte	and	Karl	Möseneder	(Tübingen:	Niemeyer,	1996).	
27	Stifter,	Werke	und	Briefe,	vol.	1.2,	211f.	
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the	unexplained,	the	narrator	touches	on	the	gap	between	the	explanatory	abilities	of	scientific	
research	and	the	way	individuals	experience	mental	realities	—	a	gap	which	still	exists	today,	
manifesting	itself,	for	example,	in	the	context	of	fMRI	(functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging).	
This	type	of	brain	scan	measures	relative	blood	flow	in	different	regions,	with	increased	
circulation	implying	increased	neuronal	activity.	However,	its	use	in	cognitive	studies	in	order	to	
draw	conclusions	about	the	connections	between	mental	operations	and	specific	brain	regions	
has	been	criticized	for	falling	into	the	cum	hoc	ergo	propter	hoc	logical	fallacy,	in	which	
correlation	is	assumed	to	prove	causation.28	In	addition,	poor	experimental	design	calls	into	
question	conclusions	drawn	from	the	deceptively	compelling	colored	brain	diagrams	generated	
from	fMRI	scans;	for	example,	the	tasks	given	to	experiment	participants	in	order	to	‘locate’	
emotions	are	often	unacceptably	reductionistic	or	make	indefensible	assumptions	about	how	
people	‘typically’	react	to	a	given	stimulus.29	Studies	have	shown	—	in	this	case	unambiguously	—	
that	within	the	(undamaged)	human	brain,	all	areas	are	active	at	all	times.30	Without	providing	
any	specific	or	profound	information	about	the	nature	of	heightened	activity	relative	to	base	
activity	levels,	brain	scans	cannot	lay	claim	to	anything	more	than	superficial	conclusions	about	
the	connection	between	emotions	and	physiology.	Just	as,	in	Stifter’s	time,	scientific	inquiry	into	
the	nature	of	the	human	mind	was	fraught	with	difficulties,	so	it	is	to	this	day.	Introspective	
                                                
28	“What	is	not	possible,	even	when	great	care	is	taken,	is	for	imaging	to	have	a	revolutionary	effect	on	
cognitive	psychology.”	Christopher	Mole	and	Colin	Klein,	“Confirmation,	Refutation,	and	the	Evidence	of	
fMRI,”	in	Foundational	Issues	in	Human	Brain	Mapping,	ed.	Stephen	José	Hanson	and	Martin	Bunzl	
(Cambridge:	MIT	Press,	2010),	110.	On	the	fallacy	of	drawing	reverse	inferences	about	cognitive	processes	
from	activated	brain	regions,	see	Russell	A.	Poldrack,	“Can	cognitive	processes	be	inferred	from	
neuroimaging	data?”	Trends	in	Cognitive	Sciences	10,	no.	2	(2006):	60f.	
29	For	some	examples	of	criticism	leveled	at	experimental	design,	see	Jean-Baptiste	Poline,	Bertrand	Thirion,	
Alexis	Roche,	and	Sébastien	Meriaux,	“Intersubject	Variability	in	fMRI	Data:	Causes,	Consequences,	and	
Related	Analysis	Strategies,”	in	Foundational	Issues	in	Human	Brain	Mapping,	ed.	Stephen	José	Hanson	and	
Martin	Bunzl	(Cambridge:	MIT	Press,	2010).	
30	See,	for	example,	Craig	E.	L.	Stark	and	Larry	R.	Squire,	“When	Zero	Is	Not	Zero:	The	Problem	of	
Ambiguous	Baseline	Conditions	in	fMRI,”	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Science	98,	no.	22	(2001):	
12760;	as	well	as	Mole	and	Klein,	“Evidence	of	fMRI,”	103:	“Neuroimaging	is	a	noisy	business,	and	the	brain	
is	a	noisy	place.”	
 130	
reflection	on	the	narrative	structures	of	mental	reality	was	and	still	remains	the	only	fruitful	
means	of	exploring	certain	questions	which	are	of	great	importance	to	an	existing	individual.		
	 Despite	the	hindrances	to	understanding	emotional	dynamics,	the	narrator	insists	on	their	
ultimate	intelligibility,	declaring	that	there	are	“reasons”	behind	them:	“Daß	zuletzt	sittliche	
Gründe	vorhanden	sind,	die	das	Herz	heraus	fühlt,	ist	kein	Zweifel,	allein	wir	können	sie	nicht	
immer	mit	der	Waage	des	Bewußtseins	und	der	Rechnung	hervor	heben,	und	anschauen.”	(411)	
He	suggests	here	that	a	specific	form	of	understanding	is	needed	in	order	to	comprehend	the	
events	which	he	is	about	to	relate	—	namely,	one	that	makes	use	of	composite	processing	
faculties.	The	narrator’s	reference	to	the	“heart”	—	the	metaphorical	seat	of	the	emotions	—	as	
well	as	his	claim	that	the	reasons	must	be	“felt	out”	are	indications	of	an	awareness	that	emotions	
are	composite	operations:	to	‘feel	something	out’	suggests	not	only	‘feelings’	in	the	sense	of	
emotions	but	also	an	operation	whereby	different	facets	are	taken	into	account	in	order	to	form	
an	overall	impression.	This	notion	contrasts	with	the	“scale	of	consciousness	and	calculation,”	
which	would	represent	that	which	has	been	traditionally	termed	‘reason’;	as	I	have	argued	earlier,	
reason	in	this	sense	is	a	particular	type	of	thought	operation	that	occurs	consciously	and	as	a	
binary	comparison,	hence	the	image	of	the	scale.31	This	type	of	precise	but	pared-down	thinking	
shows	up	also	in	the	image	of	“die	Wissenschaft	mit	ihrem	Hammer	und	Richtscheite,”	quoted	
above.	These	sorts	of	metaphors	suggest	a	kind	of	judgment	that	is	clear-cut,	as	opposed	to	the	
less	decisive	determinations	that	create	suspense	in	Brigitta.	The	narrator	explains	that	the	
mystery	of	his	anecdote	relates	to	the	difference	between	inner	and	outer	beauty:	
In	dem	Angesichte	eines	Häßlichen	ist	für	uns	oft	eine	innere	Schönheit,	die	wir	
nicht	auf	der	Stelle	von	seinem	Werthe	herzuleiten	vermögen,	während	uns	oft	die	
Züge	eines	andern	kalt	und	leer	sind,	von	denen	alle	sagen,	daß	sie	die	größte	
Schönheit	besitzen.	Eben	so	fühlen	wir	uns	manchmal	zu	einem	hingezogen,	den	
wir	eigentlich	gar	nicht	kennen,	es	gefallen	uns	seine	Bewegungen,	es	gefällt	uns	
seine	Art,	wir	trauern,	wenn	er	uns	verlassen	hat,	und	haben	eine	gewisse	
                                                
31	See	page	4.	
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Sehnsucht,	ja	eine	Liebe	zu	ihm,	wenn	wir	oft	noch	in	späteren	Jahren	seiner	
gedenken:	während	wir	mit	einem	Andern,	dessen	Werth	in	vielen	Thaten	vor	uns	
liegt,	nicht	ins	Reine	kommen	können,	wenn	wir	auch	Jahre	lang	mit	ihm	
umgegangen	sind.	(411)	
	
The	language	of	this	passage	construes	like	or	dislike	of	a	person	as	a	matter	of	composite	
evaluations,	which	may	not	be	immediately	—	“auf	der	Stelle”	—	transparent,	since	they	depend	
on	the	multiple	factors	that	combine	to	make	up	the	“Art”	of	a	person.	Furthermore,	if	someone	is	
underappreciated	even	though	his	value	is	apparent	“in	vielen	Thaten,”	it	suggests	a	situation	in	
which	the	components	for	a	positive	evaluation	are	present,	but	the	manner	in	which	they	are	
evaluated	turns	the	result	in	an	unfavorable	direction.	A	composite	evaluation	may	not	ultimately	
do	justice	to	the	character	of	the	one	being	evaluated,	if,	for	example,	it	is	swayed	by	elements	
specific	to	the	evaluator’s	psychological	makeup	—	as	is	retrospectively	implied	by	the	novella	in	
regard	to	both	Brigitta	and	the	Major.	By	noting	that	an	individual’s	evaluation	may	differ	from	
that	of	society,	the	narrator	maintains	that	the	qualities	that	make	a	person	likeable	are	not	
objective;	and,	one	could	add,	neither	is	the	thought	operation	by	which	the	evaluation	is	made.		
	 The	third	section,	“Steppenvergangenheit,”	also	begins	with	the	narrator	reflecting	on	his	
storytelling	method.	The	order	in	which	the	narrator	learns	the	details	of	his	hosts’	history	is	not	
the	same	order	in	which	he	presents	them	to	the	reader.	Most	conspicuously,	the	fictional	
narrator	would	not	experience	the	ending	as	a	surprise,	since	one	can	infer	that	he	did	not	know	
any	of	the	details	in	“Steppenvergangenheit”	when	he	witnessed	the	reconciliation:	from	his	
perspective,	it	would	simply	have	appeared	as	though	Brigitta	and	the	Major	had	finally	allowed	
themselves	to	give	a	more	open	expression	to	their	longstanding	affection	for	one	another	—	only	
later	would	he	have	discovered	the	other	tensions	at	work	in	that	scene.	The	discrepancy	between	
the	narrator’s	versus	the	reader’s	experience	underlines	the	fact	that	the	novella	unfolds	according	
to	a	well-considered	narrative	strategy,	which	is	also	well	reflected	in	the	text:		
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Ehe	ich	entwickle,	wie	wir	nach	Marosheli	geritten	sind,	wie	ich	Brigitta	kennen	
gelernt	habe,	und	wie	ich	noch	recht	oft	auf	ihrem	Gute	gewesen	bin,	ist	es	nöthig,	
daß	ich	einen	Theil	ihres	früheren	Lebens	erzähle,	ohne	den	das	Folgende	nicht	
verständlich	wäre.	Wie	ich	zu	so	tief	gehender	Kenntniß	der	Zustände,	die	hier	
geschildert	werden,	gelangen	konnte,	wird	sich	aus	meinen	Verhältnissen	zu	dem	
Major	und	zu	Brigitta	ergeben,	und	am	Ende	dieser	Geschichte	von	selbst	klar	
werden,	ohne	daß	ich	nöthig	hätte,	vor	der	Zeit	zu	enthüllen,	was	ich	auch	nicht	
vor	der	Zeit,	sondern	durch	die	natürliche	Entwicklung	der	Dinge	erfuhr.	(445)	
	
The	narrator’s	concern	that	he	not	reveal	details	“vor	der	Zeit”	indicates	that	interventions	in	the	
chronology	of	the	story	are	explicitly	meant	to	create	the	effect	of	a	surprise	twist;	not	the	actual	
order	of	events,	but	rather	a	narratively	—	meaning,	in	this	case,	emotionally	—	effective	
sequence	is	employed.	This	passage	also	provides	further	clues	to	the	role	of	tempo	in	the	story;	
here,	the	third	section	is	functioning	as	a	moment	of	retardation,	since	it,	as	both	a	flashback	and	
an	interruption,	delays	the	arrival	of	the	narrative	at	the	climactic	scene.	
	
IV.	Narrative	Revisions	
	 In	the	earlier	journal	edition	of	Brigitta,	there	were	more	clues	that	might	allow	a	canny	
reader	experienced	with	the	ways	of	literature	to	guess	that	Stephan	was	the	Major.	For	example,	
the	journal	version	contains	more	information	about	the	Major’s	past	love	life	in	the	second	
section,	including	mention	of	a	“junge	Gräfin”32	who	could	easily	be	connected	with	Gabriele	(she	
is	a	countess	in	the	journal	version)	from	the	third	section	dealing	with	Brigitta’s	past	life.	This	
and	other	details	that	could	potentially	link	the	Major	to	Brigitta	have	been	removed	from	the	
book	version	of	the	novella,	in	which	the	narrator	consciously	adheres	to	a	policy	of	
circumspection	with	regard	to	prying	into	his	friends’	personal	lives.33	One	correspondence	
between	the	narratives	of	the	two	protagonists	that	was	not	omitted	in	the	book	version	is	the	
                                                
32	Stifter,	Journalfassungen,	vol.	1.2,	230.		
33	“Wer	viel	reiset,	lernt	schon	die	Menschen	schonen,	und	läßt	sie	in	dem	inneren	Haushalte	ihres	Lebens	
gewähren,	der	sich	nicht	aufschließt,	wenn	es	nicht	freiwillig	ist.”	(439)	
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“Bild	[…]	eines	häßlichen	Mädchens”	(440)	which	the	Major	keeps	in	his	private	study.	The	
framed	picture	alone	might	be	enough	to	give	away	the	surprise,	but	more	likely,	it	would	only	
serve	the	reader	as	a	sign	of	affection	whose	full	meaning	only	becomes	clear	in	retrospect	or	
upon	a	second	reading.	Certainly	there	are	some	hints	to	the	ending	scattered	throughout	the	text,	
but	far	fewer	than	in	the	journal	version,	which	suggests	that	Stifter	may	have	taken	steps	to	
ensure	that	the	surprise	was	preserved.34	In	the	journal	version,	the	narrator	also	gives	too	many	
advance	warnings	that	an	emotionally	laden	scene	is	going	to	occur;	since	the	reader	is	better	
prepared	in	that	version,	the	scene	loses	some	of	its	surprise	value.	The	plot	events	are	basically	
the	same	in	both	versions,	so	the	emotions	attendant	on	witnessing	human	drama	are	still	there;	
but	with	less	surprise,	the	reader	is	affected	to	a	lesser	degree.	
	 Another	factor	influencing	the	degree	of	surprise	is	whether	the	novella	is	being	read	for	
the	first	time,	or	reread	for	a	second	or	subsequent	time.	Although	the	novelty	is	lost	in	the	latter	
case,	the	preconditions	for	readers	to	re-evaluate	their	assessments	of	the	characters	at	the	
climactic	moment	remain	in	effect.	The	act	of	reading	refreshes	the	reader’s	cognizance	of	the	
pertinent	narrative	features,	bringing	them	to	the	foreground	of	consciousness	in	the	sense	
described	in	Loosemore	and	Harley.35	Thus,	Brigitta	is	no	longer	surprising	but	still	moving,	since	
the	narrative	walks	the	reader	through	the	elements	of	the	thought	pattern	that	is	being	modeled	
in	the	text.	Going	through	the	(mental)	motions	is	sufficient	to	reproduce	much	of	the	affective	
intensity	of	a	first	reading.	
                                                
34	A	few	recent	scholars	(e.g.,	Hunter-Lougheed,	“Adalbert	Stifter:	Brigitta,”	369;	and	Meier,	“Diskretes	
Erzählen,”	219)	have	assumed	that	the	reader	guesses	the	ending,	which	would	eliminate	the	surprise.	While	
there	are	indeed	hints	present	in	the	text,	their	subtlety	makes	it	seem	more	likely	that	they	are	there	to	be	
noticed	on	a	second	reading;	thus,	I	tend	to	share	Kreuzer’s	opinion	that	it	is	overly	optimistic	to	expect	the	
typical	reader	to	figure	out	the	ending	in	advance.	For	a	convincing	discussion	of	the	dynamics	of	
information	delivery	by	the	narrator	in	this	regard,	see	Kreuzer,	“Zur	‘unerhörten’	Erzähldramaturgie,”	32.	
35	Richard	Loosemore	and	Trevor	Harley,	“Brains	and	Minds,”	221f.;	see	also	page	20.	
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	 Being	moved	is	central	to	the	discussion	of	this	novella:	it	involves	accessing	deeply	held	
inner	states,	such	as	latent	beliefs.	These	are	what	‘moves’	when	one	is	‘moved,’	and	they	do	so	
through	the	power	of	affect,	which	must	reach	a	high	level	of	momentary	intensity	in	order	to	
effect	such	a	shift.	Brigitta	is	a	difficult	character	in	part	because	her	latent	beliefs	are	based	on	an	
individualistic	system	of	values,	developed	when	she	was	left	to	her	own	devices	as	a	child,	that	
appears	impenetrable	or	even	bizarre	to	others.	An	anecdote	about	her	childhood	playthings	
illustrates	her	inner	makeup	while	also	showing	how	Stifter	improved	the	psychological	
complexity	of	the	novella	from	the	journal	to	the	book	version.	The	journal	version	reads:	
Dort	aber,	so	wie	sie	einst,	wenn	man	ihr	wohl	aus	Mitleiden	eine	schöne	Puppe	
gegeben	hatte,	dieselbe	nach	kurzer	Freude	wegwarf,	und	schlechte	Dinge	in	ihr	
Bettchen	trug,	z.	B.	Steinchen,	Hölzchen,	und	eifersüchtig	über	ihnen	wachte,	so	
hing	ihr	Auge	nun	einzig	und	allein	über	der	Wiege	ihres	Sohnes,	und	so	hegte	
und	so	hüthete	sie	ihn.36	
	
Here	it	is	clear	that	Brigitta’s	focus	on	her	son	is	as	intense	as	her	focus	on	the	sticks	and	stones	
that	she	once	preferred	over	a	pretty	doll;	however,	the	comparison	seems	like	a	rather	arbitrary	
metaphor	for	intensity,	since	it	gives	no	clues	as	to	the	connection	between	the	objects.	The	part	
about	the	child	Brigitta	appears	to	do	little	more	than	illustrate	her	idiosyncrasy.	The	book	
version,	on	the	other	hand,	contains	details	that	suggest	a	particular	reading	of	the	objects:	
So	wie	sie	einstens,	wenn	man	ihr	wohl	aus	Mitleiden	eine	schöne	Puppe	gegeben	
hatte,	dieselbe	nach	kurzer	Freude	wieder	weg	warf,	und	schlechte	Dinge	in	ihr	
Bettchen	trug,	als	Steine,	Hölzchen	und	dergleichen:	so	nahm	sie	jetzt	auch	ihr	
größtes	Gut,	das	sie	hatte,	nach	Marosheli	mit,	ihren	Sohn,	pflegte	und	hüthete	
ihn,	und	ihr	Auge	hing	einzig	und	allein	über	dem	Bettchen	desselben.	(461)	
	
This	version	contains	a	pair	of	opposites:	“schlechte	Dinge”	versus	“ihr	größtes	Gut.”	The	‘bad’	
things	are	the	sticks	and	stones,	while	the	‘good’	is	her	son;	however,	it	is	precisely	these	two	
things	that	are	being	compared	in	the	simile	in	this	passage.	There	is	thus	a	repurposing	of	
language	here,	since	the	word	‘bad’	actually	designates	something	of	value.	In	fact,	on	further	
                                                
36	Stifter,	Journalfassungen,	vol.	1.2,	245f.	
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consideration,	sticks	and	stones	are	basically	neutral	objects,	with	nothing	inherently	‘good’	or	
‘bad’	about	them;	their	‘badness’	must	therefore	be	the	product	of	conventional	expectations	—	in	
other	words,	these	are	dirty	things	that	belong	outdoors,	not	in	the	bed	of	a	little	girl	from	a	
respectable	family.	But	what	is	conventionally	considered	‘bad’	is,	in	Brigitta’s	eyes,	good.	
Comparisons	usually	function	in	a	forwards	direction	in	which	the	first-mentioned	object	has	a	
certain	quality	in	abundance,	while	the	comparison	claims	that	the	second-mentioned	object	
possesses	that	quality	also.	But	in	this	case,	viewing	the	comparison	backwards	yields	the	best	
clue	as	to	the	significance	of	“schlechte	Dinge”:	just	as	the	baby	is	a	person	who	has	not	yet	
developed,	the	sticks	and	stones	are	raw	materials	whose	potential	to	be	made	into	something	has	
not	yet	been	realized.	The	passage	thus	illustrates	Brigitta’s	prodigious	capacity	to	create	value,	
but	in	ways	that	are	not	recognizable	according	to	conventional	measures.	
	 Another	change	to	the	book	version	at	content-level	that	affects	the	emotional	effect	of	
the	novella	is	the	expansion	of	the	description	of	Uwar.	In	the	journal	version,	the	narrator	spends	
a	couple	of	pages	describing	his	tour	of	Uwar	with	the	Major	on	the	day	after	his	arrival	before	
concluding:	“Und	so	ritten	wir	am	andern	Tage	wieder	herum,	und	ehe	acht	vergangen	waren,	
hatte	mich	das	gleichförmig	sanfte	Abfließen	dieser	Tage	und	Geschäfte	so	eingesponnen,	daß	ich	
mich	wohl	und	ebenmäßig	angeregt	fühlte	[…].”37	Instead	of	this	condensed	summary,	the	book	
version	includes	descriptions	of	several	subsequent	days,	on	which	he	sees,	among	other	things,	a	
hay	meadow,	various	crop	fields,	greenhouses,	herds	of	cattle	and	sheep,	horses,	and	a	swamp	in	
the	process	of	being	drained.38	At	each	station,	the	Major	has	some	business	to	conduct	with	his	
workers	there,	and	he	checks	to	see	that	everything	is	in	order.	The	narrator	depicts	the	Major	as	
interacting	with	his	“Leuten”	(e.g.,	435)	in	an	approachable	and	noncondescending	way,	
promising,	for	instance,	that	he	would	soon	come	and	share	a	meal	with	them;	and	the	Major,	in	
                                                
37	Stifter,	Journalfassungen,	vol.	1.2,	227.	
38	In	the	Kohlhammer	edition,	these	descriptions	take	up	about	six	or	seven	pages	(vol.	1.5,	430–436).	
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turn,	comments	more	than	once	on	their	loyalty	to	him	—	for	example:	“Diese	würde	ich	sogar	
zum	Blutvergießen	führen	können,	sobald	ich	mich	nur	an	ihre	Spitze	stellte.	Sie	sind	mir	
unbedingt	zugethan.”	(438)	Although	there	is	a	definite	hierarchy	in	this	relationship	—	the	
Major	is	known	as	the	“Grundherr”	and	at	one	point	addresses	his	people	as	“Kinder”	(434)	—	the	
devotion	of	the	people	is	a	response	to	the	Major’s	sense	of	responsibility	towards	them	and	
genuine	concern	for	their	welfare;	the	relationship	is	mutually	beneficial.	One	thing	that	prevents	
this	image	of	benevolent	authority	from	becoming	all	too	patriarchal	is	the	fact	that	the	Major	
originally	learned	to	manage	his	estate	in	this	way	from	Brigitta,	as	did	Gömör	and	the	other	
presumably	male	member	of	their	agricultural	association.	The	expansion	of	the	passages	on	
estate	management	in	the	book	version	creates	an	increase	in	the	narrative	time	(Erzählzeit),	
which	produces	more	of	a	feeling	in	the	reader	that	the	narrator’s	visit	extends	for	quite	some	
duration	before	he	is	introduced	to	Brigitta.	Of	course,	both	versions	make	it	clear	that	a	
considerable	amount	of	narrated	time	(erzählter	Zeit)	elapses,	but	the	book	version	actually	slows	
down	the	narrative	tempo,	thus	causing	the	reader’s	immersion	in	the	details	of	Uwar’s	
management	to	last	longer.	As	a	consequence,	the	reader	who	reaches	the	climax	of	the	book	
version	has,	firstly,	more	of	an	experience	of	Langsamkeit,	and	secondly,	more	details	about	the	
nature	of	this	form	of	rational	land	management	in	his	short-term	memory.	This	is	significant	
because	Langsamkeit	is	coded	to	Brigitta;	as	I	will	argue	in	the	next	section,	her	character	is	
geared	in	such	a	way	that	she	has	a	deep-seated	affinity	for	and	sympathy	with	gradual	processes.	
The	form	of	land	management	depicted	in	the	novella,	which	is	likewise	characterized	by	gradual	
developments,	is	an	outwardly	visible	manifestation	reflecting	the	nature	of	Brigitta’s	inner	self.	
This	portion	of	the	novella	thus	provides	the	reader	with	an	experience	of	time	that	puts	him	in	
sync	with	the	protagonist	in	a	certain	respect.	
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V.	Fast	and	Slow	Processes	
	 The	passage	in	the	narrator’s	introduction	in	which	he	notes	that	sometimes	the	reasons	
behind	an	emotion	cannot	be	discovered	“in	Schnelligkeit”	(411)	is	significant	for	the	whole	work:	
the	differing	dynamics	of	fast	versus	slow	processes	are	the	driving	force	behind	the	conflicts	in	
the	novella.	While	Brigitta	is	attuned	to	Langsamkeit,	the	Major	is	attuned	to	Schnelligkeit.	This	
difference	is	a	factor	in	the	discord	that	develops	between	them	as	young	people,	leading	to	their	
divorce.	It	plays	a	role	in	the	Major’s	attraction	to	Gabriele,	whom	he	first	glimpses	while	on	a	
hunt,	but	only	for	a	moment	before	she	“flog	über	die	Ebene	zwischen	den	leichten	Büschen	
davon.”	(458)	Her	eyes	are	compared	to	those	of	a	gazelle,	and	her	name	also	evokes	this	animal,	
which	helps	to	characterize	her	as	swift	and	wild.	The	sylvan	encounters	between	her	and	the	
Major	are	repeatedly	characterized	by	rapidity	and	suddenness,	including	the	final,	decisive	one,	
in	which	he	“riß	[…]	sie	plötzlich	an	sich,	preßte	sie	an	sein	Herz,	und	ehe	er	sehen	konnte,	ob	sie	
zürne	oder	frohlocke,	sprang	er	auf	sein	Pferd	und	jagte	davon.”	(459)39	Gabriele’s	beauty	and	the	
Schnelligkeit	of	her	manner	strike	a	chord	with	aspects	of	the	Major’s	inner	constitution,	
harmonizing	with	certain	of	his	latent	beliefs	about	what	is	valuable	and	desirable,	causing	a	
“Taumel	unbeschreiblichen	Entzückens”	(459)	within	him.	Exterior	beauty,	as	the	result	of	a	
composite	evaluation	of	sensory	perceptions,	is	something	that	can	be	recognized	instantly	—	
that	is,	quickly.	It	is	an	attribute	which	the	Major	also	possesses,	and	thus	he	has	a	natural	
sympathy	for	others	like	himself.	
	 Gabriele	represents	a	certain	type	of	feminine	ideal,	usually	encountered	in	the	woods;	
one	could	easily	imagine	Wilhelm	Meister,	Franz	Sternbald,	or	some	other	Bildungsroman-
protagonist	encountering	a	Gabriele	during	his	wanderings.	In	spite	of	a	certain	flatness	inherent	
                                                
39	Compare	this	to	the	Major’s	slow	courtship	of	Brigitta,	which	stretches	across	several	pages	(451–454)	and	
includes	further	textual	indicators	of	its	considerable	duration,	such	as	“Dies	dauerte	längere	Zeit”	(452)	and	
“eine	Gelegenheit	[…],	deren	manche	früher	schon	ungenützt	vorüber	gegangen	waren”	(453).	
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in	the	portrayal	of	a	type	such	as	this,	Stifter	develops	a	psychological	background	to	this	
encounter	that	serves	to	motivate	what	follows;40	in	other	words,	there	are	deeper	narrative-
psychological	reasons	for	why	Stephan	is	drawn	to	Gabriele	in	addition	to	her	physical	beauty.	As	
I	argued	in	the	previous	chapter,	it	is	worth	asking	the	question	of	why	an	individual	develops	an	
infatuation;	in	this	novella,	one	major	factor	is	the	similarity	of	their	childhoods.	The	beginning	of	
a	romantic	relationship	usually	includes	the	discovery	of	shared	aspects	of	one’s	life	narrative	
(which	can	serve	as	a	starting	point	for	a	future	shared	narrative),	and	this	is	of	such	importance	
that	participants	may	even	construe	elements	of	their	histories	as	aligned,	even	if	the	similarity	is	
in	fact	tenuous.41	Conversely,	individuals	with	a	similar	history	often	have	an	affinity	for	one	
another	before	they	are	aware	of	their	commonalities,	which	would	fall	under	the	category	of	
mysterious	psychological	dynamics	mentioned	in	the	narrator’s	introductory	reflections.	In	the	
case	of	the	Major,	“sein	Vater	hatte	ihn	auf	dem	Lande	auferzogen,	um	ihn	für	das	Leben	
vorzubereiten.”	(449)	Following	his	education,	his	father	first	sends	him	to	travel	abroad	and	then	
introduces	him	to	society,	giving	the	impression	that	there	was	a	carefully	thought-out	plan	to	his	
upbringing.	Gabriele	was	likewise	raised	in	the	country	according	to	her	father’s	wishes;	she	is	
described	as	“die	Tochter	eines	greisen	Grafen,	der	in	der	Nachbarschaft	wohnte,	ein	wildes	
Geschöpf,	das	ihr	Vater	auf	dem	Lande	erzog,	wo	er	ihr	alle	und	jede	Freiheit	ließ,	weil	er	meinte,	
daß	sie	sich	nur	so	am	naturgemäßesten	entfalte,	und	nicht	zu	einer	Puppe	gerathe,	wie	er	sie	
nicht	leiden	konnte.”	(458)	Gabriele	thus	shares	childhood	narratives,	which	are	highly	influential	
since	they	are	acquired	during	formative	years,	with	the	Major;	however,	an	important	difference	
is	that	her	father	purposefully	avoided	any	kind	of	set	plan	in	her	upbringing.	Nevertheless,	the	
                                                
40	Dittmann	recognizes	that	Gabriele	has	a	positive	side	in	“ihrer	Spontaneität”	(“Brigitta	und	kein	Ende,”	
25)	and	thus	that	her	character	is	not	exclusively	limited	to	representing	the	“Klischee	der	Verführerin,	die	
vordergründig	eine	Ehe	zerstört”	(ibid.,	24).	
41	This	tendency	plays	a	part	in	the	‘loved	you	all	my	life’-script	as	well	as	its	close	relative,	the	‘known	you	
all	my	life’-script;	see	page	96.	
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idea	that	too	much	exposure	to	society	ruins	a	young	person	is	an	influential	one,	being	shared	
not	only	by	these	two	fathers,	but	also	by	Johannes	the	Seducer,	who	remarks	that	there	is	“not	
much	to	steal”	from	girls	raised	in	a	“very	sociable	house.”42	Even	society	would	seem	to	agree,	
judging	by	the	way	it	responds	to	the	young	Major/Stephan	Murai:	
Hier	wurde	er	bald	der	fast	einzige	Gegenstand	der	Gespräche.	Einige	rühmten	
seinen	Verstand,	andere	sein	Benehmen	und	seine	Bescheidenheit,	wieder	andere	
sagten,	daß	sie	nie	etwas	so	schönes	gesehen	hätten,	als	diesen	Mann.	Mehrere	
behaupteten,	er	sei	ein	Genie,	und	wie	es	an	Verläumdungen	und	Nachreden	auch	
nicht	fehlte,	sagten	manche,	daß	er	etwas	Wildes	und	Scheues	an	sich	habe,	und	
daß	man	es	ihm	ansehe,	daß	er	in	dem	Walde	auferzogen	worden	sei.	(449–450)	
	
The	description	of	the	Major	as	having	something	“wild”	and	“shy”	about	him	further	underscores	
the	affinity	between	him	and	Gabriele.	In	addition,	society	seems	to	have	virtually	the	same	
impression	—	in	a	masculine	version	—	of	him	as	he	has	of	Gabriele:	“hier	führte	ihm	das	
Schicksal	ein	ganz	anderes	Weib	entgegen,	als	er	es	immer	zu	sehen	gewohnt	war.”	(457–458)	The	
difference	that	he	perceives	in	her	is	not	merely	external,	for	there	had	also	been	beautiful	women	
in	Vienna,	whom	he	blithely	ignored	in	favor	of	Brigitta;43	it	has	to	do	with	Gabriele’s	demeanor,	
which	is	free	of	conventional,	bourgeois	romantic	scripts.	Notably,	however,	Brigitta	was	also	
                                                
42	Kierkegaard,	Either/Or,	Part	I,	339.	
43	“[S]ein	Auge	ging	an	den	größten	Schönheiten,	die	ihn	umringten,	vorüber,	das	ihre	mit	sanfter	Bitte	zu	
suchen.”	(454)	In	an	otherwise	highly	insightful	article,	Dittmann	inexplicably	claims	that	Brigitta’s	ugliness	
is	an	“ärgerlicher	Lesefehler”	(“Brigitta	und	kein	Ende,”	28).	Yet	contrary	to	his	assertion	that	the	narrator	
does	not	communicate	to	the	reader	the	impression	that	Brigitta	is	ugly,	the	narrator	does	indeed	comment	
on	her	ugliness	when	he	sees	the	portrait	of	her	as	a	young	woman;	in	fact,	his	recognition	of	it	despite	the	
painter’s	attempts	at	“Verschleierung”	emphasize	that	it	was	very	obvious.	While	it	is	noteworthy	that	the	
narrator	never	describes	the	40-year-old	Brigitta	as	ugly,	this	is	likely	due	to	the	influence	that	her	inner	
qualities	have	already	begun	to	exert	on	his	faculties	of	perception;	namely,	the	Major’s	high	praise	has	
predisposed	the	narrator	to	think	well	of	her,	and	this	in	turn	would	influence	how	he	perceives	her	
physical	appearance	through	mechanisms	of	subjective	distortion.	Also,	in	the	reconciliation	scene,	when	
Brigitta’s	features	“in	unnachahmlicher	Schönheit	strahlten”	(473),	the	choice	of	verb	suggests	not	that	they	
are	beautiful,	but	rather	that	their	expression	is	beautiful.	Also,	the	implication	is	that	this	forms	a	stark	
contrast	to	her	usual	appearance.	By	making	the	contrast	extreme,	the	narrative	implies	that	the	power	of	
inner	beauty	and	forgiveness	is	very	great	indeed	to	have	been	able	to	overcome	such	an	aesthetic	obstacle.	
So	when	Kreuzer	agrees	with	Dittmann	that	Brigitta’s	ugliness	cannot	be	“unumstritten	angenommen”	
(“Zur	‘unerhörten’	Erzähldramaturgie,”	27),	this	is	based	on	a	misreading	that	conflates	the	very	two	
properties	which	the	story	—	according	to	the	narrator’s	reflections	at	the	beginning	—	seeks	to	
differentiate:	inner	versus	outer	beauty.	
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raised	apart	from	society,	though	the	circumstances	were	different:	her	family	lived	in	town,	but	
she	herself	maintained	a	separation	that	was	not	so	much	spatial	as	emotional.	This	has	
disadvantages	that	come	to	the	fore	over	the	course	of	the	novella,	but	also	one	advantage	that	
makes	her	attractive	to	the	Major:	“Weil	sie	ihr	Herz	nicht	durch	Liebesgedanken	und	
Liebesbilder	vor	der	Zeit	entkräftet	hatte,	wehte	der	Odem	eines	ungeschwächten	Lebens	in	seine	
Seele.”	(455)	This,	too,	is	freedom	from	the	romantic	scripts	of	society;	although	Brigitta	and	
Gabriele	initially	appear	to	be	opposites,	they	are	similar	in	many	ways,	as	well.	The	“großen	
wilden	Augen”	(447)	of	the	young	Brigitta	attest	to	the	fact	that	all	three	characters	—	Gabriele,	
Stephan,	and	Brigitta	—	belong	in	the	category	of	the	wild.44	
	 The	Major’s	infidelity	to	Brigitta	appears	in	this	light	not	as	an	outright	reversal	in	what	he	
values	in	a	woman,	but	rather	as	a	confusion	over	which	variety	of	wildness	best	matches	up	with	
his	own.45	For	in	spite	of	the	similarities,	Gabriele’s	unchecked	development	into	“gleichsam	ein	
Abgrund	von	Unbefangenheit”	(458)	contrasts	starkly	with	Brigitta’s	introversion.	They	represent	
two	variations	on	wildness:	Gabriele	is	the	beautiful	version	and	Brigitta	the	ugly;	Gabriele	suffers	
from	having	been	raised	with	too	few	boundaries,	Brigitta	from	having	had	too	many.	And	in	the	
final	scene,	when	the	narrator	sees	Gabriele’s	grave,	it	implies	a	statement	about	their	relative	
resilience:	Gabriele	is	like	the	lilies	that	adorn	her	tombstone,	frail	and	doomed	to	an	early	death;	
whereas	Brigitta	is	like	a	root	which,	though	the	foliage	be	cut	away,	can	still	sprout	anew.	The	
“kleinen	Würzlein”	which	once	“in	den	Fels	des	eigenen	Herzens	schlagen	mußten,	und	da	
                                                
44	Another	example	is	the	portrait	of	Brigitta	in	the	Major’s	study:	“der	Blick	war	wild.”	(440)	See	also	Sima	
Kappeler,	who	likewise	argues	that	Brigitta	and	Gabriele	have	striking	similarities	despite	the	contrast	in	
their	appearance	(First	Encounters	in	French	and	German	Prose	Fiction,	1830–1883	(New	York:	Lang,	1996),	
153f.).	In	addition,	Ortrud	Gutjahr’s	observation	that	Stephan	has	certain	feminine	characteristics	suggests	
another	similarity	that	binds	the	three	characters	together	(“Das	‘sanfte	Gesetz’	als	psychohistorische	
Erzählstrategie	in	Adalbert	Stifters	‘Brigitta’”	in	Psychoanalyse	und	die	Geschichtlichkeit	von	Texten,	ed.	
Johannes	Cremerius	and	Wolfram	Mauser	(Würzburg:	Königshausen	&	Neumann,	1995),	289).	
45	For	an	interesting	alternative	take	on	the	relation	between	the	three	characters,	see	Christine	Oertel	
Sjögren,	“The	Allure	of	Beauty	in	Stifter’s	Brigitta,”	Journal	of	English	and	Germanic	Philology	81,	no.	1	(1982):	
esp.	50.	
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trotzen”	(447)	are	known	in	later	life	not	for	their	subterranean,	unprepossessing	nature,	but	
rather	for	what	they	are	able	to	achieve	in	the	world	through	hard	work.	
	 Comparable	dynamics	of	speed	and	slowness	operate	on	the	reader	of	Brigitta,	who	is	
initially	presented	with	a	series	of	long	descriptive	passages	in	a	style	very	typical	of	Stifter.	This	
particularly	applies	to	the	descriptions	of	landscape	in	the	two	sections	that	constitute	the	first	
half	of	the	novella.	Many	readers	of	works	by	Stifter	have	deplored	such	expanses	of	text,	
complaining	that	there	is	not	enough	action	to	hold	their	interest.	The	second	half,	by	contrast,	
offers	more	plot-	and	character-driven	sequences,	culminating	in	the	two	suspenseful	moments	of	
the	confrontation	with	the	wolves	and	the	reconciliation	of	Brigitta	and	Stephan.	These	passages	
offer	a	‘fast’	reading	experience,	both	in	the	sense	that	the	reader’s	awareness	of	the	passage	of	
time	decreases	in	response	to	a	high	level	of	engagement,	and	in	the	sense	that	these	portions	of	
text	are	actually	shorter.	
	
IV.	Re-Evaluations	of	Surprise	
	 As	mentioned	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	surprise	hinges	on	a	discrepancy	between	
expectation	and	actuality:	an	individual	holds	a	certain	evaluation	of	a	situation,	and	then	an	
event	occurs	that	proves	this	evaluation	to	be	inaccurate	in	some	way.	There	is	thus	an	initial	
cognitive	state	that	is	subsequently	contradicted.	This	can	be	as	simple	as	the	expectation	that	
something	will	occur	based	on	the	knowledge	that,	historically,	it	has	usually	occurred	under	
similar	circumstances;	if	it	then	does	not	occur,	surprise	results.	In	Brigitta,	the	reader’s	
expectations	are	based	on	the	narratives	that	constitute	the	story;	the	surprise	twist	at	the	end	
necessitates	that	the	reader	re-evaluate	these	narratives	based	on	the	new	information	that	
Stephan	Murai	is	the	Major.	It	retrospectively	adds	a	level	of	irony	to	all	previous	events.	Leading	
up	to	the	revelation,	the	reader	has	learned	of	two	distinct	histories,	which	he	presumably	
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evaluates	in	an	opposite	manner.	On	the	one	hand,	there	is	the	history	of	the	person	known	as	
“the	Major”;	based	on	this	character’s	obvious	devotion	to	Brigitta,	his	enlightened	management	
of	his	estate,	and	his	friendliness	and	hospitality	towards	the	narrator,	the	probable	evaluation	of	
his	character	is	a	decidedly	positive	one.	A	reader	is	likely	to	feel	sympathy	for	him	because	he	
cannot	marry	Brigitta.	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	the	history	of	the	person	known	as	“Stephan	
Murai”;	based	on	his	unfaithfulness	to	Brigitta	and	his	abandonment	of	his	infant	son,	this	
character	is	likely	to	be	evaluated	as	a	contemptible	person.	Although	he	at	first	seems	
sympathetic	because	he	appreciates	Brigitta	when	no	one	else	does,	that	makes	his	betrayal	of	her	
even	more	despicable:	betraying	a	person	with	whom	one	has	previously	fostered	an	emotional	
connection	is	even	more	devastating	to	the	one	betrayed,	as	is	likewise	demonstrated	in	The	
Seducer’s	Diary,	because	it	involves	the	negation	of	a	greater	quantity	of	hopes,	expectations,	and	
beliefs	regarding	the	trustworthiness,	reciprocal	affection,	and	so	on	of	the	betrayer.	The	reader	of	
Brigitta,	on	learning	that	these	two	histories	belong	to	the	same	person,	is	instantaneously	
confronted	with	the	task	of	reconciling	the	positive	and	the	negative	character	evaluations.	
	 The	surprise	twist	necessitates	a	further	re-evaluation:	up	until	that	point,	the	reader	has	
no	solid	reason	to	think	ill	of	Brigitta;	although	the	young	Brigitta	is	often	more	prickly	towards	
people	than	necessary,	the	third	section	of	the	novella	provides	a	psychological	basis	for	her	
behavior	that	makes	it	intelligible	as	a	defense	mechanism	learned	in	early	childhood.	However,	
there	is	indeed	something	callous	about	carrying	on	a	friendly	association	with	the	Major,	visiting	
with	him	often,	consulting	with	him	on	matters	pertaining	to	the	management	of	their	estates	—	
basically	sharing	life	with	him	in	a	significant	way,	in	the	manner	of	romantic	partners	—	and	yet	
holding	him	at	an	emotional	distance.	In	addition,	Brigitta	would	have	observed	the	development	
of	the	close	bond	between	Gustav	and	the	Major	—	and	yet	she	withheld	from	Gustav	the	identity	
of	his	father,	and	withheld	from	the	Major	her	consent	to	his	openly	acknowledging	the	
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relationship.	Brigitta	is	thus	not	the	blameless	character	which	she	might,	until	the	reconciliation	
scene,	have	been	supposed	to	be.	
	 This,	in	turn,	is	likely	to	sway	the	reader’s	evaluation	of	the	Major/Stephan	in	a	positive	
direction	due	to	the	realization	that	the	Major	has	been	willing	to	suffer	over	a	period	of	several	
years	in	order	to	have	as	much	of	a	relationship	as	possible	with	Brigitta	and	Gustav;	in	other	
words,	he	has	given	proof	of	his	dedication	by	enduring	the	emotional	pain	of	being	frequently	in	
the	company	of	people	he	loves	while	simultaneously	being	denied	the	more	intimate	
connections	he	desires.	
	 Being	confronted	with	many	things	to	consider	in	a	short	span	of	time	also	increases	the	
potential	affective	intensity	of	the	reconciliation	for	the	reader.	Since	knowing	the	histories	of	the	
characters	marks	them	out	as	meaningful	to	the	reader,	having	an	accurate	evaluation	of	them	is	
important	in	the	overall	scheme	of	the	mind.	When	the	reader	is	confronted	with	data	that	are	
challenging	due	to	the	ambiguities	of	the	characters	as	well	as	the	sheer	amount	of	reprocessing	
in	light	of	the	new	information,	the	probable	result	is	a	strong	emotional	response,	which	would	
signal	that	this	matter	will	require	a	large	amount	of	mental	energy	to	resolve.	The	details	of	the	
story	that	are	stored	in	the	reader’s	short-term	memory	would	be	brought	up	for	conscious	
contemplation	once	again.	This	is	a	strong	encouragement	to	think	critically	about	the	plot	of	the	
novella	—	in	other	words,	a	likely	indirect	effect	of	the	emotional	ending	is	an	increased	
intellectual	engagement.	Instead	of	the	reader	merely	thinking	about	the	narrative	during	the	
process	of	reading	and	perhaps	afterward	—	or	perhaps	not	—,	the	text	has	a	built-in	cue	in	the	
climactic	scene	to	elicit	a	further	round	of	reflection.	Brigitta	thus	presents	an	excellent	example	
of	an	emotional	thought	operation	and	a	reasoning	thought	operation	mutually	stimulating	one	
another.	
 144	
	 That	both	Brigitta	and	the	Major	need	to	be	re-evaluated,	and	that	both	turn	out	to	be	
ambiguous	personalities,	are	among	several	structural	symmetries	of	the	novella.	This	reinforces	
the	emotional	impact	of	the	novella	because	symmetry	of	form	is	aesthetically	pleasing,	as	is	an	
onslaught	of	new	knowledge	—	assuming	that	the	reader	has	an	appreciation	for	knowledge.	
Another	symmetry	is	that	each	protagonist	undergoes	over	the	course	of	the	novella	a	process	of	
becoming	acclimated	to	the	tempo	to	which	the	other	is	attuned.	As	mentioned	in	the	previous	
section,	the	Major’s	affinity	is	for	Schnelligkeit;	during	his	years	at	Uwar,	in	which	he	learns	the	
process	of	land	cultivation	from	Brigitta,	he	both	experiences	and	acquires	an	appreciation	for	
Langsamkeit.	Brigitta	undergoes	the	inverse	process:	since	her	natural	affinity	is	for	slow-type	
processes,	she	initially	lacks	sympathy	for	the	Major’s	attunement;	however,	the	dramatic	scene	at	
the	end,	in	which	Gustav	is	attacked	by	wolves46	and	then	the	Major	is	overcome	with	grief	at	not	
being	able	to	act	as	the	boy’s	father	in	the	full	sense,	is	an	encounter	characterized	by	speed	and	
intensity.	It	is	this	experience	of	the	power	—	and	also,	in	the	case	of	the	Major’s	outpouring	of	
feeling,	the	positive	value	—	of	fast-type	processes	that	breaks	through	her	resistance	to	them	and	
results	in	her	likewise	learning	to	empathize	with	the	other’s	attunement.	The	reconciliation	of	
                                                
46	When	Wolfgang	Oppacher	claims	that	the	wolves	represent	“die	verdrängte	wilde	Sinnlichkeit,”	it	is	an	
example	of	an	interpretive	overreach	(“Schicksal	und	Schöpferfiguren	in	Adalbert	Stifters	Erzählung	
‘Brigitta’”	Literatur	in	Bayern	21,	no.	81	(2005):	29).	The	viciousness	of	wolves	is	here	irreconcilable	with	
sensuality,	especially	since	this	novella	as	a	whole	codes	sensuality	as	a	positive	value	to	be	developed	and	
encouraged;	for	example,	the	kiss	is	depicted	as	a	positive	step	in	the	young	Brigitta’s	development.	
Attaching	sensuality	to	the	wolves	is	furthermore	disadvantageous	for	interpretive	efforts	because	it	
obscures	the	emotional	dynamics	driving	the	reconciliation	scene.	The	wolves,	of	course,	function	as	a	
threat	to	the	relational	balance	that	has	become	established	over	time	between	Brigitta,	the	Major,	and	
Gustav.	The	threat	to	Gustav’s	life	places	stress	on	the	emotional	bonds	that	tie	them	together,	shaking	
them	out	of	a	balance	that	has	become	a	rut,	a	habit	that	no	longer	quite	corresponds	to	the	strength	of	
their	affection	for	one	another.	The	external	pull	at	these	bonds,	which	the	wolves	represent,	results	in	a	
counter-pull	—	that	is,	an	upsurge	of	affection	—	which	disrupts	the	restrained	relationship	that	had	for	a	
long	time	prevailed	between	Brigitta	and	the	Major.	Through	the	catalyzing	function	of	the	wolves,	the	
characters	end	up	settling	into	a	new	balance	that	better	suits	their	individual	development.	
	 Oppacher’s	interpretation	is	an	anachronistic	application	of	psychological	ideas	drawn	from	
twentieth-century	literary	criticism	to	this	nineteenth-century	work.	Stüben	comes	much	closer	to	a	time-
appropriate	depiction	of	the	worldview	informing	the	text	when	he	describes	the	wolves’	aggression	as	a	
merely	temporary	disruption	of	a	divine	balance	that	was	thought	to	order	the	natural	world	
(“Naturlandschaft	und	Landschaftskultur,”	145).	
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the	protagonists	thus	also	involves	their	differing	temporal	affinities	being	brought	into	alignment.	
The	developmental	arcs	of	the	characters	underscores	that	the	mind	is	most	readily	shaped	by	
repetition	or	by	intensity.	In	the	case	of	the	reader,	the	ending	functions	as	a	synthesis	of	the	fast	
and	the	slow	processes:	the	twist	itself	is	a	fast-type	process,	but	it	relies,	for	its	depth	of	effect,	on	
the	preparatory	narratives,	which	illustrate	slow-type	processes	of	cultivation.	The	novella	
promotes	an	acknowledgment	of	the	value	of	both	types	of	process.		
	 The	emotion	of	surprise	is	particularly	suitable	for	reinforcing	the	major	values	advocated	
in	the	novella,	notably	forgiveness	and	constructive	exertion.	Since	surprise	inherently	involves	a	
correction	to	one’s	latent	beliefs,	it	is	especially	effective	at	destabilizing	existing	mental	
constructs.	During	the	process	of	correction,	the	reader	is	open	to	new	beliefs,	since	the	old	ones	
are	being	rewritten;	this	is	an	ideal	time	for	the	values	in	the	novella	to	take	root.	Here	again,	the	
experience	of	the	reader	mirrors	the	experience	of	the	characters,	particularly	Brigitta,	since	her	
beliefs	about	the	Major	are	shifted	in	the	climactic	scene.	
	 A	distinctive	feature	of	the	way	Stifter	structures	the	surprise	is	that,	while	the	reader	
already	has	a	great	deal	of	information	about	the	characters	which	has	been	acquired	over	an	
extended	period	while	reading	the	prior	sections	of	the	novella,	only	a	brief	moment	—	the	time	it	
takes	to	read	the	word	“Stephan”	—	is	required	to	alter	the	significance	of	virtually	every	passage	
involving	the	protagonists.	Once	the	reader	makes	this	connection,	suddenly	it	is	possible	to	
make	the	whole	range	of	consequent	connections	that	have	just	been	discussed,	and	which	had	
previously	been	unacknowledged:	from	the	Major’s	paternity	to	the	overlay	of	suffering	attendant	
on	his	residence	in	Uwar,	from	Brigitta’s	unabated	affection	for	the	Major	to	the	real	reason	why	
she	has	avoided	a	relationship	with	him.	Since	emotions	are	time-dependent,	the	onslaught	of	
new	realizations	heightens	the	impact	to	a	greater	degree	than	would	a	slow	process	of	
recognition.	
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	 By	the	time	of	the	narrator’s	visit	to	Marosheli,	the	Major	has	already,	through	long	
practice,	changed	his	lifestyle	habits	as	well	as	his	assessment	of	Brigitta,	such	that	his	
recommendation	of	her	to	the	narrator	is	altogether	rhapsodic:	“Sie	werden	in	meiner	Nachbarin	
Marosheli	das	herrlichste	Weib	auf	dieser	Erde	kennen	lernen.”	(442)	By	applying	himself	to	
Brigitta-esque	forms	of	“Thätigkeit”	over	and	over,	he	has	gradually	rewritten	the	internal	scripts	
—	the	“sittlichen	Gründe”	(411)	which	guide	behavior	—	that	drove	him	to	be	a	flighty	spouse,	and	
then	to	travel	the	world	aimlessly.	For	latent	beliefs	about	how	life	ought	to	be	lived	are	a	type	of	
pathway,	and	the	ones	that	are	used	more	become	better	established.	Brigitta,	however,	suffers	
from	a	willful	misconception	of	the	Major,	in	that	she	holds	two	opposing	views	of	him	which	she	
has	failed	to	reconcile.	On	the	one	hand,	the	narrator	has	the	distinct	impression	that	Brigitta	
regards	the	Major	as	“der	Mann	[…],	der	ihr	Wirken	und	Schaffen	zu	würdigen	verstand.”	(464)	
Yet	although	she	recognizes	his	goodwill	towards	her,	and	even	consults	him	as	an	equal	partner	
in	matters	pertaining	to	the	management	of	their	estates,	her	prejudice	prevents	her	from	
allowing	the	emotional	gap	between	them	to	close.	She	still	clings	to	a	pride	based	on	the	
requirement	which	she	had	imposed	on	the	young	Stephan	when	he	asked	why	she	told	him	not	
to	court	her:	“weil	ich	keine	andere	Liebe	fordern	kann,	als	die	allerhöchste.”	(454)	The	intense	
emotionality	of	the	scene	at	the	end	is	what	shakes	her	out	of	her	mental	rut	and	leads	to	a	
reassessment	of	her	stance	towards	the	Major.	She	finally	realizes	her	mistake	—	“ich	habe	nicht	
geahnt,	wie	gut	du	seist”	(473)	—	and	makes	a	more	balanced	evaluation	of	him	as	a	flawed	yet	
vastly	improved	human	being:	“Wie	bist	du	gut	geworden,	jetzt	kenne	ich	dich”	(473).	
	 Brigitta’s	forgiveness	of	Stephan	stands	in	contradiction	to	the	idyllic	constructions	(of	
landscape,	for	example)	in	the	story	and	rescinds	Brigitta’s	own	demand	for	absolute	love	which	
she	made	as	a	young	woman,	replacing	it	rather	with	a	love	that	is	strong	enough	to	absorb	
betrayal	—	that	is,	to	forgive.	In	addition,	a	reader	who	experiences	a	strong	emotion	at	the	twist	
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of	the	story	is	rendered	more	open	to	adopting	the	belief	that	a	love	capable	of	withstanding	
injury	is	superior	to	a	love	that	demands	to	remain	unspoilt	and	flawless.	
	
V.	Conclusion	
	 It	is	possible	to	change	one’s	beliefs,	and	Brigitta	demonstrates	two	ways	in	which	this	
occurs.	The	activities	of	the	Major	in	Hungary	—	his	cultivation	of	the	land	on	his	estate,	his	
winning	over	of	the	Hungarian	populace,	and	his	emulation	of	Brigitta	—	exemplify	the	slow	
method	by	which	an	individual,	through	repetition,	entrenches	a	mental	habit.	The	climactic	
scene	of	the	novella,	on	the	other	hand,	presents	the	fast	method	by	which	beliefs	can	be	
displaced	through	the	element	of	surprise.	Because	the	order	and	pace	at	which	information	is	
perceived	plays	a	role	in	how	it	is	evaluated,	the	narrative	strategies	of	a	text	are	central	to	how	it	
evokes	an	emotion.	This	chapter	in	particular	shows	what	is	lost	in	an	explanation	of	a	literary	
emotion,	as	opposed	to	the	experience	of	the	emotion	in	the	work	itself.	The	developmental	
trajectory	of	an	emotion,	a	temporal	phenomenon,	is	affected	by	the	timing	of	the	presentation	of	
the	factors	that	produce	it.	In	the	case	of	an	intellectually	profound	surprise	such	as	the	one	in	
Brigitta,	where	there	is	a	high	degree	of	informational	density	in	a	very	brief	moment,	the	
difference	between	the	aesthetic	delivery	of	the	emotion	in	the	novella	and	its	literary	analysis	in	
a	text	like	this	one	is	especially	striking.	
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Chapter	Four:	
The	Dynamics	of	Regret		
in	Marie	von	Ebner-Eschenbach’s	Die	Resel	
	
	
Marry,	and	you	will	regret	it.	Do	not	marry,	and	you	will	also	regret	it.	
Marry	or	do	not	marry,	you	will	regret	it	either	way.	Whether	you	marry	or	
do	not	marry,	you	will	regret	it	either	way.	[…]	Hang	yourself,	and	you	will	
regret	it.	Do	not	hang	yourself,	and	you	will	also	regret	it.	Hang	yourself	or	
do	not	hang	yourself,	you	will	regret	it	either	way.	Whether	you	hang	
yourself	or	do	not	hang	yourself,	you	will	regret	it	either	way.	This,	
gentlemen,	is	the	quintessence	of	all	the	wisdom	of	life.	It	is	not	merely	in	
isolated	moments	that	I,	as	Spinoza	says,	view	everything	aeterno	modo,	
but	I	am	continually	aeterno	modo.	Many	believe	they,	too,	are	this	when	
after	doing	one	thing	or	another	they	unite	or	mediate	these	opposites.	
But	this	is	a	misunderstanding,	for	the	true	eternity	does	not	lie	behind	
either/or	but	before	it.	Their	eternity	will	therefore	also	be	a	painful	
temporal	sequence,	since	they	will	have	a	double	regret	on	which	to	live.	
—	A,	Either/Or	I	
	
	
	
	 Experiencing	regret	entails	a	host	of	accompanying	phenomena	related	to	how	the	
emotion	is	perceived.	The	aesthete	in	Either/Or	is	alluding	to	one	of	the	pervasive	correlates	of	
regret	when	he	describes	it	as	causing	pain;	and	as	his	reflections	suggest,	an	individual’s	
reactions	to	regret	can	have	just	as	significant	an	impact	as	the	emotion	itself.	Janet	Landman	
provides	a	succinct,	trenchant	definition	of	regret	in	the	title	of	her	book:	“the	persistence	of	the	
possible.”1	The	idea	of	persistence	forms	a	good	starting	point,	since	an	experience	of	regret	is	an	
irritant,	something	not	so	easily	ignored,	something	that	demands	to	be	dealt	with.	However,	this	
can	present	quite	a	challenge,	since	the	causes	of	regret	lie	in	the	past:	usually	there	is	no	way	to	
undo	the	event	in	question.	This	quite	naturally	gives	rise	to	discourses	that	regard	regret	as	more	
or	less	irrational	and	as	something	that	ought	to	be	avoided	if	possible,	or	else	put	aside	as	soon	as	
one	is	able.	But	regardless	of	whether	the	emotion	is	assessed	positively	or	negatively,	the	
                                                
1	Landman’s	book	Regret:	The	Persistence	of	the	Possible	is	the	only	major	contemporary	study	dealing	
specifically	with	this	emotion	in	a	systematic	fashion;	as	she	points	out	in	her	introduction	(p.	6),	most	
books	about	regret	perform	the	function	of	advising	people	on	how	to	attenuate	it.	(New	York:	Oxford	UP,	
1993)	
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discomfort	of	regret	ultimately	sets	off	a	series	of	complex	cognitive	operations.	This	chapter	
examines	the	story	Die	Resel	by	Marie	von	Ebner-Eschenbach,	which	depicts	a	‘persistent	
possibility’	in	the	life	of	a	Gräfin	through	the	indirect	means	of	confronting	her	with	the	life	story	
of	a	young	woman	named	Resel,	who	faced	a	very	similar	possibility.	Although	much	remains	
implicit,	there	are	sure	signs	that	Resel’s	story	triggers	the	Gräfin’s	contemplative	faculties.	
	 The	cognitive	dimension	of	regret	is	essential;	it	is	an	emotion	that	cannot	be	adequately	
explained	in	terms	of	physiological	states.	Regret,	even	more	so	than	surprise,	is	sometimes	not	
considered	an	emotion.	In	fact,	it	is	absent	from	both	of	the	‘encyclopedias	of	emotion’	published	
in	recent	decades.2	One	possible	explanation	is	that	regret	could	be	regarded	as	a	mental	state	
comprising	numerous	cognitive	operations,	including	one	or	more	other	emotions,	and	thus	
viewed	as	an	aggregate	state	rather	than	an	emotion	in	its	own	right.	It	might	be	considered	as	
having	been	adequately	accounted	for	in	the	descriptions	of	the	sub-emotions	that	form	a	part	of	
it.	However,	for	the	present	purposes,	regret	fits	the	profile	of	an	emotion	excellently,	since	this	
investigation	seeks	to	deal	in	an	integrated	fashion	with	the	affective	states	and	thought	
operations	involved	in	complex	emotions.	
	 One	defining	feature	of	regret	is	that	it	is	a	backwards-looking	emotion	directed	at	some	
past	event.	This	event	remains	a	subject	for	contemplation	in	the	present	—	in	some	cases	
asserting	itself	quite	forcibly	on	the	conscious	mind	—	due	to	the	human	capacity	to	imagine	that	
circumstances	or	a	different	choice	might	have	resulted	in	a	different	outcome.	Accounts	differ	as	
to	whether	a	necessary	condition	for	the	emotion	is	that	the	agent	had	—	or	believed	himself	to	
                                                
2	Namely,	the	Encyclopedia	of	Human	Emotions	(1999)	and	the	Encyclopedia	of	Emotion	(2010).	On	the	other	
hand,	Jesse	J.	Prinz	refers	to	regret	as	an	emotion	despite	his	focus	on	bodily	states	and	dismissal	of	pure	
cognitivist	positions	in	his	theory	of	emotion.	See	Gut	Reactions:	A	Perceptual	Theory	of	Emotion	(Oxford:	
UP,	2004),	vii.	
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have	had	—	the	ability	to	steer	the	outcome	in	a	different	direction.3	This	chapter	focuses	on	
situations	in	which	the	involved	individuals	arguably	did	have	this	kind	of	choice;	for	that	reason,	
the	specific	manifestation	of	regret	to	be	discussed	here	is	closely	tied	to	issues	of	decision-
making.	
	 A	second	defining	characteristic	of	regret	is	the	presence	of	a	counterfactual	situation	in	
the	mind	of	the	person	who	experiences	the	regret.	The	counterfactual	is	likely	tied	to	an	
alternate	history	—	specifically,	a	projection	of	how	things	would	have	developed	up	to	the	
present	moment	if	an	alternate	choice	had	been	made.	It	is	thus	also	dependent	on	the	past	event,	
since	the	event	is	imagined	to	be	the	cause	that	would	have	resulted	in	the	counterfactual.	
	 Thirdly,	regret	involves	a	sense	of	discomfort;	there	is	always	some	variety	of	negative	
emotion	directed	at	either	the	non-existence	of	the	alternate	reality,	or	the	present	state	of	
actuality,	or	both.	This	discomfort	can	take	many	forms,	depending	on	the	particular	
circumstances	of	the	situation:	sadness,	disappointment,	hopelessness,	anger,	doubt,	shame,	guilt.	
These	constitute	secondary	affective	states	resulting	from	the	overarching	process	of	regret.	This	
is	the	origin	of	regret’s	reputation	as	something	that	ought	to	be	avoided.	As	unpleasant	as	the	
experience	of	regret	may	be,	however,	it	can	have	certain	useful	functions	for	an	individual.	Some	
of	these	may	not	be	immediately	apparent,	especially	while	the	subject	is	under	the	influence	of	
these	negative	emotions.	Two	significant	potential	benefits	resulting	from	regret	that	are	
                                                
3	One	major	context	for	the	study	of	regret	is	that	of	economic	decision	making;	in	this	type	of	regret,	it	is	
assumed	that	the	agent	could	indeed	have	acted	otherwise.	See,	for	example,	Scott	Rick	and	George	
Loewenstein,	“The	Role	of	Emotion	in	Economic	Behavior,”	in	Handbook	of	Emotions,	ed.	Michael	Lewis,	
Jeannette	M.	Haviland-Jones,	and	Lisa	Feldman	Barrett,	3rd	ed.	(New	York:	Guilford,	2008),	141.	In	other	
situations,	regret	may	be	felt	even	though	the	causative	event	was	out	of	the	agent’s	control	entirely:	“It	is	
appropriate	for	me	to	regret	the	damage	that	a	recent	fire	has	caused	to	my	neighbor's	house,	the	pain	that	
severe	birth	defects	cause	in	infants,	and	the	suffering	that	a	starving	animal	experiences	in	the	wilderness”;	
see	Terrance	McConnell,	“Moral	Dilemmas,”	in	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	ed.	Edward	N.	
Zalta,	Stanford	University,	fall	2014	ed.,	http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/moral-
dilemmas/. 
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documented	in	Landman’s	extensive	study	of	the	emotion	are	its	role	in	decision	making	and	in	
the	transformation	of	the	self.	(The	latter	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	later	in	this	chapter.)	
	 Regret	thus	involves	a	past	event,	an	imagined	alternate	reality,	and	some	sense	of	
discomfort	with	the	outcome.	However,	regret	does	not	necessarily	imply	a	conviction	that	
another	path	should	have	been	chosen.	For	example,	an	individual	who	had	once	been	presented	
with	two	good	opportunities	might	regret	not	having	been	able	to	take	advantage	of	the	one	not	
chosen,	even	though	the	one	that	was	chosen	came	to	fruition	in	a	thoroughly	beneficial	way.	
Such	an	individual	need	not	wish	that	things	had	been	different	in	order	to	feel	sadness	over	the	
loss	of	the	other	opportunity.	
	 As	the	above	example	shows,	regret	may	entail	considerable	ambiguity.	In	addition,	the	
involvement	of	an	imagined	alternate	reality	introduces	a	narrative	element	into	the	phenomenon.	
This	is	a	spur	to	comparisons	with	actuality	as	well	as	a	major	reason	why	regret	is	a	dynamic	
process:	the	narrative	element,	as	a	fictional	representation,	is	fluid,	which	allows	for	an	infinite	
string	of	what-ifs.	The	result	may	not	necessarily	be	an	infinite	loop,	however,	since	it	depends	on	
how	the	individual	deals	with	the	emotion	—	whether	conclusions	are	drawn,	behaviors	changed,	
thought	operations	suppressed,	etc.	The	situation	in	Die	Resel	is	that	a	character	is	presented	with	
a	narrative	that	serves	as	a	concrete	manifestation	of	an	alternate	reality.	The	scenario	narrated	to	
the	character	bears	such	a	striking	resemblance	to	her	own	counterfactual	scenario	that	even	she,	
at	times,	confuses	the	two.	Although	this	setup	places	a	limit	on	the	fluidity	of	the	imagined	
counterfactual,	it	nevertheless	suggests	numerous	paths	of	inquiry	into	the	conflicts	that	
dominate	the	character’s	life.	
	 The	three	properties	of	regret	listed	above,	as	well	as	its	narrative	element,	together	form	
the	signature	structure	of	the	emotion.	In	the	preceding	chapters,	I	have	continually	emphasized	
the	importance	of	evaluations	as	causative	factors	in	an	emotion;	here,	they	are	also	important,	
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but	the	causative	side	is	less	important	in	terms	of	unpacking	the	complex	narrative	
interconnections	surrounding	an	instance	of	regret.	Instead,	the	element	of	persistence,	which	
operates	as	a	backwards-looking	impetus	to	reflection,	provides	the	sustained	attention	necessary	
to	uncover	retrospectively	the	factors	that	have	previously	been	evaluated	and	relate	them	to	
counterfactual	possibilities	which,	significantly,	may	have	been	generated	after	the	decision.	Thus,	
the	production	of	information	and	its	evaluation	occurs	not	only	in	the	moment	of	decision	but	
also	to	a	great	extent	in	its	wake.	In	this	chapter,	I	show	how	the	setup	of	Die	Resel,	with	its	inner	
and	outer	narratives,	creates	a	simulation	of	the	signature	structure	of	regret;	the	main	character	
is	confronted	with	this	simulation,	which	produces	affective	resonances	in	her.	This	situation	
becomes	an	externalization	of	what	are	normally	internal	thought	operations,	and	thus	this	
representation	lays	open	regret	to	be	analyzed	by	the	reader	from	an	unusual	perspective.	
However,	this	setup	is	not	so	different	from	the	ordinary	case:	regret	is	generally	prompted	by	
one’s	own	mind,	often	seemingly	against	one’s	own	volition;	likewise,	in	this	text,	the	narrative	
situation	acts	as	an	unasked-for	prompt	to	the	character.	The	sections	that	follow	use	the	
structual	features	of	regret	as	a	lens	with	which	to	interpret	the	story	and	explore	how	regret	sets	
in	motion	reflections	by	both	readers	and	characters	on	issues	of	choice,	loss,	societal	pressure,	
and	self-actualization.	
	
I.	Framing	Regret	
	 Die	Resel	was	published	as	part	of	Ebner’s	Dorf-	und	Schloßgeschichten	in	1883.4	Ebner’s	
work	in	general	has	not	received	a	great	deal	of	scholarly	attention,5	and	Die	Resel	is	relatively	less	
                                                
4	The	author’s	preferred	form	of	her	name	was	“Marie	Ebner”;	hence,	she	will	be	referenced	as	such	in	the	
remainder	of	this	chapter.	
5	To	point	out	a	particularly	conspicuous	example,	the	only	critical	scholarly	edition	of	her	works,	dating	
from	1978	to	1989,	is	incomplete;	the	Dorf-	und	Schloßgeschichten	and	Die	Resel	are	not	among	the	included	
texts.	The	quotes	in	this	chapter	are	therefore	taken	from	the	collected	edition	of	Ebner’s	works	that	was	
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popular	than	a	number	of	her	other	works,	such	as	her	novels	Božena;	Lotti,	die	Uhrmacherin;	and	
Das	Gemeindekind.	Even	within	the	Dorf-	und	Schloßgeschichten,	Krambambuli,	a	tale	of	canine	
loyalty,	has	overshadowed	the	other	stories	in	the	collection.	Die	Resel	is	a	frame	narrative	in	
which	the	story	of	Resel	forms	the	inner	part.	The	fact	that	the	title	refers	to	Resel,	the	heroine	of	
the	framed	narrative,	rather	than	the	(otherwise	unnamed)	Gräfin,	reinforces	the	indirect	nature	
of	the	tale;	in	other	words,	the	Gräfin’s	experience	is	communicated	almost	entirely	by	means	of	
Resel’s	tale,	through	both	similarities	and	contrasts.	The	identity	of	the	Gräfin	is	obscured	behind	
her	title	as	well	as	behind	her	attempts	to	repress	her	past,	but	Resel’s	story	provides	the	occasion	
for	her	to	confront	the	circumstances	of	her	life.	In	the	outer	frame,	a	Graf	and	a	Gräfin,	both	of	
whom	are	only	referred	to	by	their	titles,	are	spending	some	time	at	their	newly	renovated	lodge	
in	order	to	take	advantage	of	snipe-hunting	season.6	They	invite	the	Oberförster	over	to	dinner	
with	them,	and	afterwards,	the	Gräfin	asks	him	about	a	strange	hunter	who	has	accompanied	her	
earlier	in	the	day	and	about	a	grave	in	the	middle	of	the	forest.	This	prompts	the	Oberförster	to	
relate	the	story	of	Resel,	who	is	buried	outside	the	cemetery	because	she	took	her	own	life.	The	
remainder	of	the	text	consists	of	the	Oberförster’s	narration,	and	thus	Resel’s	story	predominates	
in	terms	of	the	amount	of	space	it	occupies;	however,	the	outer	frame	remains	conspicuously	
present	throughout	due	to	numerous	interruptions	by	the	Gräfin.	The	fact	that	the	Gräfin	reads	
into	Resel’s	story	a	connection	with	her	own	history	attests	to	the	persistence	of	counterfactual	
possibilities	in	her	mind.	
	 Right	from	the	beginning,	the	Gräfin	signals	her	identification	with	the	‘protagonist’	of	the	
story	being	told	to	her.	The	basic	conflict	at	the	outset	of	each	their	histories	turns	out	to	be	the	
                                                                                                                                                       
printed	by	her	publishers,	the	Gebrüder	Paetel	in	Berlin,	during	her	lifetime.	Scholarship	on	Die	Resel	is	
mostly	confined	to	the	occasional	brief	discussion	of	this	text	within	a	broader	survey	of	the	Dorf-	und	
Schloßgeschichten.	
6	The	absence	of	names	in	the	framing	narrative	contrasts	with	the	framed	narrative,	in	which	almost	all	of	
the	characters	have	names.	Much	of	what	can	be	learned	about	the	characters	in	the	outer	portion	is	not	
stated	directly	but	rather	inferred	from	the	inner	portion.	
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same:	the	young	woman	is	in	love	with	a	man	who	is	young,	poor,	and	of	a	lower	social	standing,	
but	her	family	pressures	her	to	marry	a	suitor	whom	they	have	chosen	instead.	The	text	reveals	
that	the	Gräfin	complied	—	the	Graf	is	the	socio-economically	advantageous	partner,	not	the	man	
she	loved.	Resel,	on	the	other	hand,	ran	away	from	home	to	the	cabin	of	her	lover,	Toni.	When	
her	parents	and	the	local	priest,	Pater	Vitalis,	discover	what	she	has	done,	they	are	dismayed	at	
her	breach	of	their	behavioral	code,	but	they	decide	that	forgiving	her,	rather	than	casting	her	off,	
and	arranging	for	her	to	marry	Toni	as	soon	as	possible,	is	the	best	course	of	action.	The	priest	
carries	this	news	to	Resel,	who	is	only	too	happy	to	oblige,	since	she	feels	moral	—	if	not	social	—	
pangs	of	conscience	for	her	actions.	However,	Resel	insists	that	Toni	must	accompany	her	to	her	
parents’	house	to	request	their	forgiveness.	After	the	priest’s	departure,	Toni	returns	home	in	a	
bad	mood.	When	Resel	explains	the	situation,	he	insists	that	he	does	not	want	to	get	married.	
Resel	becomes	increasingly	frantic,	and	when	he	does	not	relent,	she	grabs	his	pistol	and	aims	it	
at	herself.	Toni	tries	to	take	the	pistol	from	her,	but	she	fires.	Fatally	wounded,	Resel	is	carried	to	
the	home	of	her	parents,	where	they	reconcile;	however,	just	as	Pater	Vitalis	is	about	to	
pronounce	absolution,	Toni	bursts	into	the	room	and	begs	Resel	to	forgive	him.	The	priest,	seeing	
that	she	has	very	little	time,	tries	to	continue	the	rite,	but	she	halts	him,	forgives	Toni,	and	then	
dies.	The	frame	narrative	returns	just	long	enough	for	the	Gräfin	to	express	her	wish	to	meet	Toni,	
whereupon	the	Oberförster	informs	her	that	she	has	already	done	so:	he	was	the	strange	hunter	
who	accompanied	her	earlier	in	the	day.	The	final	sentence	of	the	story	draws	a	parallel	once	
again	between	Resel	and	the	Gräfin,	as	the	latter	thinks	to	herself	that	Toni	had	reminded	her	of	
the	man	with	whom	she	was	in	love	prior	to	her	marriage:	“Einen,	den	zu	vergessen	ihre	Pflicht	
war.”7	
                                                
7	Ebner-Eschenbach,	Marie	von,	Gesammelte	Schriften,	vol.	2,	Dorf-	und	Schloßgeschichten	(Berlin:	
Gebrüder	Paetel,	1893),	373.	Subsequent	page	numbers	given	in	parentheses	within	this	chapter	refer	to	this	
volume.	
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	 Ebner’s	story	Die	Resel	contains	a	literary	representation	of	regret	in	which	the	cognitive	
structure	of	the	emotion	is	inscribed	into	the	structure	of	the	text.	The	counterfactual	situation	
which	is	a	constitutive	part	of	any	experience	of	regret	is	represented	in	this	text	by	the	framed	
narrative;	because	it	takes	on	this	explicit	form,	it	allows	for	a	close	examination	of	the	
relationship	between	the	individual	who	experiences	regret	and	the	regretted	content.	The	
sustained	analysis	of	a	regretted	action	sets	up	a	situation	of	intellectual	ping	pong	in	which	the	
subject’s	focus	vacillates	between	the	counterfactual	condition	and	the	actual	condition.	This	
parallels	the	setup	created	by	the	frame	narrative	in	Die	Resel,	since	the	reader	has	many	
opportunities	and	inducements	to	bounce	back	and	forth	between	the	Gräfin’s	story	and	Resel’s,	
as	does	the	Gräfin	herself.	
	 At	a	textual	level,	this	is	accomplished	through	the	aforementioned	interruptions	by	the	
Gräfin,	which,	though	numerous,	are	brief;	thus,	the	reader	learns	relatively	little	about	her	life	
compared	to	Resel’s.	What	one	does	learn	is	mostly	in	the	form	of	hints,	such	as	when	the	text	
mentions	that	the	Gräfin	chooses	the	largest	cigar	—	and	this	is	while	they	are	having	an	after-
dinner	black	coffee;	clearly,	the	Gräfin	is	in	need	of	stimulants.	Through	caffeine	and	nicotine,	
which	produce	a	biological	arousal	detached	from	any	deeper	humanistic	meaning,	she	seems	to	
be	trying	to	compensate	chemically	for	the	greater	lack	in	her	life:	the	opportunity	to	have	a	
relationship	with	a	partner	who	is	on	her	level.	
	 The	Gräfin	has	in	common	with	Resel	not	only	a	romantic	conflict	but	also	an	energetic	
temperament.	The	Oberförster	begins	characterizing	Resel	as	a	fine	young	woman	by	comparing	
her	appearance	with	the	Gräfin,	but	with	the	caveat	“aber	ein	Feuerteufel”	(355);	his	listener,	
however,	finds	nothing	so	out	of	the	ordinary	in	this:	“Ja,	ja,	so	wilde	Hummeln	giebt’s,	ich	habe	
auch	eine	gekannt”	(355),	and	it	is	implied	that	she	is	referring	here	to	herself	—	her	former	self,	
at	any	rate.	Besides	bumblebees,	several	other	winged	animals	are	compared	with	Resel:	she	
 156	
seems	like	“ein	Fink	oder	ein	Kanari,”	and	the	Oberförster	describes	her	as	“flying”	over	the	
meadows	(356).	He	says	it	is	“gegen	ihre	Natur”	(356)	for	her	to	stay	indoors,	even	though	this	is	
what	her	parents,	he	himself,	and,	by	extension,	society	in	general	would	consider	most	
appropriate.	And	that	touches	on	the	major	underlying	conflict	in	this	narrative:	Resel	is	a	person	
with	a	strong	impulse	towards	self-actualization	living	in	a	highly	restrictive	society.	When	the	
Oberförster	misinterprets	this	as	“eine	Passion,	ihr	Leben	zu	riskiren,	als	ob	sie’s	nicht	früh	genug	
los	werden	könnt”	(356),	the	Gräfin	feels	compelled	to	make	one	of	her	interruptions,	again	
showing	her	identification	with	Resel:	“Nein,	nein,	daran	hat	sie	nicht	gedacht,	sie	hat	die	Gefahr	
geliebt,	das	kommt	vor,	auch	Mädchen	haben	Heldenblut	in	den	Adern	…	Vielleicht	war	ihr	
Großvater	Soldat	wie	der	meine.”	(356)		
	 Resel	is	not	only	heroic,	but	also	impetuous	—	even	to	a	fault,	since	shooting	herself	was	
the	act	of	a	moment,	not	carefully	considered.	But	as	a	personality	trait,	it	also	helps	to	explain	
her	affinity	for	Toni,	whose	temperament	is	described	as	mercurial,	moody,	and	jealous;	that	is,	he,	
too,	has	an	apparent	tendency	to	let	his	emotions	go	unchecked	and	unreflected.	The	Gräfin	also	
gives	off	signs	that	she	recognizes	Toni’s	personality	type	and	understands	why	Resel	was	in	love	
with	him,	as	opposed	to	the	Oberförster,	who,	with	his	stolid	and	respectable	outlook,	finds	it	
baffling.	Meanwhile,	her	husband	is	“bereits	im	Halbschlafe”	(355),	showing	himself	to	be	quite	
the	foil	to	the	youthful	lovers.	
	 At	times,	the	Gräfin	carries	her	identification	too	far	and	ends	up	attributing	to	Resel	facts	
that	are	actually	from	her	own	history.	This	happens	when	the	Gräfin	assumes	that	Resel’s	suitor	
is	bald	—	after	the	reader	has	been	told	just	a	few	paragraphs	earlier	about	the	reflection	of	
candlelight	on	the	Graf’s	bald	head.8	It	occurs	again	when	she	presumes	to	continue	the	story	
                                                
8	In	some	editions,	such	as	the	Nymphenburg	Press’s	collected	works,	one	or	both	of	these	passages	instead	
indicates	that	the	Graf	had	grey	hair.	The	commentary	on	his	age	remains	in	effect	either	way,	but	this	
discrepancy	is	a	further	indication	that	Ebner’s	oeuvre	is	in	need	of	editorial	attention.	
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herself	(“Nun,	soll	ich	Ihnen	einsagen?”	(361))	and	in	so	doing	substitutes	her	own	grandparents	
for	Resel’s	elderly	parents.	She	is	a	little	embarrassed	when	the	Oberförster	corrects	her	—	in	the	
former	case,	presumably	because	she	is	worried	that	her	husband	might	realize	that	she	was	
disparaging	him.	However,	the	Graf	is	fast	asleep	by	this	point	in	the	narrative,	which	serves	as	a	
signal	that	he	is	not	a	suitable	companion	for	the	Gräfin	in	terms	of	age	and	temperament.	
	 Textual	evidence	suggests	that	the	similarities	to	Resel	are	not	merely	a	product	of	the	
Gräfin’s	imagination.	There	are	several	factual	correspondences	between	the	two	lives,	such	as	the	
circumstance	of	their	both	indeed	having	elderly	guardians	and	of	having	faced	the	dilemma	of	
wanting	to	marry	one	person	while	their	guardians	want	them	to	marry	another.	In	addition,	the	
similarity	receives	outside	confirmation	from	the	Oberförster	on	more	than	one	point.	When	
asked	to	describe	Resel’s	appearance,	he	replies,	“Sie	wird	beiläufig	eine	Person	gehabt	wie	
Hochgräfliche	Gnaden,	nur	nicht	so	mager	da	herum”	(355),	indicating	his	waist.	Later,	he	
remarks	to	her	unprompted:	“Jetzt	haben	grad	so	g’schaut	wie	die	Resel”	(360).	Nevertheless,	
there	are	significant	differences	between	the	two	that	create	the	possibility	of	sketching	out	a	
theory	as	to	why	their	life	paths	diverged	—	one	that	goes	beyond	the	mere	circumstance	of	their	
belonging	to	different	social	classes.	The	Gräfin	once	again	identifies	with	Resel	when	the	
Oberförster	tells	a	couple	of	anecdotes	to	illustrate	her	propensity	for	heroic	deeds:	
“wenn	ich	denk’,	daß	sie	als	ein	zwölfjähriges	Ding	ein	Wickelkind	aus	dem	
lichterloh	brennenden	Haus	gerettet	hat	und	ein	paar	Wochen	drauf	bald	ersoffen	
wär’.	Ist	nämlich	ins	Wasser	gesprungen	einem	jungen	Hund	nach,	der	hätt’	
ertränkt	werden	sollen.”	
	 “Einem	Hund?	—	Förster,	das	hätt’	ich	auch	einmal	gethan	bei	einem	Haar!	
aber	die	Gouvernante,	die	dumme	Gans,	hat	mich	am	Kleid	erwischt	und	
festgehalten”	(356f.)	
	
In	this	case,	the	Gräfin’s	claim	to	similarity	must	be	read	with	skepticism.	Firstly,	of	the	two	
anecdotes	here,	there	is	considerably	more	at	stake	in	the	first	one;	although	a	drowning	puppy	is	
apt	to	arouse	sympathy,	it	does	not	belong	to	the	same	valuation	category	as	a	baby	in	a	burning	
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house.9	Tellingly,	the	Gräfin	only	lays	claim	to	the	lesser	of	the	two	grand	deeds	—	and	even	then,	
it	is	only	as	an	‘almost.’	Secondly,	it	is	doubtful	whether	a	governess	is	in	fact	capable	of	physically	
restraining	a	healthy	twelve-year-old	—	that	is,	nearly	fully	grown	—	child,	assuming	that	the	
child	was	sufficiently	determined.	Even	if	the	governess	were	strong	enough,	it	seems	as	though	
she	would	need	to	do	more	than	catch	hold	of	the	child’s	dress.	Ultimately,	the	Gräfin’s	
implication	that	she	had	the	will	but	lacked	the	opportunity	to	be	like	Resel	is	unconvincing;	
these	anecdotes	contain	signs	of	her	insufficient	personal	mettle.	After	all,	the	governess	has	an	
analogy	in	the	Pater	Vitalis	character,	and	Resel	establishes	early	on	a	pattern	of	acting	contrary	
to	his	wishes.	If	Die	Resel	seems	like	the	story	of	someone	who	missed	her	chance	to	have	a	story,	
this	passage	suggests	that	in	fact	the	Gräfin	has	been	chronically	missing	her	chances	all	along.	In	
light	of	these	insights	into	the	Gräfin’s	psychology	in	moments	of	peril,	it	comes	as	no	surprise	
that	she	and	Resel	likewise	diverge	in	the	very	grave	matter	of	the	marriage.	As	for	the	role	of	
social	class,	it	might	indeed	be	a	factor	after	all,	but	in	a	more	indirect	way	having	nothing	to	do	
with	governesses:	namely,	one	could	view	the	Gräfin’s	confined	outlook	and	Resel’s	
impetuousness	as	personality	attributes	that	are	partially	socially	conditioned.	In	that	case,	
hearing	Resel’s	story	would	serve	the	function	for	the	Gräfin	of	confronting	her	with	an	
alternative	outlook	on	life	and	cuing	her	to	engage	in	critical	self-reflection.	
	
A.	The	Outer	Frame:	Attitudes	of	the	Gräfin	
	 The	collision	of	the	two	frames	that	plays	out	on	the	level	of	the	outer	frame	is	a	tangible	
feature	of	the	text	that	highlights	regret’s	revelatory	function.	It	is	at	the	points	of	tension	
between	the	Gräfin’s	mental	outlook	and	Resel’s	that	the	decisive	psychological	factors	leading	to	
differing	decisions	become	apparent.	The	Gräfin’s	brief	interruptions	and	snippets	of	commentary	
                                                
9	Admittedly,	this	is	a	normative	statement;	however,	it	is	a	persistent	norm,	and	one	which	it	probably	
would	not	even	have	occurred	to	Ebner’s	nineteenth-century	audience	to	challenge.	
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provide	the	necessary	clues	to	infer	what	sorts	of	reasons	are	behind	her	behavior.	In	addition	to	
the	mental	life	of	the	Gräfin,	the	contextual	information	that	is	brought	out	into	the	open	helps	to	
identify	the	major	forces	to	be	reckoned	with	in	this	society,	such	as	class	differences.	
	 The	Gräfin	represents	herself	as	having	had	no	choice	about	many	aspects	of	the	course	of	
her	life.	Yet	no	matter	how	strong	the	familial	pressure	might	be	—	and	there	might	very	well	be	
severe	social	and	economic	consequences	attached	to	a	refusal	to	comply	with	the	wishes	of	one’s	
guardians	—	nevertheless,	one	could	not	actually	be	forced	to	marry	against	one’s	will.	In	the	late-
nineteenth-century	Austrian	Empire,	the	colluding	institutions	of	the	monarchy,	the	aristocracy,	
the	Catholic	Church,	and	the	patriarchy,	though	still	dominant,	were	on	the	verge	of	decline.	
Ebner’s	own	life	is	evidence	that	resistance	to	institutional	pressures	was	possible.	Ebner’s	family	
—	even	including	her	husband	Moritz	once	he	realized	the	potential	for	negative	reviews	of	
Ebner’s	plays	to	become	associated	with	‘his’	name	—	disapproved	of	her	authorial	occupation,	
but	she	persisted	and,	ultimately,	not	only	produced	a	large	body	of	work	but	also	garnered	
widespread	public	acclaim.	Therefore,	it	was	not	the	case	that	a	woman	had	‘no	choice’	about	her	
life	—	though	the	available	alternative	might	be	hard	to	take.	
	 The	Gräfin’s	immediate	response	on	learning	that	Resel’s	death	was	a	suicide	is	to	make	
assumptions	about	what	must	have	happened	to	her:	“‘Umgebracht!’	rief	die	junge	Frau	erregt	—	
‘gewiß	aus	unglücklicher	Liebe,	sie	hat	ihren	Geliebten	nicht	heiraten	dürfen,	oder	er	hat	sie	
sitzenlassen,	der	Lump	…	Ist’s	so?	Sagen	Sie’s,	wenn	Sie’s	wissen.’”	(255)	The	Oberförster	neither	
confirms	nor	denies	the	Gräfin’s	speculations,	choosing	instead	to	answer	her	last	question	by	
stating	that	he	is	in	fact	acquainted	with	the	details	of	Resel’s	history,	since	she	was	his	niece.	The	
readiness	with	which	the	Gräfin	comes	up	with	these	possibilities	shows	that	her	head	is	full	of	
scripts	about	why	people	commit	suicide	—	scripts	that	seem	heavily	influenced	by	literary	
models.	Due	to	such	iconic	examples	as	Shakespeare’s	Romeo	and	Juliet	and	Goethe’s	Die	Leiden	
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des	jungen	Werther,	the	notion	of	characters	committing	suicide	in	the	wake	of	romantic	
frustrations	has	been	an	established	feature	of	the	public	imagination	for	quite	some	time.	
Although	neither	of	the	Gräfin’s	suppositions	is	exactly	right,	Resel’s	story	does	contain	elements	
of	both.	This	is	not	the	only	instance	in	which	the	framed	narrative	displays	such	strong	signs	of	
traditional	literary	and/or	dramatic	structures	that	it	verges	on	openly	flaunting	its	fictitious	
character	through	the	contrast	with	the	more	‘realistic’	framing	narrative	inhabited	by	the	
Gräfin.10		
	 Another	dimension	of	the	Gräfin’s	character	that	is	hinted	at	in	this	passage	is	that	she	
seems	a	little	too	excited	about	the	prospect	of	a	sensational	story.	While	Charlotte	Woodford	has	
read	this	as	a	sign	that	the	Gräfin’s	interest	in	Resel	is	little	more	than	a	desire	to	reap	
entertainment	from	the	dramatic	tale	of	her	demise,11	it	is	also	a	sign	of	her	profound	boredom.	
Woodford’s	claim	that	the	Gräfin	“has	no	real	feeling	for	Resel”12	has	a	certain	plausibility	on	the	
surface.	The	Gräfin’s	repeated	urgings	that	the	Oberförster	continue	with	the	tale	of	Resel	could	
be	construed	as	an	indication	that	she	is	merely	interested	in	deriving	entertainment	from	the	
story.	This	could	be	considered	an	insincere	form	of	emotional	engagement,	since	it	does	not	
involve	empathy	with	Resel.	One	could	read	it	as	an	apparent	lack	of	sadness	at	Resel’s	fate;	at	any	
rate,	the	Gräfin	does	not	engage	in	effusive	expressions	of	it	—	this,	however,	is	in	keeping	with	
the	overall	gesture	of	the	story,	which	is	to	achieve	its	impact	by	conspicuously	not	saying	all	that	
could	be	said,	and	instead	letting	the	reader	fill	in	the	gaps.	
	 This	touches	on	the	question	of	what	constitutes	an	appropriate	emotional	response	to	a	
situation.	If	the	(ultimately	normative)	judgment	is	made	that	the	‘appropriate’	response	to	
Resel’s	story	involves	feeling	pity,	sadness,	distress,	outrage,	etc.	on	account	of	its	tragic	elements,	
                                                
10	See	also	page	180.	
11	Charlotte	Woodford,	“Suffering	and	Domesticity:	The	Subversion	of	Sentimentalism	in	Three	Stories	by	
Marie	von	Ebner-Eschenbach,”	German	Life	and	Letters	59,	no.	1	(2006):	55.	
12	Woodford,	“Suffering	and	Domesticity,”	56.	
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then	the	Gräfin’s	response	may	well	appear	inadequate.	However,	her	failure	to	show	any	such	
emotions	can	be	explained	more	fully	by	viewing	her	as	being	in	a	state	of	ambivalence.	On	the	
one	hand,	she	does	pity	Resel.	On	the	other	hand,	she	also	admires	her.13	The	Gräfin	thus	inhabits	
a	state	of	tension	because	the	positively	valenced	emotion	of	admiration	is	a	check	to	negatively	
valenced	feelings	of	pity	and	sadness.	
	 What	constitutes	an	‘appropriate’	response	also	factors	into	how	one	interprets	the	two	
protagonists,	which	in	turn	determines	one’s	overall	interpretation	of	the	text	along	the	
continuum	of	optimism	and	pessimism.	Die	Resel	is	a	story	that	derives	its	narrative	suspense	
from	unresolved	tensions.	It	presents	significant	ambiguities	—	the	suicide,	the	Gräfin	as	a	
character,	and	the	effect	of	the	experience	on	the	Gräfin	—	without	providing	an	interpretive	
foothold.	In	fact,	the	structure	of	the	story	lends	itself	to	being	open-ended;	the	two	parts,	
framing	and	framed	narrative,	form	a	contrast	that	invites	the	reader	to	wonder	whether	one	
represents	a	‘better’	path,	or	whether	they	counterbalance	each	other.	Even	the	criteria	on	which	
such	an	evaluation	could	be	based	are	left	open,	since	the	text	itself	reveals	no	indications	of	a	
partiality	to	a	particular	reading.	
	 Is	the	Gräfin	supposed	to	be	unsympathetic?	After	all,	she	is	a	little	bit	silly	for	
immediately	wanting	to	run	off	and	kill	herself	in	the	face	of	her	romantic	dilemma,	a	little	
cowardly	for	giving	in	to	familial	pressure,	and	a	little	pretentious	for	comparing	herself	to	the	
decidedly	more	heroic	Resel.	Although	Resel	had	a	moment	of	weakness,	it	was	only	a	moment,	
and	only	because	circumstances	demanded	of	her	a	strength	that	was	beyond	what	can	be	
humanly	expected.	The	Gräfin,	on	the	other	hand,	has	no	such	excuse	and	could	simply	be	
interpreted	as	a	weak	personality.	Ebner	—	especially	in	her	younger	years	—	had	a	critical	eye	for	
                                                
13	The	Gräfin’s	admiration	for	Resel	is	even	stated	explicitly	at	one	point:	Upon	hearing	that	Resel	had	run	
away	to	Toni’s	cabin,	she	responds	“mit	einem	Gemisch	von	Tadel	und	Bewunderung”	(363).	
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human	flaws	and	could	pass	harsh	judgments	on	her	contemporaries.14	However,	she	also	seems	
to	have	believed	in	the	value	of	renunciation	and	of	presenting	an	appearance	of	harmony	to	the	
outside	world.	Perhaps	the	Gräfin	represents	a	path	of	compromise	with	the	flaws	of	society,	
necessary	in	order	to	get	along	with	one’s	fellow	human	beings.	But	if	so,	why	are	Resel’s	parents	
depicted	as	acquiescing	to	a	marriage	with	Toni	as	soon	as	she	challenges	them?	By	conceding	too	
soon	and	too	easily,	the	Gräfin	never	has	the	opportunity	to	learn	whether	her	guardians	might	
not	have	been	brought	to	concede,	particularly	since	it	was	her	life	at	issue	and	not	theirs.	Resel’s	
relationships	with	others	support	the	notion	that	social	ties	pull	both	ways.	
	 The	Gräfin,	on	hearing	that	Resel	ran	away,	once	again	tries	to	anticipate	what	happened	
in	the	story,	presumably	basing	her	guess	on	what	she	herself	would	have	done:	“‘Sie	hat	sich	ins	
Wasser	gestürzt	oder	in	einen	Abgrund,’	erklärte	die	Gräfin	mit	großer	Bestimmtheit.	‘Wohl	ihr,	
daß	sie	es	konnte,	daß	keine	Gouvernanten	da	waren,	sie	zu	hindern.’”	(362)	This	second	
disparaging	reference	to	governesses	is	another	attempt	to	shift	responsibility	for	the	outcomes	of	
her	life.	One	cannot	take	entirely	seriously	the	Gräfin’s	death-wish;	it	reads	rather	as	if	she	wants	
to	make	a	suicide	attempt	that	she	knows	will	fail,	simply	in	order	to	elicit	feelings	of	guilt	from	
her	grandparents.	The	Gräfin	seems	to	have	adopted	the	victim	mentality	of	‘you’ll	be	sorry	when	
I’m	dead,’	which	is	a	form	of	emotional	manipulation	in	which	one	party	attempts	to	instill	guilt	
in	another	(a	procedure	known	today	as	a	‘guilt	trip’).	This	shows	through	in	the	Gräfin’s	reply	to	
the	Oberförster	when	he	reports	what	“die	ordinären	Leut’”	(362)	said	to	Resel’s	parents,	which	
gives	the	reader	a	glimpse	at	the	viewpoint	of	society:	“Wenn	man	einem	Kind	von	jeher	seinen	
Willen	gelassen	hat,	darf	man	nicht	auf	einmal	Gehorsam	von	ihm	verlangen.	Die	den	Selbstmord	
am	bittersten	beweinen,	brauchen	nicht	erst	zu	fragen,	wer	ihn	verschuldet	hat.”	(363)	The	Gräfin,	
                                                
14	See	Eda	Sagarra,	“Marie	von	Ebner-Eschenbach	and	the	Tradition	of	the	Catholic	Enlightenment,”	in	The	
Austrian	Enlightenment	and	Its	Aftermath,	ed.	Ritchie	Robertson	and	Edward	Timms	(Edinburgh:	UP,	1991),	
123.	
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quick	to	express	agreement	with	the	prevailing	opinion,	responds	by	interjecting,	“ganz	richtig.”	
Perhaps	this	is	an	attempt	to	maintain	the	appearance	of	propriety	by	not	expressing	a	view	that	
deviates	from	the	norm;	however,	her	audience	does	not	seem	to	necessitate	such	a	move:	the	
Graf	is	asleep,	the	Oberförster	does	not	seem	like	the	type	to	be	that	easily	scandalized,	and	there	
is	no	one	else	present	in	the	room.	So	perhaps	it	is	herself	whom	she	is	trying	to	convince	that	she	
agrees	with	these	views;	by	expressing	them	aloud,	she	‘proves’	to	herself	that	she	can	occupy	the	
position	of	someone	who	thinks	in	this	way.	Both	possibilities	might	play	a	role	to	some	degree;	
the	text	does	not	even	hint	at	an	interpretive	recommendation,	thus	leaving	open	a	moment	of	
thought-provoking	ambiguity.		
	 Additionally,	the	Gräfin’s	interjected	response	reveals	her	desire	that	Resel’s	parents	—	
and	likely	by	extension,	her	own	grandparents	—	be	made	to	feel	horrible	for	trying	to	coerce	
their	daughter	into	an	arranged	marriage.	A	further	‘guilt	trip’	has	apparently	been	employed	
previously	by	Resel’s	parents,	whom	she	reports	as	having	said	to	her:	“Wenn	Du	uns	lieb	hast,	
heirathest	Du	den	Andreas”	(364)	—	that	is,	the	suitor	they	had	selected.	The	Gräfin,	too,	has	
been	subjected	to	this	by	her	grandparents,	judging	by	her	assumptions	—	presumably	drawn	
directly	from	personal	experience	—	about	what	Resel’s	guardians	must	have	said:	“Du	nimmst	
ihn,	Du	mußt!	—	Wir	wollen,	wir	beschwören	—	der	Frieden	unserer	alten	Tage	hängt	davon	ab.	
—	Wie	sanft	würden	wir	sterben,	wenn	wir	Dich	wüßten	in	der	Hut	eines	braven	Mannes	…	Kind,	
Kind!	mach	uns	den	Tod	nicht	schwer.”	(361)	When	all	of	this	is	combined	with	the	Catholic	priest	
Pater	Vitalis’	insinuations	that	by	running	away	Resel	has	alienated	God	(“Du	Gottverlassene”)	
and	probably	sent	her	parents	to	an	early	grave	(“Weißt	Du,	ob	Deine	Eltern	die	Schand’	
überleben?”),	Die	Resel	evokes	an	image	of	a	social	order	held	in	place	by	a	system	of	mutual	
guilting,	a	lack	of	interpersonal	boundaries,	and	emotional	abuse	(364).	Authority	figures	fail	to	
account	for	the	personhood	of	their	dependents	and	to	accommodate	their	individual	emotional	
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needs;	if	the	dependents	manage	to	retaliate,	it	is	with	methods	analogous	to	those	of	the	
authorities.	These	tactics	transcend	the	class	divisions	alluded	to	in	the	title	of	the	collection,	
Dorf-	und	Schloßgeschichten,	since	they	are	employed	by	both	the	common	people	and	the	
nobility.	
	 As	the	Oberförster	is	explaining	the	outcome	of	the	conversation	between	Resel	and	Pater	
Vitalis,	the	Gräfin	interrupts	him	again,	this	time	very	obviously	cutting	him	off	mid-sentence	in	
order	to	break	out	into	a	speech:	
Die	Gräfin	fiel	ihm	erregt	ins	Wort:	“Die	Zucht	hat	ihr	gefehlt,	die	Führung.	Sie	ist	
ganz	allein	dagestanden,	Aug’	in	Aug’	mit	der	Versuchung	…	Arme	Resel!	—	Von	
einer	solchen	Gefahr	wissen	wir	freilich	nichts;	uns	wird	die	Wahl	zwischen	Recht	
und	Unrecht	erspart	—	die	Beschützer	laufen	uns	ja	nach	auf	Tritt	und	Schritt.	Gar	
oft	verdrießt	einen	die	beständige	Ueberwachung	und	ist	am	Ende	doch	Glück	und	
Gnade.	—	Ach,	wie	wohl	thut	das	reine	Gewissen,	das	wir	uns	—	nein,	das	man	
uns	bewahrt!	…	Weiter,	Oberförster,	warum	unterbrechen	Sie	sich	alle	
Augenblicke?”	(364f.)	
	
The	irony	of	the	Gräfin	accusing	the	Oberförster	of	interrupting	himself	underlines	the	fact	that	
there	is	a	layer	of	falsity	in	her	utterance,	of	which	she	is	perhaps	only	half-aware.	Indeed,	this	
speech	is	altogether	a	reversal	of	her	initial	and	probably	less	self-censored	comment	referring	to	
the	assumption	that	Resel	had	run	off	in	order	to	commit	suicide:	“Wohl	ihr,	daß	sie	es	konnte.”	
And	if	there	were	any	remaining	doubt	as	to	whether	the	Gräfin	inwardly	sympathizes	with	Resel	
for	running	away,	her	response	to	learning	of	how	Toni	insensitively	dismisses	the	offer	of	
marriage	—	“Ach,	daß	sie	doch	nicht	zu	ihm	gegangen	wäre!”	(367)	—	must	put	it	to	rest.	The	
inclusion	of	“doch”	suggests	both	admiration	of	Resel	and	mixed	feelings	about	that	admiration.	
The	questionable	relationship	of	the	Gräfin	to	her	own	words	in	these	passages	gives	the	reader	
reason	to	suspect	that	the	above	speech	is	merely	a	rationalization	of	her	decision	to	accept	the	
arranged	marriage.	For	one	thing,	a	governess	cannot	actually	control	her	charges’	lives	to	that	
extent,	nor	is	it	believable	that	a	person	such	as	the	Gräfin	has	thus	far	been	presented	to	be	
would	want	someone	else	to	dictate	her	life	choices	to	her.	A	governess	would	not	present	a	
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decisive	hindrance	to	one	sufficiently	committed	to	a	course	of	action.	In	addition,	the	
contradictions	in	the	Gräfin’s	commentary	suggest	that	she	is	trying	to	talk	herself	into	believing	
the	socially	acceptable	‘line.’	The	notion	that	one	can	cause	oneself	to	evaluate	a	situation	
according	to	a	value	system	in	which	one	does	not	believe,	simply	through	repetition	of	the	
conclusion	prescribed	by	that	system,	is	a	doubtful	proposition,	but	a	widespread	one.	If	the	
previous	chapter	is	any	indication,	such	values	are	neither	changed	nor	circumvented	so	easily.15	
Furthermore,	the	Gräfin’s	use	of	the	first-person	plural	“wir”	in	this	passage	is	telling;	it	not	only	
places	her	within	a	peer	group	of	young	women	belonging	to	the	upper	class	but	also	provides	her	
with	a	collective	behind	which	she	can	hide.	The	implied	logic	runs	thus:	‘since	these	others	do	
not	stand	up	for	themselves,	neither	am	I	to	blame	for	not	standing	up	for	myself.’	The	Gräfin	
seems	to	be	trying	to	convince	herself	that	she	has	had	no	choice	in	the	way	her	life	turned	out;	
trying	to	evade	regret	and	the	pain	she	would	experience	if	she	confronted	it	directly.	At	any	rate,	
it	raises	the	question	of	the	extent	to	which	the	Gräfin	is	responsible	for	what	becomes	of	her	
when	she	complies	with	the	dictates	of	society.	
	 The	story	contains	an	important	narrative	choice	at	this	point:	the	parents’	offer	is	only	
revealed	after	the	Gräfin	finishes	this	speech.	The	Oberförster’s	narrative	is	mostly	chronological,	
and	thus	it	might	have	been	more	natural	to	explain	that	the	parents	decided	to	allow	the	
marriage	with	Toni	about	a	page	earlier,	in	the	context	of	telling	how	they	found	out	that	Resel	
was	at	his	cabin;	however,	by	delaying	the	exposition	of	this	olive	branch,	the	narrative	gives	the	
Gräfin	the	opportunity	to	say	what	is	on	her	mind	under	the	assumption	that	the	powers	that	be	
are	immovable.	
	
                                                
15	See	page	145.	
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B.	The	Inner	Frame:	Religious	Critique	
	 I	will	now	turn	to	the	inner	frame,	which	must	be	explained	in	order	to	understand	the	
Gräfin’s	engagement	with	it.	This	part	of	the	narrative	provides	even	more	information	on	what	
this	society	is	like;	the	dynamics	of	societal	forces	acting	in	the	world	are	dominated	here	by	
collectively	held	religious	values	which	are	intertwined	with	familial	authority.	The	ending	
suggests	that	Resel	could	easily	also	be	thought	to	be	subject	to	regret,	but	ultimately	escapes	it	
for	the	most	part,	as	the	path	of	confronting	problems	head-on	is	not	the	path	of	regret.	
	 The	presence	of	the	“Herr	Dechant	von	Marienhöhe”	(369),	who	happens	to	be	visiting	his	
subordinate	Pater	Vitalis	when	Toni	bursts	in	bringing	news	of	Resel,	provides	Ebner	with	the	
opportunity	to	contrast	the	attitudes	of	two	different	agents	of	the	Church.	Pater	Vitalis	has	
known	Resel	for	a	long	time	and	is	genuinely	fond	of	her;	according	to	how	the	Oberförster	
describes	him,	his	human	sympathy	has	often	restrained	him	from	admonishing	her	on	many	
occasions	when	she	has	tried	his	patience,	just	as	it	curbs	his	rebuke	when	she	bursts	into	tears	at	
Toni’s	cabin.	The	visiting	Herr	Dechant,	however,	is	an	outsider	who	is	both	unacquainted	with	
the	involved	persons	and	seemingly	of	a	less	kindly	nature	than	Pater	Vitalis.	He	evaluates	the	
situation	solely	according	to	the	moral	proscriptions	he	represents,	without	the	influence	of	
mercy,	pity,	or	affection.	In	his	pedantic	adherence	to	religious	forms,	he	objects	to	the	idea	that	
Pater	Vitalis	should	travel	to	the	dying	Resel:	“Wie?	das	Allerheiligste	hinauftragen	an	die	Stätte,	
wo	alles	Heilige	mit	Füßen	getreten	worden?	Unmöglich.	Bringt	erst	die	Verwundete	ins	
Elternhaus	zurück,	zu	Buße	und	Entsühnung	…”	(370).	Instead	of	arguing	with	the	Herr	Dechant	
and	wasting	precious	time,	Pater	Vitalis	replies	that	indeed	she	should	be	brought	to	her	parents’	
house	to	be	reconciled	with	them,	and	that	he	can	just	as	well	administer	the	last	rites	there.	
	 In	spite	of	the	Herr	Dechant,	Resel	survives	the	trek	to	her	parents’	house.	The	parents	
once	again	show	no	scruples	about	forgiving	their	only	daughter	when	circumstances	are	
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sufficiently	dire.	Toni’s	forced	entry	results	in	a	scene	that	stages	a	clash	of	institutional	principles	
when	the	performance	of	the	confession	ritual	conflicts	with	the	religious	principle	of	forgiveness.	
This	time,	it	is	Pater	Vitalis	whose	evaluation	of	events	is	circumscribed	by	ritualism	to	the	
exclusion	of	other	considerations;	he	does	not	seem	to	notice	the	signs	being	given	off	by	Resel:	
“Alles	Irdische	war	von	ihr	abgefallen,	sie	hat	ihn	mit	so	einem	sanftmüthigen	Mitleid	angeschaut”	
(372).	The	Oberförster,	as	the	narrator	of	this	passage,	gives	a	description	which	implies	that	Resel	
is	at	this	moment	concerned	with	higher	principles	than	the	merely	earthly,	thus	inscribing	into	
the	text	the	distinction	between	human	practices	and	divine	law.	Pater	Vitalis’	concerns	have	to	
do	with	Church	practices	and	thus	proceed	solely	from	the	human	side	of	this	consideration:	
	“Mein	Kind,	denke	jetzt	nur	an	den	Ewigen,	vor	dem	Du	bald	stehen	wirst,”	
beschwört	Vitalis	—	“denk	an	das	Heil	Deiner	Seele.	—”	
	 Aber	sie	sagt:	“Mein	Lebenlang	habe	ich	um	Verzeihung	gebeten,	jetzt	
bittet	Einer	mich,	und	ich	soll	sie	ihm	verweigern?”	
	 “Dein	Heiland,	mein	Kind,	begehrt	einzuziehen	in	Dein	Herz	—	empfange	
Deinen	Heiland,	mein	Kind.”	(372)	
	
Since	the	ritual	itself	is	supposed	to	be	about	forgiveness,	the	passage	sets	up	a	conflict	between	
an	individual	forgiving	another	individual	versus	the	Church	forgiving	(on	behalf	of	God)	an	
individual.	The	parenthetical	in	the	previous	sentence	is	an	indication	that	the	latter	transaction	
is	not	straightforward,	even	though	it	is	considered	as	such	in	the	fictional	society	of	this	text.	
Pater	Vitalis,	however,	clearly	believes	that	an	attitude	of	contrition	is	not	enough	for	God	and	
that	the	Church’s	ritual	forms	a	prerequisite	for	divine	forgiveness.	The	Oberförster	evaluates	the	
situation	in	the	same	way,	since	he	concludes	that	Resel	“hat	über	die	Versöhnung	mit	einem	
Menschen	die	Versöhnung	mit	ihrem	Schöpfer	versäumt”	(372).	The	extent	to	which	the	text	may	
contain	an	implicit	critique	of	the	Catholic	insistence	on	human	intermediaries,	as	well	as	of	the	
notion	that	an	attitude	—	that	is,	an	internal	state	—	of	contrition	is	insufficient	unless	
accompanied	by	the	official	Catholic	ritual,	is	open	to	speculation.	There	are,	however,	some	
inconclusive	pieces	of	evidence	in	journals	and	letters	showing	that	Ebner	experienced	spiritual	
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struggles	during	the	period	in	her	life	during	which	Die	Resel	was	written.16	Various	forms	of	
religious	critique	also	show	up	in	many	of	her	other	texts	from	this	period,	such	as	Unsühnbar	
(1889),	“Glaubenslos?”	(1883),	and	“Unverbesserlich”	(1910),	among	others.17	
	 Another	interesting	feature	of	the	above	passage	is	Resel’s	comment	that	she	has	been	
asking	for	forgiveness	her	whole	life.	Such	frequency	implies	that	the	society	in	which	she	lives	
basically	finds	fault	with	the	very	nature	of	who	she	is	as	a	person.	Nevertheless,	everyone	in	
Resel’s	narrative	is	described	as	being	unreservedly	fond	of	her.	This	contrast	is	an	implicit	
criticism	of	a	society	that	causes	one	of	its	most	beloved	members	to	feel	as	though	there	were	
something	inherently	wrong	with	her.		
	 In	spite	of	Resel’s	expression	of	doubt	about	whether	God	would	forgive	her,	the	tone	of	
the	text	sends	clear	signals	that	the	reader	is	supposed	to	feel	that	Resel’s	forgiveness	of	Toni	
takes	precedence	under	these	particular	circumstances.	The	affectively	charged	(perhaps	even	
sentimental18)	depiction	of	the	deathbed	scene	makes	a	direct	emotional	appeal	to	the	reader.	In	
other	words,	the	reader	is	supposed	to	sympathize	with	Resel	and	her	compassion	for	Toni’s	
future	conscience	to	the	extent	of	questioning	whether	the	neglect	of	a	Church-mandated	form	
would	really	result	in	her	alienation	from	God.	The	conflict	in	this	passage	is	thus	also	about	the	
question	of	if	and	when	extenuating	circumstances	exist	for	a	situation	involving	religious	
principles.	
	 As	this	scene	is	taking	place,	Resel	is	lying	in	bed,	flanked	by	her	parents,	with	one	hand	
on	her	mother	and	the	other	outstretched	towards	Toni.	The	stylized	spatial	arrangement	of	the	
figures	is	reminiscent	of	poses	from	Christian	iconography;	as	the	central	figure,	Resel	is	thus	
                                                
16	Klostermaier,	Victory	of	a	Tenacious	Will,	190–193.	
17	See	Klostermaier,	Victory	of	a	Tenacious	Will,	192.	
18	Though	noting	that	such	scenes	in	Ebner’s	work	are	often	criticized	as	sentimental,	Woodford	argues	that	
Ebner’s	texts	subvert	conventional	sentimentality	for	the	purpose	of	social	critique	(“Suffering	and	
Domesticity,”	47).	
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placed	in	the	position	of	Christ.	This	connection	is	further	strengthened	by	the	Oberförster’s	
description	of	Toni:	“ich	habe	viel	gesehen	in	meinem	langen	Leben,	so	etwas	nicht	wieder.	Der	
rechte	Schächer,	wenn	man	den	vom	Kreuz	abgenommen	hätte,	bevor	der	göttliche	Erlöser	ihm	
Vergebung	verheißen	—	dem	sein	Ebenbild	war	er.”	(371)	The	“Schächer”	is	a	reference	to	the	
Gospel	of	Luke,	according	to	which	there	were	two	thieves	crucified	on	either	side	of	Jesus.	The	
so-called	penitent	thief	asks	for	mercy,	whereupon	Jesus	assures	him	that	he	will	be	with	him	in	
paradise.	To	drive	home	the	point	that	this	is	an	important	metaphor	and	not	just	a	one-off	
comparison,	the	text	has	the	Oberförster	refer	to	Toni	as	a	“Schächer”	a	second	time	when	he	tells	
at	whom	Resel	was	pointing	(372).	On	the	one	hand,	the	reference	points	to	the	fact	that	Toni	has	
stolen	from	Resel	the	opportunity	of	being	reconciled	with	society	after	her	breach	of	its	moral	
code.	To	suggest	that	he	is	responsible	for	her	death	is	going	too	far,	but	his	refusal	to	marry	her	
certainly	would	have	had	social	consequences	for	her,	if	not	for	him.	On	the	other	hand,	the	
allusion	reinforces	the	idea	that	Resel’s	last	act	was	noble,	commendable,	even	Christ-like.	The	
episode	of	the	penitent	thief	has	traditionally	been	interpreted	to	mean	that	it	is	never	too	late	to	
be	reconciled	with	God,	and	that	a	penitent	attitude	is	all	that	is	required,	since	the	thief	hanging	
on	the	cross	had	no	opportunity	before	his	death	to	take	any	action	in	accordance	with	his	words.		
	 This	subtly	undermines	the	official	position	of	the	Church.	A	further	point	of	implicit	
criticism	is	articulated	in	the	Oberförster’s	description	of	the	scene	immediately	following	Resel’s	
death:	“Wir	stehen	vor	ihr,	ich	und	die	Eltern	nämlich,	und	starren	sie	voller	Entsetzen	an,	und	
doch	wieder	nicht,	weil	sie	daliegt	und	lächelt,	so	friedlich	wie	ein	unschuldiges	Kind.”	(372)	The	
contradictory	feelings	are	the	product	of	two	separate	modes	of	evaluating	what	has	just	taken	
place.	The	onlookers’	horror	results	from	viewing	Resel’s	actions	according	to	Catholic	beliefs	
about	the	economy	of	forgiveness.	Their	contrary	feelings,	on	the	other	hand,	are	a	response	to	
their	affectionate	feelings	towards	their	daughter/niece:	since	Resel’s	peaceful	smile	implies	that	
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she	herself	had	no	regrets	about	what	she	did,	her	relatives	feel	some	sense	of	satisfaction	that	her	
human	desire	for	reconciliation	was	realized,	regardless	of	whether	this	might	conflict	with	any	
divine	ordinances.	Thus,	since	there	is	a	perceived	conflict	of	feeling	good	versus	behaving	rightly,	
the	contradiction	is	between	positive	human	sentiment	and	religious	condemnation.	
	 Pater	Vitalis,	after	having	vacillated	throughout	the	narrative	between	pity	for	human	
fallibility	and	adherence	to	Church	doctrine,	undergoes	another	shift	of	attitude	in	the	wake	of	
Resel’s	death.	From	the	perspective	of	the	Catholic	tradition,	there	is	ample	cause	for	pessimism	
with	regard	to	Resel’s	spiritual	status;	since	this	conflicts	with	the	human	sympathy	of	her	loved	
ones,	Pater	Vitalis	instead	appeals	to	a	Biblical	text	with	a	different	implication	by	reciting	from	
the	Lord’s	Prayer	—	not	the	whole	thing,	but	rather	just	the	line	that	particularly	applies	to	this	
situation:	“Vergieb	uns	unsere	Schulden,	wie	auch	wir	vergeben	unseren	Schuldigern.”	(373)	This	
line,	in	this	context,	makes	a	reverse	interpretation	of	what	has	just	taken	place:	rather	than	
viewing	Resel	as	having	forgiven	Toni	instead	of	securing	God’s	forgiveness,	the	statement	
petitions	God	to	forgive	her	precisely	because	she	forgave	Toni.	
	 It	is	unclear	whether	Pater	Vitalis	himself	is	aware	of	the	full	implications	of	his	
exclamation	in	terms	of	the	conflicting	interpretations	which	it	highlights;	the	Oberförster’s	
earlier	characterization	of	him	as	“einschichtig”	(357)	would	suggest	not.	In	any	case,	his	
characterization	as	“Einer,	der	geworden	ist	wie	ein	Kind”	(353f.)	after	—	and	implicitly	also	
because	of	—	Resel’s	death	suggests	that	his	invocation	of	the	Lord’s	Prayer	may	have	been	more	
of	a	wish	than	an	expectation.	Furthermore,	the	fact	that	Resel	ends	up	being	buried	in	the	woods	
rather	than	the	cemetery	shows	that	the	predominant	feeling	in	society	was	that	her	actions	
irrevocably	separated	her	from	them.	From	a	symbolic	standpoint,	however,	it	is	interesting	that	
the	exclusion	from	the	socially	designated	place	of	burial	results	in	Resel’s	grave	being	placed	in	
the	element	in	which	she	felt	most	at	ease.	The	remote	location	of	her	grave	suggests	a	further	
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positive	interpretation	in	that	it	represents	an	individual’s	standing	alone,	independent	of	society	
—	that	is,	a	successful	resistance	to	the	status	quo.	On	the	other	hand,	being	dead	precludes	her	
rather	conclusively	from	ever	making	any	progress	within	the	existing	social	sphere.	Nevertheless,	
a	person	who	can	be	viewed	as	a	martyr	to	a	cause	may	still	have	influence	on	the	living.	This	is	
the	possibility	presented	to	the	Gräfin,	though	it	remains	uncertain	at	the	end	of	the	story	what,	if	
any,	effect	Resel’s	narrative	will	have	on	her	future	actions	or	attitudes;	but	regardless	of	how	she	
reacts,	the	same	possibility	of	being	influenced	is	implicitly	also	offered	to	the	reader.	
	 The	Gräfin’s	regret,	in	the	form	of	her	persisting	occupation	with	Resel’s	story,	provides	
the	occasion	for	examinations	to	take	place	that	expose	dark	aspects	of	this	society:	the	
prevalence	of	emotional	manipulation,	stringent	rules,	and	pressure	to	keep	up	appearances.	Such	
contextual	factors	are	necessary	for	an	adequate	understanding	of	what	was	at	stake	in	the	
choices	of	these	two	women,	and	are	prerequisite	to	any	kind	of	evaluation	of	their	situations.	
	
II.	Subversion	and	Its	Lookalikes	
	 Ebner’s	prose	works	display	an	intriguing	mix	of	resignation	and	the	unwillingness	to	put	
up	with	misery.19	The	two	opposite	ends	of	this	spectrum	confront	each	other	in	Die	Resel	by	
means	of	the	two	protagonists.	For	despite	certain	similarities	of	circumstance,	the	Gräfin	and	
Resel	represent	different	ways	of	approaching	societal	pressures.	This	chapter	has	dealt	thus	far	
with	the	Gräfin’s	(potential	for)	regret,	but	the	character	Resel	is	likewise	subject	to	this	question.	
Resel	is	the	Gräfin’s	opposite	in	the	sense	that,	by	forgiving	Toni	and	thus	relieving	her	conscience,	
her	final	moments	tie	up	any	loose	ends	that	might	result	in	regret;	her	death	then	seals	off	any	
                                                
19	Anikó	Zsigmond	concludes,	with	reference	to	Ebner’s	novellas,	“Auch	die	Protagonisten	der	unteren,	
ausgelieferten	Schichten	müssen	zur	Überzeugung	und	Bewährung	ihrer	Menschenwürde	gelangen,	indem	
sie	die	Duldung	von	Not	und	Elend	als	menschenunwürdig	verurteilen.	Sie	müssen	über	ihre	Resigniertheit	
hinaus	wachsen:	nur	so	können	sie	ihre	Bestimmung	in	der	Ebner-Eschenbachschen	Welt	erfüllen.”	See	
“Das	Menschenbild	in	Marie	von	Ebner-Eschenbachs	Novellen,”	Jahrbuch	der	ungarischen	Germanistik	5	
(1998):	172f.	
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further	possibility.	Although	previously	characterized	as	someone	who	felt	“Reue”	(358)	quickly	
and	often,	the	events	that	cause	this	are	comparatively	insignificant,	usually	involving	a	perceived	
neglect	of	her	parents.	It	seems	that	Resel,	in	exchange	for	remorse	over	minor	matters,	is	able	to	
escape	the	anguish	of	regretting	major	life	events.	
	 Resel	perhaps	has	the	potential	to	subvert	the	social	order,	but	Toni	does	not	—	and	that	
is	where	Resel	makes	her	big	mistake:	in	misjudging	him.	In	fact,	it	almost	seemed	as	though	
Resel	intuitively	suspected	that	there	might	be	trouble	getting	Toni	to	agree,	as	suggested	by	the	
otherwise	unexplained	“Frost”	(365)	that	shakes	her	even	as	she	is	simultaneously	elated	to	hear	
her	parents’	offer	to	let	her	marry	him.	Failing	to	recognize	the	distinction	between	herself	and	
Toni	is	her	tragic	flaw.	Resel	is	a	subversive;	she	thinks	that	Toni	is,	too,	but	he	is	not.	Clearly,	her	
parents	and	Pater	Vitalis	are	planted	firmly	inside	the	social	order;	Toni	represents	the	opposition	
to	it.	Submission	and	revolt	are	two	established,	if	opposed,	conventional	patterns.	Submission	is	
acting	in	accordance	with	principles,	and	revolt	acting	in	opposition	to	them.	But	to	subvert	
means	to	undermine	the	principles	of	something	from	within.	There	is	an	important	distinction	
between	subversion	and	revolt.	While	obedience	and	revolt	are	opposites,	subversion	implies	a	
third	thing:	questioning	the	very	form	of	the	system.	Resel	thinks	that	Toni	would	share	in	her	
aspiration	to	combine	what	their	society	firmly	regards	as	a	disjoint	set:	amorous	attachment	and	
the	contract	of	marriage.	Subversives	do	not	want	a	completely	different	life;	they	want	the	same	
things	as	everyone	else,	but	done	differently.		
	 Resel’s	suicide	could	be	attributed	to	desperation	over	losing	her	social	status;	however,	
something	else	less	obvious	may	also	be	at	play	in	her	decision.	It	could	be	that	once	Resel	fully	
understands	Toni’s	position,	her	deep	disappointment	and	the	realization	that	she	is	profoundly	
alone	in	her	approach	to	life	contribute	to	her	despair.	She	seems	to	have	aspired	to	an	ideal	love	
and	is	then	confronted	with	the	fact	that	Toni	does	not	fit	her	ideal,	since	otherwise	he	would	
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scarcely	be	capable	of	speaking	so	dismissively	of	their	relationship,	no	matter	his	mood.	The	
song	lyric	he	quotes,	“Ich	will	dich	ja	lieben,	/	Aber	heirathen	nicht”	(367),	is	indicative	of	an	
entirely	conventional	point	of	view;	although	a	man	who	accepts	sex	while	rejecting	commitment	
might	garner	social	censure	(but	then	again,	society	might	just	find	it	easier	to	look	the	other	
way),	he	is	adhering	to	a	type	of	‘bad’	behavior	that	is	so	firmly	established	that	it	might	as	well	be	
culturally	sanctioned	—	hence	the	existence	of	this	folk	song	on	the	subject.	It	is	therefore	a	
moment	of	critique	when	Resel	insists	that	Toni	must	accompany	her	to	seek	forgiveness	from	
her	parents	on	the	grounds	that	he	has	also	“gefehlt”	(366);	her	determination	that	he	share	in	the	
social	blame	constitutes	an	implicit	rejection	of	the	double	standard	for	the	sexes	in	regard	to	
morality.	
	 Initially	it	is	not	clear	that	Toni’s	actions	are	incongruous	with	a	subversive	stance.	But	as	
soon	as	he	rejects	the	option	of	marriage	on	the	grounds	that	he	wants	to	enjoy	his	freedom,	he	
reveals	himself	to	be	just	as	much	a	part	of	the	societal	system	as	any	of	its	other	representatives	
—	for	example,	Pater	Vitalis.	Such	a	sentiment	is	the	sole	privilege	of	male	members	of	this	
society,	who	are	not	held	to	the	same	moral	‘standards’	as	the	females.	In	fact,	it	is	even	expected	
that	men	will	not	abide	by	the	supposedly	agreed-upon	rules	of	chastity,	fidelity,	honesty,	and	so	
forth;	an	excellent	example	is	given	in	Ebner’s	story	Die	Poesie	des	Unbewußten,	which	is	
structured	as	a	series	of	letters	between	a	young	woman,	her	husband,	and	her	mother,	the	latter	
of	whom	arranged	the	match	between	the	couple.	Over	the	course	of	the	narrative,	it	emerges	
that	the	husband	has	previously	had	an	affair	with	a	married	woman,	which	the	other	characters	
all	try	to	keep	secret	from	the	young	woman.	The	affair,	however,	is	only	considered	to	be	
problematic	inasmuch	as	it	would	be	shameful	if	it	were	to	be	openly	acknowledged	to	the	new	
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wife;	none	of	the	characters	expresses	any	genuine	moral	outrage.20	The	rigid	societal	system	
reflected	in	both	this	story	and	in	Die	Resel,	a	system	ostensibly	supposed	to	create	harmony	and	
order	in	human	relationships,	in	reality	creates	its	own	opposite:	Toni	and	Pater	Vitalis	are	merely	
two	sides	of	the	same	coin.	Subversion	would	mean	breaking	the	system,	not	just	breaking	the	
rules.	The	‘good,	compliant’	member	of	society	and	the	‘bad,	noncompliant’	member	in	fact	both	
serve	on	some	level	to	uphold	the	system:	the	‘bad’	element	is	needed	so	that	the	‘good’	element	
can	point	to	it	as	an	example	of	what	not	to	do.	In	order	to	truly	subvert	the	system,	Resel	needs	
to	redefine	a	romantic	relationship	in	a	way	that	is	less	hostile	to	her	own	personal	expression.	
The	text	presents	a	solution:	combining	the	commitment	of	marriage	with	the	free	choice	of	a	
marital	partner.	But	such	a	combination	was	not	self-evident	at	the	time,	nor	is	it	to	be	realized	in	
the	text.		
	 True	subversion	in	this	context	would	consist	in	a	marriage	relationship	that	did	not	
conform	to	these	patterns;	this	is	an	idea	with	which	Ebner	was	familiar	and	which	she	tried	to	
realize	in	her	own	life	through	her	marriage	to	Moritz.	She	can	reasonably	have	hoped	to	find	in	
him	a	person	who	could	share	her	interests,	someone	who	could	understand	her	intellectual	
impulses	and	her	need	for	literary	pursuits.	Her	cousin	Moritz,	who	placed	as	much	value	on	his	
professorship	and	his	inventing	than	on	his	military	career,	was	likewise	very	committed	to	
intellectual	activities	and	had	been	known	to	clash	with	others	in	the	family	who	did	not	
understand	this.	However,	although	this	marriage	plan	looked	promising	enough	in	theory,	it	did	
not	meet	with	great	success	in	practice.	In	the	biographer	Doris	M.	Klostermaier’s	
                                                
20	According	to	some	recent	interpretations	which	assume	that	the	young	wife	is	not	as	ignorant	as	she	
pretends	to	be	in	her	letters,	she,	too,	would	be	included	in	this	number;	to	her,	the	affair	is	merely	a	tool	
she	can	use	to	manipulate	her	husband.	See	Karin	S.	Wozonig,	“Marie	von	Ebner-Eschenbachs	‘Novellchen’	
‘Die	Poesie	des	Unbewussten.’	Beziehungsgeflecht	und	Geschlechterstereotype,”	Sborník	prací	Filozofické	
fakulty	Brnenské	univerzity	11	(2006):	153f.;	as	well	as	R.	C.	Ockenden,	“Unconscious	Poesy?	Marie	von	
Ebner-Eschenbach’s	‘Die	Poesie	des	Unbewussten,’”	in	Gender	and	Politics	in	Austrian	Fiction,	ed.	Ritchie	
Robertson	and	Edward	Timms	(Edinburgh:	UP,	1996),	39f.	
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characterization,	several	factors	put	a	damper	on	the	relationship,	including	jealousy	on	both	
sides;	emotional	as	well	as	physical	distance,	since	Moritz	was	often	away	due	to	his	career;	and	
Moritz’s	mother,	who	lived	in	their	household.21	Although	Klostermaier	does	see	somewhat	of	a	
reconciliatory	gesture,	this	only	developed	during	the	last	years	of	the	marriage.	Ebner	was	thus	
well	acquainted	with	the	difficulties	of	prediction.	
	 Resel	fled	her	parents’	home	because	everyone	in	it	opposed	her	in	a	matter	very	
important	to	her	own	happiness.	Yet	she	was	not	despairing	enough	to	take	her	life	at	that	point	
because	she	still	had	one	person	on	her	side:	Toni.	When	he	turns	his	back	on	her,	however,	that	
is	when	her	courage	falters.	Resel	faces	the	dilemma	of	the	subversive:	while	society	is	the	source	
of	her	distress,	she	cannot	completely	detach	herself	from	all	other	people.	Her	suicide	is	an	
ambiguous	gesture.	On	the	one	hand,	it	can	be	viewed	as	a	failure	of	courage	and	of	her	faith	in	
other	people.	Death	serves	as	an	escape	from	a	trying	situation.	And	although	the	representatives	
of	society	—	Resel’s	parents	and	Pater	Vitalis	—	changed	their	stance	to	accommodate	Resel	after	
she	ran	away,	she	does	not	trust	them	to	accommodate	any	further	deviation	from	their	dictates.	
On	the	other	hand,	her	suicide	can	be	seen	as	a	final	act	of	resistance.22	Regardless	of	how	much	a	
society	may	circumscribe	the	life	paths	available	to	its	members,	an	individual	still	has	the	option	
of	refusing	to	participate	by	dying	instead.	Death	can	be	a	signal	of	dissent	—	especially	a	literary	
suicide,	which	emphasizes	an	argument	by	driving	a	situation	to	an	extreme	conclusion.23	Resel’s	
decision	to	be	alienated	from	the	Church	rather	than	forego	reconciliation	with	Toni	signals	a	
willingness	to	forgive	individuals	but	not	the	societal	structures.	
                                                
21	See	Klostermaier,	Victory	of	a	Tenacious	Will,	77	and	206f.	
22	Agatha	C.	Bramkamp	lists	other	examples	from	Ebner’s	work	in	which	characters’	decisions	to	commit	
suicide	can	be	viewed	“as	a	means	of	self-definition”;	see	Marie	von	Ebner-Eschenbach:	The	Author,	Her	
Time,	and	Her	Critics	(Bonn:	Bouvier,	1990),	78.	
23	See	also	page	159.	
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	 The	story	contains	an	implicit	critique	of	the	fact	that	there	seems	to	be	no	tenable	
alternative	for	Resel	in	the	mortal	world.	Her	suicide	can	be	read	as	an	act	of	defiance,	whereas	
the	Gräfin’s	relief	that	she	has	been	spared	by	the	‘protections’	that	attend	her	high	social	station	
reveals	her	mindset	to	be	a	product	of	precisely	that	system.	By	refusing	to	bend	to	the	oppressive	
social	order,	Resel	demonstrates	an	integrity	which	the	Gräfin	lacks.	The	Gräfin	is	a	compromiser,	
a	self-denier,	a	renouncer.24	Resel,	on	the	other	hand,	is	a	committed	idealist;	her	first	impulse	is	
to	reject	the	whole	situation	once	she	sees	that	Toni	is	not	as	committed	to	her	romantic	ideal	as	
she	herself.	The	one	thing	she	preserves	above	all	else	is	her	adherence	to	her	own	principles.	
	 Resel’s	suicide	reveals	a	point	of	vulnerability	in	the	subversive	stance,	resulting	from	the	
fact	that	it	does	not	entail	a	wholesale	rejection	of	society.	She	kills	herself	because	she	is	not	
quite	able	to	stand	alone	in	the	world;	for	the	same	reason,	she	flees	to	Toni’s	house.	Through	
most	of	the	story,	she	cannot	quite	detach	herself	from	all	contact	with	society	and	realize	a	self-
sufficient	existence.	However,	her	deathbed	scene	offers	her	a	fleeting	moment	of	transcendence	
of	the	oppressive	societal	sphere:	in	becoming	alienated	from	the	Church	in	favor	of	satisfying	her	
own	conscience,	her	independence	reaches	a	height	exceeding	any	previous	point	in	the	narrative.	
	 While	the	suicide	suggests	this	rather	heroic	interpretation,	viewed	from	another	angle,	it	
is	also	a	product	of	a	particular	character	flaw	of	hers:	impetuousness.	Resel’s	moment	of	
weakness	perhaps	shows	that	the	Gräfin,	by	being	less	impetuous,	is	superior	in	one	point.	
Because	the	latter	pauses	before	acting,	she	has	a	potential	to	develop	her	reflective	capacity	—	
and	because	she	survives	beyond	the	end	of	the	story,	she	also	has	the	opportunity.	But	at	the	
same	time,	an	effectual	personality	presupposes	that	reflection	remain	in	balance:	informing	
                                                
24	Zsigmond	identifies	renouncers	(“Entsagende”)	as	a	recurring	character	type	in	Ebner’s	fiction	(“Das	
Menschenbild,”	170).	Edith	Toegel’s	article	on	the	topic	emphasizes	its	positive	side:	“resignation	and	
renunciation	are	critical	gestures	of	disapproval,	but	also	sources	of	enrichment	and	fulfillment”;	however,	
this	seems	to	be	less	applicable	to	the	Gräfin	than	to	the	characters	Toegel	discusses.	See	“‘Entsagungsmut’	
in	Marie	von	Ebner-Eschenbach’s	Works:	A	Female–Male	Perspective,”	Forum	for	Modern	Language	Studies	
28,	no.	2	(1992):	141.	
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action,	not	substituting	for	it.	This	could	pose	a	challenge	for	the	Gräfin,	who	remains	in	a	
contemplative	state	throughout	the	story.	Furthermore,	she	shows	some	signs	of	denying	
responsibility	for	her	actions,	which	would	allow	her	to	rationalize	a	dismissal	of	any	perturbing	
issues	brought	up	for	contemplation	by	Resel’s	narrative.	Whether	she	will	ultimately	take	
advantage	of	the	opportunity	to	become	reflective	remains	an	open	question	at	the	end	of	the	
story.	
	
III.	Telling	a	Non-Story	
	 The	Gräfin	presents	a	tremendous	narrative	obstacle:	she	has	no	story.25	She	caved	in	to	
the	wishes	of	her	parents.	She	married	the	old,	rich	suitor.	She	is	living	out	her	bored,	
understimulated,	comfortable	existence.	These	factual	particulars	lack	a	hook,	an	angle	of	
suspense	that	could	be	woven	into	a	gripping	narrative,	at	least	in	the	usual	way.	But	just	because	
they	are	unsuitable	for	traditional	narrative	modes	does	not	mean	they	are	not	worth	telling.	
What	the	Gräfin’s	story	does	have	is	internal	tension,	even	though	the	tension	neither	breaks	
through	to	the	surface	nor	comes	to	any	resolution.	Ebner	finds	a	clever	way	to	dramatize	the	
Gräfin’s	life	by	means	of	narrative	structures.	This	contrasts	with	the	technique	employed	by	
Theodor	Fontane	in	Effi	Briest,	which	likewise	tells	the	history	of	a	bored	young	woman.	Whereas	
Fontane	approaches	Effi’s	boredom	directly	by	simulating	it	with	long,	uneventful	text	passages,26	
Ebner’s	indirect	method	makes	fewer	demands	on	a	reader’s	attention	span.	An	important	
function	of	the	framing	device	in	Die	Resel	is	to	provide	a	subsidiary	form	of	narrative	movement	
to	the	plot.	It	achieves	this	through	steering	the	reader’s	attention	back	and	forth	between	the	
                                                
25	Eugen	Thurnher	describes	the	narrative	situation	in	Die	Resel	as	“Poesie	des	Ungesagten”	but	does	not	
pursue	this	thought	further;	see	“Die	Poesie	des	Ungesagten:	Zu	Stil	und	Weltanschauung	der	Marie	von	
Ebner-Eschenbach,”	in	Marie	von	Ebner-Eschenbach:	ein	Bonner	Symposion	zu	ihrem	75.	Todesjahr,	ed.	Karl	
Konrad	Polheim	(Bern:	Peter	Lang,	1994)	151.	
26	See	Brian	Tucker,	“Performing	Boredom	in	Effi	Briest:	On	the	Effects	of	Narrative	Speed,”	The	German	
Quarterly	80,	no.	2	(2007):	185–200.	
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inner	and	outer	narratives.	Resel’s	narrative,	which	does	contain	a	suspense	arc,	helps	to	hold	the	
reader’s	attention;	meanwhile,	the	frequent	commentaries	of	the	Gräfin	are	an	invitation	to	
imagine	her	as	a	similar	character	under	opposite	conditions.	
	 Just	as	the	Gräfin	seems	to	inhabit	a	non-story,	so	too	does	the	Graf	seem	like	a	non-
character.	He	effectively	removes	himself	from	the	narrative	by	falling	asleep;	in	fact,	the	latter	
half	of	the	story	never	even	mentions	him,	even	though	he	is	technically	still	present	in	the	room.	
What	little	the	reader	does	learn	about	the	Gräfin’s	undescribed	existence	must	be	inferred	from	
brief	snippets,	such	as	the	following:	“Beim	schwarzen	Kaffee	begann	der	Graf	in	seiner	breiten	
und	äußerst	gutmüthigen	Art	den	Stand	der	Waldungen	zu	loben.	‘Das	ist	ein	Unterschied,’	sagte	
er,	‘zwischen	den	meinigen	und	den	fürstlichen,	wo	wir	im	Herbst	gejagt	haben.’”	(351)	Little	as	it	
is,	this	is	the	most	revealing	piece	of	information	about	the	husband	in	the	whole	story.	It	
apparently	pleases	him	that	he	owns	a	finer	piece	of	property	than	the	prince,	his	social	superior;	
this	hints	at	the	sort	of	thing	that	occupies	his	mind	—	namely,	being	able	to	one-up	other	
members	of	the	nobility.	He	also	lacks	any	appreciation	for	his	wife’s	attempts	to	be	charming:	
the	Gräfin’s	playful	implication	that	the	Oberförster	has	slighted	her	in	claiming	that	Resel	had	
the	prettiest	brown	eyes	ever	elicits	nothing	more	than	a	grunt	from	him,	and	thus	the	Gräfin’s	
tease	that	the	Oberförster	does	not	recognize	her	superiority	“comme	il	est	bête”	(355)	—	‘because	
he	is	stupid’	—	is	revealed	to	apply	in	earnest	to	her	husband.	
	 The	processes	associated	with	regret	bring	up	the	Gräfin’s	inner	life	for	re-evaluation.	As	
in	chapter	three,	the	issue	at	stake	is	the	alteration	of	beliefs	and	internal	scripts.	Although	the	
Gräfin	probably	cannot	(or,	at	any	rate,	is	highly	unlikely	to,	since	it	would	involve	radical	social	
consequences)	change	many	aspects	of	her	exterior	existence,	her	attitudes	towards	her	existence	
can	be	altered.	The	narrative	of	the	Oberförster	creates	in	her	an	emotional	turmoil	that	places	
her	in	a	condition	of	readiness	to	re-evaluate	her	latent	beliefs.	Although	not	as	sudden	and	
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dramatic	as	the	concluding	scene	of	Brigitta,	this	situation	is	nevertheless	powerful	because	of	its	
thoroughness:	the	similarities	with	Resel	which	run	through	the	entire	tale	call	to	the	foreground	
of	her	attention	all	of	the	parameters	of	her	romantic	history,	and	they	do	so	in	a	systematic	and	
structured	way	due	to	the	fact	that	Resel’s	history	has	a	narrative	arc	paralleling	that	of	the	Gräfin.	
Whereas	other	types	of	associations	might	only	draw	a	connection	between	two	things	based	on	
one	or	two	similar	details,	this	association,	which	takes	the	form	of	a	story,	connects	with	her	
personal	experience	on	multiple	levels,	thus	increasing	its	affective	potential.	
	 Framing	a	narrative	is	a	device	that	introduces	a	form	of	commentary	into	the	text,	since	
the	characters	in	the	outer	frame	have	a	perspective	—	whether	explicit	or	implicit	—	on	the	story	
within	the	frame.	Often	this	can	serve	the	goal	of	steering	reader	reactions	to	the	text	by	
simulating,	within	the	text	itself,	a	process	of	analysis	from	a	critical	distance.	This	is	not	quite	the	
dynamic	in	Die	Resel,	however.	Obviously	the	Gräfin	still	has	a	reaction	to	the	material	with	
which	she	is	being	presented,	but	she	does	so	from	a	position	of	closeness	rather	than	distance.	
Her	identification	with	the	character	of	Resel	coupled	with	the	technical	device	of	her	frequent	
interruptions	of	the	framed	narrative	blend	the	two	narrative	strands	together.	In	addition,	
although	the	text	suggests	that	the	Gräfin	is	profoundly	affected	by	the	story	she	hears,	it	gives	
little	specific	information	about	how	she	evaluates	it.	For	these	reasons,	the	outer	frame	neither	
steers	reader	perceptions	significantly,	nor	is	it	superior	in	this	regard	to	the	inner	framed	
narrative.	
	 Die	Resel	ends	with	an	image	of	Toni	which	the	Gräfin	recalls	to	mind	from	earlier	in	the	
day:	“Der	hartnäckige	Schweiger	mit	dem	finstern	Blick,	in	dessen	Nähe	ihr	fast	unheimlich	zu	
Muthe	gewesen,	hatte	eine	flüchtige,	rasch	verjagte	Erinnerung	in	ihr	geweckt,	—	die	Erinnerung	
an	Einen,	den	zu	vergessen	ihre	Pflicht	war.”	(373)	By	indicating	that	the	association	of	Toni	with	
her	former	lover	was	“rasch	verjagt,”	the	text	signals	that	the	Gräfin	has	been	committing	
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repression.	The	ending	is	left	open:	Will	she	continue	to	repress	thoughts	of	the	path	she	did	not	
take,	or	will	she	begin	to	work	through	them	in	some	way?	The	reference	to	her	“duty”	to	forget	
underlines	the	fact	that	the	story	of	Resel	—	a	type	of	vicarious	experience	—	is	the	only	available	
socially	acceptable	outlet	for	her	to	work	out	her	feelings.	This	is	a	society	which	is	hostile	to	
anything	too	direct.	
	 The	final	moment	of	the	story,	in	which	the	Gräfin	reflects	on	Toni’s	appearance,	is	quite	
ambiguous.	Of	course	it	has	a	high	degree	of	salience	for	her,	since	he	reminds	her	of	her	lost	
lover;	but	he	also	seems	rather	a	wreck,	raising	the	question	of	whether	marrying	him	would	even	
have	had	a	better	outcome.	Though	on	the	other	hand,	his	current	condition	could	be	a	result	of	
the	trauma	that	befell	him.	The	reader’s	evaluation	of	the	ending	is	again	another	matter.	Die	
Resel	is	a	story	that	derives	its	narrative	suspense	from	unresolved	tensions.	Resel’s	suicide,	the	
character	of	the	Gräfin,	and	the	effect	of	the	story	on	the	Gräfin	are	all	open-ended	elements	that	
clamor	for	some	sort	of	positive	or	negative	evaluation,	but	this	can	only	be	supplied	by	the	
reader.	The	omniscient	narrative	instance	abstains	from	commentary,	and	it	cannot	be	
ascertained	to	what	extent	Resel’s	story	is	actually	similar	to	the	Gräfin’s.	Nor	does	the	reader	
know	the	specific	details	of	the	Gräfin’s	story,	just	as	the	Gräfin	herself	does	not	really	know	how	
it	would	have	turned	out	for	her	if	she	had	pursued	a	different	course	of	action.	
	 Resel’s	story	contains	a	dramatic	reversal	that	hints	at	Ebner’s	long	years	of	ultimately	
unsuccessful	struggle	to	become	a	playwright:	at	the	point	when	Pater	Vitalis	visits	Resel	in	Toni’s	
cottage,	her	story,	by	all	appearances,	could	have	a	happy	resolution;	that	quite	the	opposite	
occurs	is	an	example	of	peripeteia	worthy	of	a	stage	play.	By	letting	her	experience	as	a	would-be	
dramatist	shine	through	in	the	Resel	plotline,	Ebner	plays	with	the	boundary	between	fiction	and	
actuality.	Although	the	events	of	Resel’s	life	may	be	considered	to	have	actually	taken	place	within	
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the	world	of	the	story,	nevertheless,	the	Gräfin	receives	them	in	the	form	of	a	narrative.27		She	—	
as	well	as,	one	might	argue,	anyone	who	hears	a	story	—	may	thus	on	some	level	be	considering	it	
as	a	piece	of	fiction,	which	is	a	type	of	reflection	that	has	its	own	set	of	practices.	The	Gräfin,	of	
course,	also	inhabits	a	fictional	world,	but	its	lack	of	any	dramatic	form	or	traditional	markers	
such	as	those	present	in	Resel’s	story	causes	its	fictionality	to	fade	into	the	background.	By	
consciously	or	unconsciously	viewing	Resel’s	story	as	a	fiction,	the	Gräfin’s	evaluation	of	it	
changes.	She	has	more	room	to	distance	herself	and	to	claim	that	she	could	not	have	done	what	
Resel	did,	on	the	grounds	that	‘real’	people	cannot	do	what	‘fictional’	people	do.	However,	the	
credibility	of	her	claim	is	undermined	by	characters	in	other	stories	by	Ebner,	such	as	Komtesse	
Paula,	in	which	a	member	of	the	nobility	manages	to	marry	her	chosen	partner	instead	of	her	
parents’	choice.	Such	precedents	indicate	that	the	Gräfin	is	in	a	situation	of	believing	defiance	of	
the	social	order	to	be	impossible	rather	than	its	factually	having	been	proven	impossible.28	
	 Does	the	Gräfin	regret	not	choosing	otherwise?	Or	does	Resel’s	story	function	for	her	as	a	
cautionary	tale?29	‘Do	not	stray	from	the	socially	sanctioned	path,’	it	intones	melodramatically,	‘or	
else	you	will	end	up	dead.’	(Such	a	view,	of	course,	ignores	the	question	of	whether	dying	is	always	
the	worst	thing	that	can	happen	to	a	person.)	As	noted	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	one	need	
not	necessarily	wish	that	one	had	in	fact	chosen	differently	in	order	to	regret	a	missed	
opportunity.	The	very	persistence	—	or,	mental	salience	—	of	a	counterfactual	alternative	to	one’s	
actual	past	gives	rise	to	the	processes	of	self-examination	that	form	the	intellectual	backbone	of	
                                                
27	See	also	Woodford,	“Suffering	and	Domesticity,”	54f.:	“Resel,	in	the	eyes	of	her	uncle,	is	a	real	figure	
whose	death	is	sadly	mourned.	Yet,	for	the	countess,	she	becomes	an	ideal	figure,	with	representative	value:	
a	lens	through	which	she	sees	her	own	fate.”	
28	As	Ockenden	points	out,	characters	in	other	works	by	Ebner	whose	families	try	to	coerce	them	into	
marriages	sometimes	resist	successfully	and	sometimes	not	(“Unconscious	Poesy,”	37).	
29	Gudrun	Brokoph-Mauch	comments	on	the	warning	qualities	of	Resel’s	story	but	does	not	consider	the	
possibility	that	certain	aspects	of	the	text	also	undermine	this	view;	see	“‘Die	Frauen	haben	nichts	als	die	
Liebe’:	Variationen	zum	Thema	Liebe	in	den	Erzählungen	der	Marie	von	Ebner-Eschenbach,”	in	Des	
Mitleids	tiefe	Liebesfähigkeit:	Zum	Werk	der	Marie	von	Ebner-Eschenbach,	ed.	Joseph	P.	Strelka,	(Bern:	Peter	
Lang,	1997),	66f.	
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regret.	Among	other	functions,	regret	is	the	counterforce	to	self-deception.	It	forces	one	to	
confront	—	no	matter	how	painful	—	one’s	own	inner	scripts	that	have	caused	one	to	make	the	
choices	that	brought	one	to	this	place	in	life.	In	the	case	of	the	Gräfin,	feeling	regret	could	cause	
her	to	acknowledge	and	work	through	rather	than	denying	and	repressing	her	choices;	it	could	
prevent	her	from	setting	herself	up	for	problems	down	the	road	due	to	unresolved	psychological	
issues;	it	could	help	her	become	aware	of	societal	scripts	that	she	has	internalized	about	how	to	
act	in	the	world.	The	latter,	in	particular,	has	the	potential	to	play	a	role	in	the	transformation	of	
the	self,	since	awareness	is	prerequisite	to	deciding	whether	to	accept	or	reject	a	particular	script	
that	influences	one’s	behavior.	Whether	or	not	these	positive	functions	will	be	realized	depends	
on	the	Gräfin’s	response	to	the	pang	that	Resel’s	story	undoubtedly	causes	her.	It	is	possible	that	
her	rationalizations	have	rendered	her	immune	to	any	deeper	examinations	of	her	own	motives;	
however,	the	fact	that	she	takes	great	interest	in	Resel’s	story	indicates	that	regret	is	nudging	at	
her	consciousness,	prodding	her	to	reflect	on	her	situation,	her	choices,	and	her	attitudes.	The	
ending	leaves	room	for	the	possibility	that	she	will	not	remain	unaffected	by	hearing	Resel’s	story,	
though	it	remains	uncertain	as	to	whether	she	will	break	through	her	self-created	illusions,	
confront	her	choices,	and	change	herself	in	anticipation	of	future	challenges.	
	
IV.	Conclusion	
	 Die	Resel	is	a	dense	story	in	which	nearly	every	detail	contributes	something	to	the	
understanding	of	the	psychology	of	the	characters.	Faced	with	the	choice	between	integrity	and	
agony	or	compromise	and	comfort,	the	two	protagonists	choose	differently.	The	Gräfin	is	a	young	
woman	unsure	of	the	extent	to	which	she	is	committed	to	resisting	the	lifestyle	that	society	has	
prescribed	for	her.	Resel	is	a	headstrong	personality	who	actually	gets	away	with	everything	—	
until	it	depends	upon	involving	another	person.	Either,	neither,	or	both	may	have	cause	to	regret	
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her	choice	in	the	sense	of	wishing	it	undone,	but	the	text	leaves	it	up	to	the	reader	to	make	the	
final	evaluation.	Far	from	being	simply	a	‘negative’	emotion,	regret	operates	as	a	vehicle	for	
uncovering	the	hidden,	subtle,	or	unacknowledged	dimensions	of	the	situation.	The	capacity	of	
regret	to	have	a	beneficial	function	is	instantiated	by	Resel’s	actions	on	her	deathbed,	which	
suggest	that	it	is	never	too	late	to	begin	making	sensible	decisions.	Other	benefits	of	regret	that	
feature	prominently	in	this	story	are	its	functions	as	a	deterrent	against	future	repetitions	of	a	
mistake,	as	a	catalyst	to	a	change	of	one’s	operating	procedures,	and	as	an	aid	to	self-knowledge.	
These	last	may	or	may	not	come	to	fruition	in	the	Gräfin’s	life;	but	in	any	case,	her	confrontation	
with	her	past	through	the	medium	of	Resel’s	story	shows	how	regret	operates	as	a	process	to	open	
up	such	potentialities.	
	 The	framed	nature	of	Die	Resel	makes	possible	two	different	evaluations	of	Resel’s	story	
that	form	a	thought-provoking	contrast.	From	the	reader’s	perspective,	Resel	has	a	personality	
such	as	is	encountered	in	stories	—	and	perhaps	only	in	stories.	She	almost	seems	too	vivid	for	
real	life,	as	if	no	one	could	actually	be	that	intense.	But	from	the	Gräfin’s	perspective,	Resel	is	a	
historical	person	who	acts	with	a	heroism	worthy	of	fiction	but	nevertheless	existed.	The	inner	
narrative	is	in	some	sense	a	projection	of	the	(Gräfin’s)	worst-case	scenario,	and	yet,	because	of	
the	way	Resel	held	onto	her	integrity,	it	cannot	be	claimed	that	her	life	ended	in	unmitigated	
tragedy.	She	thus	presents	a	challenge	to	the	Gräfin’s	comfortable	psychological	equilibrium,	
since	the	contrast	with	the	Gräfin	reveals	the	latter’s	‘realism’	to	be	an	excuse	for	her	
faintheartedness.	Die	Resel	provides	an	interesting	look	at	the	contrast	between	those	who	
confront	the	challenges	of	life	head-on	and	those	who	are	content	with	imaginatively	
contemplating	possibilities.	By	blurring	the	distinction	within	the	context	of	the	story,	the	
differing	perspectives	of	the	reader	and	the	Gräfin	raise	age-old	issues	of	fiction	versus	reality;	
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issues	of	what	can	plausibly	be	expected	of	a	fictional	character,	and	of	what	can	realistically	be	
expected	of	an	actual	person.	
 185	
Afterword:	
The	Quest	for	Intelligibility	
	
	
Reasons	are	curious	things	—	when	I	do	not	have	passion	I	proudly	look	
down	on	reasons,	and	when	I	have	passion	reasons	swell	up	immensely.	
—	Søren	Kierkegaard,	Journals	and	Papers	
	
	
	
	 In	the	preceding	chapters,	I	have	largely	refrained	from	commenting	on	historical	
interrelations	between	the	texts	being	analyzed,	choosing	instead	to	focus	on	thematic	
connections	and	those	that	support	the	observations	being	made	on	the	inner	workings	of	
emotion.	However,	given	that	the	nineteenth	century	serves	as	a	temporal	boundary	for	this	
project,	some	comment	on	how	the	texts	relate	to	their	period	of	production,	as	well	as	on	the	
relation	of	this	literary	era	to	the	topic	of	emotion,	is	fitting.	
	 When	referring	to	a	historical	period	of	literary	or	artistic	production	in	an	academic	
context,	it	has	become	common	to	include	in	the	same	breath	a	self-critical	commentary	on	the	
practice	of	periodization.	There	is	not	just	one,	but	multiple	Enlightenments;	Realism	was	never	
truly	realistic	nor	Naturalism	naturalistic;	the	concept	of	Postmodernism	is	lacking	in	
distinguishable	characteristics.	200	While	on	the	one	hand,	qualifying	these	terms	is	a	worthwhile	
practice	because	it	reminds	us	of	the	particularities	of	the	individual	artists,	works,	and	ideas	that	
are	being	generalized	about,	on	the	other	hand,	periodization	retains	its	appeal	as	a	means	of	
grappling	with	broad	concepts	of	change	over	time.	In	the	case	of	this	project,	the	caveat	could	
read:	the	techniques	of	Romanticism	are	still	informing	work	being	produced	today.	The	reaction	
against	Enlightenment	rationalism	no	doubt	spurred	a	uniquely	pronounced	concentration	on	
                                                
200	An	unfortunate	side-effect	of	periodization	is	the	confusion	it	can	cause	between	the	everyday	usage	of	
language	and	its	usage	to	describe	movements;	in	an	attempt	to	make	the	distinction	clear,	I	have	
capitalized	terms	wherever	they	refer	to	specific	periods	and	left	them	lowercase	otherwise.	
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emotions,	yet	there	is	an	element	of	universality	in	the	human	desire	to	understand	itself	which	
transcends	historical	boundaries.	
	 Romanticism’s	emphasis	on	emotions	would	seem	to	make	it	a	logical	fit	for	a	project	like	
this	one,	though	on	the	other	hand,	the	period	dealt	largely	with	the	expression	of	emotions,	
whereas	I	am	concerned	with	their	inner	workings	and	causes.	This	presents	no	obstacle	in	the	
case	of	E.T.A.	Hoffmann,	however,	as	this	author	was	meticulous	about	writing	into	his	texts	the	
causal	chains	attached	to	events;	despite	the	initial	appearance	that	supernatural	forces	are	at	
work	in	Das	Fräulein	von	Scuderi,	there	prove	to	be	intelligible	—	if	not	entirely	reasonable	—	
causes	behind	all	of	the	events	in	the	story.	Hoffmann	is	arguably	the	only	true	Romanticist	
author	in	the	group.	The	character	of	René	Cardillac	alone	is	sufficient	to	position	Das	Fräulein	
von	Scuderi	firmly	within	the	tradition	of	demonic	Romanticism,	the	dark	side	of	the	movement.	
In	the	context	of	this	project,	Hoffmann’s	text	constitutes	a	point	of	departure,	to	which	the	
others	may	be	compared	in	order	to	seek	signs	of	the	development	across	the	century	of	
Romanticism’s	legacy	of	interest	in	emotions.	
	 Both	Søren	Kierkegaard’s	and	Adalbert	Stifter’s	periods	of	activity	correspond	to	the	
middle	of	the	nineteenth	century,	making	them	heirs	of	Romanticism.	The	circumstance	of	
Kierkegaard’s	being	Danish	delayed	the	onset	of	his	influence	on	the	rest	of	the	world	—	by	
decades,	in	the	case	of	many	languages.	His	response	to	the	legacy	of	Romanticism	can	therefore	
be	considered	a	side	branch,	whereas	Stifter’s	work	participated	more	in	mainstream	European	
intellectual	development.	Kierkegaard	might	be	classified	as	a	late	Romanticist,	and	it	is	certainly	
the	case	that	his	seducer-figure	draws	heavily	on	the	ideas	of	demonic	Romanticism.	However,	on	
a	certain	level,	Either/Or	Part	I	is	also	a	parody	of	German	Romantic	attitudes.	Kierkegaard’s	
philosophical	objective	—	pseudonyms	notwithstanding	—	of	critiquing	the	aesthetic	lifestyle	
pushes	his	text	beyond	the	boundaries	of	the	movement.	Stifter’s	preference	for	the	subtle	powers	
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of	nature	over	the	dramatic,	which	he	articulated	in	the	well-known	foreword	to	Bunte	Steine	
(1853),	predisposes	him	to	turn	his	attention	inward,	to	matters	of	individual	psychology,	such	as	
emotions.		
	 By	the	time	Marie	von	Ebner-Eschenbach	gained	renown	as	writer,	Modernism	was	on	the	
horizon,	as	the	collective	cultural	awareness	started	to	catch	up	with	the	ongoing	changes	to	
everyday	human	existence	that	had	been	wrought	over	the	course	of	the	century	by	the	rise	of	
industry.	Yet	since	her	literary	production	remained	disconnected	from	the	attitudes,	techniques,	
and	concerns	of	Modernism,	it	fits	better	into	a	narrative	about	nineteenth-century	intellectual	
tendencies.	Besides,	Modernism’s	preoccupations	with	acceleration	and	fragmentation	favored	a	
focus	on	external	rather	than	internal	matters.	Nevertheless,	at	the	end	of	this	line	of	
development,	we	see	the	literary	exploration	of	emotions	reaching	out	beyond	the	limits	of	
individual	interests,	as	the	Gräfin’s	regret	becomes	externalized	through	the	story	of	Resel.	
	 Romanticism	and	its	legacy	constituted	a	current	of	introspective	analysis	in	the	artistic–
intellectual	landscape	of	nineteenth-century	Europe;	the	twentieth	century	likewise	experienced	
trends	focused	on	individual	life,	but	these	differed	in	accordance	with	the	particularities	of	the	
era.	Starting	at	the	dawn	of	the	century,	Freudian	psychoanalysis	worked	its	influence	on	the	
European	cultural	imagination;	and	before	mid-century	had	arrived,	the	Holocaust	had	given	
people	reason	to	question	their	selves	—	that	is,	the	inner	workings	of	human	beings	—	with	an	
intensity	and	desperation	that	was	previously	inconceivable.	Inquiries	into	human	interiority	thus	
took	on	a	qualitatively	different	character	as	compared	with	the	previous	century.	
	 The	nineteenth	century	offers	its	own	idiosyncratic	ways	of	grappling	with	the	human	
experience,	among	which	the	exploration	of	emotions	is	especially	prominent.	What	the	topic	of	
emotions	lacks	in	broad	political,	historical,	or	socio-cultural	implications,	it	seeks	to	recoup	in	
the	depth	of	its	consequentiality	for	individual	human	well-being.	The	brain	is	constantly	
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performing	multifaceted	comparisons	of	new,	incoming	data	with	its	own	latent	networks	of	
belief,	meaning,	and	memory.	Because	emotions	are	the	cumulative	result	of	action	over	time,	
because	they	are	based	on	latent	beliefs,	and	because	they	are	intrinsically	bound	up	with	
priorities,	they	reveal	more	about	who	we	are	than	the	sequential	thought	operations	commonly	
referred	to	as	rationality.	Acting	rationally	or	irrationally	is	the	action	of	a	moment,	but	acting	
emotionally	is	the	result	of	a	lifetime	of	actions	that	have	shaped	our	belief	systems.	
	 The	analyses	presented	in	this	project	cannot	indicate	to	the	reader	the	specifics	of	his	or	
her	own	individual	emotions,	but	it	is	to	be	hoped	that	they	may	contain	structural	resonances	
with	real	situations	and	suggest	ways	of	approaching	the	task	of	understanding.	Since	emotions	
often	occur	as	very	rapid,	seemingly	instantaneous	evaluations,	it	can	be	difficult	to	determine	the	
factors	involved	and	how	they	were	evaluated	in	order	to	reach	the	given	outcome.	Literature	has	
the	potential	to	portray	emotions	in	a	more	accessible	way.	In	the	works	examined	in	this	project,	
the	text	contains	detailed	information	about	the	given	situation	as	well	as	the	characters’	former	
and	current	mental	states,	which	is	crucial	to	sorting	out	how	a	particular	emotion	forms;	and	
because	of	the	nature	of	the	textual	medium,	the	reader	has	the	possibility	of	re-reading	and	
analyzing	these	components	until	able	to	reconstruct	the	evaluative	operations	that	constitute	the	
emotion	at	hand.	Literary	representation	can	thus	function	as	a	means	of	learning	through	
analogy	about	the	genesis	of	emotions,	thereby	bringing	about	an	awareness	of	one’s	own	
practices	for	the	careful	reader.	The	connection	between	textual	narratives	and	mental	narratives	
forms	the	basis	for	a	productive	and	enduring	dialog	between	literature	and	emotion	studies.	
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